The Cases for Autonomy and Separatism in the Caribbean - Case Study Example

The concept of secession hovers around a group of people struggling to assert their identity by leaving a to which they legally belong to. Secession like divorce is an ultimate act of alienation. (Premdas 1990:12-31) Committed against an existing state, successful secession results in the emergence of an international unit possessing all the attributes of an independent state - territory, people, government, and sovereign autonomy. (Premdas 1990:12-31) Or as a temporary measure, may settle for internal self-government within an extensively decentralized system such as a federal or confederal state. (Premdas 1990:12-31) While occupying the intermediate condition as a protected autonomous entity within an extensively decentralized sovereign state, the movement tends to continue to articulate the desire for a separate an independent destiny with these two goals oscillating between moments of satisfied accommodation and periodic bursts of renewed determination for outright secession. In the end, the objective remains constant - exit completely. (Premdas 1990:12-31) Separatism may be conceived broadly as a quest for autonomous survival either within or without a state; secession strictly speaking is a variant of separatism in which the secessionists seek outright separation and independence in a sovereign state. The quest for self-determination by a community within a plural state is often caught up in upheaval. As an act of territorial and political assertion, a secessionist struggle is usually prolonged, punishing, and prohibitively costly. Furthermore, the logic of the self-determination principle in sanctioning the demand of each people for its own state, embedded doctrinally in the nature of the state as it has evolved, has been the source of territorial fragmentation accompanied with mass expulsions and genocide not merely with the claims of the Third World states after WWII but this has been the case since the French Revolution. There have been waves of self-determination drives ever since the inception of the nation-state as aunit of national and international social organization. With the fall of the multi-ethnic great empires run by the Turks, the Hapsburgs, and the Russians, the cultural fragments sought separate destinies in acts of self-determination. Practically the entire globe was under European imperial control where new states after the European model were engrafted willy nilly on ethnically diverse populations. In these territories, self-determination drives for freedom were enacted one after the other especially after WWII. (Premdas 1990:12-31) This essay will look at the concept of secession from a comparative point o view. A case in point is that of Tobago. Of all the cases for autonomy and separatism in the Caribbean, Tobago, which is one small part (about 6% in territory) of the twin-island state of Trinidad and Tobago, with population of about 1,300,000 (1990) and measuring 5,148 km., has been the most persistent in seeking some type of self-government. Here, the Tobagonian autonomist movement raise its point from the perspective of the regional factor as a fundamental feature for secessionist tendencies in Trinidad and Tobago. The movement further complemented and strengthened its argument with secondary factors, such as neglect and exploitation. (Premdas 1990:12-31) Tobagonians claim that they are unique, because their lifestyle revolves around the village, which has maintained important aspects of its ancestral African features of collectivism, as opposed to the rugged individualism or the capitalism characteristic of Western societies. (Williams 1964:122) In Tobagonian society, family and kinship ties are very important. While Trinidad has a cosmopolitan, divided and urbanized society, Tobagos society is homogeneous and relatively cohesive. Tobagonians can rightfully claim that theirs is a separate and distinct culture, the values of which differ significantly from those of Trinidadians. Tobagonian vocabulary contains certain terms that are alien to the Trinidadians vernacular of creolized English. (Williams 1964:122) Furthermore, Tobagos claim for autonomy involves regional distinctiveness and historical problems that bred economic neglect and discrimination. Moreover, Tobago has not always been a part of Trinidad. The British colonizers welded them together for administrative convenience as in Nevis. And as in Nevis, the forced marriages have not always been a happy ones. In recent times, in fact, these grievances have resulted in oblique and periodically open assertions in Tobago for outright separation. The case of Tobago is comparable to that of Cameroon where the British Southern Cameroon has been struggling to break away form the Republic of Cameroon and St. Kitts-Nevis federation in the Caribbean where Nevis has been struggling to also to secede from the federation. In the Cameroon, the British Southern Cameroon under the banner of Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) complains that, the territory of Southern Cameroon is being neglected and exploited by their French counterparts form the east. (Ngoh 1996:184) It is worthy to note that Southern Cameroon voted to join the Republic of Cameroon in a plebiscite organised by the United Nations