Politics of the European Union: Theories on the Development and Nature of the European Union - Essay Example

?RUNNING HEAD: POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THEORIES ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Politics of the European Union: Theories on the Development and Nature of the European Union School Date Politics of the European Union: Theories on the Development and Nature of the European Union The Regional integration process in Europe has unfolded at an unsteady and unpredictable pace and in unexpected directions, regardless of the once confident predictions of the classical paradigms to the contrary (Jones, 2001). The flux in community affairs makes real difficulties for those whose task is to uncover and explain the process. Developments so far have certainly carried the European process across the minimalist threshold that demarcates integration from mere intergovernmental cooperation, without realizing is the ambitious goal to an immensely complex process of political change. Radical changes have characterized European politics in the recent years. Various scholars have been poised with the question of whether there is a single theory that tries to explain the nature and development of European Union. Indeed, there is no single-defined theory that explains this phenomenon. This essay will discuss theories of nature and development of European integration. They include functionalism, Neo-functionalism, federalism, Intergovernmentalism, policy networks, multilevel governance, and institutionalism theory. The processes of democratization and state consolidation have, immensely, affected the politics in the society—the perception and undertaking of regional politics have changed due to international developments. The continuity of European integration process has made the European Union an increasingly influential political actor. Federalism’s contribution to the development of European integration turned out, then, to be much less significant than might have been anticipated in the earlier years (Jones, 2001). The constraints of national politics, the residue appeal of the national interests underpinned by a revived continuing sense of national identity were the vital factors towards European integration. In addition, the unpredictable impact of events and the movement’s failure in these fluid circumstances to convert public opinion to its cause, led to deep internal tensions that eventually engulfed the movement in debilitating factional squabbles (Pallemaerts, 2006). The trend in integration theory is towards less dogmatic explanations of integration events and processes. Recent approaches tend to disclaim the view that the Union’s path of development was inevitable, or that its future can be confidently predicted. They tend to lay greater stress than earlier theories upon the choices available to governments and upon the influence of international events and circumstances. Newer theories are also more eclectic than the old, drawing upon various schools of thought. As such, Grand theories, which seek to provide a comprehensive explanation of the EUs nature and development, have tended to be replaced by ‘middle range’ theories (Archer, 2000). There are an increasing number of these theories, meaning that the study of the EU is becoming increasingly fragmented. Functionalism theory favors the strategy of gradually undermining state sovereignty, by encouraging technical cooperation in policy areas across the state boundaries. The founding father of the functionalist school was David Mitrany (1966), a Romanian born-scholar who taught for many years at the London School of Economics. He regarded nationalism as the biggest threat to the world peace and favored a shift in human loyalties from the national to the international level. This was achieved through mutually beneficial international cooperation in sectors such as transport, agriculture, science and health. Mitrany’s ideas rest on the assumption that governments are less able to meet the welfare needs of their citizens than ‘non-political’ international authorities. People would, therefore, become more committed to transnational cooperation and less nationalistic (Mitrany, 1966). Mitrany envisaged the emergence of spreading web of supranational authorities, to undertake tasks formerly performed by national governments. According to Mitrany, there would be many agencies; therefore, international power would be diffused rather than centralized. Mitrany thought that these authorities would have a strong managerialist’s ethos and would be ‘above’ politics. He was interested in global rather than regional cooperation—regional integration was nationalism writ large. Therefore, he was opposed to a ‘continental union’ in Europe, and to the creation of institutions which in his view mirrored those of the sovereign states (Mitrany, 1966). The weaknesses of the functionalist approach seem to glare in the light of post-war history. For example, it assumes that the functional cooperation can be separated from politics. However, the decisions of the technical agencies are often highly political: several, such as the Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Educational, and the International Labor Organization (ILO), have been torn to political disputes. These agencies have been created by states for their mutual benefits—they remain under the ultimate control of sovereign states (Jones, 2001). Functionalism also