Oslo Agreement of 1993 - Case Study Example

Running head: Outline the main provision of the Oslo Agreement of 1993 and evaluate critically the responses to it of the main actors in the Middle East Outline the main provision of the Oslo Agreement of 1993 and evaluate critically the responses to it of the main actors in the Middle East [The name of the writer appears here] [The name of institution appears here] Introduction Since the signing of the September 1993 Oslo agreement, the Israel- Palestine 'peace process' has been punctuated by a series of dramatic developments. (Finkelstein, 1996). The security environment in the Middle East has become increasingly complicated during the past decade. Up to and including the 1991 Gulf War, the regional environment was largely shaped by fears of interstate aggression, either by superpower intervention or by regional states against each other. Fears of interstate aggression certainly remain today, but they are manifesting themselves in new ways. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been a persistent source of tension for decades, for example, but it has taken on new dimensions in the aftermath of the failed Oslo process and the recent explosion of violence that shows no signs of abating. These traditional issues have been joined by several more recent problems that defy easy solutions. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continue to spread throughout the region, despite international non-proliferation efforts. Terrorists recruited and trained in the Middle East are now carrying out attacks far beyond their own borders, creating strong global interests in countering the sources of this phenomenon (Litvak, 1993). The declaration of principles between Israel and the PLO was designed to undertake direct discussions leading to the establishment of Palestinian self-rule, beginning with Gaza and Jericho. These two agreements were assumed to be the result both of the domestic pressure faced by the new Israeli government caused by their perceived failure to move the process along as initially promised and of Arafat's perception that his lack of concrete gains was enhancing the strength of his opponents within the Palestinian movement (Meir, 1993). Thereafter, trusted emissaries of these two principals met in secret negotiations facilitated by the late Johan Holst, then Norway's foreign minister. The Washington ceremony which brought to the world's attention the initial results of this secret effort began an entirely new "third track" to the Arab- Israeli diplomatic process-direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO with a specified timetable leading towards an interim stage of Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and an area around Jericho but with a clear acknowledgement that further movement would then occur incrementally as negotiated. This was followed by the Cairo agreement of 13 February 1994 brokered by the strenuous efforts of Egyptian President Mubarak (Sayigh, 1999). These two diplomatic and political shocks, therefore, while clearly not bringing this subregion of the Middle East to a level of political recognition, economic and cultural interchange, or military stability that had existed in Europe in the early days of the CSCE, nevertheless had moved the process giant steps forward. Political risks associated with these two major moves obviously had been calculated as necessary given the potential outcome and, conversely, the costs of not trying. That is not to suggest that each party went into the process willingly. Future scholars likely will explore the issue of "coercive diplomacy" in this period. Rather, consciously and with purpose or not, as each of the parties entered into one or both of these processes, they endured varying degrees of risk. Each regime or leadership was exposed: the centrality which "the evilness of the Zionist entity" plays in the domestic as well as regional politics of most Arab and Islamic regimes; the profound and pervasive issue of long-term acceptance of Israel in the region, and the more immediate security concerns of facing 22 hostile Arab states and Iran, radical Islam, and most vividly "the terrorist PLO." Zionist program had to be executed unilaterally and by force (Shlaim, 2000). Main Provision of Oslo accord Gaza and Jericho First: self-governance in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, counting the removal of Israeli forces. The information of the Gaza and Jericho First Agreement were discussed and concluded in Cairo between Rabin and Arafat on May 4, 1994. The Cairo Agreement explicated a well-arranged program for the extension of autonomy within a particular time-frame, devoid of this being conditional on bilateral performance or goals (Sayigh, 1999). Reassignment of civil powers as well as responsibilities: Responsibilities in five precise spheres (education in addition to culture, welfare, health, taxation along with tourism) shall be transferred to the Palestinians. The DOP suggested that this transfer take place instantly following the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho accord. The Interim Agreement and Elections: Elections shall occur on the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a