The Indian Ocean Tsunami and Provision of Humanitarian Assistance - Essay Example

Disaster Relief 31 August 2009 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami This Indian Ocean tsunami was one of the worst natural disasters to ever happen in our recorded history. It happened around seven in the morning of December 26, 2004 and quickly devastated the coastal areas of countries bordering the Indian Ocean and killed 230,000 in an instant. The word tsunami is of Japanese origin which means harbor waves and the one that struck in the early morning hours on that day without any warning was due to a giant undersea earthquake of 9.3 magnitude that lasted for almost ten minutes. The ocean waves reached a height of 30 meters (100 feet) that swept everything in its path and triggered a humanitarian relief response worldwide unprecedented in scale, response time and urgency. This paper attempts to look at this singular event as a means of dissecting the various elements of humanitarian relief response in terms of politics, corporate social responsibility, effectiveness of non-government organizations and more particularly, two aspects of disaster relief efforts focused on government services such as housing and medical care. Additionally, the discussions will revolve on the country of Indonesia, one of the worst-hit countries and in that country, on the one area that was hit very badly, the region of Aceh on Sumatra island. The tsunami had an unintended effect on the long-festering separatist movement there and the stigma associated with accepting the relief assistance offered from a perceived enemy of the separatists. It is often surprising how politics intrudes on relief efforts which should be focused exclusively on purely humanitarian activities designed to reduce human suffering and yet results in serious distortions regarding which areas should be given relief first. In the same way that most of Hurricane Katrinas relief efforts were politicized, so was it in this case. The Politics of Humanitarian Relief Efforts It is sometimes unbelievable how politics can creep into disaster relief efforts and end up hampering those efforts from reaching the intended beneficiaries. An example would be the relief efforts against famine in Africa, which in the words of former British premier Tony Blair is a “preventable tsunami” that happens each week. Besides famine, there are the twin scourges of malaria and HIV-AIDS that had decimated the populations there and yet, there is now what is known as “aid fatigue” among donors. Famine, defined as mass death due to the epidemic proportions of failure in food consumption, is a constant in todays Africa while it had been eradicated in Asia. This compelling contrast with the Asian experience is attributable to the breakdown of political systems in most of Africa while China and India achieved a bit of victory primarily due to superiority of their political systems (de Waal 1997). Although a few Asian countries are still vulnerable to famines like North Korea, Cambodia, Bangladesh and Burma, this is due to their internal politics rather than the economics side of it. Interestingly enough, international disaster psychology has changed rapidly over the last few decades and is no longer viewed exclusively as famine relief only but now involves a traumatized victim (from natural calamities, military conflicts, etc.) that needs psychological support rather than the ubiquitous skeleton-thin famine victim who needs a handout of food. In other words, international disaster relief efforts is not apolitical nor is the agenda apolitical. The nature of humanitarian aid is intertwined with international humanitarian organizations in relation to their own societies and governments from donor countries (Reyes & Jacobs 2006). This means there is a lot politics involved not only among donor countries and the recipients but sometimes within a country itself facing a humanitarian disaster event like an earthquake. A case in point was the refusal of the Sri Lankan government of Israels offers of assistance in the early hours of the tsunami disaster because of the inclusion of Israeli soldiers in a team. Corporate Social Responsibility Private companies responded overwhelming to the appeals for help in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami. In contrast to government pledges of aid relief, the private firms and individuals came through at the most crucial time by delivering on their promise. In many instances, they provided the needed relief supplies much more quickly than their governments because there was no red tape or bureaucracy involved. Furthermore, these big corporations give the right type of aid such as the correct medicinal supplies to prevent disease outbreaks that usually follow contamination of potable water supplies like cholera, dysentery, typhoid and diphtheria. They also provided drinking water by trucking them into disaster areas. Partly due to concerns over the politicization of relief efforts, most of these firms sent their private donations to non-governmental organizations instead of directly to a nations government agency tasked with the relief efforts. Other concerns for sending aid directly to the NGOs were transparency and accountability, especially when funds were sent instead. In sharp contrast, many government donors who scrambled to make pledges failed to deliver on time. In fact, most of the actual donations received fell far short of the pledges made earlier. Effectiveness of NGOs As stated earlier, big multinationals who donated money and in kind sent their aid to private relief organizations and non-governmental organizations instead of to the government due to concerns about politics entering relief efforts. Besides bureaucratic delays, there were also concerns about government agencies trying to get credit for relief efforts and even using relief supplies to support certain political ends. Some local government officials in Sri Lanka, one of the worst-hit countries, were accused of giving supplies only to political supporters. The allegations were serious enough because complaints stated that many recipients were not even tsunami victims at all. In fact, only about 30% of all the tsunami victims got any aid. Indonesian Relief Efforts The Indonesian government had responded quite remarkably well after the tsunami despite its being a poor country. Relief efforts were better organized, most of them channeled through private volunteer organizations and the effectiveness of its response should be viewed in relation to the total disaster. The earthquake struck practically within Indonesias backyard in the island of Sumatra where an intractable insurgency movement was on-going during the time the tsunami struck. Government was criticized by some relief agencies for withholding some of the relief that was intended for Aceh because of the politics involved. In fact, there were accusations it utilized the disaster for its own political advantage by sending in Muslim militants into the region to gain the upper hand in the eyes of the local population with regards to the absence of any counterpart effort from the Free Aceh Movement. In many instances, not only politics was involved but also political corruption in form of big sums of uncoordinated aid money being diverted and in the distribution of infrastructure reconstruction contracts afterwards that often involved conflicts of interest (Harris 2003). Aceh Separatist Movement The tsunami had hit Aceh the worst because the undersea earthquake happened just a 100 miles offshore from the northern part of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. Most of the Indonesian casualties and missing were from Aceh. It was the most devastated area and relief efforts were compounded by the sheer remoteness of the province. The Aceh province was especially restive prior the tsunami due to demands for autonomy and from arbitrary arrests and indefinite detentions made by government security forces. Enormity of the catastrophe had wiped out most of the Aceh leadership and the movement settled for peace after years of armed political struggle, overcoming a stigma of accepting government aid (Mietzner 2009). Indonesia was even warned not to use the relief aid in its counter-insurgency campaigns. Reference List de Waal, A., African Rights Organization & International African Institute (1997). Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. 3rd edition, illustrated. (p. 7). Banbury Road, Oxford, UK: James Currey Publishers. Harris, R. (2003). Political Corruption: In and Beyond the Nation State. (p. 12). Florence, Kentucky, USA: Routledge. Reyes, G. & Jacobs, G. A. (2006). Handbook of International Disaster Psychology: Fundamentals and Overview. Praeger Perspectives Contemporary Psychology. Vol. 1, illustrated edition. Santa Barbara, California, USA: Greenwood Publishing Mietzner, M. (2009). Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation. Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Read More