Relationship of the U.S with Iran and Iraq in the 1980s - Coursework Example

The relationship of the U.S with Iran and Iraq in the 1980’s The Iran Iraq war of 1980-1988 has highly affected the social and economic life in the greater Gulf region. The above war has been set under examination by researchers and analysts worldwide mostly due to the high value of the particular region in terms of geopolitics. Current study focuses on specific aspects of this war: at a first level, reference is made on the relationship between Iran and Iraq before the war and the reasons for which US decided to support Iraq. Then, emphasis is given on the effects of the war on Iran especially in regard to international security, development and nationalism. The review of the period before the beginning of the war has revealed that the relationship between Iran and Iraq has been always problematic. However, the development of a war between the two states can be considered as rather unexpected; the external support, as provided especially to Iraq, seems as a critical factor in the decision of Iraq’s leader to enter in Iran’s territory. In general, the study highlights the causes of the war in regard to the relations of the countries involved, i.e. US, Iran and Iraq mostly in regard to geopolitics, a term that has been used to show ‘the political and economic factors that are likely to influence a country’s foreign policy’ (Mercille and Jones 856). Iran and Iraq before the war of 1980-1988 The relations between Iran and Iraq during the pre-war period can be considered as rather bad. In fact, the two countries had long term disputes. These disputes had ‘three dimensions: territorial, ideological and personal’ (Kassicieh and Nassar 70). These disputes characterized the relations of the two countries in late 1970s. In regard to the first dispute, the one related to territory, this was based on the following fact: since the 7th century ‘the control of the Shatt-al-Arab region’ (Kassicieh and Nassar 70) has caused severe conflicts among local populations. Iraq had to take this region over its control and waited for the appropriate chance; the Revolution of 1979 set the conditions that Iraq could expected for invading in Iran (Kassicieh and Nassar 70). Also, even if they are based on a region influenced by similar religious rules, Iran and Iraq have been controlled by ‘regimes supporting different ideologies’ (Kassicieh and Nassar 71). The leaders of Iran emphasized on universalism while Iraq’s leaders valued nationalism (Kassicieh and Nassar 70). In addition, the long term ‘conflict between Arabs and Persians’ (Karsh 256) cannot be ignored. In fact, these populations have a series of ‘cultural and religious differences’ (Karsh 256) that sets barriers in any effort for cooperation between them. In any case, particular reference should be made to the personal factor, as of critical importance in the development of the war: the end of the Revolution of 1979 in Iran resulted to the radical increase of the power of Khomeini, the person who played a key role in the Revolution. Just one year before the beginning of the Revolution, i.e. in 1978, ‘Hussein, the leader of Iraq, asked Khomeini to leave Iran’ (Kassicieh and Nassar 72). Even if not having exceptional relations with the existing regime in Iran, Hussein could not accept for Iran a regime totally opposed to his ideology. In addition, Khomeini could threaten the power of Hussein as the most powerful leader in the particular region (Kassicieh and Nassar 72). At this point, particular reference should be made to the power of Iraq as an oil producer: according to analysts the willingness of Hussein’s to expand his influence has been highly based on the economic power that the oil production secured for Iraq (Ismael and Ismael 610). Without the intervention of the oil factor the willingness of Hussein to be involved in a risky war, such as the war with Iran, will be quite low. In other words, the ambitions of the two countries’ leaders highly contributed in the beginning and the development of the Iran Iraq war. On the other hand, even without the personal factor, a military conflict between Iran and Iraq would be always possible if taking into consideration the other two dimensions of these countries’ disputes, as analyzed above. The relationship between Iran and US before the Iran-Iraq war When the war began, in 1980, the response of Iran was not the expected one. More specifically, Iran, as a country, has been quite isolated in the context of the international community. However, it seems that the leaders of Iran had not realized the problem, i.e. the lack ‘of reliable allies’ (Takey 365). Probably for this reason they had decided to escalate the military conflict with Iraq (Takey 365). It should be noted that the relations between US and Iran were not always in tension: in fact, US had very good communication and cooperation with