Does the European Union Need a Constitution - Essay Example

does the european Union need a constitution I. Introduction The history of attempts for giving Europe a constitution is long and encompasses some famous names including Winston Churchill who presented his vision of the United States of Europe in 1946 in Zurich. From 1952 up to the present, the European Union (EU) has made its presence felt especially regarding trade and commerce. Today, discussions center on a European Constitution which has gained impetus with the highly controversial speech of German foreign minister Joschka Fischer at the Humboldt University (Siller 2000). Whether the European Union (EU) needs a constitution or not has been tackled from various angles by the different states in terms of what the future has in store for them. However, the bigger picture is, will it be integrative of them as one whole body A constitution must serve the best interests not just one or a few member states. Devanny (2004) says the debate about whether the EU should adopt a constitution has been protracted and controversial. It is both a practical debate (Does the EU need a constitution) and a more abstract debate (Is the EU the kind of entity/organisation that should adopt a constitution). According to Murkens (2002), the European Union leaders at the Laeken summit in December 2001 had agreed to a constitutional convention headed by the former French President Valry Giscard D'Estaing to craft an EU constitution. And yet, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the German Federal Constitutional Court, and academic commentators say the founding treaties already form a constitution. From Murkens (2002) - "In its famous decision in Van Gend en Loos in 1963 the ECJ held that the Treaty of Rome had created a Community not only of governments but of peoples, and that the Member States had agreed to limit their sovereign rights in certain fields. A year later the ECJ established the doctrine of supremacy of Community law in Costa v. ENEL which was basically accepted by national constitutional courts. These decisions heralded the 'creeping constitutionalisation' of Community law. The novelty of the ECJ's approach was that it did not try to squeeze the Treaty into the constitutional mould of the Verfassungsstaat. More important than the 'formal constitution' was the interpretation of the Treaty by the ECJ as the 'material constitution' (Petersmann 1991: 28), whose basic tenets include the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, and implied powers, as well as respect for human rights." The arguments for and against an EU constitution rest on complicated issues of law, sovereignty, political philosophy and the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU's institutions and procedures (Murkens 2002). At the June 2004 European Council meeting, governments of the 25 EU member states signed a constitutional treaty for the European Union (Closa 2004). Intended to include voices not usually heard in the European integration process, this treaty was drafted by a "Convention on the Future of Europe." From there, member state governments negotiated on the draft that eventually produced a treaty (Ibid). But the process is far from over. It has just entered its final and perhaps most difficult phase. According to Closa (2004), the text must be ratified unanimously by the member states, each according to its own national process, but there are uncertainties that may spell disaster for the future of European integration (Ibid). II. From treaties to Constitution A timeline (History, Wikipedia 2005) shows the development of seven treaties into EU constitution from 1952 to 2003 to include - 1952: Treaty of Paris, 1958: Treaties of Rome, 1967: Merger Treaty, 1987: Single European Act, 1993: Treaty of Maastricht, 1999: Treaty of Amsterdam, and 2003: Treaty of Nice. The European Constitution is being hoped to be enacted in the soonest future. The three pillars are: 1) the European Communities (the European Coal and Steel Community or ECSC which came about in 1952; the European Community or EC which came around in 1958; the European Atomic Energy Community or Euratom coming around 1967); 2) Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP from 1987, and 3) Justice and Home Affairs from 1987 onwards (Ibid). These may explain the need for a single instrument to simplify matters from all these treaties, and the structure that has built up over 60 decades. In order to join the European Union, a state needs to fulfill the economic and political conditions generally known as the Copenhagen criteria (after the Copenhagen summit in June 1993). Also, according to the EU Treaty, each current member state and the European Parliament have to agree (Enlargement, Wikipedia 2005). Signed by representatives of the member states on October 29, 2004, it is now in the process of ratification by all of the member states. The following, (Ratification, Wikipedia 