Iranian nuclear developments - Essay Example

"Briefly discuss a current global issue, indicating why you consider it important and what do you suggest should be done to deal with it." Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is simply one that's come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to when Iran could build its first bomb. Some believe Tehran could do it in awhile; others think Iran would only be able to do so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast: If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no longer a credible strategy. The questions that countries are worried about are whether or not any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program, etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted (including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran's example). The answers that are being looked for are: 1) in the long-run Iran will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by enforcing the non-proliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weaponsrelated capabilities. Would Iran ever actually deploy nuclear weapons though Much depends on one's read of just how long-lived and truculent the current regime is. These issues are taken up in the volume's next two chapters. In "Iran's Internal Struggles," Genieve Abdo, an internationally recognized observer of Iranian politics, argues that the revolutionary government is unlikely to be overthrown anytime soon and that it will persist in its hostile foreign policies. Rob Sobhani, a leading American-Iranian commentator, however, argues that with sufficient U.S. support of the right sort, the current government in Iran could give way to a far more liberal and peaceable regime. But what is the "right" kind of support Abbas William Samii, Radio Free Europe's Iranian broadcast analyst, explores this question in chapter 5, "Winning Iranian Hearts and Minds." Although Mr. Samii does not rule out speedy regime change, he warns that it is not likely and that for that reason, the United States needs to have a long-term outreach program that will encourage a more favorable opinion of the United States among the general Iranian population. This, then, raises the question of timing. If favorable regime change may not come before Iran acquires nuclear weapons or the ability to quickly acquire them, what other course of action might the United States and its allies take to influence Iranian decisionmakers None of the most popular policy options, in short, are sure bets; all are fraught with dangers. This is why it is critical to make sure that Iran at least understands that it will not be rewarded or given a pass on its pursuit of worrisome nuclear activities. In the first instance this means that the United States and its allies must make full use of existing restraints against nuclear weapons proliferation-the IAEA and the NPT--to make sure Iran does not become a model of how to exploit the rules, but rather an example of what happens to states that bend or flaunt them. Beyond this, the United States and its allies must make clear what Iran can expect if it continues its nuclear power program--even if within the legal letter of the IAEA Statute--and how much better Iran's future would be if it terminated its program and cut its ties to terrorists, who might otherwise gain access to the nuclear know-how Iran has already mastered. The coming months will be some of the most critical in U.S.Iranian relations. The dramatic news that Iran's nuclear infrastructure was far more advanced than the public had been led to believe, puts the possibility of the Iranian bomb front and center and poses a most severe challenge to America. This, paralleled with the uncertainty in Iraq, means that sooner or later some confrontation with Iran over nuclear weapons, terrorism, and involvement in Iraq is inevitable unless the Iranians choose this moment to walk away from the Arab-Israeli conflict, reign in their terrorism, and find some way to finesse their nuclear program within the confines of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If Iran decides that the time has come for a political dialogue with Washington, the most difficult task will be to persuade its leaders that its security will be enhanced if it abandons terrorism and defers a nuclear weapons program. However, Iran will argue that it still lives in a nuclear neighborhood. Israel, Pakistan, and India will be presented as evidence of the nuclear asymmetries. So long as a dialogue focuses on these regional discrepancies, little progress is likely. Israel will not contemplate negotiating about its bomb until a generation of peace between itself and its neighbors has passed. Likewise, Pakistan will not forsake the bomb so long as India is perceived as a threat. India, always concerned about China, will not abandon its bomb until the United States, Russia, China, the U.K., and France do likewise. Thus, it is quite unrealistic for Iran to expect a nuclear quid pro quo for its own restraint. This is where carrots, as well as sticks, become important. If Iran ends military and financial support to terrorist groups, signs the additional protocol of the NPT, and complies with the statutes of the Chemical Weapons Convention, real progress may be possible. The carrots could be considerable. The United States could help resolve bilateral issues, including the return of financial assets held since the revolution and the end of executive and legislative trade sanctions. Under these circumstances the United States should be prepared to work with Iran in developing investment opportunities in the region, including energy projects. Iran faces tough political choices with regard to its U.S. policy, but the Bush administration also needs to address Iran's security needs if terror is stopped and the bomb put on hold. It is unrealistic to expect Iran to stop its missile program or slowdown the modernization of its conventional forces absent a new cooperative regional security environment. For it is not only weapons of mass destruction that determine security priorities. The future of the U.S. military presence in the Arab world and the size and configuration of Iraq's restructured armed forces will be key factors influencing Iranian perceptions. The advanced status of the Iranian nuclear program has been revealed most explicitly in recent visits to the country by IAEA inspectors. It will soon be known whether or not Iran will comply with international pressures to sign the Additional Protocol to provide more transparency about its nuclear activities. Even if Iran takes this step, there will be many skeptics who will argue that such action will merely delay the day when Iran can get the bomb. The good news is that the international community, particularly the Europeans, Russians, and Japanese, now seem to share American concerns about what the Iranians are up to. If Iran continues to refuse to have a formal official dialogue with the United States to discuss each country's concerns, the probabilities for dangerous encounters will increase. Iran will not kowtow publicly to American demands, especially in view of the difficulties the United States continues to face in postwar Iraq. However if approached with a serious set of proposals, Iran's leaders might rethink their agenda. The United States should explore the possibilities for better relations while continuing its message on terrorism and WMD. If this opportunity is missed, the likelihood of confrontation will increase and, at an indeterminate time, an Iranian bomb will materialize. In the end, of course, diplomacy is meaningless unless it is backed by the prospect of force. Cooperative military planning, creating new security arrangements, covert military actions, defense cooperation and transfers that are aimed at limiting the harm Iran's nuclear activities might otherwise pose will all soon become urgent matters. What specifi cally needs to be done will be more fully detailed upon completion of this project's second phase. Bibliography: Towards a Nuclear Weapon-Free World', Statement of the Pugwash Council issued in Hiroshima, 30 Jul 2005. Read More