Liberal Democracy and Democratization of Korea - Research Paper Example

 “So-called democratisation in Pacific-Asia is always illiberal but this does not matter.”  Discuss with reference to EITHER South Korea OR Taiwan. Introduction  As a form of government, democracy is doubtless one of the most powerful and widely accepted ideas, with more than half the world turning to representative modes of government (The Economist, Democracy Index 2007). This phenomenon gathered great strength after the collapse of Soviet Union, which signaled the triumph of liberal democracy over communism (Halliday, 2001). Within this context of increasing democratization, South Korea has been one of the most interesting cases of study in the academic domain, not only because South Korea is regarded as the most successful of the ‘third wave democracies’ in Asia (Chu 2001; Diamond and Plattner 1998), but since its unique characteristics derive from a specific historical context. Indeed, its itinerary of remarkable economic growth and development under an authoritarian regime left the seeds of a unique culture. To argue that the ‘so-called’ democratization in the Asia-Pacific is always illiberal is contextual to the academic debate on liberal democracy, which is a superset of two major political dimensions: liberalism (which is an ideology) and democracy (which is a form of government). While the terms ‘democratization’ and ‘liberal’ have no uncontested definitions in the academic literature, their coincidence in a large number of countries post-1991 makes the comprehension of this debate more complex. Firstly, the concept of democratization needs clarification as either the consolidation of democracy and democratic institutions or simply electoral democracy as a procedural form. Furthermore, the idea of the ‘illiberal’ must also be properly understood in the specific historical and geographical situation of the Asia-Pacific, to assert whether illiberal democratization is necessarily negative and how such illiberal policies came into being in the first place. In our exploration of the ideas, liberalism and Korean democratization remain the crux of our enquiry. Even among Korean scholars, the assessment of Korea’s democratization through the lens of liberalism is a controversial academic pursuit. At the heart of this debate is the concept of the ‘illiberal democracy’. Though unfortunate, the debate surrounding liberal democracy always seems to involve certain rash exaggerations, oversimplifications and generalizations, and prejudice based on weak evidence of the notion of ‘Asian democratization’. Scholars often tend to neglect the fact that different type of democracies may be based on ‘a different set of values and needs’ (Miller, 1993); similarly, other scholars who try to actively promote ‘Korean democracy’ by using the dual concepts of culture or Confucianism also seem to suffer from several limitations. This is basically because Korean democratization shows us both the universality of Western liberal democracy and particularity of Korean democracy. Even though it is undeniable that there were some illiberal characteristics at certain times 1960s to 1980s, democracy in Korea after the fall of the Soviet Union has been evaluated as the farthest to democratize, to the point of consolidating democratic institutions and reinforcing democratic procedures (Haynes 2001). Very recently, Korea has been identified as one of the few ‘liberal democratic countries’ in the Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to assess the characteristics of Korean democratization relative to the given statement, by examining the liberal democracy debate and situating the same in the political transition of Korea. The paper shall proceed by defining certain key concepts, tracing the possible ‘illiberal’ strands of Korean democratization, and finally outlining both the universal and particular tenets of Korean democracy. BODY Defining key concepts Although several studies have been made on the relationships between democracy and liberalism, there is little agreement on their findings because these subtle concepts could be interpreted as either a principle or a standard of value. Some scholars insist that the relationship between democracy and liberalism is complementary rather than contradictory (Sartori 1962), but others contend that the relationship between the two is, at best, vague (Beetham 1994). Due to these difficulties, this paper shall set the limits of democracy to derive an operative working definition: democracy (rather, Schumpeter’s idea of democracy) that covers the classical citizenship presented in Dahl’s polyarchy. Further, the paper shall regard liberalism only as a classical term based on western social contract theories that aim to promote individual rights and freedom. From these concepts, a sharp contrast is drawn between ‘Western Liberal democracy’, which is closely related to Western classical democracy, and illiberal democracy of many developing and post-communist nations. And more importantly, with regard to the time frame, this paper shall focus not only on the outbreak of the grand democratic movement in 1987, but also more widely from 1948 when the first modern Korean government was ‘given’ to up until now. It must be reiterated that considering democratization and democratic consolidation as frames of reference, Korea is still