Voluntary Euthanasia And The Common Law - Research Paper Example

Voluntary Euthanasia And The Common Law The applied ethics debate over euthanasia is typically framed around the normative claim of its permissibility, which is then followed by objections and responses launched from those who find it to be a morally reprehensible act. Nevertheless, we are faced with misunderstandings (whether deliberate or unintentional) about what the term actually refers to. Many opponents try to equate it with other immoral acts categorically recognized as immoral, such as the judicial execution of the innocent by Nazi Germans. At this point, the debate seems won or lost by emotivist standards (or, in other words, by whoever can yell the loudest). It ought to be clear that the debate over euthanasia is not centered on non-voluntary euthanasia, in which the person is not capable of expressing his or her own desires. Rather, it deals with situations such that the person is lucid and able to give lasting consent to being killed: this is called voluntary euthanasia (Otlowski). The literature dealing with the bioethics of euthanasia is indeed extensive, and is structured according to the configuration mentioned before. However, like most applied ethical issues, there seems to be a lack of consensus except between adherents to particular normative theories. Given this fact, it seems like the best course is to avoid adjudicating the dispute; rather, one should only hope to dispassionately and critically analyze the conflicting propositions. The debate over voluntary euthanasia conforms, like most issues, to a contrast between rule-centric and outcome-centric ethics. On one hand, we have an ethic of following rules universally to achieve the best and most desirable ends. And on the other, we have an ethic of achieving the best outcomes, whether evaluated as “best” according to happiness or some other standard. With the latter viewpoint, we usually encounter some argument for the respect of individuals’ autonomies as human beings, and their interests as vitally important in our normative evaluation. For instance, taking into account the interests of the person involved, and whether he or she is suffering due to some terminal illness, makes a large difference from following a rule of “respect human life” categorically. From this viewpoint, we derive the moral argument for voluntary euthanasia: that, insofar as we must respect the autonomy of individuals, we must respect that individual’s right to choose death. Since death is necessarily a part of life, and part of a human’s “autonomy” is taking responsibility for the course of his or her life, it necessarily follows that death is instrumentally related to the autonomy of a human being. The argument over voluntary euthanasia has intensified in the context of technological innovations that make a longer life possible, and pushing mortality rates back further and further. At some point, a life becomes too burdensome to continue, and death seems like the preferred option. It is ultimately the patient, given that he or she is competent to make the decision, which makes the final decision, as it is his or her autonomy which is being considered. However, the moral case for euthanasia outlined previously presupposes that the number of cases with competent patients is large enough for the issue to be of any practical significance. Clearly, in the event that a patient is unable to follow through on a suicide except by employing help from another human being, it is difficult to evaluate whether that individual is (1) enduring in his or her request, (2) competent to make the request, and thus (3) legitimately voluntary. Knowing that it is difficult to evaluate these things from a third-person perspective, it is perhaps much too complicated to determine. We cannot know what forms a competent consent to an assisted suicide from an outside perspective, and although we are respecting that person’s autonomy, it is not immediately clear from what that person is saying what he or she really has in mind (Foley and Hendin). A frequently used argument against the position in favor of voluntary euthanasia relies on the slippery slope: that allowing one kind of euthanasia will open the door to more invasive types of practices (such as non-voluntary euthanasia) because there is not enough of a distinction between them. These claimants say the slippery slope between the two types is logical, psychological, or arbitrary in nature, and the distinction is not substantive enough to prevent the slippery slope from occurring in real life. The allowance of voluntary euthanasia, some claim, is impossible without providing for the legality of non-voluntary kinds as well (Sgreccia). Therefore, those in favor of physician-assisted suicide claim to gain ammunition from concrete results. However, the slippery slope argument against the case for voluntary euthanasia deserves its fair share of criticism too. Contrary to the claim that the distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary forms is not substantive, there is reason to believe the opposite. There is nothing logically inconsistent about rejecting non-voluntary forms while accepting the voluntary form. The difference is a matter of values, not logic. Secondly, there is no reason to believe that because of support for voluntary euthanasia that someone will be more likely or willing to support its non-voluntary correlate. Thirdly, the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary forms is not at all arbitrary and is based in clear principles (Young). The difference in positions on voluntary euthanasia boils down to a difference in one’s conception of ethics: what ethical standards are designed to accomplish and whether they reduce to rules or outcomes. The moral case for euthanasia depends strongly on one’s respect for autonomy, as well as on the belief that physically incapable people are mentally competent enough to make an appropriate decision relating to the outcome of his or her life. The arguments presented by both sides are simply not compelling enough either way; typically, the only consensus that arises in issues like this fall on deeper, normative levels. Nevertheless, the arguments we hear in this debate need to be reframed to reflect more clearly the concepts being discussed. Even if it is decided, by consensus, that voluntary euthanasia is a moral practice, a conflict still remains in figuring out how just to make it a legal practice, workable in real life. Works Cited Foley, K. and H. Hendin. The Case Against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. Otlowski, Margaret. Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Sgreccia, Elio. "Legalizing euthanasia for children in the Netherlands." Statement by H.E. MSGR Elio Sgreccia. Rome: Pontifical Academy for Life. Young, Robert. Voluntary Euthanasia. 18 April 1996. 6 April 2009 . Read More