Consequences of European Union Enlargement - Essay Example

Consequences of EU Enlargement On the Opportunities for Developing an Efficient Common Security and Foreign Policy Introduction As part of the enlargement process for the now 25-member European Union, its membership is expected to expand to 30 or 35 by 2020, with the western Balkan countries as the final joiners (Batora, 2007). The deliberate expansion of EU membership is enshrined in the New Constitution for Europe, which was adopted in May 2004 based on the concept that further enlargement is necessary for EU to strengthen its capability to maintain the balance of peace in the continent (Hamalainen, 2001). The idea may be hinged on the dictum that there is strength in numbers. This actually gives expression to the founding philosophy of EU, which was established from the ruins of World War II to lessen the risks of another war in the region mainly by fostering peace and stability through economic development. Border control and economic integration have been the principal strategies used in achieving such objective (EC online), which means that with the enlargement process, there will be more borders to control and more economies to integrate. With more territories to cover and administer, won't this compromise the ability of the Union to maintain peace and stability in the region This discursive essay thus assesses the consequences of enlargement on the Common Security and Foreign Policy, a new institutional pillar of EU that has been given as much importance as the 3 EU Communities (Pillar I) and the policy of cooperation on justice and home affairs (Pillar II). The question the paper attempts to resolve is whether further enlargement would be a help or hindrance to the effort to develop an efficient CSFP plan for EU, which cannot be considered a foreign policy actor since it does not represent a single unitary state but a conglomeration of states (Lalone, 2005). The evidence seems to show that an enlargement provides EU with certain advantages to come up with a CSFP that is appropriate for its unique structure and needs. Main Issues The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty sometime after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US (Algieri, 2002). EU's initial reaction to the threat of international terrorism was to adopt a Plan of Action that supported the coalition against this menace (Ibid). The plan consisted of diplomatic overtures, police and judicial cooperation, humanitarian aid, air transport security, economic and financial measures, and emergency preparedness (Ibid), which were all pursued while the Union leadership was starting to develop the CFSP in tandem with the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Since the CFSP plan has military implications, the capability of EU to undertake such a program promptly came into question. The basic problem is that EU is non-military in structure and member states would like the Union to stay that way. At one point, for example, member states ganged up on a plan to purchase A400 military transport aircraft, which bespoke a military buildup. As for the foreign policy aspect of the CFSP, skeptics of the plan harp on the lack of EU strategic vision in this arena as evidenced by the absence of clear geopolitical thinking in the CFSP objectives set in Article 11 of the Maastricht Treaty (Cremona, 2003). There is also the inherent difficulty of conducting foreign relations on a common EU basis. This was demonstrated when Union representatives were sent on a diplomatic mission to Islamic countries at the same time that UK foreign ministers were on a separate mission at the UK government's own initiative. The disparate efforts invite accusations that EU is wanting in a coherent foreign affairs policy, which does not speak well of its ability to put together an efficient CFSP. For these reasons, observers expect the CFSP/ESDP to remain a "paper tiger," in which case EU member states may start to act on their own initiative in specific security crises with foreign dimension (Algieri, 2002). This is seen as capable of damaging both the enlargement and integration process. Another perceived setback to a more efficient CFSP development is that the ESDP has elements that are present in both Pillar I and Pillar II, such that there are few clear lines of responsibility and accountability (Born, 2004). On this concern, the CFSP developed much like the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), in which the European Parliament was given the "powers of information but no real power of control (Stavridis & Vallianatou, 2003)." Like the CCP early on, the CFSP faces the same institutional and development problem. After many years of being a bystander on the CCP, the Parliament eventually established itself as an official player in the trade policy through the 2000 Treaty of Rome, but in the case of the CFSP, there is little indication that Parliament will be given a greater involvement in the plan. Leaving out such an important decision-making body does not augur well for the CFSP (Corbett, et al., 2000). To enhance intra-EU cooperation on CFSP/ESDP, delegates to the European Parliament are in fact calling for the creation of the EU Foreign Minister and a system of consultation and joint external action (Lalone, 2005). Concepts & Theories The CFSP was made an important pillar of EU because of the new demands and challenges imposed by global and regional crises, as well as disturbing developments within Europe (EC online). At the Amsterdam Treaty, the CFSP objectives were spelled out as follow: Safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter. Strengthen the security of EU in all possible ways. Preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the Helshinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, including those on external borders. Promote international cooperation. Develop and consolidate democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (European Commission online). So far, specific CFSP strategies have been drawn up for Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean and the Middle East peace process. Under the plan, EU maintains a political presence in conflict areas though Special Representatives. These include Great Lakes in Africa, Macedonia, Afghanistan and Ethiopia/Eritrea (Solana, 2005). For the most part, the CFSP activities in these areas are non-military in nature and EU has boundless capabilities for non-military instruments and policies for peacemaking. These particular capabilities provide EU with "much more scope for preventing and resolving conflicts on its own continent than elsewhere (Hill, 2001)." In effect, the CFSP amounts to nothing more than a "paper tiger" as noted by Algieri (2002) above. However, EU has made it clear at the outset that the rationale behind CFSP/ESDP is to establish neither a European army nor a military Union (European Commission online). In fact, the Union's ongoing peace initiatives in the international scene under the CFSP plan are mostly diplomatic and economic in character. On the Middle East peace process, for example, EU activities are directed at providing jobs, social services and infrastructure rebuilding for the Gaza disengagement plan to work. For Iraq, EU has prepared a package of assistance that includes the training of judges, police and other Iraqi officers and a 550-million euro aid so far for Iraq reconstruction. Diplomatic initiatives have been undertaken for Iran as part of the effort to look for broader solutions to the nuclear question (Solana, 2005). The Union acknowledges that it cannot adopt a foreign and security policy equal in proportion to the US foreign or military policy in that EU cannot be considered a foreign policy actor representing a single state. Thus, the CFSP/ESDP is not meant as a challenge but as a supportive instrument to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and transatlantic relations. Still, the question of whether EU can be effective on this pursuit remains because of the possibility that the enlargement process may turn in new members with different political beliefs. An increased EU membership, according to Batora (2007), could throw many member states into a crisis of identity, but the good news is that it will also facilitate the gradual embedding of EU in various social contexts and thus increase its robustness as an institution. Another possible scenario in an enlarged EU is its becoming simply a regional trade organization, which will happen if the new enlargement process is not accompanied by comprehensive reforms in the Union's systems of governance (Ibid). In that case, the CFSP/ESDP may be relegated to the backburner. The plan, as emphasized in Article 1-41 of the new Constitution, can only achieve its intended purpose if member states willingly make their civilian and military capabilities available to EU for implementing policy (EC online). In other words, enlargement enhances instead of diminishes the atmosphere of cooperation. Enhanced cooperation, according to Algieri (2002), can make CFSP a meaningful Community effort if the plan is driven by two motives: 1) it strengthens and extends EU's foreign, security and defense capabilities, and 2) it avoids ad-hoc coalition building as a crisis management strategy since this does not respect the institutional and legal frameworks of EU. This was exactly the direction set by the Nice Treaty, which agreed on activities to enhance cooperation as a platform to bring integration steps further and EU enlargement into line (Bertelsman Foundation, 2000). Conclusion Further EU enlargement can generate positive support in the development of an efficient CFSP plan only if it wins the cooperation of the new members. Common sense tells us that a more enlarged Union with practically all of Europe as members will give it more strength and power before the eyes of the world. This could help develop a specific model of foreign and security policy that has no military component but enough to push EU into the international stage as a foreign policy actor that cannot be ignored any longer, the way the US underestimates the current European security and defense policy. Some EU member states sometimes appear to distort the much-needed principle of cooperation that CFSP calls for, such as when UK dispatched its own diplomatic team to the Middle East while an EU mission was at work in the Islamic countries. However, EU officials argue that such parallel initiatives do not diminish the Union foreign policy but instead strengthens it based on the principle of common interest. In the effort to forge cooperation for the benefit of CFSP, the Nice Treaty agreed on an enhanced cooperation for the plan, which could serve as an effective concept to bring additional integration and enlargement steps into line. If the desired level of cooperation is achieved, reluctant member states may cooperate to further communitarize certain fields of the CFSP within a confined setting. This will make cooperation possible in non-military aspects of foreign and security policy, which could meet the challenges of international politics within a community framework. It could also provide an opportunity to handle the increasing number of particular interests in an enlarged EU (Algieri, 2002). The CFSP provides an exciting dimension to the overall work of EU, with the EU institutions now involved in most of the traditional fields of international diplomacy. Ratification of the Nice Treaty is expected to provide opportunities for further development of this new field of European policy. Bibliography: Journals Born, H., 2004, Parliamentary Accountability and the Use of Force under International Auspices, Conference on Tackling the Double Democratic Deficit and Improving the Accountability of the ESDP, Brussels. Himalainen, S., 2001, The Euro and European Integration, Speech before the Finnish Cultural Institute, Stockholm, 12 February 2001. Lalone, N., 2005, Accountability in EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: Lessons from the Common Commercial Policy. Solana, J., 2000, The Development of CFSP and the Role of the High Representative, Danish Institute of International Affairs, 11 February 2000. Stavridis, S. & Vallianatou, A., 2003, Parliamentary Accountability in EU Foreign and Defense Policy: A Preliminary Assessment of the Convention on the Future of Europe Debate, LSE Foreign Policy Unit 2003/2. Websites European Commission, External Relations, webpage design (online) at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/110901/ EC, Common Foreign and Security Policy, webpage design (online) at: http://europa.eu/constitution/download/faq 02 eu.pdf Solana, J., 2005, Summary Intervention, Munich Conference on Security Policy, webpage design (online) at: http://ue.eu.int/solana Books Algieri, F., 2002, EU Foreign and Security Policy Post-9/11: Some Lessons for the Reform Debate and for Transatlantic Relations, Ludivig-Maximillian University, Munich. Batora, J., 2007, The Future of the European Union, In Global Politics Symposium on the Future of the European Union; T. Blazek, O. Gazovic & L. Holder (eds), ISSN 1213-7685. Bertelsman Foundation, 2000, Enhancing EU as an International Security Actor: A Strategy for Action, Gutersloh, Germany. Corbett, R., Jacobs, F. & Shackleton, M., 2000, The European Parliament, 4th ed., London: John Harper. 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