Implementation of the Development of a Social Policy - Coursework Example

A Critical Analysis of the War on Poverty Implementation and Implications The following treatise is a comprehensive assessment of the Waron Poverty and the initiated by US President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and introduced as an Act of Legislation by his successor, President Lyndon Baines Johnson through the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. It is made up of a historical account, an analysis of the passage, debates, implementation, advantages and disadvantages as well as short and long term effects on stakeholders. Included in this essay are examples, some statistics, discussions and accounts of experts regarding the controversial social policy. Likewise, it seeks to present in a very objective manner the success and failure of the Act as a Social Policy. There is a brief conclusion to showcase the author’s over-all appraisal of the Policy to include the social issues and relevance to American society. Historical Development of the Social Policy The War on Poverty in the United States was launched by President John F. Kennedy although it was formally introduced as an act of legislation by United States President Lyndon B. Johnson during his State of the Union address on January 8, 1964. After that inspiring address by Johnson, the US Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act, which established the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to administer the local application of federal funds targeted against poverty. By enacting this legislation, President Johnson envisioned not only to address the perennial problem of in the United States but to come up with long-term solutions as well for the benefit of the greater majority of Americans. The instant perception was that it was a well-timed response to an alarming poverty rate of nearly twenty percent during that period. Some of the advantages resulting from the passage of this Act were the “significant drop in the poverty rate from 22 percent in 1960 to 13 percent. Infant mortality among the poor, which had barely declined between 1950 and 1965, fell by one-third in the decade after 1965 as a result of the expansion of federal medical and nutritional programs. Before the implementation of Medicaid and Medicare, 20 percent of impoverished Americans were never examined by a physician. When Johnson finished his term, this was reduced to 8 percent. Likewise, the proportion of families living in substandard housing also declined steeply, from 20 percent in 1960 to 11 percent a decade later” (Brauer, 1982). Johnsons War on Poverty also witnessed dramatic improvements in health care and housing among the poor and needy. When President Johnson announced his Great Society program in 1964, he promised to reduce poverty, alleviate hunger and malnutrition, expand community medical care, provide adequate housing, and enhance the employability of the poor. The question now is: Was he able to fulfill his promise to the American People? President Johnson was able to persuade Congress to ratify the Economic Opportunity Act because he was able to covey to lawmakers that this was a lasting solution to help people recover from destitution. The Act provided $947.5 million dollars for job training centers, loans to poor students and low-income farmers, and basic education programs. The republicans lashed out at their political opponents for using this to get more votes (Andrew, 1998). The political opponents of Johnson and his assailed the War on Poverty and described it as an ambitious governmental effort to address the problem of persistent poverty in the United States which only emphasized the escalating racial and ideological tensions in American politics and society. Notwithstanding that the Social Policy was passed and that substantial gains were claimed and made by the Johnson administration made, political moderates claimed that public assistance, food subsidies, health programs, and child care programs weakened poorer families. The War on Poverty created dependency as Americans depended much on the Federal Government. Not only did the War on Poverty create a new class of reliance on government handouts, it also resulted in a mis-allocation of resources. The programs’ long-term consequences overshadowed any short-term successes” (Mazzuca, 2010).   Johnson swore that his war on poverty would take years. Indeed, this was an accurate forecast since the War on Poverty has continued to this day and has been an absolute and unmitigated disaster for everyone involved, except for the bureaucrats and the Democratic Party election machinery (Gillete, 1996). This landmark legislation in the USA characterized a new period for American liberalism and added new layers to the American welfare state. Legislatively, the first two years were the most active. Between President Lyndon Johnson’s State of the Union address in 1964 and the liberal setbacks suffered in the congressional elections of 1966, the Johnson administration pushed through an unprecedented amount of antipoverty legislation. A lot of media organizations became antagonistic against the efforts being conducted by the government in pursuing their programs of fighting paucity. It reported more failures than successes, elevating hostility as opposed to easing the fear and anxiety that continued to linger. Government regulation was seen as the enemy and interfered with the natural course of events (Hazlitt, 1948, pp 11-12). Some economists like Milton Friedman have argued that Johnsons policies actually had a negative impact on the economy because of their interventionist nature. Adherents of this school of thought recommend that the best way to fight poverty is not through government spending but through economic growth, though other economists argue that increased government spending and economic growth may not be mutually exclusive. Still some others opined that some economists argue that the War on Poverty violated the natural, free market and followed the concept of the broken window fallacy (Committee on Education and Labor). Implementation of the Policy The War on Poverty was intricate in as far as its origins, implementation, and impact are concerned. One basic tenet that should be taken into consideration is that many factors comprise and influence the process of public policy implementation of public social policies. Its programs and philosophies were born out of the political discomfort caused by the persistence of poverty amid the abundance of post-World War II America, the difficult questions of citizenship raised by the Civil Rights movement, and decades of social scientific thought about poverty and social reform. With the War on Poverty, American liberalism’s insistent optimism and deep faith in expertise met head-on a domestic crisis of race, social order, and political economy comparable in scope only to the Civil War and the Great Depression. The administrations of President John Kennedy and his successor Lyndon Johnson became the primary organizers of the governmental response to that crisis. To deal with concern that poverty threatened American progress, their administrations pushed hard for economic growth that could create full employment and for social reform that could enable the poor to access what President Johnson called the good life. The War on Poverty has clearly not been to able deal with the problems it was designed to address. As Rothbard observed, "these problems are demonstrably far worse two or three