undergoing the process of democratization (see Carl Baker). It is instructive to approach Korean democratization from the standpoint of both liberal and illiberal democracy, as we find that some of the core characteristics of Korean democracy can be unearthed that way. Liberal democracy, which purports to safeguard the fundamental rights and values of human life, is useful as a model or prototype of democracy for Korea. The teleological basis of liberal democracy can be used to explain after-war Korea along with the country’s alignment with the foreign policies of the great powers in the post-Second World War era. In the 1960s and 1970s it was necessary for Korea to be seen as democratic in order to secure legitimacy both inside or outside the country. The concept of liberal democracy had proved successful in the European historical experience and was increasingly influential in developing countries; for Korea, this model thus seemed a viable one to follow. Similarly, the concept of illiberal democracy is helpful in a sense that it broadens the understanding of democracy to impute cultural and historical contextualities, while maintaining the possibility of evolving a non-Western idea of democracy. Scholars tend to use either one as the primary tool for explaining successful Korean democratization. However, at the level of policy-making, both of these approaches pose potential pitfalls. Firstly, the primary criticism of liberal democracy remains that its normative imperative forces developing countries to adopt Western economic and political policies, with scant regard to the diversity of democratic potential across the world and the political realities faced by such nations. In the analytical apparatus of Western liberal democracy, East Asian is seen as an aberration or abnormality (Zakaria 1997). Some scholars such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way criticize and show apprehension for the use of the term ‘democracy’ as applied to illiberal regime; instead, they prefer to use the term competitive authoritarianism. We can recognize that the Illiberality of non-Western democracies was always a matter of concern for Western nations, even finding vigorous articulation within the Korean academic domain (see Kang). Secondly, liberal democracy usually neglects the historical and socio-cultural context of democratization. For example, the distinction between liberalism and democracy, and the advent of the former before the latter in many European countries seems lost in the pages of history; this confounds the appearance of democracy before liberalism in many developing countries. Thirdly, proponents of liberal democracy seem too insensitive to the errors they make. It is difficult to estimate the liberality of any country – in this case Korea – by relying on a set of facts and data. Lastly, this approach has grave methodological problems, especially in spelling out the relationship between liberty and democracy; they assume this ambiguous relationship as a given. Thus, when such scholars regard Korea’s rapid economic development as a structural condition of democratization, the direction of causality and the measurement of a numerical index lacks both clarity and analytical rigor (Ji 2008). Post-1945, Korea had to adapt to the structure of liberal democracy, and democracy did not find an indigenous root there. This process was accompanied by the idealization of Western democratization. It was reasonable for Westerners to regard ‘Korean democratization as distorted, nationalism as deviatory and anti-communism as exceptional’ (Kang Jungin). On the other hand, the illiberal democracy approach also has drawbacks. Firstly, the overarching framework of explanation is drawn from a vague idea of ‘Asian Values’ and Confucianism. They do not take into account what other decisive incidents, such as external and historical factors, distinguish illiberal democracy from liberal democracy. Merely focusing on the cultural factor does not explain the many political gains and democratic advantages Korea gained after the Korean War from external powers. Second, by grouping every Asian case under the umbrella of ‘Asian democracy’, fails to ascertain the specific dynamics of every democratic transformation. For example, this approach cannot expressly explain why democratization of Singapore is different to that in Korea. Thirdly, in methodological terms, this approach seeks to divide political and civil character; this method, however, may end up underestimating the power of civil or mass movements. Fourthly, this approach ignores the many democratic deficits of developing nations, such as widespread political corruption and human right abuse. Lastly, when we think that many Asian countries are on the process of democratization, it seems they hastily grant infinite characteristics to transitional democracy and overemphasize extraordinary features (Kang 1998). Particularity We must recognize that the West and Korea had different democratic experiences. In the history of the modern Western, social, political, and cultural categories came together to reveal the basic forms of liberal democracy. Liberalism was established ahead of democracy. However, for Korea, liberalism and democracy were both imposed in a top-down fashion with the help of the United States after decolonization from Japanese imperialism. Therefore, in