Analysis Of On Liberty By John Stuart Mill - Book Report/Review Example

"On Liberty" by John Stuart Mill Mill opens his book with a discussion about the "struggle between ity and liberty" describing the tyranny of government, which, in his view, needs to be controlled by the liberty of the citizens. Without such limit to authority, the government is a "dangerous weapon". The philosopher divides this control of authority into two mechanisms: first, necessary rights belonging to citizens, and, second, the "establishment of constitutional checks, by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort, supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power" (7). As such, Mill suggests that mankind will be happy to be ruled "by a master", if his rule is guaranteed against tyranny. Mill speaks in the aforementioned section in terms of monarchy. However, mankind soon developed into democracy where "there was no fear of tyrannizing over self". "This may seem axiomatic", he says, but " the people who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised" (8). Further, this can only be by the majority, and if the majority wish to criminalise a section of society that happens to be a minority - whether a race, gender, faith, or the like - this may easily be done despite any wishes of the minority to the contrary. This is in his terms the "tyranny of the majority". According to Mill, there is only one legitimate reason for the exercise of power over individuals: "The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, which says that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant" (13). This is the first mention in "On Liberty" of the so-called harm principle. The only limiting factor of liberty in Mill's view should be harm in the form of either physical or moral compulsion. If a person is thus harmed, then his or her sovereignty over self is impaired because sovereignty is exercised either through action or judgment. Children and those who cannot take care of themselves are allowed to be interfered with beyond the harm principle as they may well harm themselves unintentionally; they do not, and cannot, have sovereignty over self. Furthermore, Mill states that one may accept despotism over "barbarians" if the end result is their betterment; this implies that barbarians are of "non-age" and cannot be sovereign over self. As soon as people are capable of deciding for themselves, they should then be given liberty from authority. To illustrate his point, Mill uses Charlemagne and Akbar the Great as examples of such compassionate dictators who controlled and supposedly helped "barbarians". Referring to the rule of Akbar in India, he allowed that despotic rule could be necessary under certain conditions for stable government. He even suggests that, since people must be properly fit if democracy is to function well, a despotic form of government, if well-run with this aim in mind, might prepare its people for the exercise of responsibilities of a free electorate. This point seems to be quite controversial, since "helping the barbarians" could be easily used as a formal excuse to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Generally speaking, Mill's statement of the harm principle in Chapter I of the essay seems clear, but in fact entails a number of complications. For example, Mill explicitly states that "harms" may include acts of omission as well as acts of commission. Thus, failing to rescue a drowning child counts as a harmful act, as does failing to pay taxes, or failing to appear as a witness in court. All such harmful omissions may be regulated, according to Mill. By contrast, it does not count as harming someone if (without force or fraud) the affected individual consents to assume the risk: thus one may permissibly offer unsafe employment to others, provided there is no deception involved. (Mill does, however, recognise one limit to consent: society should not permit people to sell themselves into slavery). In these and other cases, it is important to keep in mind that the arguments in "On Liberty" are grounded on the principle of utility, and not on appeals to natural rights. (Utilitarianism claims that an action is right, if it tends to promote happiness, and wrong, if it tends to produce the reverse of happiness - not just the happiness of the performer of the action but also that of everyone affected by it.) The question of what counts as a self-regarding action and what actions, whether of omission or commission, constitute harmful actions subject to regulation, continues to exercise interpreters of Mill. In Mill's view, tyranny of the majority is worse than tyranny of government because it is not limited to a political function. Where one can be protected from a tyrant, it is much harder to be protected "against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling" (9). People will be subject to what society thinks is suitable - and will be fashioned by it. The prevailing opinions within society will be the basis of all rules of conduct within society - thus there can be no safeguard in law against the tyranny of the majority. The chief danger of democracy is that of suppressing individual differences, and of allowing no genuine development of minority opinion and of minority forms of culture. Democracy might will impoverish the culture of the community by imposing a single and inflexible set of mass values. This form of government has the virtue of fostering intelligence, common moral standards, and happiness; but where the citizens are unfit and passive it can be an instrument for tyranny. In general, the only reliable safeguard can be institutions, educational institutions in particular, that can ensure the development of individuals with personalities strong enough to resist such pressures. "The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill, or that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes-will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish" (106). "We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek the society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit, who cannot live within moderate