decades after the innovation and expansion. At the same time, the government problem solving Machine: taxes, deficits, spending, regulations, and bureaucracy, has gotten far bigger, stronger, and hungrier for taxpayer loot." The results of the War on Poverty and the Great Society, the "massive and expensive attempt to stamp out poverty, inner-city problems, racism, and disease, has only resulted in all of these problems being far worse, along with a far-greater machinery for federal control, spending, and bureaucracy" (Young). By and large, many of the American people, acknowledged as the principal stakeholders were convinced that War on Poverty was not able to resolve entirely problems it was meant to tackle. As Rothbard pointed out, "these problems became more serious two or three decades after the innovation and expansion. At the same time, the government Problem Solving Machine: taxes, deficits, spending, regulations, and bureaucracy, has gotten far bigger, stronger, and hungrier for taxpayer loot. The results of the War on Poverty and the Great Society, the massive and expensive attempt to stamp out poverty, inner-city problems, racism, and disease, has only resulted in all of these problems being far worse, along with a far-greater machinery for federal control, spending, and bureaucracy." While this particular social policy was being implemented, the beneficiaries saw the errors which was identified as the alleged lack of political will needed for an a massive campaign against poverty. Misgivings also arose because some of the plans did not function properly. Issues on corruption, abuse, and inefficiency were cited as among the reasons for these doubts. As the cost of execution went up the bureaucracy appeared to have disregarded the factors of cutting down on unnecessary spending. The Opposition pounced on this lapse of the government to assail the anti-poverty program. A fragile relationship between those who shaped this social policy, the members of Congress who supported the passage of the bill and those who carried out the implementation, referring to the members of the executive department since some of the policy’s legislative supporters were merely convinced by President Johnson to back his legislation. Critique It is worth mentioning that the sixties was a decade of carrying out tests within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations primarily to find out what policies were to be proposed and carried out that would improve the lives of the American people. The citizenry witnesses major changes and advancements during those years, including the first man on the moon, a war in Vietnam, and successes in the automobile industry. The War on Poverty introduced by John Fitzgerald Kennedy and continued by Lyndon Baines Johnson and subsequent administrations was envisaged as one of these steps towards progress. The enactment of said policy was a result of President Johnson’s plea before Congress for what he labeled A Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty. Accordingly, the enactment of the Act would provide five essential opportunities to millions of Americans such as to develop skills, continue education, and find useful work; afford communities the opportunity to develop a comprehensive plan to fight its own poverty and help them to carry out their plans; dedicated Americans the opportunity to enlist as volunteers in the war against poverty; provide workers and farmers the chance to break through particular barriers which bar their escape from poverty; and,  give the nation the opportunity for a concerted attack on poverty. Based on the annals of the Congressional Quarterly, debates in the House between Democrats and Republicans raged prior to the approval of the Act where the outcome of the final vote was in doubt was highly-partisan. There was intense competition for the votes of southern Democrats. However, in the end, the democrats emerged victorious and the Act was finally ratified. After the passage of the Act, these were the immediate developments as part of the implementation. Congress funded the programs appropriating $800 million for the fiscal year 1965, 15 percent less than the authorized $947.5 million. On November 25, 1964, OEO Director Sargent Shriver announced the first 119 projects, budgeted at $35 million, including thirty-two Job Corps camps and an urban training center; fourteen Neighborhood Youth Corps projects serving 10,500 youths in thirteen states; community action grants in twelve cities, six rural areas and one Native American reservation; work experience programs for unemployed parents in two cities and two counties; and work-study programs for needy college students at thirty-one colleges. Using the flexibility afforded by the statute for community action projects, OEO in 1965 inaugurated four innovative programs: Head Start, to assist preschool children from deprived families to enter kindergarten and first grade; Upward Bound, to prepare talented poverty-stricken youths for college; Neighborhood Legal Services, to provide free legal counsel for the poor in civil matters; and Foster Grandparents, to train unemployed elderly poor to care for neglected children and bedridden sick persons (Pollak) . Conclusion Considering recent literature on this Social Policy, the accord is that the War on Poverty benefited many but fell far short of its rhetoric. While statistics showed that poverty figures in the USA went down during the latter part of 1960, the program was regarded by many as not that effective in resolving the problem of poverty on a continuing basis. The huge funding that was allocated by the Democrat-led administration of President Lyndon Johnson for the campaign against poverty was deemed by many Americans as too enormous. The very glaring inconsistency was the finances apportioned for the implementation and the unqualified objectives that were outlined by the government. Again, for many sectors, this was just not reasonable. Admittedly, there were results in President Johnson’s War against Poverty. However, this fell short of expectations as the people were looking forward to more concrete achievements in this endeavor. Most programs were not budgeted beyond the pilot-project level. It has been said that the philosophy behind this statute was not sharing of wealth but the conviction that government can and must provide poor people with opportunities to earn a decent living and maintain their families with a comfortable means of livelihood. I agree that based on all data and discourse presented this Social Policy was just a short-lived solution and that the position of underprivileged Americans was momentarily affected by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and succeeding programs. References Andrew, J (1998). Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. Inc. Brauer, Carl M. (1982). Johnson, Kennedy, and the War on Poverty. The Journal of American History 69, no.1. Committee on Education and Labor. Examination of the War on Poverty Program, 1. Gillette, Michael, ed. (1996). Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History. New York: Twayne Hazlitt, H (1948). Economics in One Lesson. New York: Pocket Books, Inc., pp. 11– 12. Mazzuca, S. (2010). The Legacy of Johnson’s War on Poverty. Libertarian Papers, Article Number 22. Pollak, S. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Rothbard, M. (1998) The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press. Pp. 3-61. Young, A (2002). A Retrospective on Johnson’s Poverty War. Mises Daily:  Read More