left many key questions unanswered, such as how coordination of functional authorities would work or how disputes between them would be resolved. It nevertheless provided a corpus of ideas upon which theorists of European integration would later build. Neo-Functionalism Approach was developed in the 1950s, and 1960s to explain the integration processes in the European Community. The approach was founded by Haas in 1958. It viewed integration as a developing and expanding process involving bargaining and compromise, like other forms of politics. According to Haas (1958), he argued that there could be a learning curve of cooperation between governments, in which the experience of cooperation in some fields could lead to cooperation in others. In other words, there could be a ‘spillover effect’ from cooperation in one policy are to another. Haas did not believe this spillover process to be automatic or inevitable, not least because it would depend upon choices made by governments and other actors (Haas, 1958). The main differences between neo-functionalism and older functionalism are: In neo-functionalism, the political dimension and the role of governments in integration process are fully accounted for. A central assumption of this approach is that functional cooperation will take place at the behest of governments (Haas, 1958). Unlike the older functionalism, neo-functionalism accepts the importance of political conflict and the existence of competing interests. It emphasizes the importance of elites and elite bargaining rather than mass support for integration in its early stages (Archer, 2000). Neo-functionalism has a stronger empirical foundation and seeks to explain in some detail how integration process works than in the case of functionalism approach. It focuses upon integration between groups of countries in definite regions of the world (‘regional integration’) rather than upon global integration. Since the mid-1980s, there has been a period of accelerated development of the Union, manifested in the Single European Market program and the TEU. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that recent deepening of integration within the EU could have occurred without a learning curve of collaborative experience (Haas, 1958). For example, the SEM program may well have provided the momentum for the TEUs provisions on the economic and monetary union. The impact of SEM has also frequently been cited as a key contributory factor to the development of the Union’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policies. In addition, Federalism approach was developed under the influence of federalist ideas on the European integration processes. Contemporary federalists (neo-federalists) tend to be more realistic about the prospects of realizing their goals than their predecessors and are prepared to build a federal union in incremental steps rather than all at once (Pallemaerts, 2006). The aim to transform the EU into a fully fledged federation, with its own government and parliament, was espoused by the German foreign minister— Joshka Fischer—when giving his speech entitled ‘From Confederacy to Federation—Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration’ in Berlin in May 2000. Although Fischer acknowledged that his speech borne personal obligation, it is quite clear that the dream of federalism is extremely much alive in most parts of the continental Europe—including in some high places, in Germany. In April 2001, German President Johannes Rau and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder put forward separate proposals for an EU federal constitution (Jones, 2001). European federalist groups are also extremely active in promoting the idea of an EU constitution. In May 2001, Schroder’s ideas were challenged by the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, who espoused a different vision for the EUs constitutional future. He based it on a ‘federation of nation states’ —arguably a more realistic proposal, as Fischer has subsequently acknowledged (Pallemaerts, 2006). Consequently, Intergovernmentalism approach stresses the role of governments in European integration processes. The proponents of prescriptive intergovernmentalism seek to oppose attempts to enhance the powers of the Union’s ‘supranational’ institutions. In this maximalist form (for example, espoused by British Eurosceptics), prescriptive intergovernmentalism favors a ‘club of states’ conception of the union (Archer, 2000). Proponents of this approach downplay the role played in EU policymaking by the Council, the European Council and a support network of intergovernmental committees. According to this approach, which emphasizes the importance of intergovernmental bargaining, developments in integration only occur when they coincide with the interests of the governments of member states (Jones, 2001). Arguably, the intergovernmental bargaining theories need to be qualified and supplemented, by reference to the vital roles played by the Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament, interest groups and domestic policies in the EU policy system. The role of domestic politics in intergovernmental bargaining also needs to be acknowledged. The domestic politics approach emphasized the interplay between the national politics of member states and the ‘European’ politics (Archer, 2000). It assumes that the behavior of governments at the European level is explicable in terms of their need to take account