Iran’s pre-Revolution leaders: ‘the Bazargan government’ (Gasiorowski 613). Also, it seems that US wanted this regime to keep the control of Iran in the long term: it was ‘mid-October of 1979’ (Gasiorowski 613) that the a note was sent to the Iranian government; the note had prepared by CIA and aimed to inform the Iranian government on the high risk of ‘an invasion of Iraq in Iran’ (Gasiorowski 613). The government of Iran did not have the time to check the issue further: in about two months, i.e. in November of 1979, the prime minister of Iran had to resign after ‘the seizure of US embassy in Tehran by Islamist students’ (Gasiorowski 613). This event set the beginning of the Revolution and the termination of the cooperation between Iran and US; since then, the relations between the two countries have become quite hostile (Gasiorowski 613). When Iraq invaded Iran US was not willing to provide support to a hostile regime. The new regime of Iran was clearly opposed to US’s involvement in Iran’s political life, a fact that was made quite clear to US since the beginning of the Revolution. Thus, in the pre-war period the relations between US and Iran were quite bad, a fact that justifies the decision of US to support Iraq in the Iran Iraq war. The issues discussed above lead to the following assumption: if the Revolution in Iran had failed, then US would have taken the part of Iran in the Iran Iraq war. In other words, the support of US to Iraq during the war was not so much related to the need of US to secure the hegemony of Iraq but rather to the willing of US to fight the new regime in Iran, as this regime could harm US’s interest in Middle East in the long term. Another important assumption made from the events of that period, as presented above, is the following: the deterioration of the relations between US and Iran had a critical role in the beginning and the development of the war. If Iran would continue to have the support of US the leader of Iraq would have avoided the war. Why US decided to help Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war? The position of US in regard to the Iran Iraq war can be characterized as not fully justified, especially in regard to geopolitics. Both countries belong in the Gulf region, an area which is considered as one of the most powerful as of its oil production: in 1978, i.e. two years before the beginning of the war, the oil reserves of Gulf’s countries represented the ‘60% of world’s known reserves’ (Kassicieh and Nassar 69). In this context, it would be expected by US to avoid being involved in a conflict between two of the region’s states since such action would possibly threat the economic and political interests of US in Middle East. Instead, US chose to make their support to Iraq clear. This decision would be initiated by various facts: in 1979 a Revolution developed in Iran. The particular political movement led to the replacement of the country’s government, friendly to the west, and the radical increase of a party based on the Islamic rules (Kassicieh and Nassar 71). It is possible that the government of US felt that its power over Iran’s political system had been eliminated. From this point of view, supporting Iraq could offer to US the chance to set limits to the power of Iran’s new leaders. Indeed, as also noted earlier, the existing regime of Iran, i.e. the country’s pre-Revolution regime, was friendly towards the west and for this reason had the support of US and of other western countries, such as Britain (Gasiorowski 613). The occupation of Iran’s governance by a new regime, through the Revolution, had led to the termination of the cooperation between US and Iran, a fact that could threaten the geopolitical interests of US in Middle East. At the same time, the Revolution of 1979 increased instability in the Gulf region. As has reported in history, a Revolution can have ‘a spillover effect on neighboring countries’ (Kassicieh and Nassar 70). Based on the above, US’s decision to support Iraq aimed to protect the expansion of political and economic crisis across the Gulf region, a phenomenon that could severely harm the interests of US in the specific area. However, at that period the regime of Iraq was authoritarian; by supporting this regime US could not manage to secure stability since, soon or later, the willingness of this regime for excessive power would negatively affect neighboring countries (Mousavian 129). How Iran was affected by the decision of US to support Iraq? As already explained earlier, Iran entered the war with Iraq with no allies (Takey 365). On the other hand, Iraq had managed to secure the support of US, a fact that would normally cause to Iranian leaders strong concerns, as of the war’s consequences in the country’s political, social and economic environment. In addition, when Iraq passed the borders of Iran, Iran was still under recovery from the Iranian Revolution, a