2005) shows the status of ratification by the member states in three modes: A) Ratification by referenda, B) Parliamentary approval, and C) Accession - A. Ratification of the Treaty via referenda Member State Date Result: % thus voting (of % turnout) Details 1. Spain 20 February 2005 Yes: 76.7% (of 42.3%) Consultative referendum 2. France 29 May 2005 No: 54.7% (of 69.3%) Referendum 3. Netherlands 1 June 2005 No: 61.6% (of 62.8%) Consultative referendum 4. Czech Republic Cancelled Parliamentary ratification instead Referendum proposed 5. Luxembourg 10 July 2005 Yes: 56.5% (of 87.77%) Consultative referendum 6. Republic of Ireland Date not yet set Referendum 7. Denmark Postponed indefinitely Referendum 8. Poland Postponed indefinitely Referendum 9. Portugal Postponed indefinitely Referendum 10. United Kingdom Postponed indefinitely Referendum B. Parliamentary Approval of the Treaty Parliament Date Result Signature of head of state 11. Lithuania 11 November 2004 Yes. 84 to 4 in favour Yes 12. Hungary 20 December 2004 Yes. 322 to 12 in favour Yes 13. European Parliament 12 January 2005 Yes. 500 to 137 in favour N/A 14. Slovenia 1 February 2005 Yes. 79 to 4 in favour Yes 15. Italy 6 April 2005 Yes. Lower house: 436 to 28 in favour.Yes. Upper house: 217 to 16 in favour Yes 16. Greece 19 April 2005 Yes. 268 to 17 in favour. Yes 17. Slovakia 11 May 2005 Yes. 116 to 27 in favour Pending 18. Spain 18 May 2005 Yes. Lower house: 319 to 19 in favour.Yes. Upper house: 225 to 6 in favour Yes 19. Austria 25 May 2005 Yes. Lower house: 182 to 1 in favour. Yes. Upper house: 59 to 3 in favour Yes 20. Germany 27 May 2005 Yes. Lower house: 569 to 23 in favour. Yes. Upper house: 66 to 3 in favour. Pending (legal challenge) 21. Latvia 2 June 2005 Yes. 71 to 5 in favour Yes 22. Cyprus 30 June 2005 Yes. 30 to 19 in favour Yes 23. Malta 6 July 2005 Yes. 65 to 0 in favour Yes 24. Belgium (Expected) October 2005 Yes. Lower house: 118 to 18 in favour. Yes. Upper house: 54 to 9 in favour. Yes. Brussels Regional Parliament. Yes. German Community Parliament. Yes. Walloon Regional Parliament. Yes. French Community Parliament. (unlike most countries in Europe it must also be approved by regional governments the last one being the Flemish Regional Parliament) 25. Estonia (Expected) Autumn 2005 26. Luxembourg (Expected) Autumn 2005 27. Finland Postponed indefinitely 28. Sweden Postponed indefinitely 29. Czech Republic Postponed indefinitely C. Accession countries Bulgaria and Romania, the two countries due to join the European Union in 2007, have already accepted the constitutional treaty by ratifying their accession treaty as shown - Parliament Date Result Bulgaria 11 May 2005 Yes. 231 to 1 in favour. Romania 17 May 2005 Yes. 434 to 0 in favour. D. French and Dutch No Vote On November 1, 2006, the Constitution would have been scheduled to enter into force but French (May 29, 2005) and Dutch (June 1, 2005) voters rejected the treaty in referenda. This led other countries to postpone their ratification, with the Constitution now in highly uncertain future (History, Wikipedia 2005). Invariably, the reasons for the rejection of France of the treaty lie in the following- 1) The Constitution would enforce a neoliberal economic model, 2) Critics link the Constitution to the proposed directive on services in the internal market, which is widely opposed in France (Internal market, Wikipedia 2005); 3) France should not be part of any institution whose decisions can take precedence over what is decided in France at a national level, 4) Possible inclusion of Turkey to the EU (French Referendum, Wikipedia 2005); 5) The government and president are unpopular. Unemployment is running at 10% and the economy is in the doldrums, 6) The constitution would create an ultra-free market economy within the EU, that would undermine traditional French levels of social protection, and allow countries with cheaper labour costs to take French jobs; and 7) The decline of France's influence in the EU, as a result of enlargement (Q and A: French EU 2005). Burk (2005), however, sees the motives for French rejection as mixed and don't necessarily represent a rejection of the EU project. He said, "Many French felt the document was overly favorable to free market competition and wanted a stronger socialist integration among EU members." As for Denmark, the reasons for rejecting the treaty were: 1) Thirty per cent of the Constitution's opponents used the referendum as an opportunity to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the government, 2) Fears of Turkey and other Eastern European countries entering the EU; 3) Fears of an increase in immigration, or an outsourcing of jobs to new member states; 4) The Netherlands had not held a referendum on the euro, and amidst concern that its adoption had led to an increase in the cost of living, 5) Forty-eight per cent thought the new Constitution was worse than the existing treaties, 6) Forty-four per cent cited the declining influence