of both domestic and European pressures. In negotiations at European level, government will seek to protect and foster domestic interest, but in dealings with their counterparts—the governments and other member states—will not wish to appear to be ‘anti-European’. For governments, domestic interests also embrace considerations of party unity. Balancing domestic and European pressure is not always possible. Policy network theory was based in an arena where mediation of governments’ interests and the groups’ interests took place. It is a network because it involves the interaction, in the form of bargaining, negotiation and collaboration, between groups of actors in the policy process—although these actors do not have equal power (Jones, 2001). The actors are not only governments and Union institutions, but also interest groups of various kinds, such as agricultural or business lobbies. EU policy is viewed as the outcome of bargaining and coalition formation between diverse actors, including governments. The network approach combines elements of intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist perspectives. It derives from the study of pluralist policy processes in liberal democracies, where the government organizations and organized interests form policy communities in order to achieve their aims (Jones, 2001). Governmental institutions allow organized interests into the policy process, because the latter has resources of use to them, such as knowledge and expertise. Both the Commission and the Council are reliant for information, expertise and advice on these interests. There are both informal and formal channels through which groups seek to influence EU policy. The principal value of the policy networks approach is that it seeks to provide a comprehensive and accurate picture of how and who EU policies are made, taking into account both formal and informal policy processes and the roles of both institutional actors and organized interests. Whereas other approaches tend to focus on the roles of governments and of supranational bodies in the EU policy process, the policy networks approach seeks to give organized interests their due importance. However, as an exploratory theory of EU policymaking, it perhaps promises more than it delivers: its critics argue that there are formidable problems in identifying and analyzing EU policy networks, given the complexity and dynamic nature of the EU (Archer, 2000). The multilevel governance (MLG) approach developed by Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter et al. (1996) focuses on the interrelationships between levels of government in the EU—supranational, national and subnational—and upon how the actors at these levels interact. The MLG hypothesis views the European Union as a political system, in which the governments of member states are by no means the only notable actors in EU policymaking, because the influence of supranational actors must be taken into account. Therefore, MLG is less state centered than intergovernmentalism although it does not assume the power in the EU decision-making process. Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter et al. (1996) acknowledged that the national level remains the most important. MLG differs from federalism, which also involves multiple layers of government, in that it does not assume that the system has a formal constitutional basis. In MLG, the power exercised by the different levels is less clear-cut and more dynamic. The extent to which the supranational and sub-national levels are powerful in their own right or whether they reflect, or are controlled by the national level, is the center of debate concerning the validity of the MLG hypothesis (Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter et al., 1996). The Institutionalism theory is largely confined to an examination of the role of formal institutions in the policy framework (Archer, 2000). However, in the early 1970s, the advent of new institutionalism necessitated both formal and informal actors in policy-making processes. It embraces both formal and informal institutions and incorporating values, cultural norms, conventions, symbols, ways of doing things and many other characteristics. The approach seeks to explain how institutions influence the behaviors of policymakers and serve to shape policy outcomes. Applied to the study of EU, the new institutionalism, helps to explain why policymakers behave in the way they do. The new institutionalism can be categorized into historical, rational choice, and sociological institutionalism. The historical type is based on the assumption that institutions have a history which influences the behavior of the actor. Rational choice institutionalists assume that actors in the decision making process is self-interested and that institutions set limits on, also shape, their behavior (Pallemaerts, 2006). A criticism of the new institutionalism is that its proponents tend to define the term ‘institution’ so broadly that it can embrace almost anything. Nevertheless, according to its proponents it provides a framework of analysis which enables us to look beyond surface events and relationships. In order to enhance further development in the integration process, Multispeed or flexible Union have been adopted by those anxious of rapid progress. It had been espoused in a limited form in the Tindermans Report on European Union, in 1975, but received an adverse reaction (Haas, 1958). In April 