Security Measures at U.S. Airports Before and After the Terrorist Attacts - Research Paper Example

Security measures in United s’ airports before and after the 9/11 attacks The terrorist attacks that shook the United s (US) and the whole world on September 11, 2001 prompted the US government to enact several new laws to improve airline and passenger safety. The use of aircrafts to bring down one of the renowned symbols of American capitalism along with targeting the military nerve center of the US military command was seen as a lapse in airport and aircraft safety. Soon after the attacks, the then US president, George W. Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) on November 19, 2001 (Etzioni, 2003, pg, 52). The enactment of this law meant a huge overhaul in the airport infrastructure across the nation with the establishment of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The TSA worked under the Department of Transportation (DOT) and made several changes in aviation security. The most notable change was the federalization of all passenger screening across all US airports and the mandatory requirement for screening all checked baggage. To manage this across the vast airport network, the TSA deputed 158 Security directors who oversaw the security operations across the 430 airports in the United States (Johnstone, 2006, pg. 65). Post 9/11, aviation security have undergone constant changes owing to several uncovered terrorist and security threats over the years. While the primary purpose of enacting new security procedures was to restore passenger confidence and help the badly affected aviation sector, the implementation of these measures has made traveling a thorough, time consuming and less convenient process. Although the overall impact of these new regulations in unclear, enhanced confidence in air travel and safety has spurred the demand in the aviation market. However, at the same time, inconvenient security procedures during departures has meant an increasing number of travelers look to other options especially for shorter distances. For instance, travelers need to arrive at least a couple of hours in advance in order to undergo the security procedures at the airport that includes personal body screening, checking of hand and hold luggage as well as verification of various objects that passengers carry along with them. Further, passengers are also picked randomly to perform additional checks that includes verifying objects in their hand luggage and checking their shoes and belts etc. In the aftermath of the incident in December 2001, when the British national Richard Reid attempted to set off a bomb in his shoes, security personnel demand passengers to remove their shoes when arriving at security checkpoints (Price, 2008, pg. 54). The current paper is an analysis of the various changes that US airports have undergone since the 9/11 attacks, after which the country has been the primary targets for terrorist attacks. In discussing some of the measures adopted in US airports since then, the paper will provide a range of information on additional mechanisms that have been adopted in airports and some of the changes that have been initiated in an attempt to thwart any possible attacks. The Federalization of Airport security mechanisms The TSA overtook the responsibility for handling airport security in early 2002. Although initial screening of passengers was done through private equipment, the agency’s employees soon began to check passengers beginning with Baltimore Washington Airport in April that year. The TSA implemented three major changes to improve efficiency in passenger screening. Initially, the TSA sensed the need to conduct checks on its own instead of relying on private entities. In this respect, the agency increased its staff, which was also required to reduce the waiting times at checkpoints. Before 9/11, all US airports combined together were manned by a meager 16200 security personnel, all of whom were provided by private security firms. Within a year of its inception, the TSA hired more than 56000 personnel to handle both passenger and baggage lines with nearly 55% of the workforce being dedicated to handling passenger and the remainder assigned to baggage screening (Etzioni, 2003, pg. 114). In an effort to improve efficiency, the TSA also took steps to provide good salaries to security personnel, with higher wages and added employee benefits. Before 9/11, airport security guards earned an hourly wage of $7 and did not enjoy any accompanying benefits. This was identified as one of the primary reasons for the decline in the turnover among screeners with an attrition rate as high as 120% during 1998-99. By 2004, this figure had come down to a phenomenal 14% (Johnstone, 2006, pg. 78). Additionally, the TSA took steps to provide formal training for its screeners in airport security. For instance, prior to 9/11, the average screener had had merely 12 hours of training while modern TSA guidelines stipulate that a security guard can be posted in any US airport only after having undergone 100 hours of training successfully with adequate exposure to various technologies that scan passengers and baggage. Despite these sweeping changes, the TSA has often been