The Metaphysics of Spinoza - Essay Example

Spinozas Substance Monism Baruch Spinoza, also referred to as Benedict de Spinoza, is one of the three most well-known rationalists of the modern era in philosophy. The other two are Rene Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz. As a rationalist, Spinoza’s philosophy is characterized by the rigorous method of logical analysis, and indeed his projects manifest a very strict process of logical elucidation. In this paper, the author examines the monism of Spinoza, taking into account his justifications for arguing that there is only a singular substance in a manner very similar to the ancient Greek philosophers. The second part of the paper deals with some of the problems that arise from the doctrine of substance monism. Substance Monism The metaphysics of Spinoza can best be referred to or described as logical monism, that is, the doctrine that the world as a whole is a single substance, none of whose parts are logically capable of existing alone. Put in another way, it is a philosophy that teaches that everything in the universe is One, an idea that is very Parmenidean. The ultimate basis for this view is the belief that every proposition has a single subject and a single predicate, leading in turn to the conclusion that relations and plurality must be illusory. Spinoza thought that the nature of the world and of human life could be logically deduced from self-evident axioms. This is, in large part, the essence of his entire project, that is to demonstrate that the nature of existence can be understood and made clear through rational thought, hence his assumption of axioms that need no other proofs for they are rationally self-evident. This One, or singular substance, that can be conceived of is God. Consider proposition 11, where Spinoza states: “God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists” (Ariew and Watkins, 162). This substance has infinitely many attributes but human beings, being finite, can only perceive two of them, extension and thought. Unlike Descartes who thought mind and body were two separate kinds of thing, Spinoza argues that mind and body are just different ways of conceiving the same reality. This reality, Nature or God, is wholly self-contained, self-causing, and self-sufficient. It is also necessarily infinite (160), because if it is finite, then it must necessarily be limited by something else. To be limited by something is to have attributes that this substance shares with another, and this, according to Spinoza, is logically absurd. Hence, he argues that this reality is infinite. Everything in the universe is part of God, and everything that happens is a necessary part or expression of the divine nature. This is particularly evident in proposition 15, where Spinoza states: “Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be, or be conceived, without God” (163). This is a very pantheistic view that has, as a consequence, the removal of free will from the realm of human actions. After all, if human beings are a part of the divine reality, then there is no room for independent causal actions. Proposition 32 states: “Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause” (171). But Spinoza seems to find a way to attribute some degree of freedom to human beings, a type of freedom that is somewhat different from the conventional conception of freedom. Each individual according to Spinoza, is a localized concentration of the attributes of reality, as if a kind of quasi-individual, since the only true individual is in fact the universe in totality. Insofar as the local individual is ruled by his emotions, he is not free and is at the mercy of finite understanding. In order to become free, the individual must understand the extended causal chain that links everything as one. This can be done through rational reflection. This freedom is understood as becoming aware of the totality of the universe, a freedom not from causal determinism but from an ignorance of ones true nature. This is very similar to the Eastern philosophical frameworks of Hinduism and Buddhism, wherein ignorance refers to the inability to perceive the “self” as simply a part of a larger whole, and freedom as the realization of the “truth” that there is in fact no independent self. Some Problems with Substance Monism One of the difficulties with Spinoza’s monistic view is already hinted at above. It is a difficulty that pertains to the denial of free will, an idea that espouses instead a rather Eastern notion of freedom. It is no secret that Spinoza was excommunicated from his Jewish faith for holding supposedly heretic views. It is in fact ironic that for all his religious philosophical treatises, his religious ideas are considered non-traditional, to say the least. It comes as no surprise, considering that Spinoza’s doctrines move away from the Jewish faith. The denial of human freedom is a natural consequence of a pantheistic worldview. If indeed the divine infinite is shared by all, then logical order necessarily pervades everything. If coupled with divine foreknowledge, then it follows rationally that all human actions are also necessarily predestined. Hence, there is a logical absence of free will. While the monistic view of a singular substance is also shared by the Judeo-Christian as well as the Jewish tradition, these views are not pantheistic. Especially in the Judeo-Christian faith, the One has, as an attribute, a personality. This is likewise denied by Spinoza’s substance monism. The latter can be understood as the logical end of monism, similar to the views of the early Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, wherein he views the world as already containing all logical possibilities. Spinoza likewise believes that as a result of the universal substance, all circumstances are necessarily good. Any evil that is perceived is merely the result of an incomplete view of the world. What is difficult to accept with Spinoza’s whole metaphysical system is that it appears to be inconsistent with modern logic and science. In contrast to his acceptance of self-evident axioms, what are considered facts today are discovered not solely by rational thought but by observation, that is, empirical data. The latter are likewise necessary in order to infer the future. In other words, it is simply not enough to utilize logically necessary principles; one must also take into account empirical or observable information, capable of being methodically tested. Spinoza’s notion of substance is simply different from the commonly accepted modern understanding of the term. In fairness to Spinoza’s principles, his rigorous method of presenting and examining the world through logical principles is to be commended. It must be considered after all, that the scientific method is founded on rational thought. What is to be valued in Spinoza’s philosophical enterprise is the adherence to rationality, despite the scholastic tone of his thoughts. In this day and age, perhaps the value of a pantheistic view such as his, can find relevance in resolving environmental concerns. If indeed inherent value can be imputed into nature and the environment, then it would be much easier to justify actions that are meant to preserve the natural resources of the planet. This simply shows that Spinoza’s philosophic framework is to be considered lasting, for despite the difficulties connected with it, it can still find significance in the modern world. Work cited Ariew, Roger, and Eric Watkins, eds. Readings in Modern Philosophy. Vol 1. (Place: Publisher, year). Read More