The Vulnerability of Voting Machines in American Election - Research Paper Example

The Vulnerability of Voting Machines in American Election Administration Electronic voting machines in the US were adopted, subsequent to the 2000 elections. The traditional systems employed, prior to this change, had posed a threat to the integrity of the elections and the accuracy of their results. However, these new machines also proved to be vulnerable to threats. “The right to vote is fundamental, receiving protection under the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution” (Fisher 92). The US government decided to utilize electronic voting machines in the election, after it had a bitter experience in the 2000 presidential election. In that election, there was a delay of five weeks in declaring results, on account of Florida State’s inability to count the votes cast. The 2000 presidential election disclosed the lacunae in the American voting system (Fisher 92). This bitter experience actuated Congress to change the voting system by introducing the latest technological devices for voting purposes. As such, it enacted the Help America Vote Act of 2002 or HAVA. This Act facilitated the States to adopt the electronic voting machines or EVMs in the election. Moreover, the use of punch cards or levers would no longer be required. Since the right to vote is an essential factor, for the operation of democracy, it has to be guaranteed and protected. This obligation requires the government to adopt sophisticated technological devices, such as Direct Record Electronic voting machines or DRE voting machines in the electoral system. The use of these devices provides accurate and fast election results. All the same, it is indispensable to examine the ability of these DRE machines, and the effectiveness of the software used in them (Fisher 92). “In many states, Secretaries of State are the primary decision makers in selecting voting machines, ensuring they are impervious to misuse and providing training for all local officials and potentially all poll workers” (Benson 343). They are responsible for taking decisions with regard to the voting system and to adopt electronic voting machines in the polls. They are also required to ensure that voting machines are not misused. The Secretaries of State have to impart training to all the staff involved in the voting process, such as local officials and poll workers. The States can enact certain laws before the commencement of the election, with a view to promote voters’ participation in the election. An example is the Election Day voter registration. However, some critics have contended that such laws could result in voter fraud. Such frauds could hinder the accuracy and integrity of election results (Benson 345). During the electoral process, the Secretary of State ensures that the election law and the administration work together. The three crucial areas in this process are the identification of voters; the process of voter registration and the methods to be employed to ease the process; and the accurate maintenance of voter lists. As such, the Secretary of State plays a major role in the electoral process. The accuracy of the results and the successful implementation of the registration requirements depend on the active participation of the Secretary of State in the election process. Free and fair voting is ensured by several means and one of them relates to the chief election authorities removal of legally ineligible names from voter registration lists. Such expurgation ensures the accuracy and integrity of the voting process. Moreover, the State’s election authority ensures that eligible voters are not deprived of their voting rights and participation in the electoral system (Benson 343). The Elections Clause of the US Constitution empowers State legislatures to design laws that regulate the electoral process, in their state. As such, state legislatures have the power to determine and regulate the time, place, and the manner in which elections are to be held. This is the central role played by state legislatures in the election process. Furthermore, the US Supreme Court acclaimed the role of the State legislatures in conducting the election at state and federal levels, whilst duly following the most complex and comprehensive election codes. It also praised the State legislatures for efficiently regulating the time, place and the manner of conducting the elections besides ensuring the voting registrations and protecting the rights of eligible citizens (Benson 352). The activities of the state election administration are controlled by the state election code. Some examples of these activities are access to ballot, registration requirements, voter identification requirements, the date and the time of state elections, the casting of absentee ballots, campaign finance, and other issues relating to counting, recounting and audit of election results (Benson 355). The new Act, HAVA, has provided more than $300 million to replace the obsolete voting machines in the states. It also provides $3 billion for the betterment of the voting system. States that receive federal funds have to ensure some voting system standards. For instance, there should be a provision to allow voters to rectify errors in a ballot, prior to its being cast. The new voting machines should possess audit capabilities, and every polling station must provide a voting machine that can be accessed by the disabled (Benson 378). These new machines are not without their drawbacks. For example, in 2007, Electiononline.org and the Pew Center reported that these machines had failed to instill confidence in the election system. It was also reported that the Secretary of State’s role was crucial in ensuring accuracy and access to the electoral system. The transition in 2002 was beset with a variety of problems in account of improper training and machine failures. These problems were particularly severe in places like Broward and Miami-Dade counties in Florida (Benson 378 – 379). Moreover, the proper allocation of machines to polling stations has to be regulated by the Secretary of State. A particularly notorious example of improper allocation was provided in the 2004 presidential election; wherein Ohio’s Secretary of State, Ken Blackwell had failed to properly allocate these machines to the different polling stations. His blunder resulted in long voter queues and these voters and had to wait for more than five hours to cast their vote (Benson 379). “More than four years after the 2000 US presidential election debacle, a fierce debate still rages over