criticized for problems in resource allocation. Previously, screeners and other equipment were allocated based on the volume of passengers and baggage at US airports. This meant a busy airport with several screening lanes was allotted more equipment. However, this policy led to delays for passengers especially in major airports which were used as transit points where they do not pass through such screening while leading to shortages of adequate infrastructure at airports that serve as origin and destination (Price, 2008, pg. 108). There were also voices raised against the size of the TSA’s workforce and the several imbalanced introduced in handling them efficiently. By 2004, the TSA reduced its employees to 45000 screeners, which led to further problems in coping with demand for additional hiring, understaffing at busy airports and long lines of passengers waiting to board their flights (Zarembka, 2005, pg. 86). Baggage screening Prior to 9/11, there was no general system in place for processing baggage and in fact a mere 5% of all checked baggage underwent any form of screening. The TSA introduced a two stage screening system under which airlines had to implement the concept of positive bag matching. This meant that every piece of baggage was to be correlated with a passenger on board and every such item was to undergo mandatory screening using any of the four prescribed methods. To screen baggage, security personnel stationed at airports could make use of explosion detection systems (EDS), sniffer dogs, search bags manually or use explosion trace detection (ETD) systems. EDS are massive systems that can process over 150 bags per hour and were found to generate false alarms for explosives in almost 30% of screened material (Johnstone, 2006, pg. 34). Every bag that triggered an alarm was required to be searched manually, leading to additional waiting times and delays for passengers. In fact, the use of manual search has led to the filing of numerous complaints of theft and destruction of passenger’s belongings. In comparison, the ETD devices were relatively smaller but could only process half as the number by an EDS and consisted of a labor intensive process. the process involved obtaining a swab of the baggage and placing it in the instrument for analysis. Although the US congress directed the TSA to install EDS machines by 2002, airports that could not ensure their implementation resorted to a combination of any of the other three methods (Etzioni, 2003, pg. 42). Currently, nearly 90% of all baggage is handled by ETD and EDS machines while the rest are screened through sniffer dogs or manual searches. Moreover, the process of configuring the baggage screening in performed in three distinct ways. In a majority of the airports, passengers first check in with the airlines and take their bags into a screening area where both undergo checks using any of the four methods described above. In other smaller airports, passengers are first screened for their baggage and then directed to the check-in area. In either of these situations, a positive alarm prompts immediate measures for additional checks whereby the baggage is mostly opened and manually examined for any prohibited items. A very few number of airports have implemented in-line EDS with no additional inconveniences for passengers as passengers can simply hand in their baggage to airlines at the check-in counter (Zarembka, 2005, pg. 126). In this case, screening is done away from the passenger. Setting up this system requires additional infrastructure, costs and efforts to integrate such systems with existing facilities at airports. Impact on security mechanisms In general, the impact on air travel due to security measures is rather ambiguous. While additional security measures render travelling a less convenient affair, events like 9/11 have forced passengers to accept such inconveniences by arriving at airports ahead of time. Further, random searchers on passengers and their belongings, prohibitions on carrying inflammable and liquid material, restrictions in carrying pointed objects and the increased scrutiny in moving around airports add to the problems faced by passengers. In fact, nearly 65% of air travelers believe that airports are becoming places of hassle and delays while airlines increasingly point towards these measures for increasing their costs in lost ticket sales as passengers opt for alternative modes of transport or prefer not to travel altogether (Price, 2008, pg. 21). Despite these odds, passengers do sense the need for increased security and many are willing to accept some of the inconveniences described previously if not all of them. The TSA has claimed that beefing up security at US airports since 2003 has increased passenger confidence resulting in better business for airlines (Johnstone, 2006, pg. 63). In the case of baggage screening, passengers today have a feeling that their baggage is secure of any prohibited material and that dropping bags at the check-in counters reduces the time required to wait along security lines. However, lack of oversight into baggage checks has led to a number of complaints of theft and damage to material from travelers, who have expressed inability at stopping any such incidents. There