Why Governments Promote Terrorism - Coursework Example

Why Governments Promote Terrorism Introduction Terrorism is the violence use (mainly against the civilian populationtargets) to provoke fear, generate publicity, and in some cases, destabilize government. In fact, small groups opposing influential state engage in terrorism, but states and administrations also have the capacity to engage in terrorism practices. All over history, terrorism has assumed various forms. In the recent past, terrorist practices have been used by Colombian and Russian nihilists, Israelites nationalists, Nazi forces, global environmentalists, left-wing European guerrillas, dissatisfied United States radicals, death squads in Latin America, and Islamic fundamentalist to achieve certain political and financial objectives. Similarly, terrorism is not centered to any team or ideology. Discussion Critical thinkers and scholars categorize terrorism into two distinct types: terrorism by governments and states, and terrorism by groups not linked to governments. Additionally, ideological terrorism seeks to enhance a certain system of belief through violence acts and may be executed by both groups and governments (Betancourt and Alison 67). This discussion seeks to investigate why Colombian government through its policies, actions and emissions directly or indirectly promotes terrorism. Experts agree that democratic political systems in Colombia and United states provide increased opportunities and freedoms for terrorists attackers and establish a permissive condition in which networks of terrorists can function easily. While Colombia has no recognized links to al-Qaeda’s global terrorism brand, the nation has ongoing civil and tribal war weak central government, strong guerrillas and wealthy drug traffickers, lords, and paramilitary groups have made the Colombia a sanctuary of home centered terrorist teams that perform extortions, civilian kidnappings, assassinations, and constant bombings. Colombian administration through Plan Colombia and NARC policy encourages acts of terrorism. The plan Colombia provides about 800 United States consultants and conducts projects to teach and service the armed forces and military in Colombia, restrict drug transfers, and assist locals grow crops instead of coca for manufacturing cocaine. The United States forces have trained various counternarcotics battalions in Colombia as distinct improved Colombian army, which consequently has contributed to weakening of Latin American government (Kirk 67). Terrorism in Colombia marks a certain strategy that is different from other violence manifestations. In fact, Colombian government holds terrorism as a pivotal element of their series of action. The government policies and actions has not only enhanced their dependence on the terrorism strategy and launched increasingly refined forms like de-territorialized terrorism, but have also specialized in certain terrorist acts that fit their overall economic and political objectives. Whereas paramilitary categories focus entirely on massacres and mandatory disappearance, guerrillas focus on mixed terrorism such as random bombings and kidnappings. In the domestic armed wars afflicting Colombia, terrorism act is widespread. In fact, Colombia registers the topmost government sponsored terrorism incidents in the world since 1970 to about 2004. Similarly, the armed conflict of the domestic, military, paramilitary squads’ scores representing the most varied motives, and two key guerrilla teams has led to uprooting of over 4 million civilians who left their residential places to escape from terrible violence acts. Some scholars believe that the predictability of Colombian violence tends to complicate the true dimension of the conditions of terror (Arias and Hernán 44). In additions, some scholars assert that dehumanizing and devastating acts are increasingly popular and widespread in Colombia that civilian populations have developed a remarkable forbearance for brutality that complicates their ability to differentiate terrorism from other increasing prosaic violence forms. In their struggle for authority, control, and resources, the Colombian government permits use of terrorism. For instance, the government uses various violent strategies to attain their economic, political, social and military goals in the United State (Dudley 34). Experts believe that a terrorism practice in Colombia constitutes a certain mechanism that can be possibly differentiated form other violence manifestations. For instance, armed government parties, such as paramilitary and guerrilla networks, have translated terrorism into a central aspect of their series of actions. Such parties have increased their dependence on this mechanism and have enhanced their intensity of these practices and launched new, increasingly extensive terrorism forms, such as de-territorialized terrorism. Additionally, the parties have engaged in certain terrorism forms that fit their overall financial, social, and political gains. Colombian government used terrorism as a political strategy. The government used some acts of terror as a means to enhance and safeguard their key objectives (profit) by either forcing compliance or support of the target population or by forcing authorities to transform policies that obscured their key interests. Terrorist in this context is both political and economical in that the motives are economically driven (Forest 103). Similarly, terrorist practices, such as extrajudicial executions, acts of torture, targeted assassinations, forced displacements, and death threats are pervasive and economically oriented. This is because they coexist with various other