Epicurean Epistemology - Essay Example

Epicurean Epistemology While Epicurus and Epicureanism are widely known for the ethical stance on pleasure and the good, Epicurean philosophy also covers many important points in the area of epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. It is noteworthy that many issues and questions in epistemology are anticipated in Epicurus’ philosophy. In this paper, the author examines the Epicurean notions of preconception, perception, appearance and belief, and the criteria for truth: nondisconfirmation, disconfirmation, nonconfirmation, and confirmation. These are examined in order to see how Epicurus justifies the validity of empirical statements as knowledge claims. Epicurus’ notion of preconception appears to be understandable as the memory of previously conceived objects or thoughts. “By preconception they mean a sort of apprehension or correct belief or concept or universal thought stored up, that is, a memory of what has often appeared externally to us,” (Diogenes Laertius in Annas, 201). It is “pre-conceived” in the sense that in order to make meaningful any given knowledge claim, there must first be a conception or conjuring of concepts or ideas prior to the actual understanding. In other words, in order to make sense of a statement such as, “There is a man by the window,” there should be a preconception of “man” and “window”. This means that those concepts must be understood or grasped first, before the statement can be rendered meaningful. The idea of preconception is therefore important because everything else that can be understood can only be done so or made possible through a prior grasp of such basal concepts. “Preconceptions, therefore, are clear. The object of belief depends on something prior which is clear to which we refer when we speak,” (201). This is interesting because it would then seem that Epicurus’ ideas anticipate the positivist pattern for knowledge acquisition and generation of perception of ideas → concept formation → knowledge. Perception is the immediate grasp of that which presents itself to the senses without the aid or mediation of any external instrument or means. For Epicurus, perceptions are true for the primary reason that perceptions always focus on the “now-ness”, or the present grasp. “It is the special function of perception to grasp only what is present,” (202). It can be said therefore, that there is perception of something when there is an immediate and pure reception of sense-data. This is interesting because it once again anticipates contemporary discussions about the perception of reality. Philosophic questions about the truth and falsity of appearances, or those that present themselves to the senses become more concrete. How does person know, or should a person accept as real that which is perceived? For Epicurus, this leads to the interesting relationship between appearances and beliefs. What is the relationship between appearance and belief, or reality for that matter? It is noteworthy that the only access any person has to the world is through the senses. If that is the case, then any and all ideas about the world can come only by way of sense-data. This means that the world is perceived the way it appears, and this is precisely Epicurus’ point. Is there any way then, to check if this world of appearance is really what it purports to be? In other words, what is the connection, if there is any, between appearance and belief? For Epicurus, he mentions that there is indeed a curious relationship between appearance and belief. He holds that “there are two things correlated with each other, the appearance and the belief, and that of these the appearance is always true,” (202). There is the understanding of appearance as having to do with the qualities of objects. Should an inconsistency arise between appearance and belief, Epicurus argues that appearance takes preeminence over belief because of the fact that appearance is perceptual: it just is, so to speak. Therefore, any difference between appearances and beliefs can be resolved by quickly determining that how an object appears is simply how it is in fact. In Bertrand Russell’s discussions on appearance and reality, one important question that is entailed pertains to the idea that perhaps reality as is commonly known or recognized might be different from what is in fact real. More importantly, there is the question of whether or not there is indeed a reality behind the appearance of everyday objects. If indeed the sole access that one can have of the external world is through experience, and that experience shows us that objects appear differently from different perspectives, then can it be safely said that there is reliable access to what is termed reality? If appearances change, is there a reality that is entailed or pointed out by the sense-data? Russell asks the following questions: “Is there any such thing as matter? If so, what is its nature?” (Russell, 75). These are questions that become even more significant when viewed from the perspective of Epicurean epistemology, because Epicurus essentially argues that experiences, that is, sense-data, are reliable enough to provide knowledge of a reality outside of the mind. Of course, it seems that Epicurus does not confront the possible consequences of accepting the claim that there are only sense-data to point to an external reality. As far as appearances are concerned, Russell states that “what the senses immediately tell us is not the truth about the object as it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sense-data which, so far as we can see, depend upon the relations between us and the object,” (77). Epicurus holds that determining the truth and falsity of knowledge claims depend on various criteria. Nondisconfirmation is, quite simply, non-falsification. Given a knowledge claim that is yet unclear, if what is apparent (perception) does not render the claim falsified, then the latter holds true. In Epicurean terms, the claim is said to be not disconfirmed. For example, the truth of an empirical statement such as, “There is a dead cat on the road,” depends upon the nondisconfirmation or non-falsification of the statement based on perception. It is true if the apparent shows that there is a cat on the road and that it is dead. This interpretation of Epicurus shows him as a precursor to the correspondence theory of truth, the theory where a statement is deemed true if it corresponds to the actual state of affairs. Disconfirmation, on the other hand, is simply the opposite of nondisconfirmation. Where the latter demonstrates the truth of a knowledge claim by showing the apparent to not disconfirm the unclear, disconfirmation shows the falsity of a statement through falsification. Quite simply, a statement is disconfirmed when perception falsifies it. It must be recalled that for Epicurus, perceptions are true hence, when the perception of something denies the statement, then the latter is rendered false. In the previous example, if the cat does not seem to be dead, then there is disconfirmation. Nonconfirmation is the inability of the apparent to verify the knowledge claim. This is another proof of the significance of Epicurus’ thoughts in contemporary philosophy. It should be recalled that for the positivists, empirical statements are meaningful because of their capacity for verifiability. In short, such statements have truth value. In Epicurus, there is nonconfirmation if perception is not able to provide proof or evidence in support of the claim. Therefore, if in the previous example there was no way to perceptually verify the status of the cat, then there is nonconfirmation. Confirmation is the opposite of nonconfirmation. This occurs when the apparent is able to verify the statement as true. Thus, if perception shows that there is a cat on the road and that the cat does in fact appear to be dead, then there is confirmation. The knowledge claim is verified. In these four criteria, Epicurus foresees the development of epistemological theories of truth and meaningfulness. The theories of meaningfulness, verifiability and falsifiability, are anticipated in Epicurean thought. So also is the correspondence theory of truth, as evidenced by Epicurus’ notions of nondisconfirmation and disconfirmation. It can be seen that the epistemology of Epicurus carries with it many important contributions to the development of contemporary epistemological theories. Given that two of the most basic epistemological concerns are the source and validation of knowledge, there is value in what Epicurus gives as the source of knowledge, which is experience. This view paves the way for many bodies of knowledge such as the sciences. He also gives an answer for the validation of knowledge, in the form of the criteria for truth and meaningfulness: nondisconfirmation, disconfirmation, nonconfirmation, and confirmation. In all, Epicurean philosophy, particularly Epicurus’ epistemology, offers ancient but relevant, not to mention influential, answers that attempt to justify experience as a valid source of knowledge. Works cited Annas, Julia. Voices of Ancient Philosophy: an introductory reader. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Russell, Bertrand. "Problems of Philosophy." Twentieth Century Philosophy. Ed. Forrest E. Baird. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997. Read More