How Realism Explains the Evolution of the European Union - Essay Example

International Relations [Name Of Student] [Name Of Institution] INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - HOW REALISM EXPLAINS THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION INTRODUCTION Every organized community acts on their interests and on preferences that may be good or bad in ethical terms. The propensity to act on honorable motives cannot itself represent the criteria for judging the polity’s normative quality because they may very well be arbitrary. A policy based on good intentions may very well neglect others’ interests or values or fail to give them due consideration. A robust criterion can only be derived from the constraints set by ‘international law’, here taken to mean the cosmopolitan law of the people that depicts a possible community based on certain universal principles. From this perspective, it is only by subjecting its actions to a higher ranking law – to human rights and criteria of justice–that the EU can qualify in normative terms. In the perspective of the reaction of European countries to globalization such a method has scrupulous complicatedness in grasping the varying character of the European Union for the period of this route. The utilization of the theory of realism explains the adaptive methods in a condition landscape, which helps re-frame this procedure, and enables a supplementary sufficient explanation. I suggest as a criterion of a legitimate foreign policy that the EU does not aspire to become a world organization – a world state – but subscribes to the principles of human rights, democracy and rule of law also for dealing with international affairs, hence underscoring the cosmopolitan law of the people.2 In such a per- spective the borders of the EU are to be drawn both with regard to what is required for the Union itself in order to be a self-sustainable and well-functioning democratic entity and with regard to the support and further development of similar regional associations in the rest of the world. ‘Force’ is far too dull a notion to imprison these composite development. Rather the theory of realism of the international politics helps us capture the essence of this evolvement of the European union. The second key donation of realism theory to examination of social transformation is all the way through the re-framing and expansion of the perception of path dependency. BACKGROUND The theory of realism captures this method superior than that of impact. Supplementary, globalization does not just take action on the European Union, but this polity is itself component of a procedure of producing globalization, for example in its function in re-negotiating global deal regulations. The realism theory clarifies the compound variation of arrangements of European states, the European Union and the universal whole. surrounded by a altering global setting, the European Union has augmented its authority over the directive of the wealth, while the associate States have condensed theirs. The quest for institutional underpinning pertains to the problem of the present world order regarding human rights politics: as long as human rights are not properly institutionalized, when they exist merely as moral rights, they can be used at will. Human rights politics can easily become imperialistic in the name of morality and the risk of arbitrariness is inevitable as some may continue to violate human rights with impunity. What is at stake with human rights protection and the institutionalization of human rights beyond the nation state is the sovereignty of the modern state as laid down in the Westphalian order in 1648. The question of theoretical underpinning pertains to how such an order can be conceived in action theoretical terms. A cosmopolitan order is one where actors subject their actions to the constraints of a higher-ranking law and we need an approach that does not rule out this as a logical possibility. An extended conception of agent rationality – actors can act out of a sense of justice – expands the range of possible options available at the international level. This makes possible an analysis where material as well as ideal factors play a role in international politics. Pluralist-democratic political culture and institutions are a key factor in advancing regional economic integration in Europe towards a security community in which intramural wars are no longer seen as legitimate or likely. Similarly, the best examples of bilateral security communities in the world today can be found among liberal democratic states -- between the United States and Canada, and between Australia and New Zealand. Until now, co-operation and conflict-management among the ASEAN states have rested on a narrow consensus among its elite and leaders, without support and sustenance from their civil societies5. However creditable, this has not guaranteed war-avoidance with the assurance of democratic security communities, such as the European Union, or the U.S.