Fact Pattern Analysis - Assignment Example

Name: Course: Instructor: Date: Fact Pattern Analysis Question 1 The Fourth Amendment recognizes and protects the right of every person to be secure in their persons and property against searches and seizures that are unreasonable. The Fourth Amendment, therefore, requires magistrates to issue search warrants only where there is probable cause (Woollcott 317). The need to comply with the Fourth Amendment led to the development of a standard that would be applied in issuing of warrants. The Supreme Court, therefore, developed the Aguilar-Spinelli two-part test based on the decisions in Aguilar v Texas 378 US 108 (1964) and Spinelli v United States 393 US 419 (1969). In Aguilar v Texas, a warrant was issued based on an affidavit by police officers that they had received reliable information from a credible informant that heroin, barbiturates, marijuana among others were being kept at the Aguilar’s premises for purposes of sale against the law. The petitioner was found guilty of possessing heroin. In Spinelli v United States the petitioner was convicted of illegal interstate gambling. The FBI agent’s affidavit alleged that he had been informed by a reliable informant that the petitioner is disseminating wagering information using two phones which the agent had seen in a house where the petitioner had visited severally. The court struck down the search warrants that had been issued In both cases, (Woollcott 322). The facts in both cases are similar to those in the fact pattern 1 in that in all the cases, the officers in charge relied on information given by third parties to seek the issuing of warrants. In fact pattern 1, the officer relied on the depositions of Miss Cleveland, Miss Stickel and Alan Emerson, an arson investigator. The Court in Aguilar v Texas established the two-part test to measure informant tips which was confirmed in Spinelli v United States. The first prong of the test is the basis of knowledge which requires the police to show the presence of facts or circumstances that indicate the informant’s basis for concluding that criminal conduct is occurring (Mullaney 315). This prong is satisfied where the informant personally observed the criminal activity. In the facts presented in fact pattern 1, Miss Cleveland and Miss Stickel both gave information as they experienced it hence this meets the first part of the test. The second prong is the veracity prong which requires the officer to show his basis of believing that the informant is credible. This is satisfied in cases where the informant has supplied accurate information to the police before (Mullaney 315). However, in the fact pattern, there is no indication that both informants had supplied information before. In Spinelli v United States, the Court held that independent police corroboration of some of the details in a tip could cure a defect in showing the credibility of the informant. In this case, the depositions of Miss Clevelad and Miss Stickel that they had seen the defendant at the house that burned were collaborated by the Alan Emerson, an arson investigator, who stated that the fire was as a result of arson. Based on the above analysis, the two parts of the test were met when Justice James Burrow signed the search warrant. This means that the information relied upon was sufficient to issue the warrant. Question 2 The Aguilar-Spineli two-part test addressed instances when the information relied on by the police was given by an informant known to the officers. However, the test had not been applied to cases where the tip was given by an anonymous informant. Such was the situation in Illinois v Gates 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) where the Supreme Court replaced the Aguilar-Spineli two-part test with the totality of circumstances approach (Luparello 338). In Illinois v Gates, a warrant was issued based on the finding of probable cause arising from an anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale police which outlined the travel plans of the defendant and the transportation of narcotics to Illinois. The entire evidence relied in the case was obtained through the search arising from the warrant. Unlike in the facts given in the fact pattern 1, the informant was not known to the police. However, like in the fact pattern, the magistrate issued the arrest warrant which led to the recovery of the evidence. The court approved the motion to quash the warrant and suppress the evidence obtained based on the fact that there was no sufficient basis of probable cause to issue the warrant. The Supreme Court overruled the decision and invalidated the Aguilar-Spineli test holding that the totality of circumstances analysis was the appropriate test to apply in cases involving tips by informants (Luparello 339). The effect of the totality of circumstances test established in the Illinois v Gates case is the fact that the test gives the magistrate discretion to find probable cause even where the Aguilar-Spineli test does not permit the issuing of warrant. The effect of the decision is the fact that the magistrate could issue a warrant even where one of the prongs of the Aguilar-Spineli test is not satisfied as long as the magistrate has a good basis for deciding that probable cause exists. As result, the two parts of the Aguilar-Spineli test need not be considered independently. A strong showing of one of the prongs was enough to compensate the deficiency of the other. The court abandoned the Aguilar-Spineli test due to its perceived rigidity and over-technicality (Hunter and Joseph 31). In fact pattern 1, the veracity prong was deficient since the two witnesses or informants had never given police information before. However, with the application of the totality of the circumstances test as was done in Illinois v Gates, the magistrate would establish