The Difference between Transcendental Realism and Kants Transcendental Idealism - Assignment Example

The Difference between Transcendental Realism and Kant’s Transcendental Idealism 1. Explain the difference between transcendental realism (using Leibniz and Hume as examples) and Kant’s transcendental idealism. Why does Kant call his turn to transcendental idealism a “Copernican Revolution”? (DO NOT use the terms “analytic” or “synthetic”, or the phrases “a priori” or “a posteriori” in this answer.)  ANSWER: Kant defines transcendental idealism of “all appearances I mean the doctrinal system whereby we regard, one and all, as mere presentations and not as things in themselves, and according to which space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given on their own or conditions of objects taken as things in themselves” (CPR A369: translation from Kant 1996). While he defines transcendental realism as ”which regards both time and space as something given in itself (independently of our sensibility). Hence the transcendental realist conceives outer appearances (if their actuality is granted) as things in themselves that exists independently of us and our sensibility, and that would therefore be outside us even according to pure concepts of understanding” (CPR A369: translation from Kant 1996. From the definition provided in CPR transcendental idealism and transcendental realism are two spectrums wherein the reality of something external to human perception can be claimed to be real. What does this mean? This claim can be made clear if we contrast Kant’s transcendental idealism with that of Hume’s AND Leibniz’s transcendental realism. Hume’s transcendental realism holds that ideas always represent the object or impressions from which they are derived and that there will never be a case wherein an image of something can be applied to another. For example, X’s idea of a chair is derived from form an object external to human person perceiving the chair. The reality of the chair perceived is such that it is not supported by X’s perceiving the chair, rather it is objectively real, external to the perceiver. There is no abstraction of the material reality of the object. While, Leibniz’s transcendental realism holds that at the bottom of all real via the proof of sufficient reason and what is real via the proof of reason is God. God becomes the penultimate reality with which all things, arguments, and all creation are guaranteed order, harmony and existence. Kant’s transcendental idealism on the other hand holds, that what is real is that which appears. Things as they are cannot be known outside human sensibility. Things as they appear are dependent on the mind’s perception of the appearance. The term appearance is used to signify that the presentation of the objects of sense does imply that upon perception the person can already can understand the thing in itself. In other words, it does not deny that X appears as a form of perception but to claim that to know X as thing in itself based on how it appears in human perception is to go beyond what the human mind possibly can know. This can be considered as Kantian humility. Humility in the sense that Kant does not make any grand claims of things known beyond what is deemed to be within the realm of human capacity to know. And it is for this reason that Kant’s transcendental idealism is a Copernican revolution. His transcendental idealism has put man at the center of epistemological claims. This means that what human beings can know is that which appears to them. Human mind cannot cannot discuss of thing in themselves for what appears is. Moreover, in this sense, human beings do not need an external reality that supports that which appears since what appears is made understandable in the light of human understanding. For, “all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us’ (A42/B59), and that “‘we can have cognition of no object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, i.e., an appearance’ (Bxxvi, see also Bxx, A190/B235, A490-1/B518–9, A493/B521). Thus, that which appears cannot be fully known in itself. It can only be made known using the sensibility and intuition that enables man to understand the reality as it appears in the mind of the one that perceives. This Copernican Revolution is basically putting man at the center of the quest for knowledge. Kants’ transcendental idealism does not deny the reality of X that appears but to hold that as X appears one can also stipulate X in itself is in fact a misapprehension of reality. Kant’s transcendental idealism is a Copernican revolution as it tries to analyze the epistemic condition of the human mind that provides it with the possibility of cognition and it does not assume that the epistemic conditions are inherently present in a pregiven reality like most of the philosophers and thinkers during his time. 2. Explain Kant’s distinctions between the two types of knowledge (a priori and a posteriori) and the two types of judgments (analytical and synthetic). Which knowledge-judgment combinations are possible for the transcendental realist? Why? Which are possible for the transcendental idealist? Why?  ANSWER For Kant a priori knowledge is defined as “ universal cognitions which are at the same time characterized by intrinsic necessity, must be independent of experience, clear and certain by themselves” (CPR A2). Again, it is claimed to be ”independent of experience and even of all impressions of senses, is one that cannot be disposed of …such cognitions are called a priori” (CPR B2). While, cognitions which are “borrowed solely from experience are called a posteriori “(CPR A2). On the other hand, when we think of judgment we always think of it in “terms of relation” (CPR A7). In this sense, an analytic judgment is “when the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is covertly contained in this concept A…analytic judgments are those in which the subject is thought by identity…and they are elucidatory. For they do not through the predicate add anything to the concept of the subject; rather they only dissect the concept breaking it up into its component concepts” (CPR A7, B11). On the other hand, synthetic judgments are when “though B is connected with A, lies quite outside it…those judgments in which this connection is thought without [thinking] are to be called synthetic. Synthetic judgments… are expansive. For they add to the concept of the subject a