the machinery used for voting” (Tokaji 1712). This resulted in the enactment of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 or HAVA; which proposed major changes to the basic infrastructure of American democracy. It provided for funding the states to replace their outdated voting machines with new ones. Several states went in for these new voting machines, thereby discarding the traditional hanging chad punch cards (Tokaji 1712 – 1713). Despite these changes, criticism against voting machines has not reduced. In the 2004 election in Ohio, nearly seventy percent of the registered voters had used the punch card ballots to cast their votes. Several voters challenged the continued deployment of outdated machines. Some even attempted to postpone the California recall in the courts, but in vain (Tokaji 1713). Various suggestions have been proposed to improve the voting system; one of them recommends that it should be mandatory to generate a simultaneous paper record of votes cast by means of the electronic voting machines. This has been implemented by a few jurisdictions. In this context, several legal challenges have emerged against the extant system of paperless electronic voting. As such, the introduction of electronic voting had divided the populace into its opponents and proponents. It has also resulted in conflicts between civil rights agencies that support it and democratic organizations that oppose it. The 2004 elections were singularly unsuccessful in resolving these conflicts (Tokaji 1714). “Several evolving technologies have an impact on voters with cognitive and physical disabilities but at the same time improve access for all populations of voters” (Sabatino and Spurgeon 858). They provide greater access in a simplified manner to the voting system. People are prone to commit mistakes, irrespective of whether they are physically capable or disabled. Therefore, mistakes are common in voting systems. According to Selker, one out of thirty voters is bound to commit a mistake whilst making a selection on the electronic voting machine. Moreover, environmental factors also influence polling patterns (Sabatino and Spurgeon 858). For instance, factors that influence the polling pattern are lighting arrangements in the polling room; problems that could arise from electrical connections; inadequate power supply and failure to keep battery resources ready, in case power failures. Furthermore, instructions and warnings on the equipment must be clearly visible to the voters; and simple implements like magnifying glasses, should be provided for voters with poor vision. These factors contribute to the accuracy and fairness of election results (Sabatino and Spurgeon 858). In order to improve the accuracy and impartiality of electronic voting, the electronic voting machines must incorporate screens with automatic variable contrast, which can adapt itself to different lighting conditions. Instructions and guidelines must be displayed throughout the polling station and should be visible to voters awaiting their turn to exercise their franchise. The polling station must be equipped with a demonstration voting machine for educating voters. It should be spacious and there should be curtains or partitions to provide privacy to the voters (Sabatino and Spurgeon 859). In 2008, voter participation was overwhelming. A large number of voting machines throughout the nation had not worked properly on the Election Day, as pointed out by the media. The authenticity of the results of the political contests was questioned by one and all. This election had once again raised the question of accountability (Nou 746). In the US electoral process, administration tasks are chiefly supervised by private companies. The elections process is jointly conducted by the government and private companies. Technological innovation has been engendered into the election process, and the federal government guarantees the funding of such projects. Privatization of the electoral process has resulted in considerable debate, and accountability has emerged as a very important issue (Nou 747). “The confluence of private interests and technological developments also raises novel legal issues surrounding the ownership of intellectual property marshalled for inherently public purposes” (Nou 749). The government has to maintain the integrity of elections. Moreover, the present policy of the government regarding the purchase of voting machines from private companies is biased and suffers from inadequate funding. Eventually, this would lead to a decrease in the accountability of private companies (Nou 749). This environment has contributed to the decreased interest and confidence of voters in the election. Voters have begun to question the legitimacy of elections and this is reflected in the diminished voter turnout. Although, Local governments display considerable interest in bearing the cost of elections in their jurisdiction; they are not in a position to upgrade their voting machine technology. This situation has encouraged election officials to promote private participation in elections (Nou 749). Centralizing the procurement of voting machines, would reduce undesired lobbying by private companies in the weaker states, which find it difficult to enforce accountability. Therefore, Congress should take the initiative to impose restrictions on the privatization of the election process. It should accord greater importance to public interest. Such public interest should be made applicable to the states, as well as the private contractors who provide these electronic voting machines. In order to achieve this goal, Congress should enact effective enforcement mechanisms (Nou 759). Maryland implemented the Direct Recording Electronic or DRE voting system in all its polling centres. The DRE system provides several advantages, in comparison to the other voting systems. It eliminates issues of voter intent and prevents voters from casting their vote for a greater number of candidates than is permissible. This system provides voters with a list of candidates, and provides secrecy and independence to voters with disabilities. Consequently, disabled voters can cast their vote, without seeking the assistance of other individuals. The DRE provides magnified ballots for individuals with poor vision, and it is in several languages. This is accordance with the HAVA, which requires every polling station to have at least one electronic voting machine that caters to the needs of the disabled (Maryland State Board of Elections). According to the Brennan Center for Justice, electronic voting machines