political movement that had taken place just one year before, in 1979 (Takey 365). Also, as of its international relations Iran had a low performance: no allies could be identified, at least no allies that would be willing to risk their relations with US in order to support Iran (Takey 365). Indeed, since the beginning of the war US took the part of Iraq, a strategy that brought Iran in a difficult position: the country would have to participate in the war alone, with no allies, while the enemy would have the support of a global power (Takey 365). It should be noted that due to the Revolution Iran had already lost a key supported in the region: Israel (Neff 24). Up to 1979 the relations between Iran and Israel were quite good, a fact related to the decision of Iran ‘to recognize Israel de facto, in 1950’ (Neff 24). Since then, Iran had an important ally, Israel. Due to the Revolution, Iran had lost the support of Israel, being left alone in facing a strong Iraq, as supported by a global power, US. Under these terms, in the beginning of 1980s Iran could be considered as a highly volatile state that would not have the strength to stand to a war, at least not for a long time (Takey 365). Iran proved that such assumption was invalid. In fact, the attack of Iraq gave to the Iran’s leaders the chance to call the population to a union, based on common action against the enemy (Takey 365). From this point of view, the Iran Iraq war resulted to the enhancement of Iran’s integration, as this fact was also related to the increase of nationalism across the country. At the same time, the war obliged Iran to change its policy in regard to its security: in the past the country could make its regional plans, meaning its plans for cooperation with neighboring countries, based on its relations with powerful countries, such as US and Israel. After the war, Iran had to change priorities: it had to focus on the increase of its military force so that the chances for the country to be found exposed to similar threats to be reduced (Le Billon 686). In other words, the eight-year war helped Iran leaders to realize the importance of security, not only in the field of military science but also in relation to the political decisions. If Iran would be appropriately prepared, as of its military forces, in 1980, then the duration of the war would be quite shorter and its effects on Iran’s economy would be less (Le Billon 686). Conclusion The Iran Iraq war is an excellent example of the value of geopolitics for the development of strategies in the context of international relations. In the particular war US decided to support Iraq, trying to secure the defeat the Iran. Normally, the specific decision would be expected to lead to such outcome. However, the end of the war proved that the potential of states to respond to external threats cannot be guaranteed: Without having allies and with clear lack of adequate military equipment Iran was a rather easy target for Iraq; the latter, supported by the US, was able to win the war within a quite short period of time. In addition, in 1980 the turbulences of the Revolution of 1979 were still intense in Iran. One could be expected that the country’s government would not have the potential to react appropriately and to inspire the population to act as a union, two requirements that were critical for winning the war. Against all expectations, Iran managed to show strong resistance changing the progress of the war in its favor. At the end, Iran was rather benefited by the war achieving its integration and verifying its role as an important power in the Gulf region. Works Cited Gasiorowski, Mark. “US Intelligence Assistance to Iran, May-October 1979.” The Middle East Journal 66.4 (2012): 613-627. Print. Ismael, Tareq, and Jacqueline Ismael. “Whither Iraq? Beyond Saddam, Sanctions and Occupation.” Third World Quarterly 26.4/5 (2005): 609-629. Print. Karsh, Efraim. “Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War.” Middle East Journal 44.2 (1990): 256-268. Print. Kassicieh, Suleiman, and Jamal Nassar. “Political Risk in the Gulf: The Impact of the Iran-Iraq War on Governments and Multinational Corporations.” California Management Review 28.2 (1986): 69-86. Print. Le Billon, Philippe. “Corruption, Reconstruction and Oil Governance in Iraq.” Third World Quarterly 26.4/5 (2005): 685-703. Print. Mercille, Julien, and Alun Jones. “Practicing Radical Geopolitics: Logics of Power and the Iranian Nuclear "Crisis".” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99.5 (2009): 856-862. Print. Mousavian, Hossein. “An Opportunity for a US – Iran Paradigm Shift.” The Washington Quarterly 36.1 (2013): 129-144. Print. Neff, Donald. “The U.S., Iraq, Israel, and Iran: Backdrop to War.” Journal of Palestine Studies 20.4 (1991): 23-41. Print. Takey, Ray. “The Iran Iraq war: A Reassessment.” Middle East Journal 64.3 (2010): 365-383. Print. Read More