Korea, procedure became more important than substance. Secondly, the international environment, especially the global wave of democratization, affected Korean democratization. As Huntington’s third wave thesis argued, the great negotiation in 1987 was directly influenced by Philippines democratization in 1986 against Marcos’ authoritarian regime. Moreover, the attention of the international society on the 1988 Seoul Olympic was one of the major causes of the great negotiation. Thirdly, US foreign policy was decisive for Korean democratization. The US government helped Korea’s democratic transition, and maintained a national interest in building Korea as a ‘showcase for democracy’ and an anti-communist buffer state (Im Hyugbaeg). Economic interdependency between Korea and US reinforced the democratization. Fourthly, after Korean War, Korea initiated many nation-building projects with the potential marginalize or eliminate expressions of minority traditions and languages. At certain phases, liberal democracy was used as ‘performance legitimacy’ to legitimate the regime when faced with the need of economic development (Huntington). In this sense, it can be said that a totalitarian characteristic of liberalism itself, within a framework of ideological competition, helped generate a new kind of democracy. Like Lowenstein pointed out, in certain situations, a collective body’s superiority is emphasized over individual liberty in the name of national interest or survival. Fifthly, from this fact, we can find following feature: ‘Whilst in Western history, promoting liberalism was in the process of weakening the state, for developing countries (Korea), they are accompanied with strengthening the power of the state’ (Bell and Jayasuriya 1995). Western liberal democracy followed the change of consciousness towards the values of equality, freedom and pluralism; but Korean democracy was more of a process in tuning the polity with civil society. Sixthly, the middle class grew through the process of economic development, not independent of state authority. In Korean democratization, the only class factor affected political transition was the conflict between students (after 4.19 revolution) and the military government (after 5.16 military coup). Seventh, the ethno-centric characteristics, which created the national identity of Korea, were also an important factor. In the history of Korea, liberal democracy was always understood in the context of nationalism rather than Confucianism. This feature represents the priority of Korean democracy that transcends ideology. For Almond and Verba, nationalism not only caused the neat inter-linkage between politics and economics, but also remained a primary motivation for democratization. It seems more suitable to explain huge sacrifices in the political and societal realms during industrialization. Lastly, like Sidel and Hedman pointed out about the Philippines, the elite-centric government in Korea had to ‘absorb and invert radical pressures’; however, the transition was incremental and peaceful. For example, Chun’s regime’s ‘yuwha-kukmyun’ (which means turning point toward appeasement policy) in 1983 and Roh Tai-woo’s strategic decision to initiate the great negotiation can be explained with this view. Universality Even though democracy in Korea has its particular features, it has also shown many features common to liberal democracies in general. First, the idea of democratization in Korea had deep conceptual linkages with liberal-democratic procedures. For example, when the first president Rhee Sungman tried to revise the constitution and rigged elections in 1960, civil protest directly related this problem to the crisis of democracy. Although the Korean people had limited democratic experience, the mass movement demanded basic democratic rights (Kim Sunwoong 1984) and questioned the procedural democracy of Korea (Moon Jiyoung 2008), asking for the institutionalization of democracy. This event reveals the deep linkages of Korean democracy with liberal democracy. Secondly, bottom-up democratization gradually became the norm in Korea: Rhee Sungman’s resignation and reelection, demonstrations against Park Chung-hee’s repressive policies, and the 1987 great negotiation were all civil movements. Thirdly, in Korea we find institutional liberalism: Korea adopted a high majoritarian mixed system under military rule in 1963 that was more democratic than Japan, while Korea’s first constitution clearly made a commitment to liberty and equality. Fourthly, Korean democratization changed economic structures like traditional liberal democracies. Though the middle class was weak, industrialization had broken down the agricultural class, limiting the legitimacy of the military government. Moreover, a general correlation between economic development and the development of mass media can explain the catalytic function towards the encouragement of political awareness within civil society. Lastly, strategic choices of every actor were important in establishing a fine balance between different stakeholders in the democratic apparatus. The capitalist desire for a stable political and economic environment, the military government’s search for legitimacy and educated students’ cooperation with opposition parties were conclusive factors in evolving the liberal-democratic nature of Korean democracy. The Roots of Korean