predicate that has not been thought in that concept at all and could not have extracted from it by any dissection… experiential judgments are such, are one and all synthetic” (CPR A7, B11). An example of a priori knowledge are lines are made of infinite number of points, If P then P, or 2+1 while an example of a posteriori knowledge is metal alloy is stronger than iron, it is cold today. The latter can only be known after sufficient experience of the statement while the former, its cognition does not depend on actual experience of lines to be made aware that it is made up of infinite number of points or of P = P or 2 + 1 for it to be true. On the analytic and synthetic judgment distinctions. An example of analytic judgment is bachelors are unmarried males. In this proposition, unmarried males predicate added to the concept bachelors. Notice that no knowledge is added to the concept bachelors since the very concept of bachelors is such that they are unmarried males. The idea of the predicate being contained in the subject is possible on the premise that the predicate is an intrinsic defining characteristic of the subject. On the other hand, the statement kiwis are sweet is synthetic judgment based on the supposition that the predicate sweet is not something inherent in kiwis. So much so, that not being sweet of kiwis’ does not offend reason and does not create any logical contradiction, unlike when person X will claim that some bachelors are married, a logical contradiction is committed since it counters the intrinsic attribute of the concept bachelor which is unmarried male. For the transcendental realist, the possible combination of knowledge-judgment are synthetic - a posteriori and analytic –a priori. This is asserted on the ground that a synthetic –a posteriori combination is valid since it is based on experience. And it is known that for a transcendental realist, the root or the basic foundation of all knowledge is experience. This trust on experience is made even if they do recognize that experience at times may cause error. They will also accept the combination of analytic – a priori combination since they also hold that propositions which are based on reason and do not need any experiential judgments can somehow provide us with mental exercise that will enable the human mind to exercise forms of abstractions which are not basically determinative of what is supposed to be real. It simply forms part of human knowledge but it does not add up to further knowledge of the world. While for some transcendental realist, the truth presented by analytic-a priori is the ultimate truth that the human mind can grasp and understand since analytic –a priori truths are those which are indubitable in the sense that its truth necessary and its denial leads to contradiction. On the other, a transcendental idealist, the possible combinations accepted are synthetic –a prior, and analytic – a priori. Synthetic –a priori is a possible combination for a transcendental idealist since it asserts that there are certain experiential judgments whose cognitions are based on a priori foundations like objects in motion will continue to be inmotion unless acted upon by an outside force. A transcendental idealist will also accept the analytic – a priori combination since this combination basically asserts that human mind its nature and categories of understanding can grasp certain generalizable and universal truths of which experience is not needed for validation but are to be apprehended as true and valid beyond experiential justification. 3. Explain Kant’s arguments to show that space is an a priori intuition (using both the metaphysical and transcendental expositions). How does this imply that space is transcendentally ideal?  ANSWER Objects are represented as external or outside the perceiver. In the outer sense of the object “we present object as outside and we present them one and all” (CPR B37). The outer sense where objects are presented as outside is space. “In space, the shape, magnitude and relation with one another are determined or determinable” (CPR B37). Together with the outer sense, is the inner sense of the mind. The mind intuiting itself, is a manifestation that it knows its inner state (CPR A 23). In the same sense, the mind intuits that space is external to it. And this is the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space “it contains what exhibits as given a priori” (CPR B38). What does this mean? Space is “not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from outer experience . For the presentation of space must already lie at the basis in order for certain sensations to be referred to as something outside me” (CPR B38). This implies that for an object to be considered as outside the perceiver, the presentation of space is first given and this intuition of space allows the sensation as outside. This further means, that the experience of space happens only through the presentation of space. In other words, space is not something that is the result of experiencing something outside the perceiver, but it is “only the presentation of space is that outer experience possible in the first place. Hence, space is “a necessary a priori presentation that underlies that underlies all outer intuitions” (CPR A24). This means that intuition of space becomes the necessary condition with which the possibility of an outer sense is realized. Basically, the metaphysicaly exposition of space holds that space is a piori and that the presentation of space becomes determinative of sensations of outer sense. Moreover, space is “pure intuition”(CPR A 25) which asserts that “first, we can present only one space, and when we speak of many spaces , we mean by that only parts of the one and the same unique space. Second, space is essentially one; the manifold in it and hence also the universal concept of space as such rests solely on [our bringing in] limitations. It follows from this that as far as space is concerned an a priori intuition of it underlies all concepts of space” (CPR A25). In terms of the transcendental exposition of space, it means the possibility of derivation of synthetic –a priori principles (CPR B 40) and such an explication requires that “1)that cognition of that sort do actually flow from the given concept, and 2) that these cognitions are possible only on the presupposition of a given way of explicating that concept” (CPR B40). What does this mean? Geometry provides the