-Canada, or Australia-New Zealand relationships. THE THEORY OF REALISM The key argument of the realist theory is that it proposes that countries or nations are always occupied in a battle for authority and power. It further advocates the application of power to come upto the expectations for the benefit of the nation. The term National power is made up of geography, the state’s economy and above all its natural resources and also its population, army strength, the state character, and also the capability of the national government2. DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION IN THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF REALISM To evaluate the behavior of the main partners in the development of European Union we can utilize a motivated three-avenue method to international politics that includes realism, liberalism, and also an epistemic way that emphasizes the part played by different ideas in the final policymaking. The end result is that the measures of the United States are—not remarkably—best explicated by realism, and the deviation with the European Union is linked to the dominant US point in the world1. The tolerant method (which is a way of presenting the information in a plan that illuminates and supports a improved accepting of what the member states want), which focuses on the responsibility of global institution, models, and information and deems that ceremonial unions can convert the affairs between states, is greatest practical to explicate how the European Union strives to function, but its procedure may perhaps also be constant with the realist prospects. The Charter enhances the legal certainty of the citizens of Europe as everybody can claim protection for the same interests and concerns. The principle of legal certainty is currently secured only in a limited sense at the Community level. The citizen cannot be sure what rights she really is entitled to. The founding treaties of the European Community (EC) contained no reference to fundamental rights. As integration deepened, and as the Community came to have more far-reaching effects on the daily lives of citizens, the need for explicit mention of fundamental rights was recognized. The epistemic way, while winning when applied to extra circumstances or blocs, does not appear to be as supportive as the amalgamation of the further two. In new words, “traditions” and domestic concerns do not give details why the European Union as a complete acts in a detailed technique when operating in a globe setting6. Before the economic crisis that lead to the concept of combining member states and submitting the main authority to a final body which came to be evolved in the form of the EU, Institutionalists could respond to assessments with some degree of optimism and confidence. Institutionalism had gained considerable momentum, especially during the first half of the 1990s when a forum was set up to help manage the strategic uncertainties of the post-Cold War period. To be sure, the claims of Institutionalists concerning the pacific effects of multilateralism were more qualified than Western theories of liberal-institutionalism. They saw Institutionalism less in terms of formal legalistic structures of co-operation than as a long-term process of socialization and consensus building. 7 But Institutionalists, like their counterparts in the West, had based their hopes for regional order on the assumption that Institutionalism will facilitate information sharing, build trust, and provide avenues for conflict avoidance and dispute settlement. While acknowledging the newness of regional security institutions and their limitations in managing order in so vast and complex a region as the Europe, Institutionalists took a generally optimistic view of regional security, hoping that the habit of co-operation forged through dialogues and interactions would lessen the appeal of balance-of-power politics7. The Institutionalist blueprint for regional order has been Constructivist in orientation. Constructivists reject rationalist theories of international relations, including both Realism and neo-liberal Institutionalism, for which co-operation depends on calculations of gain and loss by states whose interests are deemed to be exogenous to the process of interaction. Constructivists argue that through incremental interactions and socialization, states redefine their interests and develop a "collective identity" that may enable them to overcome power politics and the security dilemma9. Prosperous countries make good neighbors. The pursuit of economic growth leading to social stability within individual countries contributes to regional peace and stability. A more stable and peaceful region would in turn promote even more growth as foreign investment funds are increasingly attracted to the region. More growth means more trade with one another. It is a virtuous cycle of prosper-thy neighbor. But the economic crisis seems to vindicate the Realist claim that the notion of "relative gain" matters in economic and security co-operation among states. The logic of relative gain assumes that states are likely to judge the benefits of co-operation by looking not just at whether all parties stand to gain from it (absolute gain), but also at whether they stand to gain more or less than the others10. In the vocabulary familiar in the Southeast Asia region, the difference is one between co-operations as a "win-win" situation vis-à-vis co-operation as "how much you win, how much I win". In the heat of the Singapore-Malaysia row, Malaysian Education Minister Najib Tun Razak accused Singapore of being "too competitive". Singapore, he alleged, "always wanted to emerge the winner and did not seem interested in seeking a win-win solution. 8" Mahathir went a step further by accusing Singapore of having "actually prospered by taking advantage of the weaknesses of its neighbours". In his view, Singapore has "no wish whatsoever to assist its neighbours ... Whatever businesses [they have] in Singapore, they flourish out of the weaknesses of its neighbours." 