new Palestinian Authority. The Interim Agreement will feature the self-government appointments in the West Bank and territories. In the remaining parts of the West Bank, Israel will supplement its forces from Palestinian inhabited areas. The Palestinian Council will have a strong police force in order to assure public order as well as internal security. Central to the DOP were two economic annexes which delineated economic cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians (Pappe, 1994). Permanent Status Talks: conference on the permanent status will begin no later than the start of the 3rd year of the interim period (May 1996). These negotiations will settle on the nature of the final settlement between the two sides. It is implicit that these conferences will cover remaining matters including Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, borders, security arrangements, relations as well as cooperation with other neighbours, and other matters of common interest. Under the DOP, the permanent status will be effective 5 years after the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho accord, that is to say May 1999 (Mahle, 2005). Impacts of Oslo Accord The Oslo accord provided for the establishment in the first instance by the PLO of a self-governing authority in Gaza and Jericho. Palestinian authority would extend to the remaining Palestinian population centres of the West Bank in a second phase, coinciding with general elections to form a governing council, the nature and powers of which were yet to be negotiated. These interim arrangements were to last for five years, once both sides had arrived at a detailed implementation agreement. Further negotiations would start after the first two years of autonomy to decide the final status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the fate of Palestinian refugees, and other matters, as part of a permanent settlement of the Palestine conflict. The resemblances with previous proposals for Palestinian autonomy were strong, but the key differences related to the official role of the PLO, its responsibility for internal security, and the degree of economic self-management (Finkelstein, 1998). Publication of the Oslo accord provoked an immediate backlash. PLO executive committee member Mahmud Darwish resigned and Shafiq al-Hut suspended his participation in protest, while in the occupied territories Faysal al-Husayni briefly called for the establishment of a 'Palestinian government of national salvation that would arrest the all-out collapse of the Palestinian institutional network' (Litvak, 1993). Arafat faced spirited resistance at a Fateh central committee meeting on 3-5 September, but finally won grudging ratification of the accord. The PLO executive committee also approved it after a two-day debate on 8-9 September; Arafat secured only nine votes in favour, exactly half of the original 18 members of the committee, but the resignation or self-imposed absence of five opponents enabled him to have his way. The PLO and Israel now exchanged letters of mutual recognition, and on 13 September US president Bill Clinton presided over a special ceremony on the White House lawn as 'Abbas and Peres signed the Declaration of Principles in the presence of Arafat, Rabin, and 3,000 guests and international dignitaries. Seven months of negotiations followed, and on 4 May 1994 Arafat and Rabin met in the Egyptian capital to sign the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, also known as the Cairo accord. The first PLO military personnel entered Gaza on 10 May and Jericho three days later, and on 12 July Arafat also arrived in Gaza to lead the nascent Palestinian Authority in person and start an entirely new phase in the Palestinian striving for statehood (Sayigh, 1999). To further complicate the political calculations, each principal actor of Oslo accord faced domestic competitors-opposition as well as coalition parties in Israel, challengers to Arafat in the PLO, and combinations of dissidents, radical Islamic activists, or waiting successors in each of the Arab states-offering different "solutions" including the complete denunciation of and withdrawal from the process. A number of opinion polls on the attitudes of the Jewish community taken right away after the White House ceremony designated an extensive support for the peace process. A Marttila & Kiley, Inc. poll for the Israel Policy Forum (IPF) conducted from September 19 through September 23, 1993, illustrated that 82% of the respondents agreed of the DOP, and merely 11% disapproved. Furthermore, 56% favoured the creation of a Palestinian state and 26 percent opposed it. Rabin was rated very positively by 61% and positively by 33 percent of the respondents, and 82% said that the Israeli prime minister was moving at about the right speed in his negotiations. Harking back to the debate concerning Israeli security, 45 percent of the sample felt that Israel would be safer if IDF troops would remove from populated areas in the territories and the Palestinians were allowed to have self-rule (Litvak, 1993). The victory of the Intifada, where the Palestinians deliberately desisted from using firearms, has optimistically taught Palestinian management that