Democracy Like Almond & Berba pointed out, even though institutions from country to country could be similar, their operations could vary well be different. In Korean democratization, the operation of democracy is most likely rooted in the Confucian legacy. When it comes to the relationship between Confucianism and democracy, there are two strands of thought: the first strand views the compatibility positively and second negatively (Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya 1995, Kang 1997, Gold 1996, Huntington 1995). The former strand seems more suitable for explaining the Korean case. Those who criticize the illiberality of Korean democratization point out that the process puts more emphasis on community survival rather than individual rights; the Confucian legacy influence this cultural factor. Indeed, Korea did have repressive and illiberal governments that had used popular elections as a tool to maintain authoritarianism during the Park and Chun regimes. In this sense, Confucianism could be used to explain the Korean democratic context. However, arguing against this generally accepted idea, many pose that this analysis is not relevant to Korean case. Korea’s democratic roots are different from classical Asian Confucianism. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, from the 18th Century onwards, we can find another strand of Confucianism called ‘Silhak’ in Korea, which aimed to modernize the polity by placing the emphasis on the general public. Secondly, due to rapid economic development, Confucianism in Korea has limited influence, that too in the political realm. Actually, Confucianism as a means of state control had faded since the15th century, and remained relevant only as a sense of propriety. Conclusion This article has attempted to sketch out the main characteristics of the liberal democracy debate with reference to Korean democracy. The major challenge of this paper was to show that the debate remains inappropriate in explaining democratization in Korea. Though each perspective sheds some light on Korean democratization, we find that neither is sufficient, since both approaches eschew a comprehensive analysis and draw only from favorable evidence. The inherent arrogance of liberal-democratic proponents that claim that ‘Western is best’ would be hard to accept for many non-Western countries (Daniel 2006), not least because such a reasoning always computes some degree of national value. Instead, it might be better to assume that Western liberal democracy is also only a certain kind of democracy. Democracy is wont to trial and error and experimentation; it is difficult, hence, to tease out any single, expedient form of democracy. A radical unification of various expecting roles of the state would also be an academic retrogression. Thus, methodologically, we need to exercise the utmost caution when examining particular case studies. More importantly, the debate was classified as irrelevant based on the characteristics of particularity and universality in Korean democratization. In short, the political transition occurred within the particular historical and external contexts such as the Korean War, ideological competition with North Korea, US influence, economic development and the state’s ethno-centric character. However, at the same time, general features in the process of liberalization and democratization, such as socio-economic structure, bottom-up pressure and interactions with elite group, were similar to countries’ democratization experience. Therefore, Korean democracy exhibited both illiberal and liberal features at the same time. To revert back to the original statement under discussion, we can now posit two important rebuttals. Firstly, democratization in the Asia-Pacific is not always illiberal. As our exploration of the Korean case shows, democratic transitions and advancements may reveal both liberal and illiberal characteristics. Secondly, it is also not true that perceived or express illiberalities do not matter in the democratic process. As the Korean case shows once more, democratic procedures can be used by political elites to legitimize their authoritarian or totalitarian rule. It is important to review and assess such distortions of the liberal-democratic form to glean out the potential pitfalls and fallacies and reinforce democratic institutions. Our study reveals the importance of both the universal values of liberal democracy as an ideal to reach for, while also respecting the political and socio-cultural realities of particular cases to accommodate illiberal developments or practices, in order not to hinder the democratic consolidation. With only one perspective, we cannot develop the whole picture. This paper argues that Korean democratization could yet prove to be a counter example (or establish the possibility of an alternative) to Western liberal democracy. Fukuyama’s statement that liberal democracy is the final form of human government, therefore, seems grossly misplaced, if not outright inaccurate. There cannot be any fixed form of democracy. That is because, like Carl Baker pointed out, ‘Democracy has changed Korea and Korea has changed democracy’; the process of change is both integral and imperative to democracy. Therefore, as experimentation continues, allegiance to any particular form is only detrimental to political and social analysis. Read More