What Really Happened in New Orleans - Coursework Example

Running Head: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN NEW ORLEANS? What Really Happened In New Orleans? s What Really Happened In New Orleans? Introduction Catastrophic Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural disasters ever to strike the U.S. Katrina was designated a Category 41 storm with winds of 145 miles per hour when it first struck Louisiana August 29, leading to the flooding of New Orleans and massive damage along the coasts of Mississippi and Alabama. A year later, officials continued to tally the deaths blamed on the storm; in August 2006, the National Hurricane Center reported at least 1,833 deaths directly or indirectly caused by Katrina, including 1,577 in Louisiana. (Bernstein, 2006) Some two million people were displaced by the storm, which caused more than $150 billion in damage. As the government, citizens and other groups struggled to respond to Katrina and to get ready for another large storm, Hurricane Rita, many serious questions were raised about the U.S.s ability to prepare for and respond to both natural disasters and man-made catastrophes, such as terrorist attacks. Government response to Katrina triggered outrage and dismay, as images from New Orleans broadcast worldwide revealed thousands of people stranded in filthy shelters, of dead bodies that were not collected by authorities, and people trapped on their rooftops, waiting for help to come. President George W. Bush, who was criticized for his administrations response to the storm, saw his popularity fall to the lowest level of his presidency to that point. Polls conducted in early September showed his approval rating ranging from 38% to 42%. Bush called for a review, and took responsibility for the government response. (Christopher, 2007) "Four years after the frightening experience of September the 11th, Americans have every right to expect a more effective response in a time of emergency," Bush said in a September 15 speech in New Orleans. (Douglas, 2006) The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) drew much of the criticism on the federal level and its embattled director, Michael Brown, resigned in the wake of the storm. He was among those called to testify before special committees created in both the House and Senate to examine government response to the hurricane. Democrats largely opposed the House committee, calling for equal representation on the panel and subpoena power. They also sought an independent commission to look into the failures, along the lines of the bipartisan panel formed to probe the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. All levels of government have faced criticism for the multitude of things that went wrong. The Reaction From Authorities Katrina was a Category 5 storm on August 28 as it headed across the Gulf of Mexico toward Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. That day, New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city, which had 485,000 residents. However, the citys own evacuation plan had estimated that, with more than 23% of residents living in poverty, about 100,000 people did not have their own transportation. Although a 2004 simulation of a Category 3 storm, commissioned by FEMA, had predicted that the city would not be able to evacuate all of its residents without assistance, the final recommendations had not been finalized and no solution implemented. (Mike, 2006) After Katrina, a plan to use city buses to evacuate people without their own transportation was not put into effect. The day after the city flooded, Nagin estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 people were still in the city. Thousands of people sought shelter in the Superdome sports arena, which was intended to be the shelter of last resort, and the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center. (Bernstein, 2006) The Bush administration has grappled with the questions of race raised by the disaster, as so many of those unable to leave the city, left behind in inadequate shelters, were black. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during a September 4 visit to her native Alabama denied that people were neglected because of their race. "Nobody, especially the president, would have left people unattended on the basis of race," Rice said. (Mike, 2006) New Orleans avoided a direct hit from the hurricane, which passed to the east of the city on August 29. The next day, however, saw breaches of multiple levees that protected the low-lying city from the surrounding waters of Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River. Parts of New Orleans are as low as 10 feet below sea level. Some 80% of the city flooded, with the water rising 20 feet in some places. The Army Corps of Engineers said that the breaches responsible for most of the flooding had been caused by high waters flowing over the concrete retaining walls and eroding the bases of the earthen levees However, according to a Wall Street Journal report later in the month, Louisiana State Universitys Hurricane Center had instead found that the levees may have had a design or construction flaw that would have caused failure from a smaller storm surge. Following Katrina, it would be weeks before most of the city was free of flood waters. The citys recovery was interrupted by Hurricane Rita, which caused renewed flooding September 23 in the already devastated Lower Ninth Ward. When Bushs budget proposal for the 2006 fiscal year was introduced, it included $71.2 million cuts in hurricane and flood-prevention projects for the New Orleans district. Meanwhile, the disaster has focused attention on the coastal erosion problem faced by Louisiana. Since the 19th century, humans had altered