The Concept of Virtue - Essay Example

The concept of virtue is surrounded by factors concerning human reason, and the particular theme of the soul. The main areas of distinction between theories appear to be based on the nature of virtue as a state and as an activity. Furthermore, general differences also include whether there exists a fundamental, underlying concept of virtue or whether a list of specific virtuous elements is possible. Of course, such theoretical discourse is bound to result in differentiating theories; the inspiration behind assessing the concept of human virtue is abound with rich possibilities and profound considerations. Aristotle’s account of human virtue is somewhat unique. For Aristotle, man’s function is the rational part of the soul acting in accordance with virtue (1097b22-1098a20). ‘In the view of the active people at least, virtue is superior’ (1095b30) and causes us to seek some form(s) of good. Thus Aristotle’s approach is distinctly a search for good, though not of listed goods. Rather, he searches for the most desirable good - the Highest Good, which is desirable for itself rather than for the sake of some other good: ‘The good is spoken of both in what-it-is and in quality and relative; and what is in itself’ (1096a20;12). This Highest Good is the attainment of happiness and wellbeing, which causes other goals to be sought inasmuch as they promote wellbeing rather than consisting of wellbeing per se. We have the capacity to live a better life by guiding ourselves through the use of reason and thus living in happiness. But because good has so many forms, it cannot be a single universal formation, ‘for if it were, it would be spoken of only in one of the predications, not in them all’ (1096a25;6-7). We need other forms of good as well, he acknowledges, such as friends and power; happiness is delicate if we lack severely some advantage (1099a31-b6). Although this severe lack may need some good fortune to allow occurrences to chance in our favor, Aristotle asserts that virtuous activity does not itself come to us by chance. We have the responsibility for employing and possessing the virtues and we are all born with the potential to have virtue; it is ‘the soul’s activity that expresses reason’ (1098a5-6). We must first develop proper habits, and secondly, acquire practical wisdom once our reason has become fully developed. When combined with practical reason, this virtue becomes fully developed. Aristotle explains happiness not as a virtue, but as virtuous activity; living well requires action rather than state. Evil people are solely driven by desire for luxury; they may never satisfy their desire and will not reach happiness. Thus, for Aristotle, happiness is not the fulfillment of desire; it is a balance maintained between excess and deficiency, in the subjective sense (1106a26-b28). Virtue is the tendency to have appropriate feelings (1105b25-6) and involves emotional responses rather than intellectual conditions (thus it is different from knowledge). There is no universal mean for every man, recognizes Aristotle; rather, it should never undermine reason, and each individual finds their mean point through reason ‘in the way that the person of practical reason would determine it’ (1107a7-2). Socrates, quite like Aristotle, searches for the deeper quality of virtuous behavior: ‘even if they are many and various, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues’ (72c4-7). He acknowledges that we desire good things, but because we may not know what is evil, good must be ‘accompanied by justice or moderation…or some other part of virtue; if it is not, it will not be virtue’ (78d8-e2). Socrates searches for virtue in its whole form, rather than Meno’s part-definitions. Rather we are all good ‘in the same way’ (73c1-2) because we acquire the same qualities in order to become good. Again, like Aristotle, Socrates believes that virtue is within the soul, and because it is immortal, it has knowledge within it already – we must recollect this knowledge through questions (81c4). Thus virtue cannot be taught; it is already within us and not dependent on factors such as gender or age (73b). Again, he brings one back to the single meaning of virtue; to simply list various types of virtue is to make many out of one (77a). For all of his reasoning and deliberation, Socrates does not seem to actually arrive at a single definition of virtue. He favors self-development over materialistic desires and truly good action rather than that which is believed to be good. The most final of his statements is as thus: ‘virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous’ (99e4). The Stoics’ main belief is that human virtue maintains a will in accord with nature, which ‘enables man to achieve this [goal] in its own way’ (John Stobaeus: Anthology 5b3;2). Because all men are seen as equal sons of God, everything good or bad in life depends on man himself. We all have perfect freedom if we can avoid ‘everything which either is vice or participates in vice’ (John Stobaeus: Anthology 5a;6) and understand that health, happiness and possessions have no value. Fundamentally, a life in harmony with the universe is promoted as virtue by the stoics; but over which we have no direct control: ‘what is necessitated is no different from what is fated’ (Theodoretus: Graecarum Affectionum Cura 6.14;1-2). The good resides within the soul, through wisdom and self-control we can achieve freedom from suffering by attaining a ‘good blend of the beliefs in the soul’ (John Stobaeus: Anthology 5b4;7). For the Stoics, to live in virtue is to live in harmony with nature; to understand the order of the universe rather than ‘confidence and wish’ (John Stobaeus: Anthology, 5b;3-4). Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics list the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, justice and temperance (John Stobaeus: Anthology, 5b2); each is a type of knowledge. To come back into the reason of nature and move into harmony with it removes the evil seen as a result of ignorance and allows the virtuous qualities to remain within: ‘natural ability in the soul is more helpful for virtue than natural ability in the body’ John Stobaeus: Anthology, 7b;27). The three accounts of virtue are not profoundly distinct from one another; indeed there are some fundamental similarities that connect them. All three recount to the idea that virtue is within the soul; this indeed is a strong facet and can relate to the principle that virtue cannot be taught. Aristotle’s account is rather plausible in that it relates to the seeking of good in the form of happiness and wellbeing. Indeed, humans do seek happiness and wellbeing; this can be the basic foundation for all virtuous activity. Yet he does not seem to account for the fact that one may be virtuous and inactive – one could argue that the very essence of virtuous happiness is not actively seeking it further. All three also establish that the desire for luxury and material goods is not virtuous; this is highly plausible as ones desire in this sense does tend to be insatiable. The very fact that Socrates does not formally establish a final definition of virtue is can be rather attractive. In this sense, he may be acknowledging that virtue is not actually definable, rather it is an element that can only be described. Indeed, to state virtue as a specific factor, such as temperance or patience, confines it unnecessarily. It could be argued that virtue can be found everywhere; to specifically define it may remove its potential to inspire. In this sense, Socrates, by resisting defining virtue per se, is appealing to its universality; its diversity and indeed its very essence. Perhaps, by trying to specifically define virtue, one may stunt its actual qualities. On the other hand, the Stoics, by listing the four cardinal virtues, allow one to grasp on a more specific level its actuality. Often to consider such an issue can result in remote concepts; by capturing it on a more concrete level, the Stoics have created a more plausible theory of virtue. Generally, such factors of life are extremely difficult to capture, especially in an objective sense. Perhaps this is an advantage, but it can lead to incomplete accounts; the Stoics do not exactly define what is meant by will in accordance with nature. Read More