in 1961, in Southern Cameroonians were limited to make a choice between gaining independence by joining Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon. It is also worth noting that, before this plebiscite, Southern Cameroon for administrative reasons was ruled as an integral part of Nigeria under the British. This was during the Mandate and Trusteeship periods. (Ngoh 1996:180) As a result Southern Cameroonians inherited parts of the British culture while the Republic of Cameroon remained with the French culture. Southern Cameroonians have never welcomed the French system which they label as corrupt, exploitative and discriminatory. It is on this basis that the SCNC has been calling for an independent State of Southern Cameroon. (Ngoh 1996:188) This has been termed the Anglophone Problem in Southern Cameroon. As in Tobaga, Southern Cameroonians see themselves as different from French Cameroonians. For instance, while Southern Cameroonians speak English West Cameroonians speak French. This alone has drawn a line, which both Southern and West Cameroonians consciously or unconsciously toe. This situation has gone a long in strengthening secessionist tendencies in the British Southern Cameroon. (Ngoh 1996:184) In the case of Nevis the story has been similar especially when compared to that of Tobago. As part of the St. Kitts-Nevis federation in the Caribbean, Nevis with about 9,000 souls on an island area of 93.2 sq.kms, had repeatedly over the years expressed the desire to secede and become a sovereign state. If at some time in the future, should Nevis succeed in this aim, it would become the smallest state in the Western Hemisphere and one of a few micro-states in the world including Tuvalu and Nauru with about 10,000 inhabitants. In its first attempt, the matter came to a head when on October 23, 1997, all members of the Nevis Island Assembly, government and Opposition alike, voted unanimously in support of a Bill for Nevis secession from St. Kitts. St. Kitts, the larger of the two entities in the twin island state, is itself a mini-state with about 33,000 persons occupying an area of 168.4 sq.kms. and which is within visual distance of Nevis. (Premdas 1990:12-31) In the post World War period, there was a brief period when the decolonization demand for independence drew both Nevis and St. Kitts together under the same party led by Kittisian Robert Bradshaw. That seemed to have been a short passing phase however. In the 1960s, that party link with St. Kitts was broken and thereafter all parties in Nevis which sought popular Nevisian political support was required affirm the ritual of demanding Nevisian self-determination. No party controlling the Nevis local government body has been able to do so without pummelling Kittisian domination and exploitation. (Premdas 1990:12-31) The Italian situation surfaced in the early 90s. Here, the Lega Nord, the movement campaigning for the secession of northern Italy, emerged as a central political player in the early 1990s. It came to the fore in the context of a crisis of Italys political system, caused by the disclosure, beginning in 1992, of the widespread and deeply entrenched practices of corruption pervading the Italian state. It gained political prominence as an anti-system movement, whose secessionism offered the most radical alternative to the crisis-ridden Italian political system. Although the Lega (as it is usually referred to) has receded more into the background in recent years, it nevertheless continues to be a presence on the Italian political scene. (Coppieters and Sakwa 2003:22) In comparative studies of contemporary secessionist movements, the Legas demand for the independence of northern Italy Padania on behalf of a Padanian nation is generally interpreted as the anomalous case of a movement acting on behalf of a group not previously identified as a nation. Its secessionism can thus be dismissed out of hand as an instrumentalist political manoeuvre, as when Ronald S. Beiner expressed the opinion that there is little reason to think that Umberto Bossis dream of a republic of Padania is anything other than a cynical fabrication. This negative evaluation is frequently shared by students of the Lega (Coppieters and Sakwa 2003:22) This focus on what is now called the Northern Question reveals that, notwithstanding the strong opposition of Italian mainstream public opinion to the northern nation-building programme of the Lega, the existence of a northern identity is nevertheless accepted. The complaints made on its behalf are moreover frequently considered credible and important. This raises the question of the relevance of sub-national identities in Italy, and of the ways to address the grievances voiced on behalf of them. In the context of the institutional reforms Italy is undergoing at present, moreover, the Legas claim and the mainstream focus on the Northern Question coincide with more general critiques of the centralism of the Italian state. The dynamics of a political situation in which reforms of the state interact with demands for federalism thus create a context in which secessionist demands may have an effective impact. (Coppieters and Sakwa 2003:25) The Lega Nord has been able to activate the latent opposition between northern and southern Italy, especially in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, by