How Exceptional Is the Middle East Compared to Other Regions of the Globe - Assignment Example

Religion and Theology By How exceptional is the Middle East compared to other regions of the globe? Discuss your answer with references to debates about the lack of democracy in the region. The Middle East covers the area from Morocco through Afghanistan characterised by semi-aridity and desert conditions as well as nomadism and dominated by Islam (Keddie 1973). However, the term Middle East according to Keddie (1973) is a nineteenth Century abstraction and did not exist in history. This region is known for its limitations to the present political understandings, thus considered to be exceptional. Most of the regions of the world have embraced and practise democracy except the Middle East. This essay discusses the exceptionality of the Middle East with regard to democratization, as compared to other regions across the globe. Different literature has addressed the aspect of democratization in the Middle East and the factors that continue to hinder countries in the Middle East from adopting democracy. Bellin (2004) observed that since the year 1972, the number of democracies across the world has doubled but the Middle East has remained adamant in embracing democratization. In the year 2004, only two countries in the Middle East would qualify as democracies, and the number had decreased from three that was observed in 1972. The Middle East has also stagnated with regard to promoting political rights and civil liberties. Similarly, the number of countries that embrace these aspects have increased over the years in different regions including Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe and America but no significant change has been observed in the Middle East (Bellin 2004). This therefore, sets the Middle East aside from other regions of the world. According to Boose (2012), the Middle East remained unaffected by the last (third) search of democracy that hit Eastern Europe as well as Latin America between 80s and 90s. Most scholars have argued that it is impossible for the Middle East to accept or experience democratization because of different factors that exist in the region. This therefore, implies that the Middle East has unique factors from other world regions that bar democratization from existing in the region. Some arguments posit that third wave of democratization spanning across Eastern Europe as well as Latin America ending in the 90s was the last and that democratization was over thus there would no longer be any transitions to democracy. Boose (2012) is however opposed to this view in the sense that the recent Arab spring and uprisings that have been witnessed in the Arab world are evidence that it is still possible for countries in the Middle East to transition to democratic states. The Middle East region has a culture that is different from other world regions. Therefore, some arguments on the lack of democratization in the Middle East have based on the cultural aspect. It is sometimes argued that Islam is incompatible with democracy, even as Islam is the dominant religion in the Middle East region. Culture and religion are in this case considered as the main hindrances to democracy in the Middle East (Boose 2012). This therefore, has been one way of explaining the lack of democratization in the Middle East and instead the prevalence of authoritarian regimes as opposed to other world regions that have readily embraced democratization. Compared to other regions of the world, some scholars have argued that the Middle East region lacks the prerequisites for democracy. This approach of explaining non-democracy in the Middle East focuses on both the cultural and political realms in the Middle East. For instance, the region is considered to lack sufficient income, a strong civil society, adequate literacy levels, democratic culture, democratic neighbours and a market-driven economy, yet all these are presumed to be necessary for any stable democracy to form (Bellin 2004). Therefore, unless there is an improvement on these cultural and political aspects, it might be hard for the Middle East to experience democracy. The countries in the Middle East have before the revolutions been characterised by a political system of either monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and the Gulf countries, or one party authoritarian states such as Syria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. However, it is notable that most one party authoritarian states as opposed to monarchies have experienced revolutions in a high level. In the case of the former one party authoritarian states, it is believed that people lived in fear before because of the possible consequences they would face if they were to oppose their authoritarian governments. On the other hand, in monarchies, it has been hard for people to revolt because legitimacy embodied by the king or prince, especially their perceived connection to the higher power as well as the influence of faith in Middle East politics (Boose 2012). In conclusion, the Middle East remains quite exceptional compared to other regions of the world, and this is mainly with regard to the aspect of democratization. Many countries in different regions across the globe have embraced democratization and are democratic states, while the Middle East still grapples with democratization. Different arguments on why Middle East is yet to embrace democratization have taken different approaches, including the cultural and political approaches in providing explanations. Nonetheless, judging by the previous revolutions experienced in some Middle East countries, there is hope that the Middle East might one day be a democratic region. In what ways have the New Historians challenged commonly held assumptions about the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict? What is at stake in this debate? The