probable cause justifying the issuing of the warrant. The basis of knowledge prong in the facts provided is satisfactorily proven since the depositions given by Miss Cleveland and Miss Stickel was based on personal observation. Further, the arson investigator was also giving information based on his observation or investigations into the fire. The two women had seen the defendant running from the porch of the house and later saw him while the house was burning. The fact that they described him sufficiently shows that they had a good look at him. The information relied on was sufficient to allow the issuing of the warrant for the search based on the totality of circumstances test established in Illinois v Gates (Hunter and Joseph 31). Question 3 The totality of the circumstances analysis established in Illinois v Gates case makes it easier for police officers to obtain warrants. The magistrate is no longer required to establish the existence of satisfactory evidence that meet the criteria in the Aguilar-Spineli two-part test before issuing a warrant of arrest (Luparello 344). The Aguilar-Spineli two-part test requires that both the basis of knowledge and veracity prongs be considered and satisfied independently for the magistrate to establish probable cause for the issuing of a warrant. The fact that evidence to support either of the prongs is insufficient means that the magistrate should not issue a warrant since no probable cause has been established. However, with the totality of circumstances analysis, the two prongs do not have to be established independently. The two prongs are seen as intertwined elements that can be used to illuminate the question whether or not probable cause exists. According to the test established in Illinois v Gates, a strong showing of either the basis of knowledge or the credibility of the informant is enough to establish probable cause even though the other prong is not sufficiently proven (Woollcott 325). In the Illinois v Gates case, the court acknowledged the fact that the affidavit relied upon in the issuing of the warrant was insufficient to satisfy either of the prongs in the Aguilar-Spineli test. The view of the court on the issue of totality of circumstances was broad to allow the court to establish probable cause that justified the issuing of the warrant. Although the facts of the Illinois v Gates case are different from those of the fact pattern 1 in that at least one of the prongs is sufficiently satisfied, the totality of the circumstances analysis remains the best test that has the greatest likelihood of success for the prosecution. This is because the prosecution does not have to show that the two parts of the Aguilar-Spineli test exist but rather that either of them is well proven. The prosecution would just have to show that the totality of the circumstances establish probable cause which would be easy based on the facts. The Aguilar-Spineli two-part test, on the other hand, requires an advanced level of proof to establish probable cause. The difficulties in satisfying the threshold of the Aguilar-Spineli two-part test are outlined in Giordenello v United States 357 US 480, 486 (1958). This case differs with the fact pattern provided in that here the affidavit relied upon to apply for the warrant did not provide the source of information on which the affiant based his conclusion of criminal activity (Mullaney 324). This meant that without the basis of knowledge, the magistrate could not establish probable cause hence the warrant could not be issued. The strict requirements that result from the Aguilar-Spineli test make it more cumbersome for the prosecution and hence more favorable for the defense. The application of the test in the current case would weaken the evidence relied upon in issuing the warrant due to the insufficiency of the veracity prong. This means that the Aguilar-Spineli test has the greatest likelihood of success for the defense (Hunter and Joseph 25). Question 4 The Fourth Amendment, as discussed above, guarantees the protection of individuals from unreasonable searches as well as seizures. An individual may, therefore, have a cause of action where there is an unreasonable intrusion of their right to privacy by government agents (Aynes 63). The case of Katz v United States 389 US 347 (1967) established an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The case differs from the one in fact pattern 2 in that it involved a conviction on basis of evidence of inter-state gambling obtained through attaching electronic listening devices to the telephone booth where the petitioner placed his calls. In the case presented in the fact pattern the intrusion of privacy, as alleged by the defendant, occurred when fire investigators discovered that the explosion was an arson attack. The telephone conversations recorded were presented as evidence in the Karz v United States case (Winn 3). The petitioner, however, appealed the decision on the ground that he wanted an answer to the question whether there was an intrusion which amounted to a search and seizure. In holding that there was a search and seizure, the Court developed the test to determine whether government actions constitute a search and seizure. First, there must be a reliance upon privacy and second, if there was such reliance, whether it was reasonable (Aynes 66). The effect of the decision in the Katz case is the fact that the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not only extend to physical intrusion and where material things are taken. The protection also covered actual intrusion and intangibles as was the case in the Katz case. The law protected people and not places (Aynes 67). In the current case, the defendant alleges intrusion after the fire event on his premises. The fact that the building that was destroyed by the fire was his brings in the