Rights for the Non-human Animals - Essay Example

Rights for the Non-human Animals Introduction Most of the existing legal systems are governed by the thought that animals are nothing but property. Rights theory has been widely used for ensuring the protection of the basic rights of nonhuman animals. Both the so-called fundamentalists and pragmatists of animal rights law often base their arguments on one version or another of rights theory. Still, there are a lot of differences between them on the nature of the rights for nonhuman animals. There are also disputes based on what is morally right and what is the effective strategy for ensuring the protection of animal rights. Many noted theorists such as Tom Regan, Julian Franklin, Evelyn B. Pluhar, Paola Cavalieri, Mark Rowlands and Gary Francione have made critical contributions to the cause of animal rights. The issue of animal rights involve many legal dilemmas about the direction of changes in the law, the degree of animal welfare must be sought, animal suffering-reduction, compulsory animal rights education and the nature of proto-rights for all animals. The purpose of the essay is to look at the possibilities of broadly defining rights theory in order to recognise the rights of nonhuman animals. The Background: Human-Nonhuman Animal Relations and Postmaterial Society Inglehart’s (1977) theoretical elaboration of the concept postmaterialism well captures the changes occurred in the last fifty years, especially with the developed countries. Postmaterialism also involves the changes brought about in the realm of human-nonhuman relations. Postmaterialism mainly deals with the value changes in the society as result of the profound transformations. Inglehart’s major point is that “the new “value-orientations” among people born after World War II yield better empirical purchase in the study of political movements than the “interests” at issue in the commonly deployed class-based theories. Referring to “quality of life” rather than to the instrumentally economic rationality typical of modernization, “Postmaterial values” arose from the conditions that liberated most people in developed countries from spending their lives on basic material demands and that opened new opportunities for self-expression and aesthetic satisfaction” (Franklin, Tranter and White, 2001, p. 129). Scarcity and socialisation are the basic themes which Inglehart follows in defining the attitude change towards animal rights. It is important to note that people can have differing opinions based on the resourcefulness of their background. Inglehart’s notion of existential security highlights the “the fundamental difference between growing up with an awareness that survival is precarious, and growing up with the feeling that one’s survival can be taken for granted” (Inglehart, 1997, p. 31). It does not mean that there is no place for materialism in the developed countries; materialism certainly could come to the forefront but postmaterialism is the dominant trend in the lives of the people in the advanced Western countries. Sica (1988) too has forcefully asserted that postmaterilaism is also essentially a product of postmodernisation. No more the societies in the developed world are determined by the forces of materialism either class based or rational-legal. Present world is increasingly characterised by cultural differences in which lifestyles play a prominent role in defining distinct social groups. Human-animal relations too are being completely reconstituted by the postmaterialist values. It is argued that “one of the most significant postmaterialist values that emerged on several fronts concerned the extension of civil rights and social inclusiveness, the breaking down of boundaries drawn on the basis of ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, and age. They were marked, that is, by acceptance of the equal moral subjecthood of former “others,” and this extended recognition, which began with humans, was not necessarily restricted to them” (Franklin, Tranter and White, 2001, p. 130). The Postmaterial society has, naturally, given birth to a postmaterial legality in terms animal rights wherein protecting rights have its own intrinsic and inherent values. Environmentalism is a key value in the postmaterialist ethics. Ecological harmony, especially with the animals is a central tenet of postmaterialism. Importantly, the ruminations on animal rights in the developed world are not simply a concern of a minority. Importantly, “animals have increasingly been discussed in the language of oppression, so effective in mobilizing other movements. Their homes and habitats are wantonly destroyed. They are subjected to cruel experiments, produced for meat under repressive factory systems, and hunted for sport. Unable to defend themselves against such oppression, both domesticated and wild animals have become increasingly in need” (Franklin, Tranter and White, 2001, p. 130). As human beings have certain control over the world and other species inhabiting this planet, they have certain responsibilities towards animals. The possibility for the extinction of many species too evokes the discourses on genocide. Moreover, the politics of animal rights has at least got tacit approval from the conventional mainstream movements. Most importantly, it has created a space for moral inclusiveness. Animal Welfare vs. Animal Rights Animal liberation movement is not a homogenous one. It has many splinter groups which see the animal rights differently and advocate different solutions to the issue of animal enslavement. In the 1970s, as part of the beginning of animal liberation movement, theorists such as Peter Singer and Tom Reagan provocatively advocated for liberating animals from human exploitation and oppression. It is well agreed by many theorists that “the term "animal rights" is used to describe any interest in improving the lives of nonhuman animals. The term is perhaps too loosely used by the public, however, as different theorists attach different meanings to the terms "rights" and "animal rights movement” (Albright, 2002, p. 918). However, rights itself is complicated term as it could be understood in many ways. It is true for animal rights as well. The rights in animal rights are understood and practised in multiple ways and, which changes from people to people and place to place. Many people have tried to speak against the conception of animal rights based on the idea of animal welfare. For the critics of animal welfare, it is not just enough to have animal welfare as it is just cover up for not recognising animals as persons. For instance, Sztybel (2007, p.1) forcefully argues that “animal welfare in standard cases is “animal illfare,” since in the meat industry and vivisection laboratories, for example, animals come to an ill-fate—a foreshortened life of intense suffering—as dominant and inevitable parts of these practices”. Animal welfarists in the standard sense are just the apologisers of a system which cruelly oppresses the animals and makes them slaves of human beings. Crucially, the welfarists aim nothing more than short term alleviation of ills towards animals with the help of law. Fundamentalists vs. Pragmatists Fundamentalism and pragmatism are the two strongest ideological currents in the animal liberation movement as they have developed different and distinct approaches to animal rights. It has been observed that “two chief concerns in animal rights law in the fundamentalism versus pragmatism debate is proposing laws that exhibit both moral integrity and effectiveness in not only relieving the suffering of animals, but in promoting the long-term goal of animal rights” (Sztybel, 2007, p. 1). For the fundamentalists, animal rights are no less than absolute and animal rights are a question of basic moral principles. On the other hand, animal rights pragmatists are of the view that “we ultimately act for sentient beings, rather than ultimately for abstract principles such as rights” (Sztybel, 2007, p. 1). Some fundamentalists are even holistic as they advocate perfect animal rights. But, partial fundamentalists do not insist for being perfectionists with relations to the practise of animal rights as they believe in the advocacy for proto-rights. The idea of proto-rights is mainly championed by Tom Reagan. According to the strong proto-right position, animal rights are not fully constituted yet but the interests of animals must be protected. On the contrary, from a weak proto-rights position, animal rights certainly involve the protection of their specific interest only up to a particular degree. Most the animal rights pragmatists believe that “welfarist laws aiming to reduce animal suffering may be best morally and practically from a pragmatist perspective” (Sztybel, 2007, p. 2). It is interesting to note that both the pragmatists and fundamentalists agree that, in terms of legality, the goal of animal rights is to reduce animal suffering at the hands of human beings. The basic fundamentalist position is that “there is a departure from what is morally right, as embodied by animal liberation, and therefore some proponents of suffering reduction laws are morally wrong. Yet another way to express this idea is that certain suffering-reduction advocates such as PETA are part of the problem, not the solution of the abolition of animal exploitation” (Sztybel, 2007, p. 3). It means that most of the legal provisions for animal welfare are although good for reducing suffering, they are not morally adequate and complicit with the existing practices that degrade animal lives. What is actually necessary is to have a new legal standing for the animals within the juridical-legal system. According to Wise (2000), animals could be counted as persons in any sophisticated legal system and they must have legal standing in court room. In Albright’s understanding (2002, p. 917), “Wise's theory presents a framework for extending legal protections to animals based on the values currently embraced by the American legal system. However, this approach extends legal rights to a select species of animals that are deemed to possess rationality”. Therefore, animal rights are not simply a question of suffering reduction but more holistically, a question of restoring personhood to animals. The Non-issue of Rationality In Reagan’s (1983) philosophical formulation, animals are what he terms as ‘subjects-of-a-life’. As human beings are not valued based on their rational capabilities, the same must be applied to non-human animals. Reagan, although borrowed much from Kant, he fully rejects the Kantian notion of reserving respect only to rational beings. Respect, on the other hand, must be ascribed as an inherent value as we do in the case of infants and mentally challenged people. Rationality is not something common among the human beings; it is the fact that our lives matters to us is the principle on which we respect each other. Also, the moral rights of non-human animals cannot be put aside. Although Singer (1995) have identified widely as an advocate of utilitarian approach, he is no way against the rights approach towards animal liberation as he thinks that the principles of justice and equality must be applied to all species equally. Rather, moral rights are not limited to human species alone. What is important is the ability of all beings to experience life and living. The life of a being always matters to itself, in spite of what others perceive of its life. In other words, all beings experience their being as a subject-of-a-life. If we agree that life has inherent value, we must agree that all beings have moral rights. Once we abide by the moral rights of all beings, it becomes fully necessary to appreciate the raison d’etre of all subjects-of-a-life. There are multiple opinions on the formulation of particular laws from the existing discourses on animal rights and animal liberation. It is argued that “laws that would satisfy the requirement of animal rights are generally not a possibility in the short-term for legislatures, although individuals or groups can indeed adopt an animal rights ethic. So pure animal rights law in the short-term is not a “better” choice if it is not a choice at all” (Sztybel, 2007, p. 3). It is often noted that strong proto-rights could eventually lead to better legal reforms. In the short term, it may be advisable to pursue welfarist measures such as suffering-reduction than meta-legal rights which are abstract universals. The Legality of Animal Rights The quest for the legality of animal rights is motivated by the argument that nonhuman animals must also be considered as persons with lives under the law and therefore, they must have legal standing as persons under a democratic legal system. At the beginning, animals such as chimpanzees and bonobos must given legal standing as they possess the necessary mental capabilities to be considered as independent persons. The idea is that the rights of animals must also be judicially and legally acknowledged as it is in the case of human beings. However, it is important to note that animal intelligence is different from human intelligence both qualitatively and quantitatively. Obviously, rationality and sentience of animals are quite different from those of human beings. If an animal fails the rationality test, we must