Definition and Facts of Freedom and Determinism - Literature review Example

Freedom and Determinism 2006 In philosophical sense of the term, free will is seen as a personal rational choice of the most befitting one from different sets of options for acts and deeds. There is an age-old debate over the notion freedom of will among the philosophers. Most of the associate such freedom with certain kind of liabilities that their ethical sense demands, meaning, to freedom of will there lies an accompanying ethical need to take the “blame” (Clearly, Hence such a freedom requires some one to be conscious of his.her actions and to have undertsanding about it also (Free Will, 2005). Determinism, of course, has different opinion regarding freedom of will. According to this school of thought (that includes philosophers like Skinner and Freud on the harder side of it and Spinoza, and Hume on the softer side) every human action has a particular motive behind it. They think that human actions could be traced the way we study nature and its laws and that every human action occurs according to specific rule dictating it. In harder sense, determinism has no room for freedom will and the other way round. Soft determinists maintain a difference taking a mid-way. They say that freedom of will although limited, is not impossible. To them acting freely, insinuates, acting within certain definite and pre-fixed options. For the Dutch stoic philosopher Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632-1677) freedom of will means to consciously accept the totally inevitable path of actions. He, so to speak advocates that man is condemned to determination the opposite of which we would hear three centuries later from Jan Paul Sartre, in his philosophical work, Being and Nothingness (Freedom & Determinism.philosophy.tamu.edu). The Four definitions The four definitions of free will and detrminism basically belongs to (1 ) The Free willist school (2) The hard Determinist school (3) The soft Determinist school and lastly the existentialist school,. In his book, Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue (1980), Williams, Clifford has explained the first three schools very deftly. Spinoza’s letter will make us clear about what a soft Determinist is up to—where he makes a departure from the free willist and where he criticized the hard liners. Lastly Sartre’s conjecture about freedom definitely will appear to us as completely new turn, reversing some of Spinoza’s terminologies. In Cliffords book, we get invove in to debate about free will and detreminism by Frederick, a Free-willist, Daniel, a Determinist, and Carolyn, a Compatibilist (“Compatibilism” is recognized also as "soft determinism" and most notably defended by Hume who held that free will and determinism are friendly, cf. answers.com) in conversation about free will and determinism. Frederick argues that if, according to Determinism, all human actions “were caused”. This, he finds, logically to conclude that those “causes” were also “caused” and so on. This cause, according to him, ultimately takes us back to before we were born – “chain of causes stretching back to happenings that occurred prior to our births”. The fallacy here, he finds, that it puts us before an order that we don’t have any “control”. After Carolyn agrees to his presumption Frederick further elaborates that then, it logically follows we can shape nothing out of our own volition since everything appear to be pre-designed, “caused” earlier and then thrown on us. So if one accepts the that man is free agent to choose and shaped his options one has to refute the argument advocated by the Determinists we are just another addition to the chain of causes to which we have to helplessly comply with. So for those who believe in free-will such a chain does not exist. To him, “our actions, or the choices that cause our actions, must be uncaused if we are to be in control of what we do”. So, Frederick asserts that either free-will exists or Determinism exist, the two being incompatible. Being a Determinist, Daniel consents to Frederick’s point and finds that Frederick made an outstanding “argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism”. The soft Determinist Carolyn refers about the 1924 murder hearing of Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold two teenagers of murder Leopold whom Clarence Darrow wanted to save. In his long petition cited as the most well crafted attack on the death punishment in American court, Darrow’s petition is considered as an unique legal document which blends human compassion for justice adorned with poetry, music, philosophy and science. Darrow in the courtroom spoke like an enchanting and said, "that the court was the only thing standing between the boys and a bloodthirsty mob." For over twelve hours Darrow harked back the Judge for long hours about the defendants’ formative years, background, and the many other aspects that led to such offenses. According to an editorial comment of a newspaper, never before or since the Leopold and Loeb trial this life of "a series of infinite chances" has been so obviously made the foundation of a “criminal defense”(Linder. 