Quid Pro Quo: Congress and the Presidency - Term Paper Example

 Quid Pro Quo: Congress and the Presidency Introduction Contemporary presidents are commonly regarded to be the principal agenda setter in Congress. Nevertheless, the president has no official power to force Congress to support his/her legislation. Even though the Constitution obliges the president to suggest any bill s/he believes is ‘necessary and expedient’ and to make a statement to Congress on the state of the union, the Constitution does not mandate Congress to support or look at the president’s proposals (Bardes, Shelley, & Schmidt, 2008, 387). The president is not even allowed to bring in legislation in Congress without having a senator or representative to back it up. The only official legislative authority awarded by the Constitution to the president—the veto—is put into effect at the conclusion of the lawmaking process, after legislations have been ratified by the House and the Senate. Hence the question is what do presidents do in order to affect the issues that are considered by Congress at the initial phases of the lawmaking process? In spite of current academic emphasis on these issues, there is still no conclusive explanation why Congress postpone its own agenda concerns in order to discuss or process the issues regarded by the president as ‘necessary and expedient’, especially when the majorities in Congress and the president belong to different parties (Bardes et al., 2008 387-388). One explanation that is discussed in this essay is the ‘quid pro quo’ (a favor for a favor) of the relationship between the Congress and the presidency. Quid Pro Quo Bargaining: A Persuasive Tactic Since the president holds no particular formal power over Congress, the dilemma of how s/he could still set the agenda has great implications for the agenda-setting issues. Particularly, it is true of circumstances where an actor has no official power over a body’s agenda and still attempts to wield external pressure or capability to affect the body’s agenda. The leading explanation of agenda setting in Congress has been John Kingdon’s ‘garbage can’ theory. Kingdon believes that several factors, such as deregulation, appeared to ascend on the agenda even with the absence of extensive public support and with ample oppositions (Larocca, 2006, 7). Rather, he suggests that agenda setting is a combination of three independent aspects, namely, political opportunity, development of solution, and problem identification. Basically, public officials formulating policy solutions do not constantly bring their agenda to congressional representatives aiming to resolve policy issues. Furthermore, there is also irregularity in the manner these actors come across one another, even though they can also be assembled by a policy entrepreneur, who has a distinctive capacity to harmonize solutions with issues (Larocca, 2006, 7). Despite the participation of policy entrepreneur, Kingdon believes that the process of setting an agenda can be unsystematic and erratic even when all actors conduct themselves rationally. Kingdon’s political entrepreneurs behave like strategic agents formulated by game theorists. These entrepreneurs predict circumstances and the responses of others in deciding their own measures to realize their objectives (Farrier, 2010). This is where the quid pro quo of the relationship between Congress and the presidency comes in. Because there are only a few individuals involved, numerous hidden bargaining around the intention of the law is expected. Quid pro quo within branches of government is widely known. This form of quid pro quo can take place across branches even in instances where a particular branch has no power over a certain process (Evans, 2004). If the president, for instances, does not implement a particular law that Congress wants to be implemented, Congress can pressure the president by threatening not to ratify a revenue legislation that s/he wants. Thus, Congress can influence implementation although the Constitution assigns implementation only to the president. Likewise, the president may take out legislation so as to execute the law. A case in point was given at the Constitutional Convention by Franklin (Grofman & Wittman, 1989, 77): “When the Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Governor [of Pennsylvania] in the means of self defense could not be got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from taxation.” The constitutional separation of powers makes sure that the executive branch will be discouraged by Congress. Disappointment with Congress is not confined to contemporary presidents, but instead surfaced in the earlier periods of U.S. history. Nevertheless, in spite of the unavoidable conflict, there are stages of compromise and cooperation. In analyzing what the president can do to get what s/he wants, Richard Neustadt offers a presidency-focused account of the relationship between the Congress and the president. He believes that the U.S. system prohibits the president from exercising his/her authority, specifically with regard to Congress (Bond & Fleisher, 1990). Neustadt argues that if the president is able to reconcile the differences between the two branches of government, s/he must be an exceptional public servant and depends on his/her ability to compromise, bargain, and persuade. Still, there are other explanations besides a presidency-focused account of the relationship between Congress and the presidency. A key alternative is a Congress-focused perspective. The U.S. Congress is a body made up of determined political representatives who have their own objectives, interests, and policy orientations (Thurber, 2002). The electoral system compels them to focus more on local interests than on the president’s national priorities. The Constitution awards Congress institutional independence from the presidency, and Congress is designed to assists its members in realizing their objectives. As a result, the success of a president is greatly influenced by the outcomes of the previous election. If the previous election places people