Substance Dualism - Essay Example

SUBSTANCE DUALISM In this paper, I will explain and argue for substance dualism, a notion in the mind-body problem champions for the existence of two distinct identities, the properties attributable to the substance and the substance to which the properties belong. Based on this principle, it is conceivable that for instance, in addition to being a collection of thoughts, the mind also has another distinct aspect, namely that which is responsible for thinking. Systematically, this gives rise to two distinct apparatus, one material and the other immaterial. Thus, the mental and the physical states are separate entities that exist independently, the basis of which is that physical things extend into space and possess no form of thought, while the very essence of mental things are the thoughts themselves, which inherently do not extend into space. Pertinent questions regarding mind-body processes are the ontological and the causal question. The former attempts to establish what amounts to mental state and to physical state, while the latter attempts to establish whether either of these states influence one another, and the manner in which such influence, if it exists, is achieved. Substance dualism, according to Swinburne (2013), addresses these questions by observing that properties describe objects, hence the existence of one makes the other inexcusable. A normal human being is thus made up of two substances, the first being the body, and the other being the person, which refers to the mind and is logically synonymous to the soul. Definition of the latter transcends thought and consciousness, as noted by Descartes, yet it remains plausible to say that the person and the body have dissimilar identities, hence are different substances. To date, the argument for substance dualism rests with Descartes conceptions that the essence of mind is thought while that of the body is extension, with the resulting duality being reminiscent of the duality of substances. Further explanation regarding this conception embodies the modal argument for substance dualism that according to Jaworski (2011), stems from three rational iterative arguments namely: (a) If humans can exist without bodies, then they cannot be bodies (b) That humans can exist without bodies (c) And hence, humans cannot be bodies The first premise is rather direct since it espouses that if two objects say x and y are identical, then they must be the same object, which implies that one cannot exist without the other. Denying the co-existence would mean denying the very first relationship, that of identity. Thus, the body and the mind being different are separate substances. The second premise conceives the existence of the mind in the absence of the body. To support, the conceivability-possibility principle that states that once it is conceivable that a variable x is true (or false), it becomes possible that x is true (or false). Thus if it is conceivable that humans can exist without bodies, then humans can exist without bodies. The second premise is characteristically the most debatable, and as such, Jaworski extends a number of explanations towards its justification. An example is the afterlife theory also espoused by Descartes and religious beliefs, that human existence does cease after death, but that only the physical body is destroyed at death, while the soul continues to exist. In this case, humans tacitly conceive of their existence in the absence of their bodies. Another argument for the second premise is Descartes Essential Property argument that espouses thoughts and thinking as the essential property of beings, with the body being an accidental property. In light of these, we realize that it is possible for humans to exist without the body, hence the ability to separate the two points to the existence of two distinct substances. The last premise is rather a confirmation and needs no further debate. A possible objection to the aforementioned arguments stems from the idea that the conceptual method discussed above in an attempt to verify the second premise inherently makes the essential property argument either circular or indistinguishable from the conceivability-possibility argument. The circular paradox emanates from the fact that it attempts to establish the conditions under which it is possible for an entity to exist while intentionally excluding the corresponding dependent variables, those without which the entity cannot exist. Regarding the in-distinguishability dilemma, the argument advances the existence of an entity without determining the essential properties necessary for its existence. However, by paying close attention to the fact that an event or an object can exist even in the absence of the accidental properties but fails to exist in the absence of essential properties, the two arguments are complimentary when analyzed within the same domain. One possible negative argument to the argument for substance dualism relates to the claim that if it is true, then persons cannot causally influence bodies, and that if persons can causally influence bodies, then the notion of substance duality is false i.e.: If substance dualism is true, then it is not possible for persons to causally influence bodies But persons can causally influence bodies Hence substance dualism is false The fundamental aspect of this argument is that for changes to be imposed in an object, the object has to possess a spatial location and the ability to transfer energy, aspects that are lacking in the mind-body different substance relationship. However, we have to embrace the idea that non-physical causation is intelligible. Additionally, since physical causation is an undeniable fact, the idea of non-physical causations being a fact is equally plausible. Alternatively, one can reject the apparent causal relationship between mental entities e.g. intentions and physical acts e.g. movement which would mean the existence of very close correlation between mental and physical entities. Clarifying such an argument would need the introduction of either parallelism or occasionalism. The former advances that mental and physical systems run parallel to one another, an aspect that makes it possible, though coincidentally, for one to influence the other. The latter, on the other hand, perceives the existence of supernatural intervention, through God, who acts as an intermediary in effecting changes that in the physical body that inherently correspond to those experienced in the mind. Noteworthy though is that even such arguments are debatable, either for being deductively insufficient or for being an escapist strategy, either of which casts aspersions in their plausibility. The substance dualism argument as a solution to the body-mind problem appears to be more concrete, both in relative and absolute terms. First, it sets as true the existence of separate entities, the body and the person (mind) by making clear arguments concerning the continued existence of the person even in the absence of the body. Secondly, it comprehensively explains the modality within which interactionism work in the concept of separate entity principle. Thus, being an argument that promises a conciliatory ground for the relationship between ontological and causal questions, as well as to their specific constructs, the substance dualism principle has a chance of sustaining better human understanding of the body-mind problem. References Jaworski, W. (2011). Philosophy of mind: A comprehensive introduction. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. Swinburne, R. (2013). Mind, brain, and free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Read More