Descartes Third Meditation: Proving the Existence of God - Essay Example

Descartes’ Third Meditation: Proving the Existence of God Introduction The Third Meditation is an attempt to generate a metaphysical outcome, God’s existence and truth. Descartes claims that God is self-caused. This argument leads to doubts that a capable cause should be different from its effect, and hence the idea of self-causation is incoherent (Wilson 2003). Descartes takes into account the probability that he, being a thinking entity with a notion of God ‘in the capacity of’ absolutely faultless being, is caused by a thing different from himself. As Descartes states (Bonnen & Flage 1999, 73): In respect of this cause one may again inquire whether it derives its existence from itself or from another cause. If from itself, then it is clear from what has been said that it is itself God, since if it has the power of existing through its own might, then undoubtedly it also has the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has an idea—that is, all the perfections which I conceive to be in God. If, on the other hand, it derives its existence from another cause, then the same question may be repeated concerning this further cause, namely whether it derives its existence from itself or from another cause, until eventually the ultimate cause is reached, and this will be God. Descartes presents two evidences of that outcome. Each piece of evidence states that an identified effect can be clarified as long as an all-powerful being is present. The effects Descartes draws on are the meditator’s idea of (1) his/her life as predetermined and (2) of God. In this manner, Descartes directs the meditator to dig up his well-known rule for unraveling the truth, which is ‘clear and distinct perceptions are true’ (Cunning 2010, 62). And, undoubtedly, a great deal of the Third Meditation focuses on whether the assumption of a misleading God, which appears to dispute the rule, can be eliminated (Wilson 2003). The application of the rule in assessing and disputing the deceiving-God assumption has encouraged a number of scholars to accuse Descartes of circular reasoning. Proving the Existence and the Veracity of God In the Third Meditation, Descartes further claims that, fundamentally, God’s existence as his maker is a circumstance of his taking part in inquiry informed by the method of doubt. This allows him to analyze with absolute confidence that God made him, and hence that all he knows ‘clearly’ and ‘distinctly’ to be factual, is factual. God’s existence, in that case, is an external state of Descartes’s doubt (Gaukroger 2006). Apparently, God is not external with regard to taking up a space that is in some way external to the doubter: “God does not occupy space at all” (Cunning 2010, 88). Instead, God is external with regard to the premise that He is an entity different from Descartes and his conditions. Similar to God, absolute objects are ‘external’ entities with regard to the premise that they are different from the meditator and his conditions (Cunning 2010); dissimilar from God, they take up space. The premise of Descartes in the Third Meditation on the existence of God is a form of cosmological premise, progressing from a conditional basis about what exists to the final assumption that this is not likely to exist if not were ‘caused to exist by God’ (Descartes 2007, 45). Descartes in fact presents two quite divergent cosmological premises in the Third Meditation (Descartes 2007, 46): (1) investigating the source of my notion of God, and (2) the beginning of me. However, my notion of God will not be present without me, and the next premise moves on to the argument that I should have a notion of God. Hence, both premises have a similar conditional basis (Broughton 2003, 144): I exist and have an idea of God. Both arguments are powered by principles concerning causality; it is those principles that, when applied to the contingent premise, yield the conclusion that God exists. The second premise embodies a more difficult composition and uses insights about time and ideals that the first premise misses out. However, the second premise cannot miss out the causal conditions of the first one, which basically are only this: ‘from nothing, nothing comes’ (Broughton 2003, 145). The conditional basis and the causal rule do not lead to the final knowledge Descartes desires in any evident manner. For example (Broughton 2003, 145): 1. I have an idea of God. 2. From nothing, nothing comes. 3. So, God exists. We would certainly ridicule an argument that proceeded in apparent parallel: 1. I have an idea of Athene. 2. From nothing, nothing comes. 