of the Netherlands in the EU, 7) Most were turned off by the aggressive style of campaigning for the EU constitution (Dutch referendum on the European Constitution 2005), and 8) The EU's big countries were already too strong and that certain provisions of the constitution would increase their power even more. (The EU Constitution, US Embassy 2005) E. Yes Votes Meanwhile, many EU members have supported the constitution, with the following general reasons given (Wikipedia 2005) - 1) Increased Parliamentary Powers 2) Simplified Voting Procedures 3) Exit Clause for Member Countries 4) A New Solidarity Clause 5) Build Common Defense Policy F. Plan of action Before the constitution can enter into force, unanimity is required although majority of EU countries have approved the treaty. In this regard Johannes Voggenhuber of the Austrian Green Party (History, Wikipedia 2005) on 15 September 2005 suggested the following plan of action: 1) Until the end of 2006, write a strongly reduced treaty containing only the non-controversial points (i.e. charter of fundamental rights, European referendum, the principle of "no law without parliament. 2) Until the end of 2009, a new constitutional convention should decide on a new European Constitution, especially regarding the favoured social system and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 3) Together with the elections for European Parliament in 2009, a European referendum on the constitutional treaty should be called. III. Points of contention The current debate on the future of Europe is often said to have begun with a speech made by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in Berlin in 2000. He had called for a debate whether Europe should be finally integrated or not. The European Convention produced the Constitution draft published in July 2003 and the final text of the proposed Constitution was agreed upon in June 2004 (Ibid). Since the French vote, some countries were said to have confirmed their intention to abandon or postpone referenda on ratification including the United Kingdom where Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had said, there is "no point" in planning a referendum following the decisions in France and the Netherlands (Strauss, BBC News June 6, 2005). Other countries, however, went on with ratification procedures, including Luxembourg, approving the treaty on 10 July 2005 (BBC News July 10, 2005). A more specific version about the general contentions in the EU constitution (Google answers 2005) have to do with the following: 1)Length and complexity, 2) Qualified majority voting, 3) Union law and national law, 4) Trappings of statehood, 5) Lack of democracy, 6) Secularism, 7) Militarism, 8) Economic policy, 9)Human rights, and 10) Exclusions. But Closa (2004) goes basic and looks into responses of the states so far in terms of holding referendums and other modes which he concludes is political. IV. Referendums and politics Closa (2004) says a majority of the member states are either committed to holding a national referendum for ratifying the Constitution or, at least, have not definitively ruled out this option. Only three member states have explicitly rejected recourse to a referendum: Malta, Sweden, and Germany. He explains why so many national authorities decided to use a referendum as the instrument for ratifying the EU Constitution and its implications. A. Countries Holding Referendums on the EU Constitution (as of October 2004) Referendum Total Countries Yes 11 Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom Probably Not 6 Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia No 4 Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Sweden Undecided 4 Austria, Germany, Lithuania, Slovenia Closa (2004) clarifies that a referendum is not required to ratify an international treaty (and strictly speaking the EU Constitution is an international treaty) in any EU member state. At most, a referendum may be required to reform the national constitution in order to incorporate amendments needed to conform to an EU treaty. But only in the Irish Constitution, amended by means of a referendum after every new treaty since the Single European Act in 1986, is this requirement explicitly stated as a direct legal imperative. More commonly, Closa (2004) said a number of European constitutions exhibit a certain mistrust of referendums. In Germany, the domestic constitutional arrangements reflect the negative view of referendums inherited from the abuse of such instruments in a totalitarian past. The Greek Constitution allows them, he said, but there exists no enabling legislation establishing the procedure, and the last one was held in 1974. In Italy, there is widespread feeling that a referendum must be held on the EU Constitution, but the government argues that are certain "technical difficulties" in holding a referendum on it. However, Closa (2004) said, legal arguments about the lack of constitutional grounds for a