The Conflict about Western Sahara - Research Paper Example

The conflict about Western Sahara either it is an independent or Moroccan territory Introduction The conflict about the control of Western Sahara has been quite long. In accordance with a report published by BBC the claims of Morocco over the territory of Western Sahara are based on specific facts. More specifically, it is noted that ‘according to the average Moroccan mind, this range of area was referred to as Greater Morocco; the latter actually involved not only Western Sahara, but also all of Mauritania, north-west Mali and much of west Algeria; these territories were ruled by the far-reaching Almoravid dynasty from the 11th and 12th Centuries’ (BBC, 23 November 2004). The specific region is currently under the control of Morocco; however, the neigbouring countries of Mauritania and Algeria have not accepted the dominance of Morocco over Western Sahara. A long conflict has been arisen among the above states – especially since 1976 when Morocco took the control of Western Sahara. It should be noticed that the control of Western Sahara has been an issue examined by the international organizations during the decade of 1970s. It was ‘October 1975 the International Court of Justice rejected territorial claims by Morocco and Mauritania; But in November 1975, Moroccan King Hassan II ordered a "Green March" of over 300,000 Moroccans into the territory’ (BBC News, 4 December 2008). Spain asked for an agreement with the participation of Morocco and Mauritania – the result was the Madrid Agreement. Soon, Morocco violated the terms of the above agreement – which recognized to Morocco the control of the 2/3 of the above region; gradually, Moroccan troops occupied parts of the 1/3 of the Western Sahara region – under the control of Mauritania – which has taken the control over the 1/3 of Western Sahara’s territory – in accordance with the Madrid Agreement. The above facts have been the most important points of the conflict among Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria regarding the control of Western Sahara. Various reasons have been identified by researchers worldwide regarding the appearance and the development of the crisis in Western Sahara. In accordance with a report published by the International Crisis Group (2007) ‘this is substantially due to the fact that for most of the actors – Morocco, Algeria and the Polisario Front, as well as Western countries – the status quo offers advantages a settlement might put at risk’ (International Crisis Group, 2007). The specific conflict has been developed through the years – especially since the existence of valuable materials, like phosphate and oil, in the territory of Western Sahara has been revealed. Current paper deals with the examination of two different aspects of the conflict over Western Sahara: a) would it be preferable for Western Sahara to be an independent state or b) it would be preferable for Western Sahara to be under the control of Morocco. 2. Western Sahara as an independent state In order to understand the potential development of Western Sahara, it should be necessary to refer to the current characteristics of the region – cultural, political, financial and urban; the independency of the region in terms of political control would be then decided by referring to similar cases of other regions that have been under the control of neighbouring countries – the effects of occupation on a region’s political and social context would be valuable in order to estimate the effects of the conflict among Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria over the control of Western Sahara. Western Sahara is an area with many potentials of growth especially because of the oil and gas reserves available in its territory. In accordance with Maxted (2006) there is ‘an increasing militarization of the development of oil and gas reserves in Africa; private security forces and African standing armies are being used to secure the interests of American, Asian and European companies’ (Maxted, 2006, 29). Under these terms, the potential independency of Western Sahara would lead to the limitation of benefits of the foreign firms that operate in the region – probably with the permission of the government of Morocco; the latter would suffer a severe financial loss if the region’s local authorities would have the control over the gas and oil reserves that have been identified in the Western Sahara’s territory. Of course, the appropriate use of these resources would be not guaranteed if the region was independent. Still the influence from the will of the neighbouring countries but also certain countries of the West –referring to Spain but also France or Britain – would be unavoidable. Regarding this issue, it is noted by McGowan (2006) that ‘from independence through 2004, the sixteen West African states have experienced forty-four successful military-led coups, forty-three often-bloody failed coups, at least eighty-two coup plots, seven civil wars, and many other forms of political conflict’ (McGowan, 2006, 234). In other words, the political independency of regions like the Western Sahara could lead to severe consequences for their citizens – referring not only to the regions’ political structure but also to their economy and – mainly – to the health and safety of the local population. In this context, independency would be a threat; the efforts made by the region’s citizens for their region’s independency would lead to the elimination of existing political, social and financial framework. In no case, the continuation living under the control of another state would be thought to be the only available solution; rather the terms of independency would be considered and discussed with other members of the international community – agreements like the Madrid agreement would be rejected being in fact an action of offering the state’s territory. The risks taken by the countries that fight for their independency have been analyzed in the literature. In a relevant study it is noted that there are four specific regularities referring to the potential relationship between the civil