A Mental State and a Human Brain - Essay Example

Two Requirements of Mental al Affiliation: Two Requirements of Mental This paper examines the causes of different mind states by setting up a scenario in which a man must replace his normal human brain with something else. This paper discusses three theories about mental state which is behaviourism, brain identity theory and Searle’s Chinese Room example. The paper concludes that the man in the case being analyzed shows some mental states but does not have a normal range of mental states. Body Materialists believe that mental state is a physical state and can be explained by a physical principle. However, they face the challenge of explaining mental states in terms of physical states. In order to understand such concepts, this paper will use the case of a friend who was recently involved in an accident and cannot be allowed to leave hospital since the doctors are unsure of the student’s mental state. Doctors claim that her brain is not normal whereas she has a clear memory of the accident and behaves in the same way as before. In my opinion of whether the hospitalized friend ha mental states or not, I believe that one can have a mental state even without an organic brain. Moreover, behaving like a human being does not prove that one has a mental state. The hospitalized friend does not show a normal range of mental states, but she shows some mental states. All the doctors in the cases have different perspectives on mental state. Their arguments represent different philosophical theories. The first doctor claims that mental states are type-identical to states of the human brain and since the patient in our case lacks a normal brain, he cannot have mental states. Doctor two said that the patient had some mental states since he could behave exactly like others but insisted that the patient did not have all of mental states. Thus in doctor two’s view, right behavior is only a necessary condition of mental states. Doctor three believes that mental states required a Cartesian soul. Dr. four disagrees and claims that same behavior is sufficient for mental states. Dr. Five rejected that human brain is necessary for mental states. In addition, he claims that if what in the patient’s head is a digital computer, then he cannot have mental states. All doctors are represent some philosophical theories. Dr. #1 is an identity theorist, #2 believes functionalism and Dr. #3 is a Cartesian. Dr. #4 is behaviorist and #5 represents parts of John Searle’s view that against machine can possibly think. This paper will focus on discuss Dr #1 and Dr #5. It is important to understand what a mental state is. Different philosophers have different definitions for the term ‘Mental state’. According to Descartes, mind is a thinking substance that has desire but does not have extension (Descartes, p13). Ryle criticizes the definition and claims that it is subject to category mistakes (Ryle, p13). Category mistake is a semantic error in which things belonging to a particular category are presented as if they belong to a different category. Ann example of category error is when someone says that a certain book has cholesterol. Cholesterol is only associated with food and thus claiming a book has cholesterol is a category error. Ryle proved that mind and material cannot be completely justified by the fact that the mind can influence thought and objects can be materialistic. According to Ryle, mental state is simply behaviour state. By saying this he means that the state in which the mind is in can influence behaviour. For example, being angry is indeed equal to acting angrily. J.C.C argues that mental state is a chemical reaction in the human brain which acts in the same way as c-fiber rising (Smart, p144). There are different definitions of mental state, but all the philosophers seem to agree on certain facts about mental state. All the philosophers agree that mental state is the ability to feel and get emotional while in the conscious state. John Searle definition on mental state is widely accepted. He says that for one to have a mental state, they have to be conscious and have to react to different situations in the same way that another human being would have reacted. Moreover, Searle claims that this behaviour must have intentionality in that one can understand the meaning of their behaviour. This paper will use the above two requirements to identify whether a patient has a mental state. The existence of a mental state does not require a human brain and therefore one does not have a reason to deny the patient’s mental state. Smart suggests that the mind state is the same as the brain state just like water is similar to H2O(Smart, p142-143). It is true that when we feel pain, C-fibers are firing in our brain (Smart, p143). However, it is irrational to say these two states are identical to each other. It is clear that C-fibers and feeling pain occur simultaneously, but we do not know if they are related in any way. For example, plants usually bloom in spring, but it does not imply that spring cause plants to bloom, warm weather does. Most scientific experiments provide correlational relationship among subjects, but correlation should not be equated to causation. First it is difficult for