argument that a man’s house is his fort and hence deserves protection against unnecessary intrusion (Winn 7). The defendant had a reasonable reliance upon privacy in the circumstances of the case. However, the second part of the test in the Katz case requires that such reliance upon privacy be reasonable. The question arises as to whether the actions of the deputy fire marshal were justified under the emergency doctrine. An emergency situation is considered as falling under the category of exigent circumstances where intrusion whether physical or actual may be justified. In this case, there was an explosion leading to a fire which led to the destruction of the house and the death of one of the occupants. In Michigan v Tyler 436 US 499 (1978) where the facts were similar to those in the fact pattern, the court stated that a burning building presents an exigency to render an entry without a warrant reasonable. In the case presented in the fact pattern, the reliance upon privacy was not reasonable due to the fire emergency. The fire situation presented a situation that falls under the exigent circumstance exceptions to the requirement of a warrant for search and seizure. As a result, the defendant’s expectation of privacy was not reasonable. Question 5 The case of Michigan v Tyler 436 US 499 (1978) is similar to the case provided in the fact pattern. Just like the fire in the case in the fact pattern, the fire in Michigan v Tyler broke out in the night and investigations stalled due to the smoke and steam from the fire. Some containers were removed by the fire chief and the detective and later the chief returned at 8 a.m. for an examination of the building. The detective also came later and made another examination and removed pieces of evidence. There was another inspection on February 16 by a member of arson police who also took photographs and other evidence. The case, however, differs on the grounds that in Tyler’s case, the house was not residential and that there was no warrantless entry into the affected property in the fact pattern case after passage of reasonable time. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the respondents due to the failure to adhere to warrant procedures under the Fourth Amendment (Decker 439). The court held that a fire is an exigency circumstance that justifies a warrantless entry into private property by state officials. Such officials may remain at the scene for a reasonable time after the fire is extinguished for the purpose of conducting investigations. Once reasonable time has passed, such officials must obtain a warrant to continue with investigations (Decker 452). In Michigan v Clifford 446 US 287 (1984), the facts differed with those of the fact pattern case in that investigations were done after passage of reasonable time (Decker 441). In this case, the defendant had taken steps to secure the property and there was no concurrent investigation to establish the cause of the fire. It was held that although a fire creates an exigency situation where a warrantless entry is justified, additional entries after the passage of reasonable time carried out to identify the cause of the fire require a warrant (Decker 452). In the fact pattern case, the deputy fire marshal testified that it was impossible to complete investigations immediately due to fire, smoke and darkness. Investigations had to be done in the morning. The searches conducted by the deputy marshal without a warrant were justified. This is because according to the Tyler and Clifford decisions, any investigations and seizure of evidence during the initial entry to the property and any continuing effort to identify the cause of the fire which does not exceed reasonable time will be valid. Investigations could not be done during the night due to the fire, smoke and darkness. The delay in the investigations into the cause of the fire did not require a warrant of re-entry in the morning since this was considered as a continuation of the investigations (Decker 453). Once Hiles had identified the cause of the explosion to be arson, he left the premises and any further investigations and collection of evidence by agents of the fire marshal’s office were conducted using a warrant. The investigations by Hiles were part of the initial entry and, therefore, did not require a warrant. The reliance on the information and evidence collected in the issuing a warrant was also justified. The search by Hiles was justified while that of the agents of fire marshal office to collect evidence for the criminal activities was justified by the warrant. Hiles’ investigations were part of the continuing effort to identify the cause of the fire and once the cause was identified, further investigations were only conducted through a warrant hence the searchers were sufficient. Works Cited Decker, John, Emergency circumstances, police responses and fourth amendment restrictions, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 89(2), 433-534, 1999. Aynes, Richard, Katz and the fourth amendment: A reasonable expectation of privacy or, a man’s home is his fort, Cleveland State Law Review, 23(1), 63-89, 2016. Luparello, Stephen, Illinois v Gates: Broadening the standard for determining probable cause based on informants’ tips, Washington and Lee Law Review, 41(1), 327-346, 2015. Hunter, Michael and Joseph, Paul, Illinois v Gates: A further weakening of fourth amendment protection, Bridgeport Law Review, 6(19), 19-46, 1985. Woollcott, Alexnader, Abandonment of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test Illinois v Gates, Cornell Law Review, 70(2), 316-334, 1985. Mullaney, Peter, Finding probable cause in an informant’s tip, Marquette Law Review, 68(2), 314-350, 2016. Winn, Peter, Katz and the origins of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, McGeorge Law Review, 40(1), 1-13, 2009. Read More

