Companion to Wittgensteins Tractatus - Essay Example

? PART I. Question The basic metaphysical problems of logical form or representations when conjoined with that which they represent, is a central and general problem in Wittgestein related to what Max Black refers as ‘transempirical’ concepts. Regarding how these are known, the above quote indicates that Wittgenstein claims that these forms “show themselves”, which Black asserts is similar to the way in which “the Great Bear” shows itself as a constellation in the stars [Black14]. However, Black adds further that this notion of showing itself, “fails to resolve the metaphysical perplexity – how can language be connected with the world?”. He argues that Wittgenstein addresses this by “invoking . . . further elementary propositions”, which is akin to the following analogy: “if a child is puzzled why a stamp sticks to an envelope, it will hardly help him to be told that lots of other stamps can stick to envelopes” [Black 15]. In other words, Wittgenstein’s is an explanation that compounds and merely ‘adds on’ the notion or idea of an explanation, and in Black’s analogy, this amounts to a tautology at best, and at worst, a circular argument – e.g. stamps stick to envelopes, because other stamps stick to envelopes. The following will examine the 'picture theory' of language and how it relates tautologically or as a 'self contradiction'. In Wittgenstein's early philosophy, language is viewed as fundamentally limited because of intrinsic contradictions, and those lie with how it it is reconciled with reality – how reality is represented.. It will be demonstrated how this attempt at a reconciliation itself, constitutes a theory of ontology or a definition concerning the nature of reality which calls a 'picture theory'. One can anticipate so far a fairly absurd situation in the Tractatus with regard to what might be described as a near impossible criteria for picturing. On the one hand, these pictures are definitively asserted by Wittgenstein to depict or denote reality ("The picture is a model of reality"[Tract. 2.21], and at the same time, such pictures are only accurate iff they are factual: "The picture agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true or false" [Tract. 2.21]. The absurdity lies in the possibility of the program itself, that is, the general program which is what constitutes the context of the picture theory of meaning is ascribe and ascertain a "totality of facts". He claims at the outset of the text that "the world is the totality of facts, not of things"[Tract. 1.1]. So, to take this absurdity one step further, a metaphor is necessary to describe this wider program. Wittgenstein's picture theory, once reduced to being either factually true or factually false, is equivalent to an attempt to draw a map of the world on a 1:1 ratio. That is, a picture perfect image where there is no discernible difference between the difference of the description of things, alongside with the very description itself. This is of course, close to being impossible, the world which Wittgenstein is referring to is a world of "facts", and the picture theory of meaning is one which is not describing the world of the senses, although the senses can often perceive factually true phenomena. To use a metaphor from a fairly obtuse philosopher, Martin Heidegger, there is a distinction between the "earth and world" for Wittgenstein, and if one mistakes his world for the earth (or, that which is perceived by the senses), then, one lapses into viewing the totality of facts as pictured, as achieving nothing less than a map of the earth on a 1:1 ratio. This is of course absurd, which is in a sense why one has to view the Tractatus as a type of idealism., and more importantly a theory of ontology or of the nature of reality. Further, his concern resembles more of a possible world than an actual world in this regard, and one might phrase this program in the following way: supposing one wanted to exhaust the possibilities of truth, what type of formal system along with its considerations would constitute such a model for this agenda? None other than pictures which were either true or false in terms of how they depict the world. But, this again, is a world of facts, and not necessarily the earth to use again the Heideggerean metaphor. Thus, there is a program or context in which the picture theory lies, which has little or nothing to do with the type of 'reference' and this context must be stated in terms of an agenda linked with the agenda of true and false propositions, which of course, are the constituents as mentioned of facts. The central argument in support of this thesis, can be construed at the juncture where Wittgenstein deals with truth and falsity itself, which comes much later in the text than section two. When Wittgenstein defines the essence of truth and falsity or true and false propositions, he claims that these amount to nothing but tautologies, and further, they convey nothing about the actual world -- that is, the earth or sensible realm. If propositions and pictures state facts, and second, if facts state either truth or falsity, then, pictures and propositions are both tautological and say nothing at all, they are, as he says "nonsense", which implies that they say nothing about the world of senses. So, for a proposition p, it is either the "case or not case": (Fp)(p V -p). Once transposed into ordinary language, as Wittgenstein does, it resounds as the following it is true that it is either raining or not raining (p or not p). This is a perfectly true statement, but also a perfect non-sensible statement -- that is, it does not actually tell you whether it is raining or not raining, even though it conveys what a perfectly true statement is, in form but not content (or, sense): "I know, e.g. nothing about the weather, when I know that it rains or does not rain" [Tract. 4..461]. By contrast, meaning in Wittgenstein is indissociable from "facts". If the world is a the totality of facts, and these facts are conveyed through pictures, and finally, these facts are reducible to being either true or false, then, his picture theory says nothing at all save for what the form of a true proposition would look like. In this regard, Wittgenstein's Tractatus allows for the possibility of saying something "clearly", but at the same time saying nothing about actual sensible referents, given that the criteria of clarity which is truth and falsity are also tautological. In sum, it has been argued that this theory constitutes a type of ‘idealism’ or an idealism of at least a 'linguistic representation' of 'reality. If such a theory or a picture which corresponds with reality (e.g. form and content) results in a meaningless tautology, it might be argued that the ‘limitations’ of logic and its relation to the world, if understood, might be a departure point in order to contemplate “that which must be passed over in silence”. In other words, by exhausting the limits of reason concerning reality, perhaps there is another and more ‘silent’ means which Wittgenstein sought in