the flow of the Mississippi River in order to prevent floods and to regulate shipping. However, with river water and silt going out to sea instead of to the natural floodplain, the coastal marshes and barrier islands which served as natural flood protectors -- were in decline. (Douglas, 2006) An energy bill approved by Congress in July 2005 included $500 million over four years to address the coastal erosion problem, although the Bush administration had tried to block the funds. (Tom, 2005) With most of New Orleans under water, thousands became stranded in their homes or in shelters, including the Convention Center and the Superdome, which lost part of its roof in the storm. People in those shelters lacked water, food and a means to get out. Hospitals flooded, and some were left without power and with few supplies. Local authorities were quickly hobbled by the loss of communications systems, lack of supplies, and confusion over who was in charge. Meanwhile, looters, some of them armed, made a chaotic situation even more dangerous. Many police officers quit or took leave to help their families; about 500 of the citys 1,700 police personnel were gone from the force as of the end of September. Dead bodies floated in floodwaters or were left in plain view. On September 1, Nagin had issued a "desperate S.O.S." for more help. The day the hurricane struck, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco (D) asked Bush to send "everything youve got." (Douglas, 2006) Yet, observers have noted flaws in the local and state response to the storm. Blanco, for example, didnt tap into the resources of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an interstate mutual aid organization that other states affected by Katrina did use. To this point, however, the most serious criticism has gone to the federal government. FEMA in the Spotlight FEMA and its now former director Brown have come under fire for mishandling Katrinas aftermath. Brown drew withering criticism when he said on September 1 that he had just learned that many people were stuck in the convention center. FEMA waited until the day the hurricane had struck to call for 1,000 federal workers to come to the area "within 48 hours." Just seven of its urban search and rescue teams were sent to the area before the storm. The agencys communications systems were not up to the test. Many people expressed frustration at having to ask FEMA for specific resources, when it was so hard to itemize what was needed. Many complained that FEMA held up aid shipments because disorganization or bureaucratic red tape. Brown on September 12 resigned from his post, three days after he had been called back to Washington and replaced as the top federal officer in the disaster zone. The day of his resignation, he repeated his view that the primary responsibility for coping disasters rested with local and state officials. FEMA, he said, was "not a first-responder agency." (Mike, 2006) FEMA was formed in 1979 during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, in response to criticisms that federal disaster efforts were uncoordinated and too spread out. FEMA combined several agencies that dealt with civil defense and disaster relief, and was given the authority to implement federal relief efforts and to coordinate federal assistance with local and state efforts. Planning for national security emergencies, including terrorist attacks and nuclear accidents, was also part of FEMAs responsibilities. FEMA faced some criticism similar to what it faces today in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, which hit South Florida in August 1992, killing nearly 60 people and causing some $21 billion in insured losses, adjusted for inflation. (Michael, 2006) Critics said that the federal government was not prepared for the storm, and that victims were in confusion over what type of assistance was available to them. Critics also complained that many of FEMAs employees were political appointees lacking experience in emergency management. Overall, FEMA also faced criticism to the effect that the agency should have been more focused on natural disasters, instead of nuclear war or other nuclear emergencies. The year after Andrew struck; President Bill Clinton named James Lee Witt as the head of FEMA. Witt, who had experience as a state emergency manager, led the agency through many reforms. During Witts tenure, many political appointees were replaced with people who had emergency experience. Some staff and resources were shifted from preparing for nuclear emergencies to natural disaster preparedness. During Clintons years in office, FEMA was elevated to a cabinet-level department. However, during the Bush administration, FEMA lost its cabinet-level status, and the agency once again was being run by people considered to be political appointees without much disaster experience. Bushs first pick as FEMA director, Joseph Allbaugh, had been Bushs campaign manager. Allbaugh had hired a friend, Brown, as FEMAs general counsel. Brown became the agencys director in 2003, but following Katrina many pointed to him as being a political appointee with little emergency-management experience. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the government underwent the largest reorganization in more than 50 years to form the Department of Homeland Security. The goal was to consolidate various government agencies to help prevent terrorist attacks. FEMA was one of the 22 agencies folded into this gigantic new cabinet-level department, which has some 180,000 employees. (Douglas, 2006) Observers say that since FEMAs absorption into this mammoth bureaucracy, it has become less prominent, with attention and resources going toward terrorism and away from disaster prevention. In July 2005, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff announced a restructuring of the agency that would shift disaster prevention away from FEMA to a new Directorate of Preparedness. (Tom, 2005) Planning and Preparedness The storm has raised serious questions about how prepared the U.S. is for another disaster. Those who studied the failures associated with the attacks are among those who have raised concerns. What is frustrating is that it is the same again; it was a lack of communication, no command and control. It is outrageous and a scandal and it cost lives. Some have called for FEMA to be returned to its status as an independent agency. (Michael, 2006) The role of the military in such a disaster is also being scrutinized. Some questioned why National Guard troops did not arrive until three days after the flooding began, and some asserted that the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan had caused too much of a strain on military resources. Bush, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and other military leaders denied such assertions. Following delays, by September 10 the federal response included: 20,000 active-duty troops, 50,800 National Guard troops, 8,900 FEMA workers and 4,000 Coast Guard personnel. (Michael, 2006) The Coast Guard in particular received praise for its handling of the disaster. Following Browns departure from New Orleans, Vice Admiral Thad Allen, the Coast Guard chief of staff, replaced him as the leader of federal efforts. The Katrina disaster, Bush said yielded a response that was not well coordinated at all levels of government. It is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moments notice. (Christopher, 2007) Bush has meanwhile ordered the Department of Homeland Security to review emergency plans in major cities. Evacuations are sure to be high on the list of items that are examined. The complicated nature of quickly and safely moving large numbers of people out of harms way was highlighted by the preparations for Hurricane Rita, which hit the coasts of Texas and Louisiana September 24. As the storm approached the Texas coast, appearing to be headed for Houston, it was a Category 5 Hurricane. State officials ordered the evacuation of 1.25 million people from low-lying areas, but some 2.5 million evacuated. Many people trying to leave Houston, the nations fourth-largest city, found themselves in 100-mile-long traffic jams. (Christopher, 2007) Many drivers ran out of gas and became stranded by the roadside. During the evacuation, a bus carrying elderly evacuees and nursing home staffers burst into flames, killing 23 people. The Houston area and its oil refineries escaped major damage, while some coastal areas in southeastern Texas and southwestern Louisiana were destroyed. Conclusion Criticism of local and national response to the hurricane is widespread in the media. Local officials complain just days after the disaster about the lack visible presence of troops and FEMA. The presidential response to the hurricane was embarrassing. The day Katrina hit, Bush was at a ceremony in California, and did not break from his vacation until the next Wednesday, which left those affected by the hurricane with a feeling of abandonment. President Bush is also responsible for appointing an unqualified lawyer, Brown, to be the director of FEMA. This caused a serious clash between state, local, and federal governments, resulting in the loss of tons of critical aid materials. Having never dealt with crisis and natural disaster relief, Brown continued to inhibit the reconstructive and rescue efforts, resulting in many fatalities that could have been prevented had a more qualified individual been in the position. Similar delaying acts were performed by Vice President Dick Cheney. The day after the hurricane, Cheney ordered workers of the power company to divert power crews, who, at the time were restoring power to local hospitals, to substations that control the diesel fuel and gasoline flow from Texas to the northeast. The workers upsettingly questioned this diversion of labor and were told to perform it anyway. Cheney did this in an attempt to avoid fuel price gouging, however it proved to be unsuccessful, and there was an enormous spike in fuel costs following the hurricane. It is an undeniable fact that a category five hurricane will have devastating effects, no matter where it makes landfall. Due to the citys cultural and racial diversity, geographical structure, and inflated poverty, it was clear that Katrina was going to hit fast and hard. Just as predicted by weather forecasters, the hurricane quickly flooded the city and those who attempted to ride the storm out perished. Unfortunately, the governments policies implemented to help did not come as quickly and as a result thousands of fatalities that could have been avoided were not. As the recovery of New Orleans moves forward, it is certain that questions about what went wrong, and how to improve, will continue to emerge. References Bernstein, Mark A.; Kim, Julie; Sorenson, Paul. (2006) Rebuilding Housing along the Mississippi Coast: Ideas for Ensuring an Adequate Supply of Affordable Housing, Rand Corporation. Douglas, Brinkley; William, Morrow. (2006) The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast, William Morrow. Mike Bryan, Ivor van Heerden. (2006) The Storm: What Went Wrong and Why During Hurricane Katrina--the Inside Story from One Louisiana Scientist, Viking Adult. Michael Eric Dyson. (2006) Come Hell or High Water: Hurricane Katrina and the Color of Disaster, Basic Books. Tom Piazza, (2005) Why New Orleans Matters, Harper Publishers. Christopher Cooper, Robert Block. (2007) Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security, Holt Publishers. Read More