referendum should not obscure the fact that the decision to hold a referendum in any given country depends essentially on political factors. In both Germany and Greece, for example, the government and the main opposition party agree on the desirability of the EU Constitution, and referendums are therefore unlikely. In Germany, a proposal to hold a referendum by the small Free Democratic Party (FDP) was rejected by the parliament even though opinion polls showed that most voters favour a referendum (Ibid). So far, what Closa (2004) was saying is that the absence of a referendum does not necessarily mean rejection or a no vote. In all cases, he said, the absence of specific provisions permitting a referendum is not an insurmountable obstacle. Even though all European democracies generally favour representative over direct democracy, almost of all them have sought a constitutional balance between these extremes. If necessary, Closa said, traditions can change. Thus, rather than a legal imperative, the decision to call a referendum stems from politics. The political factors explaining why some member states are said (Closa 2004) to resort to referendums and others are not are: 1) A genuine commitment to the idea that the importance of the EU Constitution and the changes introduced requires a renewed expression of legitimacy in the form of citizens' direct consent. 2) Shaping the decision to hold a referendum is the existence of a split between parliament and public opinion regarding EU matters. 3) In a number of cases, the referendum will act as an arbiter between parties with different views on the EU and the Constitution. 4) The growing importance of referendums for EU issues. They serve to resolve situations in which the parties are divided within themselves along anti-integrationist/pro-integrationist lines. V. YES Perspective For those in support of the EU to have a constitution, the following are some of their reasons. A. Chance to work for reforms. Voting "yes" for a state depends on a lot of considerations. They play their cards according to particulars like size of territory, history, and the like. In answer to Vote No of the anti-European campaign group that produced the "10 reasons to say No to the EU Constitution," Britain in Europe (2005) says the contentions are riddled with misconceptions, saying Europe is working - "The EU is not the economic basket case it is made out to be. Although some countries - notably Germany - have high unemployment and low growth, many do not. Over the past six years, 6 of the old 15 EU economies have grown faster than Britain's. Four of the old 15 EU economies are currently growing as fast as, or faster than, Britain, and three have a lower unemployment rate. Most of the ten new EU members are growing much faster than Britain - and thanks to the EU's recent enlargement, the combined EU economy is now bigger than the US's." For a yes vote, Britain could work for reforms, the group said. The best way to reform the EU is to play a full role in it - especially when Europe is generally moving in Britain's direction. It would be madness, they said, to isolate themselves by rejecting the treaty. It would be "a big move towards isolation, a leap into a dark and uncertain future at the margins of Europe since Britain is currently a leading country in Europe, the second-biggest member country with a strong influence on the direction of Europe." Some are said to be jealous of Britain's influence in Europe - for example, Laurent Fabius, a leading French opponent of the treaty, complains that it is too "britannique" (Britain in Europe 2005). B. Not a superstate. While examining the possibilities and limits of the EU in fulfilling an integrative function, Doraus (2002) concludes that the EU is not a superstate. It has been given competence in most areas, he said, but its jurisdiction is not general and "thematically limited," and also contingent on the legal authority of the Member states Therefore, even though the EU has certain state-like characteristics, so long as the EU does not possess the competence to give itself competence it is not a sovereign state in the received sense, he said. C. Raise standard of living. Over half a century, the Union is said to have raised its citizens' standard of living to unprecedented levels (Key facts and figures, Europa 2005). It has created a frontier-free single market and a single currency, the euro. It is a major economic power and the world leader in development aid. The enlarged EU of 27 countries will have a population of nearly half a billion. To become more competitive while remaining a fair and caring society, the EU needs to get more people into new and better jobs and to give them new skills. (Ibid). D. Integrative function. The idea underpinning the constitution would not be the underhand creation of a federal state but rather the clear representation of the two constitutive pillars of the EU: the Member States and the citizens of the