1997). Carolyn finds that Frederick’s points appearing to echo like that of Clarence Darrow, who to defend Leopold and Loeb stated that “any one of an infinite number of causes reaching back to the beginning” caused them to kill, which is strong assertion of a deterministic world. For free-willist like Frederick Darrow’s belief in determinism is of certainly not acceptable. But here Frederick agrees with Darrow that (the way a murder is condemned because of even if it is goes beyond the control of the offender) determinism, by definition does not have any room for free choices and makes every thing coming out of long chain of consequences. Answering Daniel’s query to know about Carolyn’s response to Frederick’s she expresses her opinion about freedom, choice and pre-ordained designs that the determinists find inevitable. She considers that albeit we are obliged to relate to causes that existed before we were born we have the possibility of having freedom as well. She asserts that the way we generally arrange and shape our daily life would not have been possible unless we had the freedom to do so. Nothing impedes us in making our daily life as we please. This obviously indicated that within the deterministic world of causal chains, we have a limited amount of freedom (pp. 38-39, Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue). Answering his points for specters Spinoza in his Letter to Hugo Boxel (58 (54)) explains his position towards free will and determinism For him , as he explains in the letter, possibility and inevitability are clearly two things that goes against each other. S , it appears equally obvious to him that one , who “who asserts the world to be a necessary effect of the divine nature, must utterly deny that the world has been made by chance”. According to Spinoza the undying and unlimited spirit of God is involved with all ideas. Yet those who are stressfully say God was not needed to create the humankind, give room to the idea of the world as chance-directed. This theory, he considers, to be “absurd” at first glance. Spinoza considers people to agree united that the will of the God lasts forever (he thinks human mind has enough “knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God”) and the humankind is a consequence of the active will of the God. Therefore, he writes to his friend that, “ it must necessarily be also admitted, you will observe, that the world is a necessary effect of the divine nature”. Spinoza does not give much weight to the tautological talks about “will” and “understanding. ” What he finds important is their ideas regarding the will of the God does it goes against human nature? Asks Spinoza. He implies that these people find that the God by its definition has nothing to do with humanity and human will as such. Sinoza, on the other hand says that he does not hand over such human traits as will or understanding to God and with conviction thinks that the humankind is essentially a derivative of God’s will and is not chance created . Thus Spinoza makes his position about the destined design that shapes humankind, and within which he plays his small roles. This indicated his advocacy of determinism in a benign and argumentative way In the letter to Boxel (Let 58-P03), Spinoza discusses about beauty and flawlessness. He says that those who are of the opinion that God, the maker of the cosmos made it lovely accepts the all-powerfulness and supremacy of God (thus they accept a kind of determinism). Even they are compelled to choose (or rather condemned to choose, according to the Spinoza-like usages) between two options. This means within the determined destiny that is represented by God, this world was made for the visual ecstasy and delight of men , and if not that human delight and ecstasy of vision was made by god for the “sake of the world”. So those who believe in free will have the limited power to decide between the two inevitabilities. Spinoza also holds the idea To God the “infinite”, “ Finite” things bear no lesser or inferior status, since the infinite and the finite are both willing manifestation of God to express himself. He also finds the notion of being without soul ridiculous, since it leads to the fallacious argument of a soul without a being. It is, to him almost like hearing without having ears, seeing without eyes, etc. This gives clear idea that Spinoza was a determinist, he could not avoid being rational enough to deride those who obstinately adhere to the idea of a God that oppressively dictates, does not have a rational justification of his deterministic role and does distance himself away from human yearn to know and realize him(Spinoza to Hugo Boxel, Letter 58 (54). Sartre: Being and Doing: Freedom   Leading French philosopher of the existential school, Jean Paul Sartre (1905-80) says that it is possible for a human being only who living in the as he capable to comprehend a sense of void between him/herself with the world at large. This split, this