Consequences of Partisan Polarization - Research Paper Example

Introduction The founders of the nation came up with a system of institutional politics to prevent the mischief of faction. Almost every great achievement of the national government of USA emerged during broad bipartisan consensus. However, the past quarter century has witnessed a near collapse of such an agreement. Partisan polarization is the division of political ideologies and policies, as well as people along partisan lines. Partisan polarization has deeply widened the divide between the Republican and the Democratic to a point of partisan c never witnessed since 1920s (Bennett, 2013). Partisan polarization inhibits the building of legislative coalitions, resulting to legislative gridlock. Secondly, partisan polarization is ideologically biased, and this negatively affects social and economic policies. Thirdly, partisan polarization negatively affects the efficient operations of government offices making the government incur many costs. Partisan polarization has changed the equilibrium of powers among national institutions at the expense of the Congress. Judges and executives are now acting unilaterally without the consent from the legislatures. Finally, partisan polarization has led to an increasing conflict between the Red states and the Blues states. Hence, partisan polarization has almost paralyzed every aspect of the country including political and social aspects, which are the core of government operations and functioning. Polarization and Legislative Gridlock Polarization may bring about greater variation in policy. Sometimes, it can produce new policy initiatives, and then roll these new policies back. However, there exists a dispersion in the policy-making system in America, which makes it theoretically reasonable to believe that the central effect of polarization result in less public policy (Lybecker, McBeth, & Kusko, 2012). Systems of bicameralism and power separation need an extraordinary level of consensus to vote for a new legislation. Therefore, the systems quite often require that the enacting coalitions be bipartisan. Experts have used two theories to explain patterns in significant legislation in the post-war period (Schultz, 2006). These theories are the pivot theory and the partisan theory. The partisan polarization plays a crucial role in both of these perspectives. In partisan perspectives, inter-branch bargaining with partisan actors produces new policies. Therefore, when different parties control the different branches, there would be fewer emergencies of significant policy enactments. However, such a forecast relies on the degree of policy disagreement across parties. Clearly, the late 1990s’ inter-branch confrontations were quite different from the executive-legislative relations during the Eisenhower years. Thus, it is wise to condition the predictions about the consequences of divided governments on the level of partisan polarization. The rising polarization has taken place in coincident with the rise in frequency of divided government (Stoker & Jennings, 2006). Additionally, there is a proposed pivot model, which suggests that partisan polarization plays a key role in policy-making (Nivola & Brady, 2006). Based on the support of pivotal actors, these models identify crucial conditions for change in policy. Nivola and Brady argue that the cloture in the Senate and the presidential veto are the two constraints that bind on policy-making in the US (2006). Therefore, new policies need a House majority, sixty senators to effect cloture, and the support of the president or two-thirds votes in each chamber to overrule a presidential veto. These models state that the gridlock interval is that policy space region between the senator pivotal on cloture and a presidential veto. Currently, the senator pivotal on a presidential veto is the 33rd or 67th most conservative. It depends on whether the president is liberal or conservative. The senator pivotal on cloture is 40th or 60th, depending on the position of the president. A policy that has a status quo lying in this interval will remain unchanged since any move will get a veto from at least one of the two pivotal actors. As a result, it would be rare to have significant policy making when the gridlock interval is large. It is unnecessary to have a one-on-one connection between the width of the gridlock interval and partisan polarization because the gridlock interval definition is non-partisan. Nevertheless, there is a close correlation between the two as seen from the figure below (Bennett, 2013). During the post-War period, the 1975 reforms and polarization accounts for more than ¾ of the variance in the gridlock interval width. However, it is easier to incorporate the two concepts since there is a statistical distinction in both. Apart from directly posting difficulties in legislative coalition building, there exists other effects of partisan polarization that retard the policy making (Sinclair, 2006). For example, elite polarization is to blame for reduced levels of trust in government. Consequently, the public demand for redistributive programs has become weak. Increased partisan polarization may also lead to an increased level of incentives to participate in strategic disagreements thus leading to bargaining failure and gridlock. Partisan Polarization and Public Policy The increasing conservative bias in partisan polarization has led to the rising propensity for stalemate gridlock, which profoundly affects policy outcomes. First, a politically polarized Congress will find it hard to deal with economic shocks. Second, gridlock prevents the legislative actions needed to avoid the elimination of real benefits levels. Due to this, partisan polarization eliminates the value of non-inflation-indexed social benefits. On a long-term basis, the non-indexed benefits level would converge to a point that most fiscally conservative pivotal decision makers prefer (Elder & Greene, 2012). Therefore, partisan polarization makes the public policies of social spending and non-indexed benefits have biases since it favors the fiscally conservative direction. For example, consider the minimum wage of the Federal (Lybecker, McBeth, & Kusko, 2012). Many have attempted to index it to the cost of living, inflation and absent new legislation erode its real value. Thus, if the conservative pivot shifts right, there need to be minimized and reduced adjustments to the nominal rate, depressing the wage’s real value. The estimates below are of a simple model of the annual minimum wage since 1936. The primary independent variables are a dummy variable for unified Democratic governments, polarization, a time trend, and an interaction between unified government and polarization. “Real Min. Wage = 11.29 -14.02 * Polar +3.65 *UnifiedDem – 5.75*Polar*UDG + .092*year R2 =.743 (.078) (1.37) (1.51) (2.59) (.007)” (Elder & Greene, 2012, p.9) The relationship shows that polarizations largely depress the level of the real minimum wage. The difference between the predicted wage at maximum and minimum level of polarization is approximately $ 5. Polarization has also eroded the wage’s democratic premium. At the minimum polarization level, the real wage is about $ 0.60 more in the period of unified Democratic governments. At its maximum level, democratic