Austria-Hungarys Policy toward Serbia in Terms of Wars of Retribution - Coursework Example

Austria-Hungary’s Policy toward Serbia In Terms Of Wars of Retribution Although it was a small, distant country, Austria-Hungary had twisted relations with its neighboring countries, which inevitably caused the calamity of 1914. Similar to Austria-Hungary, Serbia was a small part of the Ottoman Empire and was a vassal of the Turkish Sultan. In 1914, Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum to Serbia nearly one month after a young Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo, Bosnia, killed Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in cold blood. Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Empire diplomat to Serbia, delivered the ultimatum to the Serbian foreign ministry. After Ferdinand’s killing, Austria-Hungary sought to pursue a hard-hitting policy towards Serbia. They coordinated with the German foreign policy to force a military clash that would end swiftly and positively with a crushing Austrian conquest, before Russia, Serbia’s potent ally, and other European countries reacted. Austria-Hungary had several terms of ultimatum to the Serbian government. Firstly, Serbia was to restrain all anti-Austrian misinformation and to eradicate radical organizations within its borders. Secondly, the Serbians must allow an Austro-Hungarian investigation into the murder despite the country’s assertion that it was doing its own investigation. Austria-Hungary demanded a 48-hour response to the note although they anticipated Serbian defiance. Several countries such as Germany foresaw the effects of the ultimatum, and tried to suppress the ultimatum in a diplomatic manner. At the same time, countries begun to align themselves with their allies, in which Austria-Hungary enjoyed the support of Germany, while Britain, France, and Russia were likely to support Serbia (Bischof, Karlhofer, and Williamson xiv). Austria’s note to Serbia also elicited a sharp reaction from the British government. The meeting, held in London, served to discuss the gravity of the ultimatum. Evidently, Serbia was not likely to accept the ultimatum owing to its aggressive nature. Even if they would accept the ultimatum, it seemed unlikely that it would satisfy the demands of the aggressor (Armour 1). The ultimatum seemed likely to change the course of Europe as allies began to collaborate and coordinate their efforts in light of the ultimatum. Serbia sought Russia’s help to address the ultimatum, and they ordered four military districts to prepare for mobilization because they expected Germany to use the calamity over the archduke’s death as a justification to start a battle to protect its Serbian interests. By July 25, the Serbian authorities were aware that Austria-Hungary was ready for a fight. Serbian Prime Minister Nicola Pasic mobilized their army to prepare for battle after he delivered the response of the ultimatum. Serbians agreed to all the terms of the ultimatum, except the section that demanded an internal inquiry. They cited that this contravened their law of criminal procedure and constitution. International observers were pleased with Serbia’s response, but Austria-Hungary’s diplomat, Gieslingen, left the country immediately, confirming the end of diplomatic relations between the two regions. They failed to reach a truce, and on July 28, 1914, World War 1 began, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The diplomatic response of Austria-Hungary after the killing of Franz Ferdinand resulted in a dynamo effect that eventually resulted in World War 1. Serbia’s refusal to yield to Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum resulted in the declaration of war. Overbearing powers of nations such as Germany and Russia influenced the normal operations of small countries such as Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The allies of the two small countries ideologically charged the war, as they sought to dominate Europe. Historically, no singular country declares war on blocs of alliances. Normally, a dispute results between two countries in which other allies jump in and wage a global war. World War 1 started simply because of misguided policies and improper resolution measures. Most nations joined in the war against their will, merely to show support to their allies. Austria-Hungary wanted a war with neighboring Serbia as payback to the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Although there was tension and infighting between the two regions, no major incident or threat to national security warranted the unnecessary war that resulted. All the countries were virtually in the war for self-defense, without any tangible reason. Even so, the triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) seemed to have dissimilar ideologies from the Triple Entente (France, Russia, and Great Britain). This intensified nationalism and imperial rivalries among the groups of countries, and the antagonism between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was the much-awaited catalyst to test their powers (Armour 1). Nationalism is just one of the reasons that triggered the impulsive vicious turn that Austro-Serbian relations took before World War 1. There was a deep-rooted antagonism between the two countries that endured for long periods. In addition, in 1867, there was a constitutional arrangement, a Compromise, between the Hungarian political elite, the Magyar gentry, and the Emperor Franz Joseph, which fueled the antagonism. It resulted in challenges on the proper management of Serbia. The leaders, such as Andrassy, were malicious in their intentions in the quest of promotion of liberal principles. Russian influence in Serbia was also a source of worry for leaders from both countries, because of its influence on foreign relations. Foreign policy and diplomatic relations between the two countries worsened by policies instituted in Vienna and Budapest in the 1860s and 1870s. World War 1 in 1914 was a result of almost fifty years of unprofessional conduct in foreign policy management. The Ausgleich, or Compromise, of 1867, triggered the ultimate upheaval in Austro-Serbian relations in two exceptional ways. To begin with, the Ausgleich granted a form of home rule to Hungary, which transferred the non-Magyar nationalities there to the mercies of Magyar pro-self-government policies. This resulted in an alienation of the Serbian residents, Hungarian Serbs, and the Croats. Secondly, the Compromise law had a clause in Article 8, which coerced the joint foreign minister of Austria-Hungary to embrace the ideologies on foreign policy of the Hungarian minister president. This gave the Hungarian premier the power to apply substantial influence in foreign affairs. This Hungarian factor provided an unfavorable environment for Serbian operations. Andrassy headed one of the great aristocratic families of Hungary, and Hungarians famed him for open-minded principles. Even