are prone to nearly one hundred and twenty security threats. The Center established an observation group consisting of election officials, computer scientists and security experts, who analyzed the potential threats to commonly used electronic voting machines (Stone). Furthermore, state legislatures are empowered to impose punishments and remedies for infringements of election laws. They can appoint state authorities or governmental agencies such as the State Attorney General or the Secretary of State for the overall supervision and regulation of the election process and to investigate into any violations of State laws. The most important duty is to establish the accuracy and accessibility of the voting machines available to the voters for casting their votes on Election Day. The experience of the 2000 election placed greater importance on the role of the Secretary of State with regard to the selection and implementation of the vote counting technology. The country had witnessed the bitter experience in Florida in 2000 and in Ohio in 2004. These experiences resulted in the enactment of HAVA (Benson 355 – 356). The 2000 election experience placed many Americans in a dilemma, as to whether their votes were counted in favor of the candidate for whom they had been cast. The media stated that the ballots had disappeared and that the voting machines had failed to work properly. This was established in states where there was a keen contest between the candidates. The turnout in those states had not even reached the predicted numbers (Nou 753). The frequent technological breakdowns on Election Day made a mockery of accountability. Furthermore, the system of governance had been weakened by the statutory and regulatory oversight of the government. There is a distinct absence of transparency, in respect of the software used in the electronic machines. This is due to the fact that the private companies, which own the software used in these devices, impose a number of restrictions. Any testing done on this software is under conditions of utmost secrecy. Therefore, it is recommended that electronic voting machines should be procured only by the federal government. This will ensure accountability and transparency, and increases long term benefits and profits for contractors who supply and maintain these electronic voting machines (Nou 793). All the same, there are no instances in which electronic voting machines had been hacked by intruders. The soft ware used in these voting machines is the same software that is used in gambling slot machines. The latter have been hacked on several occasions. The Brennan Center for Justice certified that the electronic voting machines cannot be hacked. This report has been made public, in an environment where several lawsuits have been lodged by individuals in more than six States, against the purchase and use of electronic voting machines (Stone). Researchers from Princeton have stated that any individual who has access to the software installed in the electronic voting machines can infect it with malicious software. However, installing such malicious code in a single voting machine would not affect the polling turnout and it would not spread to the other machines. Moreover, there is no risk of stealing votes through malicious software. The researchers suggested that electronic voting machines are vulnerable to viruses and other malicious codes. However, others argued that the researchers had used age old tests in their analysis (Dobbs). Due to the absence of networking between the electronic voting machines, it would be very difficult to tamper with them. In one of the states, a computer security firm conducted tests on electronic voting machines. It was revealed in these tests that these voting machines were vulnerable to attacks and security threats. Furthermore, it was also found that casting multiple votes on these machines was easy. It was also possible to override the vote recording systems in those machines. The potential threats go beyond computer science. These machines have two sensitive mechanisms and use similar type of locks. Hackers can make duplicate keys for the locks at a local locksmith’s shop. The proposed internet voting system has been withdrawn on the basis of the reports provided by Pentagon sponsored computer security experts (Radford and Glaister). A number of suggestions emerged regarding the improvement of the electronic voting system. Some of these are that the electronic voting machines should be tested in public before, during and after the voting process. The source code of the electronic machine must be certified by an independent authority. This source code must be kept in a public escrow for future verification by experts. It should be ensured that the software ported with the machine is identical to the software that had been certified. The machines and relevant documents must be kept in proper custody. Moreover, competent disaster management procedures should be implemented, such as comprehensive backup plans in the event of failure of the original equipment. Lastly, Internet voting should be developed (Boland and Arado 321). Works Cited Benson, J. F. “Democracy And The Secretary: The Crucial Role Of State Election Administrators In Promoting Accuracy And Access To Democracy.” Saint Louis University Public Law Review 27 (2008) : 343 – 381. Boland, S. M., and T.C. Arado, “O Brave New World? Electronic Voting Machines and Internet Voting.” Northern Illinois University Law Review (Summer 2007) : 1. Dobbs, L. “Dobbs: Voting machines put U.S. democracy at risk.” 21 Sep. 2006. 10 Apr. 2009 . Fisher, M. “Will Your Vote Count?: Can The Current Software Withstand And Guarantee The Constitutional Right To Vote?” Journal of High Technology Law 8 (2008) : 91 – 111. “Advantages of Maryland's Voting System.” Maryland State Board of Elections. 9 Apr 2009 . Nou, J. “Privatizing Democracy: Promoting Election Integrity Through Procurement Contracts.” The Yale Law Journal 18 (January 2009) :744 – 793. Radford, T., and Glaister, D. “Hi-tech voting machines 'threaten' US polls.” 16 Feb. 2004. 10 Apr. 2009 . Sabatino, C. P., and Spurgeon, E. D. “Symposium: Facilitating Voting As People Age: Implications Of Cognitive Impairment: Introduction” McGeorge Law Review, University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law 38 (2007) : 843 – 859. Stone, A. “Analysis finds e-voting machines vulnerable.” 26 June 2006. 10 Apr. 2009 . Tokaji, D. P. “The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting And Democratic Values.” Fordham Law Review , 73 (March 2005) : 1711 – 1714. Read More