to Congress whose local orientations and objectives match up with those of the president, then s/he will achieve a more stable success. In contrast, if majority of congressional representatives have interests dissimilar from those of the president, then s/he will endure greater failures (Thurber, 2002). Thus the separateness of the branches of government and power sharing lay down the conditions on which a president bargains. When an entity shares power with another, but does not compromises his/her position upon the caprice of the other, his/her eagerness to yield to the other’s demand arises whether s/he views the action favorable for him (Evans, 2004). The core of the persuasive mission of the president is to prove to powerful parties that what the government asks of them is what they should do for their own good. Therefore, persuasive power does not only involve rational argument or appeal. The authority and position inbuilt in the president’s office strengthen his/her judgment and appeal. If an executive does not have a Congress that for its personal intentions desires to endorse its legislation, if neither going public or quid pro quo bargaining are possible as routine techniques, are there are other methods an executive can use? A president can modify what s/he demands from the Congress. Obviously, the more favorable the demands of the presidents are to the congressional majorities, the more inclined Congress is to yield to the president’s demands. Such methods of modification are usual occurrences in congressional-presidential transactions (Bardes et al., 2008). They are also vital in other domains of presidential activities. For instance, in transacting with foreign entities, presidents usually perform earlier modification of their stance. In reaction to the evolving perspectives of American politics, presidents created new ways of directing or influencing Congress. Congress, in response, safeguarded itself from the influence of the president over resources for election by adopting or imitating these instruments of persuasion. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan believes that Congress is motivated by ‘the iron law of emulation’ (Collier, 1997, 15). According to him, “Whenever any branch of government acquires a new technique which enhances its power in relation to the other branches, that technique will soon be adopted by those other branches as well” (Collier, 1997, 15). Immediately after a president creates an instrument for legislative control, Congress will copy that instrument for its own purposes to safeguard its autonomy from the presidency. Hence, the success of the presidency generates a view of enlarged presidential influence that prompts a congressional adjustment that will, consequently, motivate additional presidential inventions. The White House Office of Legislative Affairs is the most excellent focus for an analysis of relationship between the Congress and presidency for it has come to dish up the demands of Congress and the president. In order to carry out dealings between Congress and the presidency, the congressional liaison personnel should be capable of recognizing the electoral priorities of Capitol Hill and the Oval Office (Farrier, 2010; Collier, 1997). As explained by Joseph Pika, White House lobbyists are outcasts inside the White House. They try to negotiate with Congressional representatives, while a number of people in the White House believe they should focus less on the demands of Congress. The policy practitioners in the White House become quite devoted to their policy recommendations and assume that the liaison personnel will safeguard their policy proposals from concession (Farrier, 2010). In addition, Congressional representatives usually demand concessions to prevent electoral dilemmas in their own jurisdictions. One columnist explained the duty of the first head of the Office of Legislative Affairs of Ronald Reagan, Max Friedersdorf (Collier, 1997, 15): Friedersdorf’s position makes him a high-tension conductor in the alternating current of information between the Hill and the White House, the pro in the quid-pro-quo symbiosis of government: The executive branch wants congressional compliance; and the legislators need a bewildering range of services and favors from the executive. Hidden-hand leadership was a strategy employed by several presidents, like Eisenhower, to manipulate Congress by making threats against a legislator’s election chances. During the presidency of Eisenhower, this strategy was covered up for it would have been incompatible with the reputation of Eisenhower as an outcast who was beyond partisan politics (Collier, 1997). According to Larocca (2006), such attempts to demoralize or evade bargaining would have defied the principles of institutionalized pluralism and been viewed as disrespect for the authority of Congress and an insult to the bargaining society. A particular method that presidents can use to bargain with Congress and facilitate election prospects for legislators is to assist them in bringing federal resources to their jurisdiction. Lyndon Johnson was an expert on this strategy and he traded numerous favors, majority of which were intended to facilitate election prospective for gracious legislators (Bond & Fleisher, 1990). Although such favors kept on flowing, they were more abundant and more appropriate to political demands in the era of institutionalized pluralism. The president’s exploitation of favors is defined in this case as ‘granting’ instead of ‘trading’ for personal favors were rarely openly traded for a legislator’s vote (Larocca, 2006; Collier, 1997). The president tends to give out favors to Congressional representatives who are usually considered friends or prospective friends, who have supported the presidency or who may be expected to support the presidency in the future. Moreover, the capacity to gain favors from the president was viewed as a means for members of Congress to prove to colleagues their value within the Washington community. Sustaining favor requires maintaining friendly relations with congressional