non-violent civil disobedience can gain far greater worldwide sympathy than arbitrary terrorism. A vital first step was taken through the Oslo Accords of 1993, where Israel and the PLO at last renowned each other and "agreed to peace talks. This also led to the significant first handshake between Arafat and Rabin (Ciment, 1997). During the year 1993 three rounds of bilateral talks were held in Washington DC: the ninth from 27 April to 13 May; the tenth from 15 June to 1 July; and the eleventh from 31 August to 7 September, following the declaration of the Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO. Disappointed at the agreement, Syria refused to be present at further meetings, causing the cosponsors (i.e., the US and Russia) to postpone a planned twelfth round. Only after Secretary of State Christopher's visit to Damascus at year's end, did the Syrians agree to resume talks in mid-January 1994. The "Oslo back-channel" began as one of a variety of unofficial contacts between Israeli politicians and academics and Palestinians, which had been going on for some years and which had strengthened after the Labour Party ascension to power in June 1992. The Norwegian Trade Union Centre for Research, Investigation and Documentation (FAFO) - which was investigating the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the support of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry - had suggested setting up a behind-the-scenes connection for a direct dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians during 1991 and 1992. The Norwegians projected the idea to Israeli deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin, who accepted on 10 September 1992 exploratory contacts between academics (Pappe, 1994). Ya'ir Hirschfeld for Israel and Abu 'Ala (Ahmad Quray') for the PLO first met in December 1992 (before the deportation of Hamas leaders) and then from January onwards in Norway. While the "Gaza first" thought was not new, the Gaza-Jericho concept was established since 'Arafat intended at a foothold in the West Bank in order to treat the territories as a single entity, from which the projected Palestinian state would grow. Already at this early stage the Israelis discarded Palestinian control of the crossings to Jordan during the temporary period and a Palestinian "corridor" connecting Gaza and Jericho. These issues, as well as the position of Jerusalem, considered non-negotiable by Israel, caused frequent crises during the following months. Allegedly, Foreign Minister Peres was concised in March and informed Prime Minister Rabin in April, when the PLO persisted on having official Israeli representation according to another version; Rabin was in the picture much earlier). Since then, the two directly supervised the talks, now headed by Uri Savir, director general of the Foreign Ministry, who was helped by the soon-to-be-appointed legal advisor to the ministry, Yo'el Singer (an ex-military lawyer expert in international law). All in all the Norwegians hosted 14 secret meetings, 11 of them since 1 May 1993. From the outset US officials were continuously briefed by the Norwegians and, while incredulous, reacted optimistically; the Russians were informed as well, possibly at a later stage. The Egyptian leadership was also very much in the picture, serving as an infrequent go-between and facilitator. However, the "Norwegian" channel was kept secret from almost all participants in the bilateral talks in Washington, including the US officials hosting them, the chief Israeli negotiator, Elyakim Rubinstein, and Israeli military chiefs. Leaks from both the Arab and Israeli press were progressively denied by Israel and the PLO (Pappe, 1994). To assure leaders on both sides, the Norwegian foreign minister, Johan Jorgen Holst, visited Peres in Jerusalem in June and 'Arafat in Tunis in July. In addition, an unparalleled meeting took place in Cairo between the Israeli minister for the surroundings, Yossi Sarid, and 'Arafat's advisor Nabil Sha'th on 21 July, allegedly to corroborate the progress of the Oslo channel. The latter avowed that these contacts were to lay the groundwork for a "direct dialogue" between the Government of Israel and the leadership of the PLO. In retrospect, the link between Palestinian positions in both the Oslo and Washington channels, in particular after June, had become obvious. According to another report, Arafat started an additional "secret track" to Rabin, in order to guarantee his approval of the Oslo track, through his advisor Ahmad Tibi and Israeli Health Minister Chaim Ramon. To further 'Arafat's support of the promising agreement, US sources depicted the second trip of Secretary of State Christopher to Damascus in August as a possible prelude to a separate Israeli-Syrian accord, which could be reached before the conclusion of the accord on the West Bank and Gaza. The agreement between Israel and the PLO in Oslo, initialled by Peres and Abu 'Ala on 20 August, was accepted ten days later by the Israeli Cabinet. In early September it was authorized by Fath and the PLO Executive Committees. It included four documents: an exchange of letters dated 9 September between Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman 'Arafat; a letter, on the