Bush's War and Clash of Civilization - Coursework Example

BUSH Part I The US under Bush anticipated little resistance in toppling the Iraqi forces, but did not have a clear exit plan or objectives for stabilizing a post war Iraq. The US anticipated the level of military resistance, but not the civilian looting. In the case, written in the context of the Bush administration, a clear showing of the hesitation and indeterminacy of the actions that led the country to attack Iraq, remains unclear. “Over the next three months, some professional military officers voiced reservations about US plans to attack Iraq. Although it was not unusual for military professionals to disagree with White House decisions, it was unusual for their concerns to be voiced so openly to the press” (Pfiffner, 197). The case basically outlines exactly how and why the US was able to wage preemptive war on Iraq. The leadership vacuum in Iraq was due to conflict and ineffective planning based not on long-term, but on short term objectives. Looking at the situation in Iraq, we can see conflict theory at work. Conflict theory is involved with society on a larger level and seeks to determine patterns that relate to society in a whole manner that emphasizes struggle, dominance, and submission. From this perspective, issues that may be seen otherwise from another theoretical perspective are often seen in terms of inequality and repression. Conflict theorists would tend to see the situation in Iraq as being an example of a controlling force of law and authority (the American occupation) functioning on behalf of those in charge of the society (the Iraqi government), who impose labels and social coercion on other members of the society (the Iraqi people). Looking at the situation in these categories, conflict theory seems the best choice. The situation shows how again the Bush administration had been hawkish about this issue for some time, including the time-period invoked in this case, despite tepid international response, and in many cases overstepping itself in rhetorical commitment which, when invariably uncovered and questioned by the media in terms of its consequences, created a state of confused aggression that continued to the end of the Bush administration, in which objectives, such as solving the problem of the leadership vacuum in Iraq, were definitely not completed. Four events which intensified the post war animosity between the US and Iraq included. First of all, there was the issue that the US seemed to be war profiteering Iraqi resources through many companies and contractors. “Bushs war has cost the lives of more than 3,000 U.S. troops and anywhere from 52,000 Iraqi civilians to more than ten times that number. A figure for wounded Iraqis is hard to come by. For U.S. soldiers, that number exceeds 22,000. The financial toll is also exorbitant. We are spending $2 billion a week on this horror” (Rothschild, 2007). Trends in support and opposition tend in the media as well as bipartisan politics tended to be almost universally pointing towards opposition, and yet the war went on, and even escalated in scope and scale of destruction. At the same time, however, in a second issue, there was mistrust between the governments and, there were different perspectives on the issues as well. “Given the cautionary mood of the country, it is puzzling that most members of Congress seem fearful of challenging the hawkish approach to Iraq” (Pffiffner, 2000). A third event was the perception that the US engaged in preemptive war, and was seen by Iraq as an occupying power, not a liberator. Majority rule has silenced what may have been more vocal democratic opposition to the rhetoric of preemptive war against Iraq at the time, but the situation comes clear with many of the facts that were not available to the public at the time, and the facts show a strong aggression and preemptive war waged against a sovereign country on flimsy premises used to disguise more basic motives. The ensuing narrowness of debate has created a perceived choice between being cautious and being aggressive, with underlying principles remaining by and large questioned by the Obama administration, and its shift of focus to Afghanistan. A fourth event is that public reaction against the escalation of the war in Iraq tended to dovetail with public disatisfaction with the Bush administration; Bush got most of the blame, but others in his cabinet and among his advisors were perhaps even more involved in the sort of quagmire the escalation extended. In any case, this is a hot topic because many people care very deeply about it, and it also represents that rare hot topic where there are strong sentiments on both sides. For example, many Americans, although nowhere near the majority, believe that the escalation was necessary for national security. The Iraqi National Congress (Makiya and al Chalabi) removed Hussein from power by establishing opposition. The INC was essentially run by the US government as