Commonwealth of Independent States - Essay Example

The Commonwealth of Independent s (CIS) was born on the remnants of Soviet Union in 1991. Initially it was signed by leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus - three Slavic states that share a common history. Later that year every of the former Soviet republics joined the new alliance except Georgia and Azerbaijan that were forced to enter CIS in 1993, and Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania - Baltic states that never felt themselves free-will members of Soviet Union. The drastic difference between the initial design of CIS as a united federation and its current state as a loose union with little economic and political potential, along with seemingly stable development of counter-CIS GUAM subgroup has led to following questions become increasingly important: will CIS remain in future If yes, in what status - federation or association The essay tries to answer these questions through reviewing the history of CIS, analysis of GUAM, and taking into consideration benefits of CIS for its members, especially Russia. Evolution of CIS The initial goals of CIS creation were as follows. First, it was made to initiate a close economic cooperation between members through establishing a so-called 'common economic space'. Second, coordination of policies between allied states with mutual respect for interests was proposed. The third main objective of CIS was to create a unified military-strategic space under a joint command. Thus, the CIS was devised as a regional union, based on the concept of a state, complete with a centralized economy and cross-border ties at the macro and micro levels. Newly acquired independence meant little for post-soviet countries, as their economies were interdependent. In particular, membership in CIS meant the delay of energy crisis for every former Soviet republic. Despite the potential benefits CIS members could gain every of them understood the price they had to pay for using Russia's abundant energy resources. "The Soviet experience constantly reminds the new elites of the CIS that Russia could effectively usurp their independence in any supranational body in which it is the only major power center." (Aslund et al 1999, p.19). Indeed, it was never a secret that Russia uses CIS to influence the policies of regions, which were subjects of domestic policy just a few years ago. To put it simply, every CIS member except Russia faced a dichotomy: on the one hand they had to secure their newly proclaimed sovereignty, on the other - they were unable to survive without external economic help. Although allies behaved differently from each other in this complex situation, they can be divided into three general groups. The first group, which may be called extremely pro-Western, refused from as much cooperation with Russia as possible. Three Baltic regions, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania refused to enter CIS and decided to seek help from other neighbours. Politically, Lithuania is headed towards Poland, and Estonia along with Latvia favour toward Finland and Scandinavian region. The main reason for turning back on Russia was the fact that since their forced incorporation into the Soviet Union they've never acknowledged the legality of that claim. Still, even politically independent, Baltic States remain under Russian economic influence, as it remains their main trading partner. The second group, the most numerous one, tries to balance between Western help and alliance with Russia. Since Russia perceives CIS as a tool to hinder if not stall the movement of NATO towards East, these members of CIS try to gain as much use as possible from this confrontation. For instance, in spite of membership in the Council of Europe and some if not frequent calls for economic help from United States (e.g. during electoral campaign of Viktor Yuschenko), Ukraine has clearly stated its attitude to Russia as "the most important strategic partner", according to words of Leonid Kuchma. Other countries that can be referred to this group are Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Finally, the third group consists of Russia's closest allies, which seek further integration with their major partner In the case of Kazakhstan and Belarus, economic development of both leaves much to be desired and they seek to get as much economic help from Russia as possible. Obviously, Russia hesitates to merge economies with Belarus further, because undesired economic partner will hinder Russian development significantly. As for Central Asian region, every of five post-Soviet republics were strongly tied to Russia. In time, however, three of them - Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan - took independence to their liking, resulting only in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan supporting pro-Russian political course, also known as eurasianism. The former became one of the closest Russian allies after Moscow has resolved successfully Tajik civil war, which began in late 1991. As can be seen only a few partners of Russia considered goals of CIS as their own. Most of the CIS members have never laid any hopes on the revival of USSR, only decentralized. This among other reasons, such as lack of power equal to Russia, has laid a base for CIS failure to reach its goals: "combination of passive resistance by most member states and enthusiasm without resources by others has prevented the CIS from developing into an effective organization. In fact, Russia's continued determination to make the CIS work is the only thing that has kept the organization from dying entirely." (Aslund et al 1999, p.16) The idea of common military-strategic space has died early in 1993, when every CIS member has created an army of its own. 'Common economic space' also has remained only on paper, as CIS members do not feel shy to impose embargo or customs on foreign trade with allies. As for coordinating policies, it has simply became a bargaining tool: Russia provides economic help to other members in exchange for their support of its policy. There is no loyalty, if US or EU provide CIS members the same help, there's no guarantee they'll remain under Russia's influence. Finally, CIS continues to lose its prestige, as most of decisions reached by CIS council were never put into effect, and its members allow themselves not to participate in the decisions. GUUAM (GUAM) - Pro- Western Alternative to CIS Since CIS structure was of little help in limiting Russian political influence, pro-Western members had to develop an alliance of their own. GUUAM (named after its members: Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) was first introduced in 1997 with all the states except Uzbekistan. In fact, Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian participant of GUUAM, and its presence in the subgroup was weak, resulting in suspension of Tashkent membership in June 2002. The initial goal of GUUAM was to profit jointly from the export of at least part of Azerbaijan's Caspian oil via Georgia and Ukraine. However, it was often perceived by Moscow as a threat to CIS undermining Russia's leading role in the region. Needless to say, such view was reasonable, taking into consideration the discussions of military security component fro GUUAM in the shape of either a joint peacekeeping battalion or a security force to guard the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan export pipeline for Azerbaijan's Caspian oil and financial support of GUUAM by US. "While GUUAM's members made no secret of their desire for closer cooperation with Euro-Atlantic and European structures, the advantages of closer economic cooperation were touted as the locomotive for GUUAM's development" (Fuller 2005). Thus, GUUAM was created for economic profit firstly, and then western political opposition to Russia. GUUAM members also had reasons not to trust Russia. To pro-Western orientated states Russian strive for eurasianism was considered as a threat to their sovereignty. Indeed, Georgia has learned well from South-Ossetian example that Russian help in peacekeeping has come at a price of losing the part of its independence. Another vivid example is the fact that Russia still delays the withdrawal of its army from Moldova, mainly because of the issues in Trans-Dniester region. While Russian support of Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh seems to be reasonable it explains the pro-Western position of Azerbaijan. US, EU and NATO seemed to be more credible allies. While post-Soviet states were more orientated towards West in early 1990s they became more careful in expressing their allegiance to Western powers later. The case of Uzbekistan withdrawal from GUUAM in 2005 resulting in much greater loss than just one 'U' in the naming clearly illustrates the case. Western world is often accused in creating 'rose revolutions' in post-communist states for increasing Western influence in the region. Regime changes in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine raised the blind for GUUAM members: West is not only an aid, but a threat also. While Russia was partially successful in countering pro-Western GUAM with its own coalitions (e.g. CACO, or EURASEC), political conflicts between these alliances depict the shift of identity for the whole region. While extreme pro-Western and Eurasianist positions were more welcome in earlier post-Soviet periods, countries took more pragmatic and reasonable positions in late 1990s and 2000s. It has become obvious to most of the governments that careful considerations of both poles should be used in their foreign policies. Benefits of CIS for Russia While being a formality to most of its members, CIS will not be cancelled until it suits Russian interests. It is a mechanism for asserting Russian hegemony over the other ten states (Turkmenistan withdrew from CIS in 2005 and is now an associate), and at the same time it can be viewed as way to coordinate the policy of other members with Russia. The latter benefit diminishes in value over time as other subgroups become more and more effective, however the former activity is still important to Russia, and may be used as an excuse for CIS existence. Political coordination tool of CIS bases on the premise that all post-Soviet states except Baltic are historically linked with Russian identity. E.g. Belarus was never an independent country before, which clearly explains the short strive for independence from Russia. Also Russia uses economic levers for policy coordination, such as old pipeline system, which was useful in Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis after the Orange Revolution in Kiev. For the reason of getting away from Russia's economic pressure GUAM members try to put the new gas pipeline system, which avoids Russia, in use. Another important CIS activity for Russia is peacekeeping. In this case it is beneficiary for all the CIS members - for instance, it helped Georgia to partially deal with Abkhazian problem, and for Russia it provided a lever to make Georgia enter the CIS in 1993. Though Moscow's peacekeeping activities allowed it to dominate and prevent the extension of outside influence in the CIS region it also benefited smaller states by reducing war actions between the parties and sometime resolving the conflicts. Since Western powers cannot fully influence CIS, they also approve Russian peacekeeping activities. Important issues for Moscow, such as counter-terrorism actions and establishing the common air defense system between Russia and other CIS states also can be viewed as a benefit for Kremlin along with the consideration that these decisions are carried out from bilateral and not multilateral negotiations. Putin has persuaded CIS states to establish anti-terrorism center with headquarters in Moscow. Thus, despite the formality and lack real power of CIS, it is still unlikely to dissolve. In case of CIS dissolution most of its members will have to seek other allies, and most probably turn to West. However, EU will not take these new candidates easily since most of post-soviet countries (except Baltic states) do not meet its requirements. "The prospects for CIS member states joining the EU are unlikely. Equally unrealistic are their hopes for receiving ample financial assistance from the EU budget" (Butorina and Zakharov 2005). Therefore the dissolution of CIS now will lead to increasing political and economic instability of the region. Conclusion The main reason CIS has not become and unlikely to become a close federation in future is the struggle between westernism and eurasianism within its members. While many CIS members seek acceptance in EU and NATO, their economy largely depends on Russia, which brings them to inevitable balance between pro-Western and Eurasian orientation. Additionally national identity of CIS is closely tied to Russia. CIS may also be good for other member states, because they can come together and limit Russia's desire to integrate them with Russia. All these arguments make the following answer to further CIS status the most credible: CIS will remain as a loose association in the following years. References Aslund, A., Olcott, M.B., Garnett, S.W. (1999). Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington. Fuller, L. (2005). "Ukraine aspires to leadership role in revitalized GUUAM", The Ukrainian Weekly, May 8. Butorina, O. and Zakharov, A. (2005). "Change or Die". Russia in Global Affairs, No.3 July-September. Retrieved May 5, 2007 from http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/region-economics/numbers/12/943.html. Read More