so, his critics, such as the Slavs, did not see him in a similar manner. They portrayed him as a crafty and untrustworthy person whose personal interests overrode that of the nation. Like any other leader, open-mindedness has its limits and he clearly depicted this in matters related to nationalism. His attitude towards the outside world and to his country was quite dissimilar. He had an obsessive fear of Russia because of the support it garnered from several Slavs living in the Habsburg Monarchy. He saw Russia as a threat to his power and leader of the Hungarian state. As a result, it was a matter of prime significance to combat Russian influence in Serbia before they become a stalking-house for Russian insurrection. This triggered the myriad of foreign issues from foreign policy in the two regions. Policy issues between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were exacerbated by the fact that de Count Friedrich von Beust determined foreign policy until 1871. The disconcerting effect of Serbian independence on southern Hungary and the likelihood of Russian influence in Serbia troubled Beust. Even so, his main apprehension was grand policy in Western Europe, especially owing to the loss of territory and reputation after Prussia defeated Austria in 1866 (Armour 1). While Andrassys was alarmed over an impending Russian threat, Beust reduced the likelihood of Russian interference by coercing the Turkish government to make appropriate compromise to its Balkan Christians. Andrassy wanted him to act first enough because Beust’s strategies were long-term and involved the coordination of several nations such as Turkey. This intricate scenario led to his first incursions into foreign policy. Beusts policy towards Serbia sought to suppress more pretensions and meeting its more warranted accusations against the Turks. In the course of the 1860s, Serbian authorities fought for the emancipation of the Balkan Christians, through military coalitions with the other Balkan principalities and a synchronized rebellion in the Turkish region. However, the unity between the two failed, especially because of Serbias military weakness and uprising in the Turkish provinces. In 1867, Beust withdrew the last Turkish garrisons from Serbian soil, and in return, he cautioned the Serbians to maintain peace. During this time, the Russians played a pacific role and did not interfere in matters concerning Hungarians and the Turks. Austria-Hungary enjoyed superiority in Serbian affairs, mostly through accidental ways, rather than the qualities of their policies. Later, a deep policy split opened up by mid-1867 involving the Prince and Garasanin, which strained Austro-Serbian relations (Armour 1). Andrassy sought all possible means to shoulder Russia out and wield the support of Serbia. According to Andrassy, Austria-Hungary required Serbia to promise that they would not rebel the rest of European Turkey. They formed a treaty to establish profound economic and political ties between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Horse-trading was popular between Austria-Hungary and Russia as they fought to administer, among other things, the right to inhabit and administer Bosnia. The Russians were easy-going because of the impending meeting of congress of the powers in Berlin in June 1878. Russia gave them approval that Austria-Hungary would authoritatively conclude whatever economic measures it envisioned with Serbia. This agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary established Austria-Hungarys economic and political domination over Serbia. Even so, Serbia did not agree to these conditions because the result of the agreement signified almost entire subordination of Serbias benefit to Austria-Hungarys interests. The railway convention was another significant bargaining chip for Austria-Hungary, which resulted in considerable antagonism between it and Serbia. Ristic and largely, the Serbian Congress took a long time to implement the railway treaty because if rail connected Serbia to Austria-Hungary before the commercial treaty, it would have to rely on exports from Austria-Hungary. Serbia kept a wide berth off the treaty because they felt like the railway treaty would undermine their independence. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary exploited the situation to bend Serbia towards its will. After the commercial treaty was signed in May 6, 1881, Austria-Hungary enjoyed privileged treatment in Serbia (Armour 1). Although the treaty assured Serbia of a ready Austria-Hungary market, it also meant that Austria-Hungary could flood the market with its manufactured products. In the end, Serbias economy remained stagnant for a long period. Apart from the trade treaty, Austria-Hungary could control Serbia through a veterinary convention, which had a ‘swine fever clause’. Considering Serbia’s main export was livestock, and they had no processing plant, the country depended on Austria-Hungary’s border for trade. The government used this as a lever in several occasions to coerce Serbia to yield to its demands. It would close its borders on the slightest suspicion of infection, even when there was no scare of swine flu. There was also the secret political treaty of June 28, 1881, that the veterinary convention cemented (Armour 1). The treaty bound Serbia not to put up with political, religious or other treaty with countries such as Bosnia and Russia. The treaty obliged both states to maintain impartiality if either was caught up in war with a third party. This clearly demonstrated Austria-Hungary’s policy toward Serbia in terms of wars of retribution. In conclusion, Austria-Hungary’s actions towards Serbia were a war of retribution. They undermined Serbia’s ambitions in several ways, including denying them the right to engage in foreign policy. This sought to prevent Serbia from interactions with Bosnia and Russia. Although Austria-Hungary invasion and occupation of Bosnia outraged Serbia, they were not allowed to criticize their actions. Serbia could complete its trade transactions only though the Austria-Hungary frontier. Serbia had to purchase products only from Austria-Hungary. All these actions undermined their economic growth and sovereignty as a nation. Their abnormal relationship was bound to backfire at some point, especially in the age of nationalism. Economic liberation and political divergence later followed after Serbia changed its political structure. Sociable relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia were impractical, especially after the policy of economic and political control that Austria-Hungary’s political leaders adopted over Serbia. Works Cited Armour, Ian. The Roots of Sarajevo: Austria-Hungary and Serbia, 1867-81. History Today Volume 38 Issue 8 August 1988 Bischof, Gunter, Ferdinand Karlhofer, and Samuel Williamson. 1914: Austria-Hungary, the Origins, and the First Year of World War I. Contemporary Austrian studies, volume 23. Read More