same date, by the latter to Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst; and the DoP on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, initialled in Oslo on 20 August. The DoP was signed in Washington DC, on 13 September, in the presence of President Clinton, by Foreign Minister Peres for Israel and Mahmud 'Abbas for the PLO and witnessed by the foreign ministers of the US and Russia (Flapan, 1979). At year's end the timetable set out in the DoP proved impractical. On the one hand, considerable issues could not be settled nor differences in awareness bridged in a couple of months, as the PLO strove to improve every possible sign of sovereignty, and Israel pursued a security-driven, slow and very cautious completion. The negotiating tactics favoured by the PLO - trying to remove concessions for resuming talks after each "crisis," nonetheless small, as they had done before the ninth and tenth rounds of the bilateral talks - also delayed progress. Alternatively, the protracted negotiations facilitated opponents of the agreement to provoke violence, which eroded public support on both sides. On balance, though, the agreement proved stronger than the crises which held up its accomplishment and was perceived by both parties as vital to their interests. The implementation agreement was signed in the spring of 1994 (Sayigh, 1999). Conclusion The Oslo process cannot produce a permanent settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The population between the Mediterranean and the Jordan will soon be half Israeli-Jewish, half Palestinian-Arab (Finkelstein, 1998). In the wake of sympathy and remorse immediately after the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, three-fourths of Israelis polled expressed support for the government's handling of the peace process. While such high support is obviously influenced by a volatile emotional reaction to the traumatic loss of their leader, the long-range impact of this surge of support may well be significant. Widespread shock at the consequences of the escalation of verbal and symbolic violence to physical violence and political assassination, may also lead to more civil political discourse. Agreement on this issue between Prime Minister Peres and Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu is an important first step in that direction. Going on the defensive, most of the Oslo opponents denounced the murder in the strongest possible terms, but there was a reluctance to give up the idea of Greater Israel or bless the peace process. When consul Collette Avital proposed to organize a memorial service for the slain prime minister, the project was almost derailed because some nationalist and religious groups expressed reservation about what they viewed as too much emphasis on peace. When the organizers refused to give opposition spokesmen an official part at the rally, the ZOA and the National Council of Young Israel took out an ad in the New York Times emphasizing the partisan nature of the event. At the insistence of propeace activists at the Conference of Presidents, twelve former chairpersons of the organization sent a letter to the two dissenting organizations calling their ad "unacceptable" and "censurable." The letter added that, while "it is your right to have sought to change the program or opt not to participate . . . you sought to undermine this communal endeavour" (Seliktar, 2002). In claiming to represent the community, the Presidents Conference had the opinion polls behind it. The January 1996 AJC survey indicated that 79 percent supported the Labour government handling of the peace process, an 11 percent rise from October 1995. There was also a majority for continuing U.S. aid to the Palestinians and, for the first time since 1993, the opposition to Oslo within the Orthodox community had declined from 64 percent to 56 percent. Still, as in all previous polls, the older cohorts, the nationalists, and the Orthodox were the most sceptical of the peace process. 75 This segment, highly vocal and dedicated to the vision of Israel as a guardian of the land of Israel was ready to play a major role in reversing the Oslo process by helping the Likud party to regain power in Israel (Seliktar, 2002). Bibliography Finkelstein, N (1996). Whither the "peace process" New Left Review, p218. Finkelstein, N (1998). Securing occupation: the real meaning of the Wye River memorandum. New Left Review, p232. Flapan, S. (1979). Zionism and the Palestinians, Croom & Helm, pp 123-129. Litvak, M. (1993). The Palestine Liberation Organization' Middle East Contemporary Survey, 17, p168. Mahle, M. B. (2005). A politico-security analysis of the failed Oslo Process. Middle East Policy xii (1). Morag, N. (2000). Unambiguous ambiguity: the opacity of the Oslo Peace Process in. Karsh, Israel: the first 100 years vol. 11. Seliktar, O.; (2002). Divided We Stand: American Jews, Israel, and the Peace Process, Praeger, pp 145-50. Pappe, I. (1994).The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, I. B. Tauris & Co. Sayigh, Y. (1999). Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993. Oxford University Press, pp 178-88 Shlaim, A. (2000). The Iron Wall. Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company. Read More