representatives so as to foster the form of individual bargaining that characterizes institutionalized pluralism (Thurber, 2002). While sustaining favor does not immediately result in electoral prospects, it is an essential element of successful bargaining with congressional representatives. Summation and Analysis— Clinton’s NAFTA Anybody with sufficient political assets can become a policy coalition leader. Among such individuals are party and committee leaders in every house of Congress. Several of these leaders, including the president, have the privilege to use distributive benefits for vote trading. President Clinton used distributive benefits to convince Congress to endorse legislation to put into operation the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Evans, 2004, 132). On the 17th of November 1993, Congress signed NAFTA by ratifying H.R. 3450, a legislation to guarantee execution of the conditions of that agreement (Evans, 2004, 132). The success of Clinton in Congress had been suspected. It appears that the administration succeeded only with a string of compromises to congressional representatives embodying numerous local interests that were intimidated by the trade liberation of NAFTA with Canada and Mexico (Farrier, 2010). Journalists who largely supported it and interest groups that contested the agreement all denounced what they described as the unashamed trading of votes that guaranteed NAFTA’s success in Congress. Nevertheless, no veteran spectator of the executive branch could have been taken aback by the efforts of Clinton to gain or buy votes; he simply emulated the strategies popularized by many of his forerunners. President Clinton was not quite restrained by misgivings about pork barrel plans; indeed, he confronted the opposite issue when his economic stimulus legislation was botched in spite of favors it granted to congressional representatives (Evans, 2004, 132-133). In the opinion of the president, that legislation was quite filled with pork that it would have been unsuccessful in generating the boost that he aimed for in the first place-- a case of vote trading that went berserk. According to Farrier (2010), the vote trading or vote buying process can quickly slip from the control of the individuals who initiated it, with spiraling claims for pork from congressional representatives who make threats to hold back their votes without it. As the outcome of the stimulus legislation shows, Clinton established patterns that generated increased expectations of favors among members of the Congress even prior to the 1993 vote on NAFTA. In order to ensure the approval of his economic projects, Clinton entered into several agreements with congressional representatives (Larocca, 2006). A congressional staffer revealed that in the early stages of his presidency, Clinton yielded, at the insistence of western ranchers, on his proposal to raise grazing charges for federal realties. The staffer got the idea that this is how to bargain with the president. She also said that “some people just hold out as a rule,” although they agree to the president’s demands, “especially if it’s a tough vote. They can say ‘not only did I think it was right, but I also made them come to me” (Evans, 2004, 133). Hence, the earlier agreements of Clinton raised definite expectations among congressional representatives that he also would engage in vote buying for NAFTA. Particularly, some members of the Congress realized that if they withhold, they may receive favors. The capability of President Clinton to fully exploit the political machinery to gain approval for NAFTA in Congress was an evident success for his besieged administration at the time. Willing to prove a determination to bring forth‘New Democrat’ legislation in 1992, and reluctant to give up his campaign promises, Clinton showed exceptional political ability as he formed wide-ranging alliances across party leadership and interest groups (Farrier, 2010, 76). As the decision to approve or reject NAFTA approached, the presidency exploited every possible strategy to persuade unsure congressional representations, revealing the political mechanism operating in Washington. Members of the House were offered guarantees of electoral support from the Clinton couple in future elections. Conclusions Quid pro quo bargaining between Congress and the presidency is a widely used tactic of gaining political influence because of its proven effectiveness. Numerous presidents in the history of U.S. politics have tried to work their way through the complex legislative process through vote trading or vote buying. Favors have been given out to gain electoral prospects and guarantee the passing of legislation in Congress. Although questioned by some as an unethical, dirty way of doing politics, quid pro quo bargaining is a deeply embedded tradition in the American political system. With or without the public’s knowledge or approval, this form of relationship between Congress and the presidency will persist, not just in the U.S., but also elsewhere. References Bardes, B., Shelley, M., & Schmidt, S. (2008). American Government and Politics Today: The Essentials. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning. Bond, J. & Fleisher, R. (1990). The President in the Legislative Arena. London: University of Chicago Press. Collier, K. (1997). Between the Branches: The White House Office of Legislative Affairs. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Evans, D. (2004). Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress. UK: Cambridge University Press. Farrier, J. (2010). Congressional Ambivalence: The Political Burdens of Constitutional Authority. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky. Grofman, B. & Wittman, D. (1989). The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. New York: Algora Publishing Larocca, R. (2006). The Presidential Agenda: Sources of Executive Influence in Congress. Ohio: Ohio State University Press. Thurber, J. (2002). Rivals for Power: Presidential-Congressional Relations. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Read More