Humanitarian Assistance Programs - Essay Example

MHE512 - Disaster Relief Module 5 - SLP Answer The main problem faced by every country and all other countries that provide relief in the aftermath of a disaster to alleviate human suffering is a gross lack of personnel that are exclusively trained and specifically deputed for the purpose of disaster relief. The two basic means by which US Department of Defense (DoD) provides overseas humanitarian assistance are operational deployments and deliberately planned engagement activities such as Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects that mainly deal in medical or health-related assistances. Military personnel that had participated in humanitarian assistance programs as project leaders have admitted that only one out of fifty such project leaders had this as the only duty. Other responsibilities had more often than not prevented them from spending more than 25% of their available time in humanitarian assistance. The part-time nature of current staffing of humanitarian assistance programs limits their effectiveness from the outset. Moreover, humanitarian assistance programs are often considered as one time, temporary duty and rarely linked to other projects. Thus, the valuable experiences from hundreds of overseas humanitarian missions undertaken by DoD are largely lost with limited documentation and remain almost totally unavailable to the large community of private volunteer organizations, nongovernmental organizations and international organizations that frequently provide humanitarian assistance alongside the DoD. (Sharp, Wightman, Davis, Sherman, & Burkle Jr, 2001) An idea about the number of humanitarian assistance programs undertaken by the DoD can be had from the information that in 2002 there were 24 reported ongoing major humanitarian emergencies worldwide, each involving populations of 300,000 or more at risk of death, unless outside nations provided humanitarian assistance. In all, 73 countries were considered unstable and in many of these, U.S. political, economic, or humanitarian interests were at risk, raising the possibility of military deployments. Perhaps the longest running humanitarian project managed by U.S. military is Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) in Honduras. Medical units have provided humanitarian health care for Honduras for over two decades. However, lessons learnt from these and other successful humanitarian assistance missions should be made available to the large international community of providers of humanitarian relief in order to increase the effectiveness of all forms of humanitarian assistance, military and civilian. (Drifmeyer & Llewellyn, 2002) Answer 2 The most important criteria of a Disaster Relief Plan is, as the name suggests, its ability to provide succor to suffering humanity after a disaster has struck (it could be natural or even manmade as anyone following the current plight of Tamil population in Jaffna peninsula would immediately agree). And, the biggest catch is, the huge difference between having good management plans and having good leadership. During the Katrina catastrophe, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) fell woefully short of exhibiting potent and effective political leadership and quite naturally cooperation among federal, state and local authorities crumbled. Suddenly all concerned forgot lessons learned in past emergencies and though Bush administration had invested substantial time and dollars in setting up an apparently effective and robust disaster relief plan, when the crunch came, nothing seemed to work. The other equally important criterion for a disaster relief plan to produce effective results is the capability of the plan managers to correctly forecast or anticipate the extent or magnitude of an impending disaster. If a proper estimate is not made, even the best disaster relief plans are bound to fail. FEMA was simply overawed by the impact of Katrina. Suddenly it had to arrange housing for 400,000 people – twenty times more than those that were in need of housing after four hurricanes had lashed Florida the previous year. (Barr, 2005) Answer 3 The answer to this question can be found in the predicament of foreign aid workers that had battled the after effects of Cyclone Nargis that had struck Myanmar on 3rd May, 2008 leaving 134,000 people dead or missing, and 2.4 million survivors facing hunger and homelessness. The administrative hurdles erected by a xenophobic military government and an economy demented by years of misrule created a unique situation where even the most intrepid relief worker also started feeling helpless. The Myanmar military limits the sale of mobile phones, bans satellite phones, sharply restricts car imports and rations gasoline between 3.5 and 7 liters a day. The main beneficiary of such a highly restrictive regime are the government employees and military officers, who profit by selling permits, gasoline and many other items on the black market. Aid workers from the United Nations working their way up the Irrawaddy Delta, the area hardest hit by the cyclone, asked for permission to import six vehicles, but did not hear anything from the government even after a fortnight. Same thing happened when the aid workers asked for a larger ration of gasoline and requested permission from the military junta to allow use of satellite phones as local telephone system (including mobile telephony) which was already in a pitiable condition had broken down completely after the cyclone. With a dysfunctional government and an economy that had almost broken down, and with basic amenities like electricity available for hardly five hours a day in the commercial capital Yangon, foreign relief workers realized within no time that the available infrastructure was woefully short of the minimum requirement and in spite of their best efforts, the disaster relief mission failed to provide any real succor to the affected. (The New York Times Media Group, 2008) Answer 4 Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo had warned way back in 2005 that corruption in the legislature compromised national integrity and did harm to the countrys pleas for international relief in the event of any natural calamity. This amply highlights what the international community thinks about corruption in the recipient country. (Xinhua News Desk, 2005) Same is the case in Myanmar where rampant corruption has wrecked the economy and almost every form of business is controlled by the military dictatorship. The outside world considered the Myanmar government callous and indifferent as it reacted with agonizing sloth as thousands lay dying after the devastating cyclone in 2008. But years of unbridled corruption has rendered the government completely dysfunctional with every decision taken through the military scalar chain and bureaucracy hardly ever evincing any initiative. The UN relief workers very soon realized that any form effective relief can only be provided, if the rampant corruption prevalent at every level of society is factored in the action plan. (The New York Times Media Group, 2008) Hence, in my opinion, it would be appropriate for the subject country to consider corruption in their plan. But allowing external aid agencies to tackle the prevailing corruption and graft is a sensitive issue involving political contexts of sovereignty of an independent country. In most cases the recipient country does not allow external foreign aid agencies to handle issues of corruption on their own howsoever imperative it might be. Answer 5 It has already been discussed that a plan is as strong as the leader who is implementing it. So, one of the biggest pitfalls of a DRP is weak leadership and it admittedly is extremely difficult to either anticipate it or replace it at an instant if necessary. The other pitfall of an otherwise sound DRP is corruption and lack of sincere cooperation in the recipient country. It was apparent in Mozambique when floods and cyclone repeatedly hit the country from 2000 till 2007. (Cosgrave, 2007) It was also apparent in Myanmar when Cyclone Nargis hit the country in the middle of 2008. Thus, while a DRP can be initially evaluated for possible strengths and weaknesses by meticulously examining all that is written on paper and minutely monitoring the dry drills by relief workers, the actual evaluation can be done only when the plan is implemented at the ground level. This is because two of the most important considerations for making a DRP successful can never be evaluated or anticipated till the plan is put in action. Bibliography Barr, S. (2005, December 4). FEMA Review a Fine Idea, But Leadership Is Key. The Washington Post . Cosgrave, J. (2007). Inter-agency real-time evaluation of the response to the February 2007 floods and cyclone in Mozambique. New York: UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Drifmeyer, J. E., & Llewellyn, C. H. (2002). Measuring the Effectiveness of Department of Defense Medical Humanitarian Assistance. Bethesda, MD: Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences. Sharp, T., Wightman, J., Davis, M., Sherman, S., & Burkle Jr, F. (2001). Military assistance in complex emergencies: what have we learned since the Kurdish relief effort? Prehospital Disaster Med, 16 , pp. 197-208. The New York Times Media Group. (2008, May 29). Access isnt enough in Myanmar; Decades of corruption and dysfunction impede relief effort. International Herald Tribune . Xinhua News Desk. (2005). Roundup: Nigerian president warns corruption harms debt relief efforts. Beijing: Xinhua News Agency. Read More