The Effect of International Relations on Ukraines Political Development - Term Paper Example

The effect of international relations on Ukraine’s political development In contemporary world, the way countries cause difficulties within the borders of each other is no longer their own business. In the conditions when globalization and popularity of democratic values define the global reality, it is no longer possible to isolate from the world and live a completely independent life. For instance, numerous revolutions that occurred in Ukraine in the recent years showed that the level of third parties’ involvement is significant enough to define domestic agenda of weak countries. In the given case, the whole situation has certain traits of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main actors who try to shape the policy of transitional countries are European Union and Russia. In this context, the reflection of this uncertainty on domestic Ukrainian policy is evident. In particular, from the very appearance of independent Ukraine the ideas of either getting closer to Russian Federation or entering European Union struggle with each other within Ukrainian society. In addition, radical changes of the ideological representation within Ukraine’s executive and legislative branches are closely linked to the preferences of this country in its foreign policy. In the given circumstances, the clear position of Ukrainian society is even not visible. Thus, the comprehension of Ukrainian internal situation is impossible without the investigation of balance of powers between Russia and the EU, clarifying the dynamics of both Russian and European policies towards Ukraine, and characterizing the reflection of these international attitudes in Ukrainian internal environment. Consequently, in a given essay it becomes evident that Ukrainian society lives under the rules defined not in independent manner but by international context, because throughout the years its government has represented uncertainty in this dual choice concerning the direction of foreign policy. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT To start with, contemporary state of international relations is an outcome of Cold War era, as ideological struggle between modern Russia and Western world (in particular, the EU and USA) still exists. In the recent history of European region, the key manifestations of this rivalry appeared when transitional countries entered either European Union (like Baltic countries) or established by Russia Eurasian Customs Union (like Belarus) (Freedman 8). After the decision of Poland on joining the EU, Ukraine turned into the border country between these two ideological camps due to its geographical position. In this context, an attempt to choose Russia between these alternatives gave a start for Ukrainian revolution (Euromaidan) in 2013. Thus, current case of Ukrainian crisis includes previously existing frustration in the U.S.-Russian and European-Russian relations in the region of Eastern Europe (Graham 26). Notwithstanding, it is not appropriate to perceive Europe as an actor with united position. In this context, significant level of economic cooperation between Russia and certain European countries either supplement or oppose the rivalry within the EU structure in relations with Russian Federation. In particular, in gas sector there is no common vision concerning the extent of dependence on Russian gas. Namely, Germany (Westphal 3) and Italy are more interested in maintaining cooperation than France or the UK (Schubert, Pollak, and Brutschen). Thus, international relations in its economic dimension actually experienced certain transformation since the Cold War. Although, contemporary changes in Ukrainian situation cause certain transformations within the balance of powers in the relations of these grand actors in global politics too. In fact, some researchers assume that current political confrontation has potential to replace rational economic interests (Westphal 1). For instance, Russia currently seeks for the diversification of its energy export in favor to China (Graham 36). In response, the escalation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on ideological ground raises a question of alternative energy sources for Europe (Wastphal 3-4). In addition, the starting U.S.-EU cooperation in energy sector (Graham 35) make current economic situation resemble the balance of powers in the Cold War era. Hence, current economic changes divide the world in the same manner as already existing political variations. In this context, the current balance of powers between Western camp and Russia does not differ from the Cold War one. As Graham states, “it is race that Russia will be no better placed to win than was the Soviet Union during the Cold War” (34). Nevertheless, the high level of interdependence between Russia and the EU in their current economic interests (Schubert, Pollak, and Brutschen) disables any possibility of strict and rapid diversification actions in their relations. However, the appearance of crises and ‘color revolutions’ within the region challenges this economic balance considerably (Freedman 14-17). In this context, common demands for transparency and democracy are rather associated with European countries than with authoritarian Russia. Thus, it is reasonable to state that ideological competition between Western democracies and Russia defines international situation for such post-Soviet country as Ukraine. Even though this conflict is not as sharp as it was in the Cold War era because of common economic interests, clear political preferences in the positioning of transitional countries escalate these differences to the open competition. THE DYNAMICS OF RUSSIAN AND EU POLICIES TOWARDS UKRAINE Furthermore, Ukraine has a certain role of transit state in a highlighted international situation; however, Russia