means, who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences, who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect, must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favourable sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself" (72). Behind this rests the idea that humanity is capable of progress - human nature is not static. It is not merely re-expressed in generations and individuals. It is "not a machine to be built after a model but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing." (55). For Mill, government is not a matter of natural rights or social contract, it is rather to be judged according to "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interest of man as a progressive being" (14). By this he means that forms of government are to be evaluated in terms of their capacity to enable each person to exercise and develop in his or her own way their capacities for higher forms of human happiness. Such development will be an end for each individual, but also a means for society as whole to develop and to make life better for all. Mill divides human liberty when in private into its components or manifestations: first, the freedom to think as one wishes, and to feel as one does. This includes the freedom to opinion, and includes the freedom to publish opinions known as the freedom of speech. Second, the freedom to pursue tastes and pursuits, even if they are deemed "immoral," as long as they do not cause harm. And third, the "freedom to unite" or meet with others, often known as the freedom of assembly. Without all of these freedoms, in Mill's view, one cannot be considered to be truly free. "On Liberty" involves an impassioned defence of free speech. Mill argues that free discourse is a necessary condition for intellectual and social progress. We can never be sure, he contends, if a silenced opinion does not contain some element of the truth. He also argues that allowing people to air false opinions is productive for two reasons. First, individuals are more likely to abandon erroneous beliefs if they are engaged in an open exchange of ideas. Second, by forcing other individuals to re-examine and re-affirm their beliefs in the process of debate, these beliefs are kept from declining into mere dogma. It is not enough for Mill that one simply has an unexamined belief that happens to be true; one must understand why the belief in question is the true one. For Mill, liberty is defined by "the nature and limits of the power of which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual." Mill's stance is that society can step in only when the action of the individual causes harm to others. Interference for any other reason is unwarranted and only hinders the development of society as a whole. When these liberties are preserved, the end result is freedom, and true freedom, according to Mill, is pursuing one's own good in which ever way they deem fit, so long as it doesn't bring harm to others. And here in lies the problem: it is human nature to believe that you are right and the other is wrong. "We can never be sure," he wrote, "that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion, and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still" (19). Our beliefs and actions are reasonable or not depending upon our capacity to critically assess them. Only through free debate can such critical skills be developed and maintained: our self-development as reasonable persons, capable of critical assessments for belief and action. Thus, the main theme of the essay is the individual. Everything else, society, education, government and so forth had their basis in the individual's rights to his own liberty. No one, no member of society, government, even God, if he appeared before an individual, could enforce his will upon him. That is not to say that you couldn't change someone's mind through discussions, but instead, that no one had a right to force his views upon another. Your happiness is yours (individual) to enjoy without any infringements. Conversations between individuals or groups of individuals are essential in developing the notion of liberty. Mill claims that you should feel free to convey your views openly without forcing them onto others. After all, a man who learns from no one but himself has a fool for a teacher. There is however an exception to this rule. That is, if an individual in any way harms or comes onto others' rights to liberty, or causes a social threat, hence he or she is subjected to forced inclinations by other members of society. The best sort of person is one who individually is responsible for his or her beliefs and actions. It is not someone whose beliefs or actions are simply those that conform to some custom, or are simply those that they have always had, or are simply those asserted to be correct by some authority. The best kind of beliefs and actions are those that emerge from the person's own critical assessments, and the best kind of person is the individual who can provide as required those critical assessments. As for why that sort of person is the best, it is because such a one will not only be happy in his or her own case but will be concerned with, and contribute to, the happiness of others. Individuality is, in other words, one of the main ingredients of human happiness, and it is for that reason to be cultivated. Here, as elsewhere, it is utility, the general welfare, that determines what is right and what is the best. Since individuality is good, it is necessary to foster social institutions that contribute to that individuality. Free, uncensored debate is one such institution. So, more generally, is liberty, the right to do as one wants free from the interference of others, so long as what one wants does no harm to others. (And merely offending the moral sensitivities of others does not count as harm. Especially since others often confuse feelings of repugnance with feelings of moral disapprobation.) Democracy and representative government also contribute to the development of the individual, for much the same reason that free speech so contributes, and so these too are social institutions that are justified on utilitarian grounds. Works cited Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. Batoche Books. Kitchener, 2001 . Read More