The UK Government: From a System of Government to Governance - Coursework Example

The UK Government: From A System of Government to Governance Introduction Political analysts have claimed that the government of the United Kingdom (UK) has moved from government to governance, or more specifically, from a unitary state government to network governance (Watts 2006). The objective of this paper is to analyse and discuss the extent of UK’s shift from a system of government to governance by drawing on cases from the international or national arena. In order to determine the extent of this shift, the governance description should begin with the concept of policy networks or groups of organisations gathered around a main government position or sector. These groups generally incorporate big business, professions and trade unions. The cooperation of these groups is needed by the central departments for delivery of services. They require their support because British government seldom delivers services. It normally makes use of other departments to do so (Moran 2005). Moreover, there are quite numerous groups to talk to hence government should amass interests. It demands the rightful representatives for that policy domain. The groups on the other hand require the financial support and legislative power that only the government can grant (Wright 2003). Policy networks are an established component of British government. Normally, policy networks develop an agreement about what they are doing, an agreement that fulfils at least a few of the objectives of all concerned. They have developed customary approaches in decision making. They are considered public service’s private government, mockingly identified by the New Right as ‘producer groups’ (Bevir & Rhodes 2003: 57) that exploit government for the fulfilment of their own sectional motives. The Thatcher conservative government pursued to lessen their authority by employing markets to provide public services, sidestepping active networks and restraining the ‘rights’ of professions, usually by putting them into thorough management and financial regulations. Yet these corporate marketisation and management developments had unforeseen outcomes. They disjointed the arrangements for delivering public services, generating demands for groups to collaborate with one another to carry out the delivery of public services (Richards & Smith 2003). To put it simply, and ironically, marketisation reproduced the networks it intended to change. In general, sets of organisations currently deliver services of the welfare state. What happened, in fact, is the proliferation of networks in UK government. The process of fragmentation not merely produced new networks; it too enhanced the membership of active networks, integrating the charitable and private sectors (Wright 2003). Furthermore, the government traded direct controls for indirect regulations thus core departments are now neither essentially nor consistently the pivot of a network. The government has the power to determine the restrictions to network activities and decisions: after all, it financially supports the services. However, it has also reinforced its reliance on different networks. The process of devolution to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales basically contributes an additional layer of intricacy that is prone to stimulate defensive networks (Bevir & Rhodes 2003). Thus, this discussion will begin with the other narrative regarding the British government with the notion that governance denotes ‘governing with and through networks’ (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004: 22). The term ‘governance’ is applied as shorthand to include change in the public sector; to sum up the transition in British government from the powerful executive (government) to networks (governance). It denotes the evolving structure of the British state and to the means wherein the networks’ informal power shapes, enhances and replaces the state’s formal authority (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004). Strong Executive A persistent argument about the British executive puts emphasis on the relative authority of prime minister and cabinet. Even though the argument has its detractors, political analysts still grieve about the presidentialism of Blair. Their criticism believes the optimal way to analyse the executive is to examine major functions and their officials. Rather than a positional framework, advocates of the strong executive identify it by its responsibilities. Rather than enquiring which function is vital, they enquire which positions characterise the innermost piece of British government (Bevir & Rhodes 2003). The fundamental responsibilities of the British executive are to unify and incorporate policies of the central government and to function as final negotiators of conflicts between various components of the government apparatus. Political institutions apart from the prime minister and cabinet, involving, for instance, the Cabinet Office or the Treasury, can perform these tasks (Wright 2003). However, the debate about the power of the British executive is overplayed. It is apparent there were constantly numerous restrictions. With the shift from government to governance, furthermore, the restrictions have turn out to be ever more persistent. The narrative of the past two decades is defined by fragmentation complicating the process of centralisation as a divided executive aims to enhance horizontal cooperation among organisations and departments and vertical cooperation between sectors and their organisational networks. An accidental outcome of this pursuit for central regulation has been a ‘hollowing-out’ of the powerful executive (Rhodes 1994). The ‘hollowing-out’ of the state implies that the progress of governance has weakened the capability of the strong executive to take action successfully, making it more and more dependent on mediation or diplomacy (Bevir & Rhodes 2003: 58): The state has been hollowed-out