war and the natural resources: ‘first, oil increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; second, ‘lootable’ commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen existing conflicts; third, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and civil war; and finally, the association between primary commodities and the onset of civil war is not robust’ (Ross, 2004, 337). It is clear in the above study that the development of a financial or cultural crisis within a particular society cannot be considered as justifying a civil war; the latter is rather related with specific political and financial interests which cannot be pursued unless a military conflict begins. On the other hand, there are certain regions, including North Africa, where the existence of strong financial interests usually leads to the development of military conflicts – the control of these territories by specific states is regarding as a prerequisite for the financial development of the latter. Regarding this issue, it is noted that ‘while the strategic-military weight assigned to North Africa by the West declined after 1956, with the growth of local nationalist movements and the relinquishment of French protectorate authority over Morocco and Tunisia, North Africa has acquired a unique political and economic significance and relevance for Western interests’ (Lewis, 1972, 56). Because of the existence of the particular interests, the development of military conflicts in the specific region is a common phenomenon. In the case of Western Sahara, neighbouring countries but also countries from the West tend to use their military forces in order to take the control of the specific region. This is a problem that cannot be resolved by the international community – at least not easily – because it is related with the strategic interests of the governments of specific countries. These interests cannot be deleted – or simply disappeared; in this context, the conflict in the Western Sahara is likely to be significantly increased in case that the local population decide to ask for independency. However, the local authorities could ask for the support of the international community. Even if a specific period passes with no particular achievement towards the particular direction, the regions’ citizens would try to understand the important of being reluctant to their claims. The independency of Western Sahara would lead to the limitation of the powers of Morocco’s political leader – also to the limitation of the profits of Morocco from the oil and gas reserves existing in the Western Sahara’s territory. In the above context, the independency of Western Sahara would lead to severe political – and probably military – conflict causing severe financial and political turbulences to the dominant country – this of Morocco. The benefits from the independency are not quite clear; it is not guaranteed that the authorities of Western Sahara would be able to control the internal political conflicts or to develop an effective cooperation with the foreign investors. Independency of Western Sahara would be evaluated using different criteria: if the freedom of developing the country’s political, social and financial context would be the priority of the region’s citizens then the independency would be characterized as being important for the Western Sahara; otherwise, existing political and social framework – control by Moroccan authorities would be preferred. 3. Western Sahara as Moroccan territory As noted above, the decision of Western Sahara’s authorities to seek for the region’s independency – referring especially to the independency from Morocco which has the dominance over Western Sahara – would be depended on a series of factors – especially referring to the priorities set in the political, social and financial field. At a first level, it would be necessary to identify the political context of Western Sahara and the right of Morocco to control the region – a control that has been acquired through a military intervention, i.e. it was not the result of negotiations. Regarding the above, it can be stated that Western Sahara can be characterized as a ‘quasi-state’, i.e. a state that does not have the characteristics of states – as they are developed within the international community. However, the states of the specific type are likely to retain their power on the development of political, financial and social decisions. It is explained that ‘the main reason why these states nevertheless have not collapsed seem to be that they have managed to build up internal support from the local population’ (Kolsto, 2006, 723). In the case of Western Sahara, the ability of the local community to confront the Moroccan military forces – which they were used for the occupation of the specific region – has been proved to be quite limited. In fact, Western Sahara is a region with limited power in terms of the protection of its population’s rights and safety. Being under the control of Morocco has helped the region to be developed commercially and financially; however, in the political field the ability of the region’s authorities to resist to the governance of Morocco has been proved to be limited. The dependency of Western Sahara from Morocco – more precisely being part of the Morocco’s territory – would lead to the high financial development of the region. Indeed, with the support of the funds invested by Morocco – and its strategic alliances – Western Sahara could be transformed to a highly developed region – perhaps not up to the level of Jubail, a well – known industrial city in the Gulf region – but at least up to a satisfactory level. In other words, in case that Western Sahara would remain under the control of Morocco, there would be more chances for the region’s industrial development to progress faster. In a similar context, Western Sahara would be also benefited from the urban structures of Morocco; this is an issue that would be strongly criticized – even after several years from the invasion of Morocco in Western Sahara, the urban development of the specific region is at quite preliminary level. However, it is not guaranteed that