order to establish to fulfil what Max Black refers to as the “metaphysical obsession” [Black 18]. PART II. Question Number 2. HEIDEGGER Heidegger characterizes human existence as 'being-in-the-world'. This expression contains two notions: 'being-in' and 'in-the-world'. Thus, human existence is essentially 'being-in'. It involves the idea of 'there'(Da). So human existence is the 'Da' of the 'Sein' of the world. In other words, it is in the 'there' of human existence, i.e., in his 'being-in' the world that being is disclosed. Dasein's 'being-in' is the basis of his familiarity with the world and in which the structure of the world is disclosed. The main concern, of this section is to dwell on the nature of Dasein by analyzing the way in which Dasein is in his 'there', viz., his 'being-in'. In elaborating this point, we will consider the meaning and modes of Dasein's 'being-in' and knowing the world as a typical mode of Dasein's 'being-in'. Dasein's 'being-in' is not the same as "withinness", in which sense we speak of one present-at-hand essent in another. Here the term 'in' is taken in its spatial sense and we consider something as containing a thing [Heidegger, 236]. For example, apple is in the basket, water is in the bucket and the garment is in the cupboard. "`Being-in' is distinct from the present-at-hand insideness of something present-at-hand 'in' something else that is present-at-hand". So Dasein's 'being-in' does not mean a spatial 'in-one-anotherness' or 'side-by-sideness' . 'Being-in' also is not to be understood on the subject-object schema because such a schema would divide the 'being-in' between the subject and the object, which amounts to side-by-side presence of the present-at-hand entities as the subject and object. Dasein's 'being-in' is not spatial, but existential. In this sense, the term 'in' derives from terms to reside, and to dwell. Thus, 'being-in' here means 'to be at home with', 'to reside alongside', 'to be familiar with', 'to be involved in' and 'to be entrusted with that familiarity with the world about'. In this sense we speak of someone 'being in a profession', 'being in a conspiracy' and 'being in love'. Here 'being-in' refers to a personal and existential 'inhood' which implies the relationship of dwelling and involvement [Heidegger, 238]. Thus, 'being-in' means Dasein's being accustomed to his environment and in relationship to the entities of his surroundings. In other words, it involves Dasein's entanglement with things of his world. Dasein's `being-in' comes in various ways. It consists in having to do something, producing something, consuming something, abandoning something, interrogating, considering, and determining. All these activities show Dasein's interest in things and his concern for them. They can be called Dasein's caretaking [Heidegger, 245ff.]. The care-taking or 'being-in' is not an occasional property of Dasein which he sometimes has and other times does not have. We cannot speak of Dasein without his 'being-about' with entities. So 'being-in' is the essence of Dasein's being. The most fundamental trait of Dasein's 'being-in' is what Heidegger calls the disclosedness of Dasein: "Dasein is its (his) disclosedness." Hence, Dasein's 'being-in' or 'there' is the clearing within which the world is discovered or disclosed. Referring to the traditional metaphor of human nature in man, Heidegger says that this metaphor is an ontic way of pointing to the existential-ontological structure of human existence as disclosedness. To say that Dasein is 'lit up' means that as 'being-in-the-world' he is cleared or is a lighting-process. Dasein is illumined not by any other kind of being, but by his opened-up-ness to entities, which belongs to his very structure. It is the clearing of Dasein towards all entities of the world and is the basis of his familiarity with the world; it enables Dasein to encounter entities and be involved with them. Dasein's 'being-in' is identical with the disclosedness of the world. To quote Heidegger: ". . . the world is 'there' its being-there is (Dasein's) 'being-in'."/ We could say that Dasein's 'being-in' is a state of Dasein's being, in which as opened-up-ness or the lighting-process he dwells among entities in concernful dealings and discovers them in their being. It is ultimately difficult to ‘transcend’ the ‘otherness’ of social existence, or social life, and therefore, such an attempt can really only provide for a state of alienation, and arguably a form of false consciousness (not Sartre’s sense). One of the assumptions that Heidegger makes is the capacity to negate the nothing of ones past, and the others (the rest of us normal individuals). However, it is questionable as whether such an undetermined self is in this act of negating (and of course, with what consequences?). As a counter-argument to such a self, consider the following argument. If, for example, I was to negate, etc., and affirm my ‘being’ as a free self, it would follow that I could offer some form of a definition of this ‘free self’. Thus, it would follow that I could define ‘the self’. Yet, through the very fact of defining my self, or ‘the self’, I am drawn to the recognition that I am intimately tied with my community in some sense. To define myself, is to literally employ words – that is, in finding the attributes which I recognise as being that which defines myself. However, it is plausible that a further recognition could take place in this activity, and that is the recognition that the words/concepts which I am employing, belong to the community, and this was stressed within the context of Heidegger’s ‘being in the world’. This presents a paradox. If I am free and independent, is it possible to freely know myself without the mediation of my community? Is it possible in this sense, to independently employ words and concepts which are essentially a private language? The language of everydayness is important because it says a lot about what Heidegger meant by language. That is, even though what was being talked about had a somewhat negative connotation. The line between the social and the individual is one that is at the forefront of consideration. 'Being in the World' is a fundamental fact about human existence, but so too with finitude. Part of being socialised, involves a relationship with language and one of the forms or types of language that Heidegger is most critical of, is the language associated with the throwness of everydayness, which is a mouthful. Our struggle with language as individuals, is a struggle with finitude or our own finitude which stands as a 'fact' about our ontology. Work’s Cited: Black, Max. (1982). A Companion to Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Heidegger, Martin. (1961). Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie. New York: Harper & Row. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1961). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul. PHILOSOPHY: 2 QUESTIONS. WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEW OF LANGUAGE AND II # 2 HEIDEGGER'S NOTION OF 'BEING IN THE WORLD'. Read More