EU (Dorau 2002) In the long run, such a short and accessible document might even generate some sort of a user-friendly and value-oriented constitution meeting the integrative function that ascribes to it (Closa 2004). E. Sovereignty not an issue. On fears of losing sovereignty, according to Dorau (2002), sovereignty is "a matter of executive monopoly and power of legal enforcement." The impact of new technologies and globalisation of economic, political and social procedures on the state has brought about a loss of state sovereignty already, both legally and factually (Ibid). F. Importance of defending opportunities. The importance of a formal constitution is superseded by the importance of defending "the substantive living conditions, the educational opportunities, the leisure and the space for social creativity that give a sphere of private autonomy its value and utility and are the preconditions for effective democratic participation (Ibid). G. Already empowered but Murkens (2002) quotes Christoph Doraus's book Die Verfassungsfrage der Europischen Union that the assumption that the founding treaties of the European Community and the interpretation lent to them by the European court of Justice (ECJ) already amount to a constitution. But for Dorau a comprehensive constitution is more than a juridical construction of foundational principles that structure a specific legal and political order. It is "also an instrument of social integration and an expression of community norms and values." (Dorau 2002). In other words, any constitution should serve to integrate member states. VI. NO perspective A. Reading clearly constitution. Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt was quoted as saying in Financial Times (TEAM 2005) that "The Constitution is the capstone of a European Federal State." Meanwhile, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Former Belgian Prime Minister and Vice-President of the EU Convention was quoted in Irish Times (Jun 2, 2004) as saying, "We know that nine out of 10 people will not have read the Constitution and will vote on the basis of what politicians and journalists say. More than that, if the answer is No, the vote will probably have to be done again, because it absolutely has to be yes" (TEAM 2005). B. European Superstate. Further, Coughlan (2005) writes that the constitution "effectively turns the EU into a State or virtual State in which its Member States become like provinces or regions, with their national democracy, sovereignty and political independence formally ceded to the superior entity." This would be so because "the new Treaty-cum-Constitution revokes all existing EC/EU treaties and reapplies the existing body of law of the European Union, which is vast and invasive." Of Britain, Hughes (2005) says the Blair government may go down in history as those responsible for taking the UK out of the EU instead of taking the country to the heart of Europe. This, as a result of a possible "no" vote on the EU Constitution. In the words of Hughes (2005) - Tony Blair on taking power in 1997 set out his goals of making the UK a leading player in Europe and of changing the longstanding British antipathy to the EU. Almost 8 years later the picture is bleak. The UK public, out of all the 25 member states, has the lowest proportion seeing the EU as a 'good thing' in regular EU opinion polls. It is also the member state that currently looks most likely to vote 'no' to the EU constitutional treaty in a referendum expected to be held in 2006. It is quite possible the UK could be the only one of the 25 to vote 'no'. This would lead to a heated debate, and perhaps little choice, about leaving the EU, negotiating some form of 'special partnership' to ease the divorce. In a white paper presented to the Parliament dated September 2004 however, Blair (2004) said he was recommending a referendum on the constitution as a success and as a major step toward creating the kind of Europe that the British people want. Blair (2004) said - "We are much better able to tackle problems such as pollution, terrorism and international crime by working with our neighbours and partners than by acting alone. It is as part of the EU that we are best able to deliver the stable, safe, and prosperous world that we all want." C. Only by key elites. Quoting Christopher Booker and Richard North's book, "The Great Deception, The Secret History of the European Union" Couglan (2005) explains the EU constitution is "deception" because the process of building a Europe-wide State has taken place by gradual steps, but the political State-building aim has been subscribed to only by the key political, economic and bureaucratic elites pushing the project. It has not been agreed to by the citizens of the different countries of Europe, although the Constitution confronts them with that choice clearly for the first time. The five gradual steps to the EU (State) Constitution that Couglan (2005) mentioned were: 1) The 