the funds available for the urban development of Western Sahara – difficult to be estimated – would be sufficient for the transformation of the region’s existing infrastructure. As noted above, the long term occupation of Western Sahara from Morocco has not led – at least yet – to such transformation. On the other hand, it can be noticed that existing political, social and legal contexts in Western Sahara are not compatible with those of Morocco; however, the chances for extensive differentiations – referring to these sectors – between the above states are reduced by the fact that both countries are part of the same region – the North Africa – having common historical and political background; in this way similar political and legal rules would be implemented in Morocco and Western Sahara; just a few alterations would be possibly required in order for the existing political, legal and financial frameworks of Western Sahara to be fully aligned with those of Morocco. 4. Conclusion Under the influence of the political and social ethics of the West, the political and economic life of people in Africa has changed a lot the last decades. The specific issue is highlighted in the study of Alder (2004) where it is noted that ‘a meta-analysis of changes in catches, market values, exports, imports, employment, access, and domestic supplies in western Africa since 1960 illustrates the impact of the expansion of the ethics and values of the West on the particular region’ (Alder, 2004, 156). It is not made clear whether the above transformations have been made under the monitoring – or even the pressure – of the international community. The latter has participated actively in the development of North Africa and the protection of human rights in all the countries of the specific area – including Western Sahara and Morocco. In accordance with a study published in 1962 by Williams ‘so far, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the Commission for Technical Co operation in Africa South of the Sahara are the agencies in which virtually all mid-African nations have been most active’ (Williams, 1962, 1). Today, the role of the United Nations in the protection of the rights of people in Africa has become more important; the local political authorities have been asked to support more actively the human rights in their territory. However, the intervention of the military forces of United Nations has been unavoidable – like in the case of Darfur – especially in countries that do not have powerful political authorities – belonging rather in the category of ‘quasi-states’ presented above. Western Sahara – which is an indicative example of a ‘quasi-state’ – has potentials for future growth. However, it is not quite clear up to now which would be the consequence of the region’s independency from Morocco? It would be the beginning of a long term growth or the region would be led to a long term financial and political crisis? Recently, the Moroccan political authorities have accepted to begin the negotiations with the authorities in Western Sahara regarding the control of the region. More specifically, in a report published by Magharebia (2009) it is noted that ‘Morocco is "reasonably optimistic" about reaching a peaceful solution to the Western Sahara conflict, Communications Minister Khalid Naciri said Thursday (February 26th), following the visit of new UN Western Sahara envoy Christopher Ross’ (Magharebia, 23.2.2009). However, it is not made clear whether there is an intention by the Moroccan leaders for leaving the territory of Western Sahara or whether it is just a call for negotiations on rights that could be potentially offered to the citizens of the region. The efforts made by the area’s citizens in order to gain their autonomy are described analytically in a report published by the Global Policy Forum. In the above report it is noted that ‘May 2005 saw Sahrawi demonstrations openly calling for independence; the Security Council passed Resolution 1720 in October 2006 reaffirming commitment to self-determination but stopped short of coercing Morocco to grant independence’ (Global Policy Forum, 2009). It should be noticed that the United Nations referendum mission in Western Sahara has been extended up to the 30th of April 2009 – the Security Council Resolution 1813 – published on April 30 of 2008 is the document which has been used for the extension of the UN referendum mission in the specific area (Global Policy Forum online database). Works Cited Alder, J. (2004) Western Africa: A Fish Basket of Europe Past and Present. The Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 13, No. 2, 156-178 Kolsto, P. (2006) The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 43, No. 6, 723-740 McGowan, P. (2006) Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004. Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 32, No. 2, 234-253 Lewis, W. (1972) North Africa: Calculus of Policy. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 401, No. 1, 56-63 Maxted, J. (2006) Exploitation of Energy Resources in Africa and the Consequences for Minority Rights. Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 29-37 Ross, M. (2004) What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War? Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 41, No. 3, 337-356 Williams, G. (1962) Aids and Obstacles to Political Stability in Mid-Africa. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 342, No. 1, 1-8 Online Sources BBC News (2008) Regions and Territories, Western Sahara, last accessed on 28/4/2009, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/3466917.stm BBC (2004) The conflict in Western Sahara, last accessed on 28/4/2009, available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A3121363 Global Policy Forum (2009) Western Sahara, last accessed on 28/4/2009, available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/wsahara/wsindex.htm International Crisis Group (2007) Western Sahara: the cost of the conflict, last accessed on 28/4/2009, available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=5235 Appendix Figure 1 – Western Sahara (source: BBC News, 2008) Read More