transcendental exposition of space. This is possible since geometry utilizes and explains synthetic experience of space, however, the universal truths and deductions deduced from geometry is a priori eg triangle has three sides. In this sense it can be claimed that space “represents no property whatever of any things in themselves, nor does it represent things in themselves in their relation to one another…space is nothing but the mere form of all appearances of outer senses i.ei it is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us” (CPR A26, B42). Being such, space is the necessary condition with which things appear external to us. It does not inform or tell us regarding the nature of things in themselves. As such, distinction has to be made between space as empirically real and space as transcendentally ideal. When space is referred to as empirically real it connotes that the appearance of sensation of things as external to us is real. This reality accounts for the limitation of the judgment which the human perceiver has added to the concept and in this case the concept of space. As such, “the proposition All things are side by side in space holds under the limitation: if these things are taken as objects of our sensible intuition” (CPR B43 A27). This idea supposes that space is transcendentally ideal which implies that space separated or removed from human sensibility is nothing. Since by definition space represents no property of objects but that “it is the condition of the possibility of all external experiences” (CPR A44 B28). Thus, space becomes transcendentally ideal the moment that the external objects which are presentations of our sensibility are removed from the intuition of space and assumes that space is the underlying support that allows the outside sense of the objects of our sensibility. In other words, you remove the subject, you take away the perceiving subject or the subjective conditions in space, and then space is nothing. 4. Explain Kant’s arguments to show that time is an a priori intuition (using both the metaphysical and transcendental expositions). How does this imply that space is transcendentally ideal? ANSWER Kant parallel discussion of time is almost similar with that of space. He begins his discussion by claiming that “time is not an empirical concept” (CPR B46) that has been abstracted in experience. Rather, the moment that simultaneity and succession are presented, the a priori intuition of time is presupposed. What does this mean? In (CPR A 23), Kant discusses the inner sense with which the mind intuits itself. Although, this does not provide an intuition of the soul itself, “we can intuit the soul’s inner state. [That form is time.] Thus, everything belonging to our inner determinations is presented in relations of time. Time cannot be intuited outwardly, any more than space can be intuited as something within us “(CPR A23). With this, it can be impugned that for Kant time is the form of the inner sense ie “ the intuiting we do to ourselves and of our inner state” (CPR B50). Time refers to our intuiting ourselves since “ time cannot be a determination of outer appearances, [because] it does not belong to any shape or position, etc, rather determines the relation of presentation of our inner state”(CPR B50). Furthermore, time “is a necessary presentation that underlies all intuitions” (CPR A 31). So much so, that all appearances can be removed but “time itself cannot be annulled” (CPR A31) since “all actuality of given appearances is possible only in time” (CPR A31). This a priori necessity of time “is the basis for the possibility of the apodeictic principles about the relations of time, or for the possibility of axioms about time in general” (CPR B47). Moreover, time is “is a pure form of sensible intuition" (CPR A32) Different part of time are all parts of the one and the same time (CPR A32). And that time is unlimited (CPR B48) since specific limitations of time are limitations of time in general. Being such, in the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time, time is the form of the inner sense of ourselves, it is our mind intuiting itself, and that time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances, and as such, all objects of the senses are in time (CPR B49 –B51). The transcendental exposition of the concept of time which, just like space, is the possibility of deriving a “synthetic a priori cognition is made possible in the general theory of motion” (CPR B49). This presupposes that the time “in which we place these presentations, and which itself precedes the consciousness of them in experience and underlies as formal conditions, the way in which we place them within the mind, already contains relations of succession, of simultaneity and of what is simultaneous with succession” (CPR B67). Thus, taking the metaphysical exposition and transcendental exposition together, it can be impugned that time is empirically real for “time has objective validity with regards to appearance as, because these are already things considered as objects of our senses” (CPR A35) but the moment that the subjective condition of time is removed, time is nothing. Hence, “time is merely a subjective condition of our human intuition (an intuition that is always sensible – i.e. in as much as we are affected by objects); in itself, i.e. apart from the subject, time is nothing” (CPR A35). As such, the transcendental ideality of time, just like space, is such that remove from the subjective condition of sensible intuition, then again, time is nothing. The transcendental ideality of time implies the transcendental ideal of space by showing that the inner sense and outer sense of pure intuition which is time and space respectively are only real in so far as the subjective condition of the perceiver is accounted for. But both time and space has no reality at all apart from the perceiving subject (CPR B52). This highlights an important innovation of Kant in the discourse of space and time – space and time are not general classifications of things in themselves. Rather space and time are simple and pure intuitions of appearances, necessary conditions for cognition. REFERENCE: Kant, Immanuel. (1996). Critique of Pure Reason: Unified Edition (with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions). Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Introduction by Patricia Kitcher. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Read More