sense of break between him/her and the world around is what he considers as freedom. But then again, this conscious break from his earlier existence also means that he accepts his former self as a part of his existence. Unlike the Determinists, Sartre is of the opinion that Human being do not have an “elemental nature” at their birth. They have to create their fundamental nature as Individuals and they are “condemned to Freedom” as against the deterministic view of being condemned to chain of causes. Sartre is very cautious to point out human beings are full of false ideas (“bad faith”) about itself. Sartre does not think that bad faith is something that is imposed on us from outside, but its something we make out of false evidences of our selves. “ He claims that self-analyses help to examine like the way do to get away from bad faith the self and to discover it’ own nothingness. This kind of getting to know the for-itself, which for Sartre is Freedom, the ability to question, discard chances, though a break with the world around reach to detached conclusion (Hawa, Language as Freedom)— i.e. by being aware of what is, the owning up of what one is not. The For-itself stands generally outside of being, and as such it remains free. This for-itself, wants to wipe out the in- itself which is basically a mysterious notion it cannot be defined as to this, or that and it basically remains as being obscurely related to for it’ self as a perception that throws itself to the world. It is something that Sartre finds hanging in the air and representing nothing, but a certain kind of crude intuition. In his definition of freedom and determinism, Sartre reverts Descartes famous axiom cogito ergo sun (I think therefore I exist) by the notion that that I exist, therefore I think—existence, thus for Satre goes before the soul. . In his Transcendence of Ego (first published in 1937) Sartre already deviates from earlier philosophical ideas of the self, recognized as consciousness. Self, argues Sartre, is not "in" perception, let alone being the same as it is. The self stays outside "in the world, like the self of another." It a continuous process related with the world, manifested through actions, It trying to contemplate, by acting with the word as an existence. it is not fully bloomed fully aware as such. In his “ I think, therefore I am" he sums up this theory. Since action implies a sense of choice, if we have to believe in the free –willist (which Sartre was at least before he became an ardent supporter of Marx, and during the time he wrote Being and nothingness, i.e, during 1943) And since a choice involves an individuality the relation between the cognizant I think and the lively I do is important Sartre explains this position in Being and Doing as: Indeed by the sole fact that I am conscious of the causes which inspire my action, these causes are already transcendent objects for my consciousness; they are outside. In vain shall i seek to catch hold of them: I escape them by my very existence. I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the causes and motives of my act. I am condemned to be free. This means that no limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself or, if you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free. (Satre, Jean Paul, p.439, Being and Nothingness) Compare /Contrast with personal preference From an academic point, no doubt its Sartre who can delve into the matter of freedom and determinism more intensely, departing from traditional concepts (of Descartes, Spinoza and Husserl’s idea of study the of consciousness) His methodology of dissertation albeit brazenly could give fresh blood to legacy of philosophy, either suffering from theistic simplicity (as we find it in Spinoza’s concept of freedom) or much from traditional psycho-analyses. The new soft l Determinists, like what we find in Williams, Clifford deserves attention and merit in today’s social and political world. It’s a philosophy that can take part in our day-to-day life and in one which most of us live in without being aware of. Works Cited Free Will, First published Mon Jan 7, 2002; substantive revision Thu Apr 14, 2005 Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ Freedom & Determinism. http://philosophy.tamu.edu/~sdaniel/quesfree.html Spinoza, Letters to Hugo Boxel, Letter 58 (54), Selected Correspondence: retrieved from http://home.earthlink.net/~tneff/let5854.htm#TOP Linder, O. Douglas, The Leopold and Loeb Trial, A Brief Account, retrieved from http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/leoploeb/Accountoftrial.html Williams, Clifford, Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue, Hackett Publishing Company, 1980 Hawa, Salam, Language as Freedom in Sartre's Philosophy, retrieved from http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Lite/LiteHawa.htm Sartre, Jean, Paul, Being and Doing: Freedom, from Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, English 1958 Translation by Hazel Barnes, London Sartre, Jean, Paul, Transcendence of Ego, Hill and Wang 1991 Read More