is also the increasing sense that security at US airports tends to have a larger impact at large and busy airports than the smaller ones. In the case of the former, the congestion induced due to huge volumes of baggage means that material does not get loaded onto connecting flights and waiting times for most international flights are expected to be longer. The machinery at place is unable to cope with the demand and turn into huge bottlenecks leading to decline in efficiency of the TSA. Various forecasts have been made over the impact of the TSA’s efforts on passengers. In short, the work of the TSA has led to the creation of a more positive effect that has overshadowed the negative impact it has resulted within US airports. Despite the seeming effect on downsizing the demand for air travel, enhancement of the quality and speed of scanners has led to faster processing of passengers and baggage besides leading to increasing efficiency in detecting prohibited items or suspects. By providing adequate training to improve staff quality, the TSA has in a way made every possible effort to reduce the inconvenience to passengers. Further, there is ample evidence to suggest that federalizing the security structure among US airports has brought back the confidence within the travel over the safety with air travel. In fact, a poll by Zogby showed that nearly 60% of the people who polled felt safer as a result of the new baggage scanners at airports (Etzioni, 2003, pg. 97). The introduction of stringent procedures in air travel has made them feel safer. In short, consumer confidence has been mixed to the introduction of new procedures post 9/11 and there has been no evidence of a direct impact on the demand for air travel. However, there is enough reason to believe that the TSA would have to come up with smarter solutions at busier airports, which are prone to longer delays and waiting times, prompting many to consider alternative hubs for embarking on their travels. Unless the TSA ensures that it can process men and material faster, it cannot ensure that the reputation of some of its biggest airports will be maintained. Conclusion A study by the Cornell University in 2007 demonstrated that the new rules with airport security introduced in US airports had in fact led to a reduction in passenger volume by as much as 5 percent. In the case of the nation’s 50 busiest airports, this figure climbed to 8% (Price, 2008, pg. 120). The major contributor to this decline was the increased delays and longer processing times at security checkpoints. In contrast, there was no impact on baggage screening measures as most of airline traffic, which is based on connecting flights meant that passengers did not have to get their baggage checked at every destination. Further, there was ample evidence to suggest that security measures led to an increaded reduction in demand especially for flights of shorter duration. In fact, the study determined that any pricing strategies did not have a significant impact on stimulating this demand. While current baggage handling procedures reduce the volume of originating passenger inflows, there was no resultant impact due to the federalization of airport security across the US. The replacement of traditional systems with TSA stipulated screeners meant more stringent methods to screen passengers and a signal that the strategy of the administration has worked to a large extent. The TSA increased its workforce, wage levels for staff and imparted quality training in security procedures, systems and techniques. Further, the level of efficiency demonstrated by screeners across various categories of US airports in terms of passenger traffic suggests a uniform pattern. However, there have been a few deviations during the past few years with some regional airports such as the Elko regional airport in Nevada, which reinstated private security agencies. Although there is expectation that many smaller airports will follow suit, there is little evidence to suggest that the TSA would recommend this method in any large way (Zarembka, 2005, pg. 87). Finally, it can be concluded that post 9/11 security measures have led to a reduction in the demand for air travel. The net benefits of these new measures have worked towards balancing this decline in consumer demand, although the consequences of these regulatory guidelines will only be evident in the coming years. The cost of overhauling the entire airport security system was over a billion dollars. However, reduction in demand should be perceived as a temporary phenomenon. The demand for safer air travel is sure to lead to resurgence in the market and the government is expected to use its experience in enhancing the entire security apparatus to ensure a better experience for travelers. References Etzioni (2003), Rights vs. public safety after 9/11: America in the age of terrorism. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Johnstone (2006), 9/11 and the future of transportation security. New York: Greenwood Publishing. Price (2008), Practical Aviation Security: Predicting and Preventing Future Threats. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. Zarembka (2005), the hidden history of 9-11-2001. London: Emerald Group. Read More