This prong is satisfied where the informant personally observed the criminal activity. In the facts presented in fact pattern 1, Miss Cleveland and Miss Stickel both gave information as they experienced it hence this meets the first part of the test. The second prong is the veracity prong which requires the officer to show his basis of believing that the informant is credible. This is satisfied in cases where the informant has supplied accurate information to the police before (Mullaney 315). However, in the fact pattern, there is no indication that both informants had supplied information before.

In Spinelli v United States, the Court held that independent police corroboration of some of the details in a tip could cure a defect in showing the credibility of the informant. In this case, the depositions of Miss Clevelad and Miss Stickel that they had seen the defendant at the house that burned were collaborated by the Alan Emerson, an arson investigator, who stated that the fire was as a result of arson. Based on the above analysis, the two parts of the test were met when Justice James Burrow signed the search warrant.

This means that the information relied upon was sufficient to issue the warrant. Question 2 The Aguilar-Spineli two-part test addressed instances when the information relied on by the police was given by an informant known to the officers. However, the test had not been applied to cases where the tip was given by an anonymous informant. Such was the situation in Illinois v Gates 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) where the Supreme Court replaced the Aguilar-Spineli two-part test with the totality of circumstances approach (Luparello 338).

In Illinois v Gates, a warrant was issued based on the finding of probable cause arising from an anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale police which outlined the travel plans of the defendant and the transportation of narcotics to Illinois. The entire evidence relied in the case was obtained through the search arising from the warrant. Unlike in the facts given in the fact pattern 1, the informant was not known to the police. However, like in the fact pattern, the magistrate issued the arrest warrant which led to the recovery of the evidence.

The court approved the motion to quash the warrant and suppress the evidence obtained based on the fact that there was no sufficient basis of probable cause to issue the warrant. The Supreme Court overruled the decision and invalidated the Aguilar-Spineli test holding that the totality of circumstances analysis was the appropriate test to apply in cases involving tips by informants (Luparello 339). The effect of the totality of circumstances test established in the Illinois v Gates case is the fact that the test gives the magistrate discretion to find probable cause even where the Aguilar-Spineli test does not permit the issuing of warrant.

The effect of the decision is the fact that the magistrate could issue a warrant even where one of the prongs of the Aguilar-Spineli test is not satisfied as long as the magistrate has a good basis for deciding that probable cause exists. As result, the two parts of the Aguilar-Spineli test need not be considered independently. A strong showing of one of the prongs was enough to compensate the deficiency of the other. The court abandoned the Aguilar-Spineli test due to its perceived rigidity and over-technicality (Hunter and Joseph 31).

In fact pattern 1, the veracity prong was deficient since the two witnesses or informants had never given police information before. However, with the application of the totality of the circumstances test as was done in Illinois v Gates, the magistrate would establish probable cause justifying the issuing of the warrant. The basis of knowledge prong in the facts provided is satisfactorily proven since the depositions given by Miss Cleveland and Miss Stickel was based on personal observation.

Further, the arson investigator was also giving information based on his observation or investigations into the fire.

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