us to eliminate the possibility of ignoring common causes and confusing cause and effect. Secondly all experiments collect data about the past but no one is certain on how things will happen in future. Therefore, we cannot be sure that C-fiber and pain are related just because C-fiber firing happens at the same time as feeling pain. It is only certain that they are correlated, but no experiments have been done to conclude the same. One can only be able to tell that another person has a mental state only if mental states are identical to brain states. Otherwise, it would not be possible to tell this. In this case, I would not have realized that the brain of my friends had been were it not for the conversation I overheard. We cannot be 100% certain that anyone’s brain is organic and original. If mental states require a human brain, it is challenging to tell if a person has a brain or not. This proves that behaviour is the only thing that can be used to determine mental states and hence behaviour is necessary for mental states. However, behaviour does not fully represent the mind state. Most importantly, there are things we know that have mental states but do not have human brains. Most animals can feel pain yet they do not have a human brain. Another example is the aliens. They have reasons and are rational, but they do not have a human brain either. Therefore, it is not necessary to for one to have a human brain for them to have a mental state. Searle uses a thought experiment called Chinese Room to show how intentionality is necessary for mental state. He suggests that we can put someone who cannot understand Chinese at all into a room full of Chinese-speaking people and give him a “rule book” so they know what to reply in all circumstances. These set of rules are called syntactic rules by Searle. He uses the term semantic meaning to refer the actual meaning (Searle, p302). For instance, the word “seat” and “sit” have the same syntactic meaning since they are pronounced in the same way. However, they have different semantic meaning since they mean different things. Searle believes that just knowing the syntactic meaning of an object is not sufficient to know the object. It is also necessary to understand the semantic meaning. Searle argues intentionality and consciousness are necessary in determining a mental state. For a person to have a mental state, they must react in the way they do with good reasons as to why they are doing that. Moreover they must know that that they are behaving in that way. When asked any question, he can check the rule book and find the right reply. For instance, if one asks him |nihaoma| (“how are you” in Chinese), he would reply |henhao| (“Fine” in Chinese). By following the rule book, everyone in the room would think that he knows how to speak Chinese. However, he does not understand what he hears, nor for what he replies. He does not know how to speak Chinese since he doesn’t know the semantic meaning of things he says. Similarly, the patient with abnormal brains is just like the man in the Chinese room. He may behave exactly like a normal person, but we have no idea if the abnormal brain can function like the human brain and let him understand the meaning of his reply. Computers nowadays are programmed with syntactic rules only. Therefore, if the patient in our scenario has a digital computer inside his skull, it is impossible to have a mental state. We don’t know if the patients’ abnormal brain is digital, so he may still have some ranges of mental states. However, even though he can behave exactly like other people, it does not mean he has a normal human brain. In conclusion, it is not sufficient to say that a mental state is simply behavioural since a mental state requires intentionality. I believe that intentionality and consciousness are vital in determining a mental state. It is unwise to say mind is simply behaviour or output since there a possibility of lack of intentionality. I do not think that having a human brain is a precondition to having a mind, since there are clearly counter-examples to that view (animals and aliens does not have human brains but have mental state). Perhaps the existence of mind requires behaviour combined with some other organs which together they can be sufficient to offer both consciousness and intentionality. Our patient with abnormal brains satisfied only part of the condition by having a behaviour that is similar to that of other people. However we do not know if they are aware of their behaviour and if they have any intention of behaving that way. Therefore, we are only safe to say our patient has a mental state in syntactic term but does not show a normal range of mental state. References: Descartes, R. (1641). Meditations on First Philosophy: in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul and body, Ed. Jonathan Bennett (2007). Gilbert Ryle. (1949) The Concept of Mind, Chapter 1. 11-24 Mandik, P. (2014) Functionalism, Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, 1st Ed. Wiley & Sons, Inc. 109-117 Smart, J.J.C. (1959) Sensations and Brain Processes, the Philosophical Review, 68(2), 141-156 Searle, J. (2010) Minds, Bodies and Programs, Minds, Bodies and Persons, Oxford University Press, New York. 298-304 Read More