a way to officially oust Saddam. “According to ABC, Rendon came up with the name for the Iraqi National Congress, an opposition coalition of 19 Iraqi and Kurdish organizations whose main tasks were to "gather information, distribute propaganda and recruit dissidentsf” (Iraq, 2009). This organization, created by the CIA, was used to remove Hussein from power. The US did not have any certifiable and truthful evidence that Iraq had WMD. Majority rule during this time silenced what may have been more vocal democratic opposition to the rhetoric of preemptive war against Iraq. The ensuing narrowness of debate created a perceived choice during the time that the case covers between being cautious and being aggressive, with underlying principles remaining by and large unquestioned. “After the initial failure of US troops to find WMD in Iraq, the CIA sent in a search force of 1200 experts lead by David Kay to locate the weapons. Kay’s mission was to scour the country for WMD and report back to the president… his search continued without success” (Pfiffner, 2000). One must be honest by addressing decision making in terms of why the U.S. became involved in this conflict, focusing on weapons of mass destruction and the debate that was going on at the time between the U.S. and the U.N. Security Council and other nations regarding the situation in Iraq. Richard Perle’s role was a supportive one in terms of his advice about the early stages of the war. Since, Perle has tried to distance himself from his original position of support for preemptive war, and has blamed Bush for being incompetent, saying that the plan would have worked without him. “In real life, Perle was the ideological architect of the Iraq war and of the Bush doctrine of preemptive attack. But at yesterdays forum of foreign policy intellectuals, he created a fantastic world in which Perle is not a neoconservative” (Richard, 2009). There was no direct association between Hussein and Bin Laden; in fact, the two reportedly were at the very most ambivalent about each other, one as a national dictator, and the other as a Saudi expatriate. They traveled in very different circles, and although they had some similar objectives, there were no proven organizational ties. Although public opinion has shifted towards support at some points, such as after Hussein was captured, and after the first elections, this support has been dampened by the sustained and daily deaths of American soldiers, inadequate care at Walter Reed, torture, and other counterpoints. Part II There is no clash of civilizations. The US war in Iraq was not about religion or culture; it was about family vendettas and, most of all, money. Preemptive warfare is most visible through the media, and thus through the case against clash of civilizations, concerning U.S. policy towards Iraq. Unlike the Gulf War situation, in which Iraq was seen to be instituting a war of aggression against its neighbor Kuwait by the international community, the Iraq War concerned a divided international community and a United States that was intent on the perceived unbalance of the dictator Hussein, who did not have or possess weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the present case focuses on arguments suggesting a preemptive war that will negate this possibility being posed by Bush and others. “The problem with these statements was lack of hard evidence. Two assertions about Hussein’s nuclear capacity that the administration relied upon were of dubious authenticity. B The first was the claim that Iraq sought uranium oxide from Niger” (Pfiffner, 200). The rhetoric of preemptive war suggests that since Hussein posed a threat, was hostile towards the U.S., ad was reportedly pursuing a nuclear weapons program (which later has proven to be based on faulty intelligence), this threat should be removed before it becomes too great, thus defending the freedoms and liberties of American society. “Somehow Bush thinks he can still be victorious in Iraq. Even Henry Kissinger doesnt believe that anymore. And the commanders, including the Joint Chiefs, advised Bush against sending more troops. Bush responded by scolding them and then changing commanders… The new U.S. military strategy seems to be "surge and train” (Rothschild, 2007). The film “Promises” does not fit into my perception about the clash of civilizations, because despite the movie’s focus on conflict, I believe that the future contains a utopia; not a dystopia. REFERENCE Froomkin, D. (2007). Change in tactics, not strategy. Washingtonpost.com Huntington, P (2006). The Clash of Civilizations. Pfiffner, J (2004). The decision to go to war with Iraq Rothschild, M. (2007). Bushs undemocratic escalation. The Progressive. Is Iraq another Vietnam? (2004). Monthly Review. Iraqi national congress (2009). http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Iraqi_National_Congress Richard Perle tries to distance himself (2009). http://www.parapundit.com/archives/005992.html Read More