from above by for example international interdependence, and from below by for example marketisation and networls, and sideways by agencies. On the inside the British strong executive was by now typified by policy networks and sporadic and selective cooperation. It has been increasingly hollowed out on the inside by the unforeseen outcomes of marketisation, which disjointed delivery of public service, proliferated networks and expanded networks’ membership. Sooner or later devolution to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales will require further complexities. Certainly, there could be a demonstration outcome that will provide further impetus to the pressure for local devolution in England (Watts 2006). On the outside the state is as well being hollowed-out by EU’s membership and other commitments with the international community (Moran 2005). Menon and Wright (1998) claim that Britain has ‘forged an efficient policy making and coordinating machine’ (Menon & Wright 1998: 48) due to the fact that the government decides and acts harmoniously; it has been triumphant in its ‘basic strategy of opening up and liberalising the EU’s economy’ (ibid: 48). Rhodes (1994) proposes that the membership of UK to the EEC and involvement in the ensuing creation of the EU has witnessed power transfer upwards from the ‘central state to a supranational tier of government’ (Garnett & Lynch 2007, 203). As argued by Rhodes, the transition from government to governance has weakened the authority of the UK government. Or, as Rhodes eloquently put it, “the British state is being eroded or eaten away” (Rhodes 1994: 149). Devolution will furnish extra momentum to the cycle, from government to governance and back. It could be one of the most important developments of the post-war years since it strengthens decentralisation with fragmented political power. Devolution to the English territories will never occur in the being of the subsequent Blair parliament. However, the novel Regional Development Agencies and the guarantee of regional mandates on whether to bring out elected legislative bodies have not stopped the regional demands for devolution. Instead, political decentralisation hangs on the political schema (Watts 2006). The civil service could eventually face a mixed blanket of local assembles and elected governors in England, in addition to the devolved governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, which will require a new government apparatus to handle intergovernmental affairs for the EU and for local matters. Diplomatic talent in intergovernmental negotiation will turn out to be a major component of a bureaucrat’s selection. Britain will experience the federal-provincial peacekeeping quite typical of other Westminster structures such as Canada and Australia. As stated by Sir Richard Wilson of the Home Civil Service, ‘the civil service are going to have to learn skills that we haven’t learned before’ (Bevir & Rhodes 2003: 59). In other words, the networking capabilities more and more required to manage delivery of public service will also be at the finest in handling the intergovernmental affairs of a devolved Britain. On the other hand, ‘Britain as a unitary state’ (Bevir & Rhodes 2003: 59) underlines centralised power, political assimilation, a directive operating code enforced through system of government and the authority of the centre to invalidate decentralised authorities. On the contrary, the governance account underlines political fragmentation, decentralisation, interdependence and devolution. Conclusions Any attempt to determine the extent of the shift of the UK government from centralisation (government) to decentralisation (governance) will consistently encourage the chance of appearing biased. The governance description opposes a perspective of British government that views Britain as a unified state with a core executive. Apparently the strong executive of Britain can function determinedly. Just as apparent, the centre organises and puts into practice policies as deliberated some of the time. But present accounts of the Westminster framework attach very little significance to the disagreeable laws of unplanned outcomes. Governments become unsuccessful because they are fastened into power-reliant affairs and because they should govern with and through intricate organisational networks. The governance description obviously implies that to implement a directive operating code creates malfunction into the policy design. This form of centralisation will be complicated by interdependence and fragmentation that, consequently, will bring about short periods of centralisation. The governance description recognises various rationales for deviating from the constraints of the Westminster paradigm. The first step is devolution, and it requires too much effort and force. Devolved governments are independent, they decide and act autonomously. References Bevir, M. & Rhodes, R.A.W., 2003. Interprepting British Governance. New York: Routledge. Garnett, M. & Lynch, P., 2007. Exploring British Politics. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. George, S., 1992. Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Sem-Detachment. Oxford: Oxford University . Goldsmith, S. & Eggers, W.D., 2004. Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Menon, A. & Wright, V., 1998. The Paradoxes of Failure: British EU Policy Making in Comparative Perspective. Public Policy and Administration , 13 (4), pp. 46-66. Moran, M., 2005. Politics and Governance in the UK. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Rhodes, R., 1994. The Hollowing Out of the State. Political Quarterly , 65 (2), 138-151. Richards, D. & Smith, M.J., 2003. Governance and Public Policy in the UK. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watts, D., 2006. British Government and Politics: A Comparative Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Wright, T., 2003. British Politics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Read More