throughout the years demonstrated much clearer intense to include Ukraine in the sphere of its interest in contrast to the EU. As an outcome of previous conflicts in Serbia and Georgia, Ukraine remains as a real country of Russian foreign expansion in context of Eurasian Custom Union in addition to Armenia and Moldova (Freedman 19). At the same time, European Union and Ukraine did not manage to create stable cooperation within their relations. European position. In fact, the EU currently is not consistent in its incentives; actually, it was always suspecting Ukraine’s “chronic corruption, limited respect to the rule of law and uneven economic development” (Freedman 23). Notwithstanding, the EU is known as possessing its ‘soft power’ in the region of Eastern Europe in order to steadily re-define internal visionary of all the post-Soviet countries (Freedman 8). In this context, it has created the European Neighborhood Policy as “an EU incentive to shape its environment and frame the growing interdependence between an enlarged Union and its new members” (Delcour 119). In the case of Ukraine, this unity also launched a specific Eastern Partnership program in order to develop both multilateral and bilateral relations with certain countries (Martinezgarnelo y Calvo 132). Although, the effect of these political incentives is doubtful. In fact, strict rules of membership in the EU caused a situation when this unity did not encourage Ukraine to become its natural member but relied on its seldom incentive (Freedman 23). In this context, shown by Yanukovych sudden change of mind towards the Agreement of Association demonstrated the weakness of European cooperation with Ukrainian government. In other words, Ukrainian case showed that joining Western countries is a complicated and self-motivated process supplemented by European indecisive attitude towards its further enlargement. Russian position. In the given circumstances, Russian actions had always been clearer and demonstrated their assertive manner. For instance, Moscow and Kyiv always tended to solve their gas contradictions by the extension of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea (Westphal 1-2). In the given example, it is evident that Ukrainian government itself did not hesitate to fall into the sphere of Russia’s economic influence in order to gain certain economic benefits. In this situation, European Union insisted on negotiations and gradual transformation under the Eastern Partnership regulations. Unlike the West, Russian strategy revealed itself as more concrete and based on vital Ukrainian needs. In fact, the strategic aim of this type of economic relations had political motives, as gas discounts had been refraining loyalty of Ukrainian government (Gelpern 2). As Gelpern also noticed, “Ukraine’s long-standing dependence on energy imports has been a major factor in its debt difficulties” (2). In other words, long-term aggressive expansionist energy policy from Russia created the internal economic crisis in Ukraine. In this context, Schubert, Pollak and Brutschin assume that current crisis in Ukraine is crucial, because “that is where the future of the Russia-EU relationship is being tested” (Two futures). In other words, the previous attitude towards Ukraine from the EU encouraged Russian expansion on this territory. In turn, European countries rise their concern on the dependence on Russian gas not to repeat the Ukrainian situation. Currently, Ukrainian crisis in general and Crimean annexation in particular doubt an ability of this country to hold its traditional position of transition country (Westphal 1). At the same time, the EU and Russia had already launched certain policies to make Ukraine too weak to decide its foreign policy by itself. In this context, these two actors had negotiated on the Nord Stream Pipelines; hence, this new transit channel left Ukraine only with the half of transported to Europe Russian gas (Schubert, Pollak, and Brutschen). In other words, all the involved actors in the region agreed to shrink the economic independence of Ukraine, while competing on being the subject of its political orientation. In the context of this conflict, Russia had been always endeavoring much harder than European Union. As a result, Ukraine suffers from economic instability and European diffidence to date, even though it has articulated a clear intense to join European Union in the recent events. REFLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLICIES IN UKRAINIAN DOMESTIC SITUATION Finally, the internal political situation of Ukraine has always been reflecting this international balance of power, even though Ukrainian society had already chosen entering the EU in 2004. In this context, the attitudes of politicians, academic researchers, and Ukrainian society itself differ; in fact, these varieties demonstrate the long-term existence of uncertainty within this country in the vector of its foreign policy. Political environment. Ukrainian political leaders tried to maintain balance between the EU and Russia in their foreign policy. Although this country has always been too week to survive as an independent buffer, international environment still keeps encouraging Ukraine to play this role (Freedman 28). For instance, current economic difficulties caused by Yanukovych regime cannot be eliminated because of its impossibility in contemporary international context. In this case, both European and Russian law cannot define the legal category of ‘odious’ debt (Gelpern 5). And so, the fact that is obvious for Ukrainian protestors who revealed corruption of their rulers is not that clear for current international environment. Consequently, it forces the new government to enter the negotiations with both the EU and Russia in order to find an opportunity to pay the debts made by previous corrupted rulers. Academic community. Moreover, there