1994, Alain Lamasoure, France’s European Affairs minister, proposed a ‘hard core’ of EU members, comprising countries applying all Union policies provided for in the Union treaties. He suggested that this might initially comprise the founder members and would be linked by a political declaration rather than a new treaty (Pallemaerts, 2006). A similar proposal was put forward in Germany by Karl Lamers in a policy report for the Christian Democratic Union in the summer of 1994, fuelling suspicions in some parts of the Union that Germany and France were seeking to create a Union ‘premier league’. In November 1994, the then French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, proposed a concentric circles model of integration with three tiers, a hardcore of EU members at the center; a second tier of EU countries not ready or willing to pursue deeper integration; and a third tier of partner countries outside the EU (Jones, 2001). Finally, the ‘end-point’ theory is largely absent but explicitly developed to provide an insight on the nature and development of the EU. Unless it is assumed that the member states can go on integrating forever, it seems reasonable to assume that there must be some point at which the EU project can be regarded as largely complete (Archer, 2000). There are several reasons why little work has been done on ‘end-point’ theory. Firstly, integration has been widely regarded as a process rather than as an end. Secondly, it is widely recognized that the integration process is as yet far from complete; therefore, speculation about its ultimate end point is premature (Pallemaerts, 2006). Thirdly, the success of the EU integration project has been partly due to a certain ambiguity about the ends of integration. However, recent development—for example, the launch of an official debate on the future Europe; acceptance of the idea of flexible integration, the ‘no’ vote in the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice (ToN) and growing interest in the idea of a Union constitution—may stimulate theorizing about the Union’s final destination. Although these ideas were not taken up, the idea that groups of EU countries should be allowed to pursue deeper integration in an explicit field continued to gain ground. A joint declaration on ‘reinforced cooperation’ was issued by the French and German foreign ministers in October 1996 (Jones, 2001). The Treaty of Amsterdam formally sanctioned the idea of flexible integration, by introducing provisions which would allow groups of EU states to pursue integration projects, under strict conditions. However, no projects under these provisions have yet been undertaken as the conditions are so strict or, more cynically, because support for such cooperation by most member states amounts to posturing. Currently, there has been an increase in the number of member countries participating in the EUs European Security and Defense Policy—commonly referred to as Eurocorps (Haas, 1958). Implicit in the Eurocorp’s project is the assumption that it is legitimate for a group of member states to pursue deeper integration outside the Union framework, provided that the project is compatible with the Union’s goals. Prior to its formal incorporation into the Union framework, the Schengen Agreement—not all EU countries should participate in the single currency project (Archer, 2000). However, critics argue that flexibility of the EU will increase the complexity of EU institutional structures, rendering them more difficult for ordinary citizens to understand. In conclusion, the essay analyzed seven (7) theories on nature and development of the European Integration process. The theories covered include the functionalism, Neo-functionalism, federalism, Intergovernmentalism, policy networks, multilevel governance, and institutionalism theory. Functionalism stresses on technical cooperation in policy areas across the state boundaries, Neo-functionalism is focused on cooperation between governments in realization of development of the EU, and Intergovernmentalism approach is based on the role of governments in integration process. In addition, federalism theory argues on the basis of federal government in enhancing EU development, while policy networks theory involves the interaction, in the form of bargaining, negotiation and collaboration of the member states. Finally, multilevel governance (MLG) approach and new institutionalism focuses on the relationship between various levels of government in the EU—supranational, national and subnational. Arguably, all of the contending theories have something to offer in providing insights and perspectives as we struggle to understand the increasing complexity of this phenomenon. However, none is capable of providing adequate information on the nature and development of European Union. References Archer, C. (2000). The European Union: structure and process. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. Haas, E.B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Jones, R. A. (2001). The politics and economics of the European Union: An introductory text. London: Edward Elgar Publishing. Marks, G., Scharpf, F., Schmitter, P. & Streeck, W. (1996). Governance in the European Union. London: Sage. Mitrany, D. (1966). A working peace system. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. Pallemaerts, M. (2006). The European Union and sustainable development: Internal and external dimensions. New York: Vubpress. Read More