governments resulted in reduced real minimum wage. You can extend this analysis with various types of data on a specific policy outcome. Polarization and Government Functioning Partisan polarization has resulted in an increased level of contention when it comes to presidential nominations into various governmental positions (Mullard, 2004). It has resulted in many confirmations whenever a there are nominations for the executive or legislative offices. Consequently, it has driven otherwise qualified individuals from offices and created many vacancies in the American bureaucracies and judiciary. It has thus eroded the effectiveness of governmental offices. A recent study found very strong evidence that there is a great increase in the length of time needed to confirm appointed persons due to partisan polarization (Mullard, 2004). Figure below demonstrates this phenomenon. For the post-war era, the model estimates the following effects partisan polarization, divided government and their interaction. ln (confirmation time) = -0.99*divided + 1.468*polar + 2.165*polar*divided + other controls (0.350) (0.469) (0.610) Given this specification, the polarization has increased the confirmation times since 1970s by 35% in the period of unified governments and 90% in the period of split governments. Although there are minimal effects on the individual nominees (maybe one or more months), their accumulations over many nominees have largely affected the staffing in the executive branch. The distance between the median of the opposite party and the president largely affect the confirmation process duration for federal judges. A two standard variation in this distance reduces the daily confirmation probability by 60%. Polarization accounts for a larger part of the variation in this measure. Therefore, polarization is to blame for the great vacancy rates in federal judiciary. Partisan Polarization and the Separation of Powers The ability of a legislative body to make laws gives it its power. As pointed out earlier, partisan polarization directly impedes the legislative process (Kousser, 2010). Many positive perspectives of policymaking have stated that a lack of the ability to pass corrective laws gives room for increased autonomy for judicial and executive actors in the policy process. Some recent empirical studies support such claims. Evidently, it is more likely for Presidents to act unilaterally in the periods of legislative-executive conflicts (Stoker & Jennings, 2006). Presidents are also more likely to come up with agencies by use of reorganization authority instead of seeking a new statue in the event of an inter-branch diverges of preferences. Such agencies are not as durable and politicized as statutory agencies. With regard to the courts, Congress is much more likely to enforce federal statutes by giving powers to private litigants and courts rather than executive bureaucrats in the event of the divergence of the congressional majorities and the president’s preferences. Hence, partisan polarization significantly results into litigation explosion. Red States versus the Blue states Partisan polarization has expressed itself mostly in state policy, especially since the election of 2010 that saw the Republicans gaining unified control of many state governments. They began earnestly to pursue the red-state model, which commonly includes reduced spending on education and social programs, a sharp reduction on taxes for high-income earners, curbs on unions, and culture-war priorities. Meanwhile, some blue states political elites have pressed ahead with progressive policies that exactly oppose their counterparts (Elder & Greene, 2012). There are evidences of the signs of partisan polarization in ideologies on either side. However, the nature, degree, and the trajectory differ from left to right. Currently, conservative Republicans are consistently displaying a more partisan antipathy. Overall, both ends perceive the opposing party to be a threat. Ideologically, about 66% of Republicans perceive democratic policies as threats to the well-being of the nation. On the other hand, half of consistently liberal Democrats claim that policies passed by republicans threaten the nation’s well-being. Conservatives also show more partisan character in their personal lives. It is most likely to find conservatives making friends and prefer like-minded communities. However, there exist evidences of ideological uniformity on either side where the share of democrats have steadily and increasingly maintained their liberal views for the past 20 years. It has quadrupled from 5% in 1994 t0 about 23 % today (Kousser, 2010). Rather than creation of deep divisions within the Democrats, there is evidence of relative consensus social issues like homosexuality and abortion. Moreover, different economies and social structures emerge from different policies (Nivola & Brady, 2006). Historically, most of the red states have been poor than their counterparts. The red states have thus used low wages to lure people in business. Their renewed emphasis shows that they are maintaining an old social order that seemed to be fading away. Conclusion Partisan polarization is greatly affecting the unity of Americans in a negative way. It has divided the Republicans and the Democrats now more than ever when it comes to ideological perception. Additionally, it has created an imbalance in powers among government functions, leading to judges and executives making decisions without the consent of the judiciary. It has negatively altered the functioning of the judiciary and the administrative state. Finally, many public policies are wrong in some ways because partisan polarization has biases. Therefore, it is high time to get rid of this phenomenon. References Bennett, A. J. (2013). A2 US Government and Politics (2nd ed.). London: Hodder Education. Elder, L., & Greene, S. (2012). The politics of parenthood: Causes and consequences of the politicization and polarization of the American family (2nd ed.). Albany, ID: State University of New York Press. Jones, D. R. (2001). Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock. Political Research Quarterly, 2(2), 18-26. doi:10.2307/449211 Kousser, T. B. (2010). Does Partisan Polarization Lead to Policy Gridlock in California?California Journal of Politics and Policy, 2(3), 28-31. doi:10.2202/1944-4370.1071 Lybecker, D. L., McBeth, M. K., & Kusko, E. (2012). Trash or treasure: recycling narratives and reducing political polarisation. Environmental Politics, 2(32), 46-52. doi:10.1080/09644016.2012.692935 Mullard, M. (2004). The politics of globalisation and polarisation (3rd ed.). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Nivola, P. S., & Brady, D. W. (2006). Red and blue nation?: Characteristics and causes of America's polarized politics (2nd ed.). Stanford, IA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University. Schultz, C. (2006). Political competition and polarization (2nd ed.). Cph, AZ: Copenhagen Business School. Sinclair, B. (2006). Party wars: Polarization and the politics of national policy making(2nd ed.). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Stoker, L., & Jennings, M. K. (2006). Aging, Generations, and the Development of Partisan Polarization in the United States. Political Ideologies, 4(2), 45-67. Read More