is no unified position even in academic environment that investigated Ukraine. For instance, there is no consensus whether to consider Orange revolution occurred in 2004 as an outcome of work made by Western NGOs or as resulting from the local elites’ efforts on mobilization and propaganda (Onuch 45). In the same manner, there appeared several academic discussions on whether the Agreement of Association in context of European Neighborhood Policy has real outcomes for associated countries like Ukraine (Delcour 120-123). Thus, it is reasonable to state that the way academic community reacted on Ukrainian foreign incentives resembles unclear European attitude towards its own enlargement, as the researchers tended rather to evaluate the whole process in a critical manner than to develop a clear policy proposal for joining any ideological camp. Public opinion. In contrast to politicians and academics, two revolutions in favor to European choice had demonstrated the existence of clear strategic vector of foreign policy in Ukrainian society itself. In this context, it is an illustrative fact that recent events of Euromaidan started right after the refusal made by former President Yanukovych to sign an Agreement for Association with the EU. Moreover, starting events of Ukrainian revolution in 2013 demonstrated clear support of European Union by popular usage of certain signs and slogans (Onuch 47). In the context of revolutionary processes, it is evident that the protesters themselves were fighting for “not just EU accession, but safeguards for basic right and an end of systematic elite corruption” (Onuch 49). Notwithstanding this, it is an illustrative fact the first to articulate the wanted alliance openly and unambiguously was rather diverse Ukrainian society than its ideologically united political leaders. Thus, it is necessary to mention that the pre-requisite to maintain neutral position in international relations had caused all these problems. In particular, Freedman states, “the alternatives were serious reform involving a massive upheaval to get closer to the EU, getting closer to Russia as a means to avoid reform, or, as is still conceivable, splitting in two” (28). In the given context, conservatism of Ukrainian elites and uncertainty of academic community is the result of Ukrainian geopolitical choice. Hence, only the latter events in Ukrainian state development proved that this country has a clear direction of its foreign policy. In the given circumstances, ordinary Ukrainians had already found it reasonable rather to enter democratic and stable in economic context European Union than to backward into the area of Russian influence. In order to sum up, the case of Ukraine revealed that the dependent position on international situation weakened this country and led to the uncertainty in its foreign policy. In the given circumstances, global balance of powers encouraged this situation, and the nature of relations between the EU and Russia revealed its complicity. In particular, it is evident that in political dimension they experience post-Cold War rivalry because of different values and political regimes. Nevertheless, Russia managed to build mutually profitable cooperation with several European countries (like Germany and Italy). Thus, the whole state of relations between Russia and the EU is complex and changes from cooperation to rivalry depending on certain situation. In this context, different policies towards Ukraine illustrate the ambiguity of this international context. On the one hand, European countries established the specific policy of Eastern Partnership in order to encourage Ukraine in deepening the cooperation with European Union. On another hand, Russia took several much more active decisions in making this country highly dependent on its gas supplies. As a result, Ukrainian government attempted to satisfy both parties. In fact, President Yanukovych managed to launch the process of domestic reformations in order to sign an Agreement on Association with the EU and increase the level of energy dependence on Russia at the same time. Playing into his hands, academic community has never been positive on clarifying the vector of Ukraine’s foreign policy. In these circumstances, Ukrainian society appears as a victim of international situation. In fact, it had already completed two revolutions, and both of them included demands on values associated with Western countries. Hence, Ukrainian case clearly demonstrates how international situation interferes certain countries to choose their future in an independent manner. Works Cited: Delcour, L. “Does the European Neighbourhood Policy Make a Difference? Policy Patterns and Reception in Ukraine and Russia.” European Political Economy Review, 7 (Summer 2007): 118-155. Print. Freedman, L. “Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 3.56 (June-July 2014): 7-42. Print. Graham, T. “The Dangers of a New Containment Policy for Russia.” Costs of a New Cold War: The U.S.-Russia Confrontation over Ukraine. Ed. P. Saunders. Washington: Center for the National Interest, 2014. 25-38. Print. Martinezgarnelo y Calvo, G. “The Eastern Partnership as an expression of the European Neighbourhood Policy: reinforcing the European normative power with the Eastern partners.” Eastern Journal of European Studies, 5.1 (June 2014): 131-143. Print. Onuch, O. “The Maidan and Beyond: Who Were the Protesters?” Journal of Democracy, 25.3 (July 2014): 44-51. Print. Schubert, S., Pollak, J., and Brutschin, E. “Two Features: EU-Russia relations in the context of Ukraine.” European Journal of Futures Research (December 2014). Web. 19 Jan. 2015. Westphal, K. “Russian Energy Supplies to Europe. The Crimea Crisis: Mutual Dependency, Lasting Collateral Damage and Strategic Alternatives for the European Union.” SWP Comments, 16 (March 2014): 1-4. Web. 16 Jan. 2015. Read More