linking it with a number of specific grievances. The first set concerns the dysfunctional features of the Italian state: on the one hand its lack of efficiency and the slowness of its bureaucracy, on the other, the corruption of Italys political establishment. For the Lega, the vices of the Italian state are a consequence of its strongly centralized structure, where the government and the central bureaucracy control the decision-making process at lower levels. (Coppieters and Sakwa 2003:30) We see that their grievance seem to resemble those of Southern Cameroon and Tobago in terms of corruption and dicrimination. According to the Legas second set of grievances, the Italian state favours the South, especially in its redistribution policies. In this interpretation, these policies reflect the fact that the Italian state is a southern institution that colonizes the North. The Lega hence directs itself against what is interpreted as the predatory Italian state (Roma ladrona, Rome the thief) and the South, accused of leading a parasitic existence financed by the North. (Coppieters and Sakwa 2003:31) The economic divide between the two parts of Italy has frequently been interpreted as a political and cultural divide, with northern Italy considered to be close to Western models and southern Italy more backward, less European. The journalist Luigi Barzini, for example, in a book written in 1964 to explain the Italians to an Anglo-Saxon readership, distinguished the northern homo economicus, very similar to his fellow Europeans, from the southerners, who were attached to un-economic values such as honour and respect, and were hence less efficient and enterprising. (Coppieters and Sakwa 2003:25) This juxtaposition has been translated into the popular images—which originated in the nineteenth century of a European North as opposed to an African South, frequently deployed by the Lega Nord. It acquired particular saliency in the early 1990s, when Italys huge public debt caused general anxiety about whether the country would be admitted into the European Monetary Union (which it joined in 1998). This anxiety gave added weight to the Legas proposal to liberate the North from the burden of the South, held to be responsible for this debt. (Coppieters and Sakwa 2003:25) The case of the Congo in Africa has been a bid different. Katanga, formerly Shaba, province covers 518,000 sq km, SE Congo (Kinshasa). Katanga borders Angola on the southwest, Zambia on the southeast, and Lake Tanganyika on the east. The capital and chief city is Lubumbashi. The province encompasses the fertile Katanga Plateau (3,000–6,000 ft/914–1,829 m high), where farming and ranching are carried on. In the eastern part of the province is an enormously rich mining region, which supplies much of the world’s cobalt as well as extensive quantities of copper, tin, radium, uranium, and diamonds. The province’s considerable industrial plant is largely concerned with the processing of minerals. Katanga is well connected by rail with the rest of Congo and with Angola and Zambia. There is also steamer service on Lake Tanganyika between Kalemie, in Katanga, and Kigoma, Tanzania. (Columbia Encyclopaedia 2001-05) The Katangese case is a little peculiar because it was an the unwillingness of the Katangese to share the wealth of their province with the rest of Congo. Under Belgian rule (1884-1960), mineral resources were exploited by Belgian firms and the province was developed much more rapidly than the rest of the country. Thus when the people of Katanga under Moise Tsombe began talking of secession the Belgians stood for them. (Columbia Encyclopaedia 2001-05) In July, 1960, after the Congo became independent, Katanga proclaimed itself a republic and seceded from the central government. Under the leadership of its president, Moise Tshombe, and with Belgian aid, Katanga fought off repeated attempts by the central government to seize control. Disorder was widespread, and the central government invoked the help of the UN. In 1960, President Tshombe reluctantly allowed a small UN force to enter Katanga. Later a considerable number of UN troops, committed to a policy of nonintervention, were stationed in Katanga to oversee the withdrawal of foreign troops. The situation grew steadily more volatile until early 1961, when the former premier Patrice Lumumba was murdered in Katanga. Under a new, stronger UN mandate the international force took control (1961) of Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi) and other strongpoints. An agreement (Dec., 1961) for reintegrating Katanga into the country proved abortive. In Jan., 1963, UN troops routed Tshombe’s forces and ended the Katanga secession. (Columbia Encyclopaedia 2001-05) BIBLIOGRAPHY Bruno C., Richard S. (2003). Contextualising Secession Oxford University Press, 2003. Ngoh V. J. (1996). Cameroon History Since 1800. Limbe, Presprint,. Premdas, Ralph R. et al. (1990). "Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective," in Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective London: Pinter Publishers. The Columbia Encyclopaedia. Sixth Edition. Columbia University Press: 2001-05 Downloaded from: http://www.bartleby.com/65/ka/Katanga.html. Williams E. (1964). History of the People of Trinidad and Tobago London: Longman,. Read More