understand that it fails in the rationality test framed up by, for and of human beings. On the other hand, there must be caring ethic which could positively recognise the needs of animals bodily security and physical and mental integrity. Such a recognition must not be based on their rationality; on the other hand, it must evolve from the idea that animals too are emotional beings and capable of having healthy relationships with other members of their own species and human beings. Tester (1992) provides us with an account of the humanity of animal rights in which the idea that there exist a rigid boundary between animals and humans is deeply questioned. The more animals interact with human, the more humanised they become. However, the problem with the argument is that human beings are radically different from animals in their moral stature so that there cannot be any equalisation of animals and humans in terms of moral standing. Animal Rights Activists The worldview and outlook of practitioners have certain effects on the pursuit of any discourse. There are many conceptions not only about animal rights but also about animal rights activists too. According to Rowan, Lowe and Weer (1995) the people involved in the animal liberation movement are most likely to be youngsters with graduate degrees than the general public. It also points out the education is an important factor in the making of broader calls for animal liberation. A survey conducted by Jamison and Lunch too proves that animal rights activists are not morally incapable; on the other hand, they are often highly educated and capable of sophisticated moral reasoning for the cause of the rights protection of both animals and humans. Galvin and Herzog have found in their studies that animal rights activists are more or less governed by an absolutist ethical ideology for they think that “a belief in universal moral principles and that adherence to such principles will lead to positive consequences” (1992, p. 146). Herrick (1990) has noted that there is widespread belief that the concerns of animal rights activists regarding the rights of animals and human beings are mutually exclusive. Animal rights activists are portrayed to be having less concern for humans than animals. However, Reagan (1983) considers that the followers of animal rights approach do favour less utilitarianism than ontological ethical principles. As animal rights do not exist in opposition to human rights, animal rights activists to have any antagonistic relations to human rights. Animal Liberation and Ecofeminism Many theorists are of the view that there are many parallels between the subjugation of women by men and the oppression and exploitation of animals by human. Both co-exist in a patriarchal society. Albright (2002, p.917) argues that “ecofeminism is a theory that draws connections between the domination over women and the domination over nature and nonhuman animals. It identifies patriarchal value systems as the common source of both the cultural validation of environmental destruction and violence against women and animals”. Only through the creation of a deep going feminist care ethic which could completely transform human civilisational ethos, there could be the liberation of both women and animals. It necessitates the challenging of the patriarchal understanding of man’s rationality and reason. Therefore, it is asserted that “ecofeminist animal welfare theorists criticize the classic concept of animal "rights," which places importance on the idea that rationality and sentience of animals is similar to human reason. Animal "rights" theory, as it is used both in Wise's book and in the animal welfare movement in general, therefore withholds protections from those animals who fail a "rationality" test” (Albright, 2002, p. 917). The point is that the care ethics can overcome the pitfalls of Kantian rationality approach in understanding the rights of animals. It is also important that human beings as rational beings have an ethical responsibility to end the suffering of animals by humans. Therefore, the basis of animal rights must be the animals’ ability to have emotional relationships and human moral and ethical responsibilities. Wilson (1997) argues that animals, especially companion animals are extended members of human family and their contributions to human health and well being must be adequately taken account of while we examine the idea of animal rights. Conclusion As the societies shift from being materialist to postmaterialist, there emerges new lifestyles which are based on new ethics, legality and rationality. The ethics, legality and rationality of animals rights are very much products of the emergent postmaterialist society. Animal rights must be seen the from the perspective Franklin’s (1999) idea of hybridity of nature-culture than the rigorous but artificial separation of nature from culture and vice versa. It is important to note that animal human relations are increasingly being redefining by advent of postmodernisation of society in which immaterial values have primacy over material concerns. Animals must have legal rights against suffering, exploitation and oppression as they too are characterised by having the ability to live their lives freely in this planet. The simple fact that animals too are subject of life is enough to recognise their fundamental rights as nonhuman animals. Neither animal rights nor animal rights have anything in opposition to the rights and morality of human beings. There is no zero sum game involved between the rights of humans and nonhuman animals. It is important to overcome the patriarchal lifestyles which govern many societies in order to liberate both animals and women both are subjugated by man. Animals must be legally recognised as living persons capable of leading their won emotional lives in their own means. Bibliography Albright, KM 2002, ‘The extension of legal rights to animals under a caring ethic: An ecofeminist exploration of Steven Wise's rattling the cage’, Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 42, Fall, pp. 915- 937. Franklin, A 1999, Animals and modern cultures: A sociology of human-animal relations in modernity, London, Sage. Franklin, A, Tranter, B and White R 2001, ‘Explaining support for animal rights: A comparison of two recent approaches to humans, nonhuman animals, and postmodernity’, Society & Animals, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 127- 144. Galvin, SL and Herzog, HA Jr. 1992, ‘Ethical ideology, animal rights activism, and attitudes toward the treatment of animals’, Ethics and Behavior, Vol. 2, pp. 141-149. 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