new historians consist a new group of historians that have focused on challenging the traditional assumptions about the history of Israel, the role of Israel in the 1948 exodus and perception of Arab to forge peaceful ties with Israel (Karsh 1999). In order to validate their ‘claims’ the new historians are known to use government papers as a primary source of evidence. Post-Zionists have readily adopted the conclusions of the new historians and even incorporated them in their ideology. Nonetheless, the new historians have varying political views and they also focus on different parts/periods in history. This essay will discuss how the new historians have challenged commonly held assumptions about the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The past historiography claims that in the year 1947, the Palestinian Arabs left their homes voluntarily after they were temporarily asked to do by the Arab leaders. However, one of the new historians, Morris, was the first to provide a different account of this and revealed that the Palestinians were forced to flee because the Zionists had expelled them compulsorily from their land and the Zionists’ militia invaded the villages where some Palestinians lived. Morris also noted that the Zionists massacred Palestinians and a version of his work was published in the year 2004 (Ottman 2008). Zionism is an ideology that is based on the establishment of the national home of the Jewish people in Palestine. When analyzing Israel by traditional history, what emerges is the notion of Israel being a ‘victim.’ The official historians have noted that Zionism came about as a result of pressures and persecutions from the gentiles though the Zionists had no bad ill against the Palestinian Arabs, but the Arabs turned down any reconciliatory efforts from the Zionists and attacked the Jews in 1948-9 (Mayamey 2010). This has been the popular view point that has been communicated to the masses through official historians, memoirs and biographers. However, the new historians have used declassified evidence to provide a different account, which perceives the Jews as aggressive people who forcefully took over Palestine in order to establish their home and acted in their own self interest irrespective of the Palestinian population in Palestine. For instance, Morris, one of the new historians, in his 1987 work explained how the Jews displaced Arabs in Palestine and caused 750000 Palestinians to be refugees. Another new historian, Ilan Pappe, substantiated the claims made by Morris basing on Plan Delat, a military strategy that the Jew developed in which they outlined how the Arabs would be destroyed whenever found in the places that had been awarded to Israel by the UN. Thus Plan Delat according to Pappe, was a major plan to have as many Palestinians as possible executed by the Jews (Mayamey 2010). The alternative views of the new historians has elicited a hot debate among academicians on the legitimacy of Zionism as an ideology based on suffering and persecution of the Jewish people. If at all it were right to go with the alternative explanations of the new historians about Zionism, then this would bring into question the very existence of Israel since it would become apparent that the memory of its establishment was built on fabricated myths as the new historians would want people to believe. However, the new historians have been criticized for distorting evidence in order to support preconceived claims and misconceptions about the Jewish people (Mayamey 2010). Although the new historians have propagated myths about the history of Israel, some flaws have been found in their myths and thus their authenticity questioned. For instance, the central myth that the new historians have propagated about the Jews is that in 1947, the Zionists and Hashemites reached an agreement to carve up on Palestine and this was the basis of mutual restraint in 1948. According to this myth, the Zionists were objected to the creation of a Palestinian state. However, examination of the evidence used in the fabrication of this myth has revealed that the perspective of the new historians on this is baseless (Karsh 1999). In conclusion, new historians have over the past years developed alternative explanations of the history of Israel, including the Arab-Israel conflict. This has therefore, resulted in the need for a re-examination of the history of Israel, including the birth of Israel as a state in order to ascertain that the history of Israel was built on fabricated myths by the original historians. Nonetheless, more criticism has been pointed toward the new historians as no evidence has been found to authenticate or validate their perspectives and explanations of the history of Israel, including the Arab-Israel conflict. Nonetheless, the new alternative explanations provided by the new historians continue to have implications for Israel as a state and influences how the Israelis today view their past as well as their future. Compare and contrast the post-revolutionary transitions in Egypt and Tunisia Almost four years have elapsed since the commencing of the Arab Spring near the end of the year 2010. There are different countries that experienced uprisings and unsettled and violent uprisings that had significant influence on them even in the aftermath of the uprisings. Egypt and Tunisia are among the countries that witnessed revolutions and both shared a similar purpose to oppose the rule at that time which they considered to be authoritarian. Nonetheless, Egypt and Tunisia had varying outcomes from the similar revolutions they engaged in. This essay therefore, compares and contrasts the post-revolutionary transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. The most similar outcome of the revolutions experienced in Tunisia and Egypt is that both countries experienced transitions in their regimes. The first uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia led to the quick overthrowing of the presidents of these two countries, even as the state institutions in these countries, mainly the army, abandoned the then president Mubarak of Egypt and Ben Ali of Tunisia. These two countries thus acquired new regimes after the revolutions (Darwisheh 2014; Mark, Jamal & Mazur n.d). There was however a difference between Tunisia and Egypt post-revolution. In Tunisia, the army took a neutral position from the revolution and let the replacement of the president be made in a constitutional manner while the military in Egypt took the side of the revolution and took over presidency claiming to protect the people. In the case of Tunisia therefore, civilian authority was responsible for the transfer of power from Ben Ali. In the contrast, in Egypt, the military had refused to relinquish power and the post-Mubarak transition in Egypt was quite challenging even as it was impossible to form a united front and come up with a new constitution (Mark, Jamal & Mazur n.d). In Tunisia, the civil society played a major role in the post-revolutionary transition, including ensuring balance of power between oppositional forces in the political process even as the country lacked strong mechanism of dictating the rules of transition. After the revolutions, Tunisia was able to develop a process of setting up commissions that would deal with different social and political aspects in the country, including corruption, human rights violations as well as elections and democratic reforms. The commission in charge of elections in Tunisia later came up with electoral rules and an oversight organization in charge of the electoral process. Although Nahda, an Islamic political party secured the majority seats in the National Assembly, it did not lead to the monopoly by Islamists in the constitution making process since decision-making was not based on the majority. Nonetheless, the power-sharing characteristic of Tunisia’s post-revolutionary politics prevented the country from finding itself in the same predicament as Egypt’s “zero sum” stalemate involving opposing groups including Egypt’s MB and supporters, the old regime and anti-MB masses (Darwisheh 2014) In Tunisia, the political party Nahda did not regard power sharing with liberal forces to be a threat, unlike in Egypt where the MB was engaged in unending conflicts with rival parties, anti-Brotherhood forces and state institutions. Additionally, the effect of the “Salafi factor” was experienced differently on Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia. While Salafi factor reduced the fear of Islamists in Tunisia, as Salafis did not contest in the elections, it increased the fear of Islamists in Egypt, where the Salafis contested in the elections and won a fifth of the parliamentary seats. In Tunisia, although an Islamist party won, Islam did not take over politics in the country. In the contrast, in Egypt, the Islamists mobilised the amendment of the country’s 1971 constitution and it became clear that non-Islamists had no chances of having control in the parliament (Darwisheh 2014). After the revolutions, Tunisia was able to create many transition institutions including the General Confederation of Tunisian Labor (UCGT), the Bar Association and the Association of Judges, among others that consisted of civil society groups and political parties. This enabled the cohesion of different political elites in the country and ensured a smooth transition. In the contrast, Egypt failed in this regard, as the Islamist and non-Islamist groups in the country were opposed to one another thus hampering negotiations. This mainly led to the non-Islamist groups to side with the military and oppose the MB, thus perpetuating polarization. The MB faced many challenges and constraints and this made transition in Egypt to be quite challenging (Darwisheh 2014). In conclusion, Tunisia and Egypt have been seen to share a similar aspect of both participating in revolution though with different outcomes. Both countries participated in the revolution with a similar goal of getting rid of the authoritarian rule that had persisted in their countries. The two countries were able to achieve this goal with the revolution, as they both did away with their authoritarian presidents. However, the process of transition was highly different between Tunisia and Egypt, especially based on the success of their transition. Tunisia is seen to have been successful in its transitioning, while Egypt was faced with a multitude of challenges that hindered its smooth transition. Works Cited Bellin, E 2004, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 139-157. Boose, J. W 2012, “Democratization and Civil Society: Libya, Tunisia and the Arab Spring,” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 310 – 316. Darwisheh, H 2014, “Trajectories and Outcomes of the Arab Spring: Comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria,” IDE Discussion Papers. Karsh, E 1999, “Fabricating Israel History: The New Historians,” Accessed from http://duncankennedy.net/documents/Is-Pal/First-Syllabus/Efraim-Karsh-Fabricating-Israeli-History.pdf, 20 June 2015 Keddie, N 1973, “Is there a Middle East?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 4: 255-271. Mark, B., Jamal, A. & Mazur, K , n.d, “Who Participated in the Arab Spring? A Comparison of Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions,” Accessed from http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/beissinger.tunisiaegyptcoalitions.pdf, 20 June 2015. Mayamey, B 2010, “Zionism: A Critical Account 1897-1948. The Development of Israel and the Exodus of Palestine from A “New Historian” Perspective,” POLIS Journal, Vol 4, 1-34. Ottman, E. T 2008, “A question of historiography: the “new historians” of Israel,” Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, 2008. ISSN 1347-8214. Vol.7, pp. 55-67. Read More