malicious indications of economically and politically encouraged crimes, such as burglaries, embezzlements, smuggling and extortion, which in most cases involve extremely high levels of brutality. In addition, advanced and resourceful organized violent practices contribute to amplify terrorist levels. The Doctrine of National Security asserts that the Colombian government unleashed a violent campaign of terror to eliminate internal enemies in their land. In a series of reminiscent of the Southern Cone dictatorship, the Colombian government deliberately spread terrorism practices to stabilize possible problems to its authority. Under the 1923 Legislative Decree, commonly recognized as the 1978 Security Statute, the Colombian military gained significant judicial support, most vital jurisdiction over alleged political felonies executed by the authority and civilians to attempt those cases into local courts. Evidence reveals that about sixty thousand civilians were arrested in the initial period of the ruling and that the government resorted to increased systematic violence and oppression. Targets included labour unionists, armed group members, and leftists intellectual militants (Arias and Hernán 44). Evidence also reveals that state terrorism in Colombia was different from Latin American paradigmatic case of the devastating war, however. Whereas the rationality is the same (for instance, engage in terrorism practices to stabilize potential threats to the authority), the extent and the magnitude are incomparable, mainly with most extensive incidents as Argentina. Additionally, since the culmination of General Rojas dictatorship Colombia has been under the rule of civilian administrations that were under the control of the electorate and the political parties. Although weak, some measures were in place and controlled the power and strategies of Colombia leaders to unleash a clandestine conflict against groups of guerrilla (Betancourt and Alison 67). As the nation tried to restore a normality semblance under the reign of president Betancure, an unanticipated and increasingly unpredictable terrorist group attacked Colombia. The executives of the Cartel, an irresponsible business of drug smugglers including Escober P, Rodrigue, Ochoa Luis and Lehder, declared a fatal group of terrorist attackers to stop the state’s decision to extradite them to the US (Kirk 90). This long war between 1984 and 1994 led to loss of thousands of residents, injured hundreds more, devastated crucial infrastructures, deteriorated the state legitimacy by exposing its incapacity to safeguard its citizens and creating an overall sense of fear and terror amidst populations. The government of Colombia has performed an indirect function in the development of paramillitarism. Additionally, some Armed Forces members, such as highly influential leaders, have ignored the detrimental practices of such groups and supported their practices through the provision of weaponry tools, trainings, and organizational aid. These harking Colombian Armed Forces members have endorsed the establishment of paramilitary networks to supplement the counterinsurgency efforts of the state (Dudley 89). Given the crucial informal links amidst paramilitary networks and some army members, paramilitaries constantly function with impunity and brutality in regions of presence of high military. Additionally, paramilitary teams have focused on disappearances and massacres and employed them to force peasants away from targeted areas they want to establish control. Consequently, these networks resort to brutal acts to validate the political status quo. Similarly, guerrillas, in their part, participate in agitational terrorism such as kidnappings and random bombings which aim to reduce the credibility and legitimacy of the nation and convey that the government is unable to provide security for its people. Some of the violent practices conducted by the government supported groups, such as massacres, forced dislocation, and assassinations, intentionally aim to instill fear in the local population. In addition, some practices intended to assist the government secure resources to wage war culminated in adverse impacts (Arias and Hernán 44). It is evident that the utilization of terrorism in Colombia represents an adverse externality of the local or domestic armed crisis that has intermittently overwhelmed Colombia starting the 1940s. Similarly, civilian immunity, the keystone basis of IHL, is consciously infringed in various instances by parties who skeptically assert that infractions are the ill-fated even though inevitable outcomes of warfare in the context of Colombia. Conclusion Therefore, a careful investigation of terrorism in Colombia indicates that terrorisms constitute a planned and intentional strategy by the government to maximize their objectives in the overall war effort. Additionally, terrorism acts are political strategies and deliberate efforts to maintain the reputation of the state, achieve economic and political control over strategic areas and establish social control over their civilians. Works cited Arias, Andrés F, and Hernán Maldonado. Farc Terrorism in Colombia: A Clustering Analysis. Bogotá: CEDE, 2004. Print. Betancourt, Ingrid, and Alison Anderson. Even Silence Has an End: My Six Years of Captivity in the Colombian Jungle. New York: Penguin Press, 2010. Print. Dudley, Steven S. Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. New York: Routledge, 2004. Print. Forest, James J. F. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007. Kirk, Robin. More Terrible Than Death: Massacres, Drugs, and Americas War in Colombia. New York: Public Affairs, 2003. Print. Read More