8 The theory of realism cannot be taken as an individual entity to explain the development of EU. There are other theories in the field of international relations that support the explanation of the evolvement of the European Union. In this respect, Constructivists take a sociological, rather than "strategic interaction", view of cooperation in which collective identity is deemed to be constitutive of state interests. From a Constructivist standpoint, conditions such as anarchy, security dilemma and power politics are not permanent or "organic" features of international relations, but are socially constructed6. International relations are shaped not just by material forces, such as power and wealth, but also by inter-subjective factors, including ideas, culture and identity. Similarly the neighborhood policy of EU can be best explained with respect to the realism theory. The policy measures foreseen by the ENP (European Neighborhood policy) can be expected to have an impact on economic growth through three conceptually separate, though practically interrelated, channels: 3 1. Structural reform: a successful application of the ENP should result in an upgrade of the regulatory framework to make it more conducive to growth 3 2. Macro policy anchor: closer adherence to sound monetary and fiscal policies should provide a better macroeconomic environment; 3. Trade and factor movement: a reduction in tariff- and non-tariff barriers between the EU and the NCs and eventually between NCs should induce growth through the customary beneficial effects of trade liberalization. 3 There is wide consensus in the economic literature on the fact that structural reform; sound macro-policies and trade liberalization are beneficial to growth. Three questions, then, are of fundamental importance: first, whether the adoption of parts of the policies, necessary to obtain a higher degree of integration with the internal market, would be taken into account which is also a growth enhancing upgrade in the regulatory environment; second, how much growth might be mobilized by a successful implementation of the ENP; third, whether the ENP can provide credible and significant political incentives to NCs to implement the necessary reforms12. CONCLUSION The nonexistence of a universal and equipped security strategy has been observed a dangerous flaw of the European Union as a worldwide actor. This is accurate in particular when the EU is visaged with biased and martial issues and differences where its broad assortment of non-military devices may verify unsatisfactory or extraneous, signifying that the EU is deficient not only in the clearness of its objectives but in addition in the competence of its means. A contrast on equal accounts is most frequently ended with the United States. Not suddenly, in the consequences of its most current catastrophe in the Iraq crisis, the EU has created its initial familiar safety policy (European Security Strategy, 2003) 13. In this paper, I have tried to give a good review, in light of the realism theory of international relations, the institutional and structural issues that decide the background, purpose and authority of the EU as a planned performer and also the course of its development. More strongly, it reviews the creation of approach and the determinants of planned actions, and the resultant expansion of EU. The junction of deliberate traditions among the associates, the institutional ability of the EU as the root of its efficient situation, and its influence to involve the configuration of the global order presents fundamentals in the materialization of policy13. In the perspective of intentional behavior, the realism theory looks at the organization by the Union of the premeditated triangle of realism and functionalism as strategy for achievement. The premeditated strategy of the Union, supported on its institutional potency in soft authority harmonized with promising hard control, is sketched as the mixture of appealing the United States in obligatory multilateralism and chasing equivalent corporation in universal issues, accordingly providing a self-possessed American power with authenticity. Endnotes 1. Anarchy in international relations theory: the neorealist-neoliberal debate. Robert Powell. International Organization Spring 2004 v48 n2 p313-344 2. Dueling realisms. (realism in international relations) Stephen G. Brooks. International Organization Summer 2001 v51 n3 p445(33) 3. Hans Morgenthau, realism, and the study of international politics. (Sixtieth Anniversary, 1934-1994: The Legacy of Our Past.) Robert Jervis. Social Research Winter 2000 v61 n4 p853(24) 4. Is Anybody Still a Realist? Jeffrey W. Legro, Andrew Moravcsik. International Security Fall 1999 v24 i2 p5 5. Learning, realism, and alliances: the weight of the shadow of the past. Dan Reiter. World Politics July 2002 v46 n4 p490(37) 6. Realism and America's rise. (theory of realism and its application to the study of international relations) Sean M. Lynn-Jones. International Security Fall 1998 v23 n2 p157(26) 7. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation. Robert Jervis. International Security Summer 2000 v24 i1 p42 8. Reasons of State, States of Reason. (new biography of Hans J. Morgenthau)(Critical Essay) Richard Wolin. The New Republic June 4, 2001 p51 Mag.Coll.: 107K0220. 9. Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. (international threats to independence of states under anarchy) Jeffrey W. Taliaferro. International Security Winter 2000 v25 i3 p128 10. Structural Realism after the Cold War. Kenneth N. Waltz. International Security Summer 2000 v25 i1 p5 11. The escalation of great power militarized disputes: testing rational deterrence theory and structural realism. Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi, D. Scott Bennett. American Political Science Review Sept 2003 v87 n3 p609(15) 12. The national interest and its interpretation. Miroslav Nincic. The Review of Politics Wntr 1999 v61 i1 p29(2) 13. Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity: The Limits of Political Realism. (Review) Laurie M. Johnson Bagby. The Review of Politics Spring 1999 v61 i2 p365(3) Read More