3. So, Athene exists. Of course, Descartes believes that the concept of God has something exceptional that distinguishes it from a concept similar to that of Athene. Moreover, Descartes believes it is important to learn how to modify the causal rule for effects that are concepts in an individual’s thoughts (Chappell 1997). What are fascinating about the assumption of the Third Meditation is what it showcases about Descartes’s notion of the method of doubt, specifically, what it is intended to produce, and how it ought to function. Descartes’s Circular Reasoning Descartes has been charged with circular reasoning, or logical fallacy, in his Meditations. This circular reasoning appears in instances where Descartes seems to argue that idea of God necessitates idea of God. Even though he exerts a bold and unsurprising effort to avoid circular reasoning, his assumptions encourage the audience to either reject a significant part of his perspective, or recognizing that one should discontinue the method of doubt at his preferred repetitiveness where ‘clear and distinct’ ideas ensure truth for they are ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’ (Tweyman 2007). Descartes argues that for him to be assured of his existence, he should be capable of gaining knowledge of things needed for assurance. Descartes claims that his definite idea of existence expresses a clear and distinct insight. Hence, Descartes argues that certainty of the ideas’ truth is dependent on ‘clarity’ and ‘distinction’ and hence, creates the universal rule (Chappell 1997, 239): “… whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.” The logical fallacy of Descartes’ arguments is manifested by them being caused by clear and distinct ideas that are themselves dependent on definite idea of the existence of God for their truth, but this idea itself necessitates factual insights (Bailey 2004, 50): Now, however, I have perceived that God exists, and at the same time I have understood that everything else depends on him, and that he is no deceiver; and I have drawn the conclusion that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true. In the above passage Descartes claims that he recognizes the existence of God. Idea of God’s absolute righteousness necessitates that he would not mislead Descartes into having clear and distinct views that were untrue. Thus, due to this idea, which is merely achieved through the factual view of the existence of God, Descartes seems to believe that every other clear and distinct view is factual (Bonnen & Flage 1999). This demonstrates that the point, “I have perceived that God exists” (Tweyman 2007, 198) is dependent on the assumption, “Everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive is true” (Wilson 2003, 81). A series of argument is ‘circular’ or fallacious, according to Cunning (2010), if one of the conditions is dependent on the final idea for its truth. In that case, this is certainly a circular reasoning. The existence of God should be recognized before one can recognize the truth of his/her views, yet in order to confirm the existence of God one has to depend on the truth of specific conditions drawn upon to deduce this existence, and these conditions cannot be recognized to be factual before one is confident that God exists. Arnauld argues that if one should verify that God exists before one can confirm his/her clear and distinct views, how is it that one can draw upon these views to verify the existence of God? Arnauld appears somewhat certain that circular reasoning has been perpetrated. He is talking about the statement that detaches the condition of God’s existence to confirm these views, where Descartes claims (Bailey 2004, 37): “… I must examine whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether he can be a deceiver. For if I do not know this, it seems that I can never be quite certain about anything else”. The dilemma inherent in this is the way Descartes afterward determine God’s existence: “This is, indeed, what he next proceeds to do, but by way of offering proofs” (Cunning 2010, 90). The dilemma with employing the evidences that he does is that merely definite idea of the existence of God can ensure the certainty or reality of a thing, and hence, “… we have no grounds for accepting the premises or validity of these proofs” (Gaukroger 2006, 42). Circular reasoning is apparent. Conclusions Apart from the fallacies found in Descartes’ idea of God and their ensuing circular conclusions, the arguments of Descartes appear to be quite coherent. And although his evidence or ‘proof’ could not have confirmed that God exists pragmatically, I am compelled to admit that Descartes has touched on several central realities about the universe, such God’s existence. However, in spite of the understated errors in this assumption, it appears that with the treatment or insertion of other conditions may get rid of the dilemmas simultaneously. References Bailey, A. First Philosophy: Knowledge and Reality: Fundamental Problems and Readings in Philosophy. New York: Broadview Press, 2004. Bonnen, C. & D. Flage. Descartes and Method. London: Routledge, 1999. Broughton, J. Descartes’ Method of Doubt. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003. Chappell, V. Descartes’ Meditations. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997. Cunning, D. Argument and Persuasion in Descartes’ Meditations. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy. Sioux Falls, SD: NuVision Publications, LLC, 2007. Gaukroger, S. The Blackwell Guide to Descartes’ Meditations. UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006. Tweyman, S. Rene Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy in Focus. London: Taylor & Francis, 2007. Wilson, C. Descartes’ Meditations: An Introduction. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Read More