1957 Rome Treaty for free trade, protected agriculture, a supranational law through the EU Commission, Council of Ministers and EU Court of Justice; 2) The 1987 Single European Act for the internal market, with wide use of majority Council voting; 3) The 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, with the euro as a single currency; beginnings of a common foreign and security policy; 4) The 1998 Amsterdam Treaty on " progressive framing of a common defense policy," and; 5) The 2003 Nice Treaty for "enhanced cooperation" where Couglan (2005) says sub-groups of States may use the EU institutions for closer integration among themselves even if others disagree, opening the way to an unequal EU. D. Treaty versus Constitution. Among other things, Couglan (2005) said the EU constitution is anti-democratic because the process of EU integration transfers power from elected national parliaments and governments to a small number of politicians and bureaucrats, who obtain a huge accretion of personal power thereby. He also said it is only turning the EU into a state or virtual state because a Treaty is an agreement between equal sovereign States acting as partners, while a Constitution is the basic law of a State setting out the relations between its subordinate parts. Up to this time the EU as an entity has been subordinate to its Member States, he said. E. Democracy Deficit. The EU constitution according to Van Gerven (2005) would implicate more questions about governability and democracy within the union. Recent "no" votes on the Constitution in France and the Netherlands also raise concerns regarding the EU's future: 1) Which form of government is most appropriate for a united Europe; and 2) Whether "the European elites that have been responsible for a steadily expanding European integration in the last fifty years are ready to leave the future of European integration in the hands of the people." Both issues, van Gerven (2005) said, can be collapsed into one basic query asking whether the EU and its institutions are ready for democracy. Van Gerven (2005) claims the EU is elite-driven according to critics, and that its most powerful institutions are confusing to understand. Also some (e.g., the Commission) are not elected, while the Parliament is elected but lacks real power. Thus, a recurrent complaint is that democratic governance, transparency, and accountability are minimal (Ibid). The proposed constitution is hoped to address the deficit. There should be core European values about human rights and dignity that provide a basis for unity in the absence of a common language or cultural tradition among member states (Van Gerven 2005) F. Lack of legitimacy for EU project. The World Socialist group as expressed by Marsden (2004) looks in-depth at the divisions that have opened up within Europe and traces it from "the US subordinating the world to its dictates." As a result, the expansion and unification of Europe supposedly heralded by the adoption of a common constitution presages instead only growing dissention and conflict. Calling the signing of the constitution an ephemeral success, the World Socialist Group quotes the pro-EU Guardian to admitting with regards to Blair: "The task is now to sell an abstract document of mind-numbing tedium, with little impact on ordinary lives, to a hostile nation." What is required, this group said, is the adoption of a perspective on which the European working class can assert its own independent interests on a continent-wide basis. VI. Conclusion In sum, the yes votes gave the following as their general reasons for saying the EU needs a constitution particularly because of benefits that would accrue to them as member states: 1) Increased parliamentary powers, 2) Simplified voting procedures, 3) Exit clause for member countries, 4) A new solidarity clause, and; 5) Build common defence policy. Other reasons given were that if there were a constitution, it would be their chance to work for reforms. Moreover, it is not a superstate that is in the making but one complementing one's state. Standards of living in a member state are also expected to rise. The constitution would serve to integrate the member states and in so doing, sovereignty is not an issue. There is also the importance of defending opportunities for growth. The treaties in fact already empower the EU but there is a need for a simplified but all embracing integrative instrument. On the other hand, the IND/DEM in the European Parliament (2005) in their 10 reasons to vote "No" to the European Constitution more or less summarises all reasons for all quarters for saying no as follows: 1) No need for the Constitution, 2) Lack of Democracy, 3) Loss of Sovereignty, 4) Creation of a European Superstate, 5) Creation of Second Class Member States, 6) Loss of Accountability, 7) EU Self-Empowerment (Explanation: The Constitution is a blank check that allows for more EU policy to be moved from unanimity to qualified majority