Personal Identity and Immortality - Essay Example

A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality Gretchen argues that the memory view of a person identity is circular because people explain individual identity by their experiences of past events. She says that it is difficult to prove that a person you are with was the same person you were with before. He argues that this can only be proven by proving the similar memory. Thus, Gretchen says that people memory think the things that have passed through their mind. Therefore, if a person identifies his friend experiences and that he recognizes him as the person, he sees then his friend is the person he had been with earlier. The identity of a person real memory and his or her physical appearances identifies a person. This is the argument behind circular memory view. Cohen attempts to think of identifying a person by his brain. He argues that if a person mind were to be transplanted to another body, it would be logical to identify such a person with his brain and not his body. Cohen tries to break away from using real memory view to explain the identity to memory and perfect resemblance of a person in heaven. He argues that if God create a single person when a person dies, then there is a possibility of life after death. There would be an identical person in heaven. Therefore, according to Cohen, real memories alone cannot explain identity. To this extent, Cohen is trying to break away from the memory view claim though Gretchen argues that his argument just resonate his prior understanding. Gretchen challenges Cohen that the notion of identifying personality identity with the brain is incorrect because the brain can be rejuvenated making identification of a person difficult. Therefore, though Cohen had earlier break away from the circular memory view of personality identification, he goes back to the issue of memory in the case of the brain transplant. Cohen gives an analogy of a brain transplant of Julia (Perry 18). He says that when a persons brain is exchanged the individual resume to have two bodies and not one. To this end, Cohen, refutes Gretchen argument that the body identity. Therefore, Cohen insists on his previous argument. He claims that immortality requires creation of another resemblance heaven. After learning that Gretchen refused a brain transplant, Cohen is so mad. He is surprised because his friend rubbishes an opportunity to live. This proofs Cohen believes in mind and memories identity confirming how hard is for him to change his notion of circular memory view of personality identity. Cohen fails to break away from the memory view circle because he insistently argues that the identity of individual is rooted in people’s brain. Moreover, he argues that the body and the mind, beliefs identifies people, but rather in the case of the concept of identity (Perry 19). However, Gretchen disputes this because it is difficult to identify a person after he dies. The essence of survival is through identity, and it is only the identity of individuals and not being that provide the possibility of survival. Cohen, therefore, fails to explain this because he argues for the state of being. He fails to break away from real memories view and thus he is not successful. 2. Shelly Kagan on the existence requirement In Kagan’s postulation, the version of the existence requirement that surfaces in Epicurus’s argument is that something can be bad for an individual. However, it can only be if the individual exists. Kagan finds it hard to accept the mere thought of rejecting this version. This is because it would mean that if one were to discard this version, then it means accepting the assertion that something can be bad for an individual even if the individual does not actually exist (Kagan 217). In such a scenario, if death were to be considered bad to an individual long after they are dead. Thus, it would as well be necessary to accept the assertion that non-existence is bad to people who were never born, even though there was a possibility for them to be born. For instance, we can imagine a coupled that was eager to raise a child out of a combination of their genetic features. For one reason or another, the couple discovers that one of them has a biological condition that makes it hard for the couple to conceive a child. If we were to reject the existential requirement, then one would expect such a couple to enter into a state of wailing for losing their would-be child, who would never exist. This means that the couple would be mourning not only the loss to themselves, but also the child itself. This is the same way that Kagan gives the example of mourning for the billions of possible individuals (Kagan 218). Thus, they never get the fortuitous to exist despite the fact that there was a likelihood for them to exist (Kagan 219). If the existential requirement were to be rejected, then it would justify mourning the tragedy of the unborn possible persons. In order to avoid the implications that would follow any rejection of the existential requirement, it would be prudent to adopt a modest view of the existential requirement rather than going through the bold version. According to the modest version, something can only be regarded as bad for an individual only if the individual happens to exist at some time or the other (Kagan 219). It is clear that this version eradicates the notion of individuals who would have existed, but they never have for one reason or the other. It is noteworthy that the modest version if asking for less as compared to the bold version that requires that for something to be bad for an individual, and then the individual must be existence at the same time as the thing that is presupposed as bad to that individual. On its part, the modest version does not require that a person must exist at the same time as the thing that is deemed bad to them. Rather, it only stipulates that an individual would have to exist at one time or another in order for something to be deemed as bad to them. Therefore, in this version the issue of viewing non-existence as bad to the unborn ‘possible’ people is disregarded. In conclusion, it is clear that the modest version justifies the assertion that death is, in fact, bad for an individual since that individual existed at one time or another. The modest version does not need that an individual occurs at the same time as the thing deemed bad to them. Thus, it is modest version to say that the non-existence is not bad to people that were never born but death is bad to those that happen to die after being in existence. 3. Kagan: Fear of Death In his book, Kagan disagrees with the fact that people fear death. He says people should have the feeling of fear because it is suitable and rational. He argues that most people do not have a reason of why they fear to die In order to explain the appropriateness of fear of death Kagan explains three conditions that this paper will attempt to explain. He uses pride as an emotion that can describe the nature of fear. In his examples, he argues that people are proud of what they achieve. Therefore, they are proud when they accomplish a certain target. A certain external phenomenon has evoked the feeling of pride. The person is proud reasonably and appropriately. However, the appropriateness of the events that makes the person proud comes into question if the people are questioned on how they achieved their goal. The question of “how” depend on the appropriateness of the accomplishment. The same case applies to the fear of death. Kagan argues that certain reasonable and external factors should evoke the feeling of fear considering death. In order to elucidate the appropriateness of fear of death, people must certify certain conditions. It is clear that Kagan neglects the fact that people fear death. He explains his ground using three concrete conditions articulately explained in his novel. The first condition of fearing death appropriately is that the stimulus feared is bad. Therefore, a person will only be appropriately fearsome external stimulus if they consider it bad. For instance, a person will appropriately fear touching an electric chair with shock since they fear that a bad shock will heat them. The second condition is that the stimuli causing fear is non-negligible. By Negligible, Kagan explains that a not eligibility is a condition when a person appropriately fears a stimulus because they cannot resist going through it. For instance, a patient going for injection in a hospital has fear because they are sure that the needle will cause pain (sad), and it is not negligible. The final condition is uncertainty of the feared stimulus. A person will fear something if they are unsure of the impacts case by the stimulus. Kagan explains that, people will not fear the stimuli if they are familiar with it. An example of uncertainty situation is a first timer surfing in the ocean will develop a sense of fear since that are unaware of the ocean wave carrying the person. The third condition largely explains the level of inappropriateness existing from people fearing death. Kagan explains that people have feeling of fear when they come close to death. However, the events that man should fear more than is the unpredictability nature of death. Death may occur at any time. According to the author, the unpredictability nature of death is the main reason people fear death; however, few people are ready to embrace it. The second reason people fear death is because of the deprivation that follows death. The tragic losses that follow death stimulate fear to people. Apparently, Kagan attempts to include anger and God’s will to take a person’s life. Therefore, Anger inflicted in people is the reason people fear death. Notably, the fear of death is thus unfitting and unsound because people are aware of the third condition. Works Cited Kagan, Shelly. "The Badness of Death." New York: Hewlett, 1998. Print. Perry, John. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978. Web. Read More