voting without a need for new treaties, or for ratification by national parliaments and referenda. This favours further centralisation of EU power and leaves the people no democratic means to block its further self-empowerment); 8) No Common EU Defence (Explanation: The Constitution clearly aims at establishing a common EU defense. This is a complete change of Europe's security structure, which influences the policies of both NATO-members and non-aligned countries); 9) Monopolisation of Fundamental Human Rights, and 10) Monopolization of Economic and Monetary Policy. The Integration Issue: From all these arguments, what appears is the need to objectively assess the European Constitution as a tool in aid of integration. If it can integrate the peoples for which the constitution was drafted, fine. But it is precisely this integration thing that Jamieson (2005) says this constitution might destroy Europe. First, he says, it is constructed on an assumption that integration and centralization have necessarily beneficial results. However, he says, there is no evidence in the economic realm that integration has brought an acceleration in the rate of economic growth in the EU (Ibid). If Jamieson is to be believed, this integrationist model flows from a belief in the entity of Europe as a bloc to challenge and contain the hegemony of the US and to meet the challenge of Asia. This bloc-ist view, Jamieson (2005) says, is also seen as the only means to protect the centralised and highly politicised dispensary of state welfare and "social solidarity". In his own words - "This is the cosmology that has dominated the thinking of the constitution's leading author Giscard d'Estaing and the officials and advisers who contributed to the drafting.And they are deeply fearful of the global shift in capital flows towards developing economies. (Ibid). From the looks of it, there is still the apprehension of some countries to get themselves committed to a European Union constitution where a unanimous vote is necessary. This implies that they are not yet ready for such constitution. As Elio Di Rupo of the Party of European Socialists (PES 2005) said, the constitution is a tools box and everything will depend on the bricklayers. As matters stand then, the member states are not subscribing to an integrated one body, being more comfortable on their own. No, the European Union does not need a constitution. References "10 reasons to vote 'no' to the European Constitution." IND/DEM in the European Parliament. 24 Oct 2005 . "Better for Britain. Vote Yes: A rebuttal of Vote No's '10 reasons to say No to the EU Constitution' "Updated 17 Jan 2005. 26 Oct 2005 . "Dutch referendum on the European Constitution." Wikipedia. 25 Oct 2005. . "Enlargement of the European Union." Wikipedia. .26 Oct 2005 "PES Leaders support Yes vote in Paris." Party of European Socialists. 18 May 2005 26 Oct 2005 . "Q&A: French EU referendum." BBC. 25 Oct 2005 . "The European Union's Constitution." US Embassy. 26 Oct 2005 . Blair, Tony (2004, Sept). "White Paper on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe." 26 Oct 2005 . Burk, Robin. (2005, 29 May). "The French 'non' to the EU Constitution." Winds of change. net. 26 Oct 2005 . Closa, Carlos (2004, Nov). "Ratifying the EU Constitution: Referendums and their Implications." U.S. Europe Analysis Series. The Brookings Institution. Washington. 25 Oct 2005 . Coughlan, Anthony. "News: An outline analysis of EU Constitution." TEAM. The European alliance of EU-critical movements. 30 Sept 2005. 24 Oct 2005 . Devanny, Joe (2004, 06 Aug). "Summary: Should the European Union (EU) adopt a Constitution" . Dorau, Christoph. "Die Verfassungsfrage der Europischen Union." In: Murkens (2002). Gerven,Walter van (2005). "The European Union: A Polity of States and Peoples." Stanford: Stanford University Press. Vol. 15 No.9 (September 2005), pp.821-823. 25 Oct 2005. . Google answers: European Union Constitution. Google. 11 Oct 2005. 24 Oct 2005. . Hughes, Kristy (2005, 1Feb). "The British debate on the EU Constitution: Can the Referendum be Won" EurActiv.com. . Jamieson,Bill. "A constitution to destroy Europe." The EU Constitution - the economic implications 26 Oct 2005 . Marsden, Chris (2004, 21 Jun). "Divisions predominate despite agreement on European constitution." 25 Oct 2005 . Murkens, Jo Eric (2002, 01 Fe). The Integrative Function of a European Constitution (Discussion of Chr. Dorau: The Integrative Function of a European Constitution [in German]. German Law Journal No. 2 (01 February 2002) - European & International Law< http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.phpid=134>. Siller, Hans Christian (2000, 01 Feb). "Why Europe Does Not Need A Constitution." German Law Journal. 3 German Law Journal No. 2. European & International Law < http://www.hausarbeiten.de/faecher/vorschau/5484.html>. Jamieson, Bill "A constitution to destroy Europe." The EU Constitution - the economic implications .26 Oct 2005 Read More