The Logical School as the Component of Reductionism - Essay Example

Quine and Dogmas of Empiricism Introduction Quine was an empiricist and positivist who was determined to prove that logical positivism was baseless, and his work became one of the most influential ones in philosophy. At the time, empiricists (persons who believe that all knowledge emanates from experience through the senses) struggled with the notion of logic in positivism. Positivism recognizes only scientific or mathematically substantiated laws, yet a degree of apriori knowledge was required in the field. These individuals felt that some statements that exist independent of experience were necessary, so they wanted to incorporate them into the positivist school of thought. The group was called logical positivists, and they accomplished this union by introducing the notion of convention. The class of positivists asserted that logical empiricism was possible through convention or arbitrariness, where agreement would be reached on the meaning of statements. Quine sought to attack this school of thought through a two-pronged approach; reliance on reductionism and making a distinction on analytic and synthetic distinctions. Quine’s two dogmas of empiricism Analytic truths Dogmas are sets of beliefs that are held to be true by certain people without question, and are often called such as a mark of disapproval from an observer or analyst. Quine felt that logical empiricism lacked legitimacy because of two dogmas; one of them was the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. An analytic truth may be understood as an assertion that is true exclusively because of its meaning while a synthetic one is held as such owing to facts. Quine felt that the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences was baseless by looking at a series of assumptions and definitions in the school of thought. Quine started with the notion of synonyms where logical positivists claim that a sentence may be defined as analytic if synonyms can be used to substitute original words and the expressions remain logical truths (Schwitzgebel, 2008). However, the philosopher opposed this statement because it presupposes that synonymy is a well understood and defined term, yet it needs to be explained before it can be applied. The philosopher sought to look for other ways in which logical empiricists sought to defend themselves, such as by saying that a logical truth exists if a sentence has terms whose definitions can be substituted by others. Quine has a problem with this component as well because it is not clear whether an irregularity can arise because of the meaning of the term or the belief that one holds about it. Definitions are in and of themselves quite controversial or indistinguishable; sometimes that may stem from an empirical truth or a belief. For instance, one may assert that a cabbage is a vegetable, but it is not possible for one to truly ascertain whether it is a fact that cabbages are vegetables or that that this is something, which one has come to believe as true (Quine and Carnap, 1990). The notion of making sentences true solely by virtue of their meaning; that is analyticity, may also be defended from an abbreviation standpoint. In this regard, the logical positivists claim that an abbreviation such as NOW may be used to represent the national organization for women, so in this sense it is an analytic sentence. Quine still has qualms with this argument because first, people rarely use abbreviations to express words and second meanings could alter even for the abbreviation. For instance NOW may alter its objectives such that it may focus solely on domestic violence or discrimination; therefore, even these abbreviations can take on a meaning of their own over time (Chalmers, 2004). Since the above defenses rely on the notion of synonymy, Quine sought to put a dent on that reliance by defining and applying synonymy in a set of sentences. He held that it is not possible to understand synonymy without finding oneself in a vicious circle since the logical empiricists’ definition of synonymous expressions rests on their interchangeability without altering the truth. Therefore, members of the group felt that a word can only be synonymous to another if a sentence will retain its truth in each sentence. Quine felt that this statement was only true in certain language contexts; for those languages where words tend to denote similar things in singular or general terms, then this was applicable. However, for languages where terms refer to different things when the terms are general and singular, speakers need to specify that analytic assumptions were made. In order for others to make sense of that analytic specification, then a reader must already be sure about synonymy, which as established earlier was not a clear term (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). Sometimes a logical empiricist may make claims about the truth behind a statement by reliance on semantic rules; here, semantics refers to meaning in language. If a group of people arbitrarily created their own language, they would have the freedom to define what sentences are analytic and which ones are not. The only problem with this process is it still does not describe what analytic truths are so that they are not just specific to the artificial language but can be applied to different languages. Even in real languages, it would still be problematic to have a set of terms, which are universally accepted as analytic truths since speakers would not be certain whether sentences are derived from meaning or truths. Many native speakers have a series of axioms (statements that are established), but few of them can deduce whether those statements were derived from experience or meaning, so the logical empiricists still find themselves in the same trap. Overall, Quine is saying that it is not possible to make distinctions between analytic and synthetic statements without reliance on aspects that are themselves in need of definition. Alternatively, logical positivists tend to rely on terms that also require an understanding of analyticity itself or synonymy; this places adherents in a virtual circle. The three terms that rely on each other in this school of thought are necessity, analyticity as well as synonymy; since all of them can be interchanged at one time or another, analyticity is itself meaningless (Pryor, 2007). Reductionism The second dogma that Quine defines in the logical school is the component of reductionism where sentences are to be verified only through sensory means. Quine feels that it is not possible to verify every individual sentence through appeals to experience or empirical testing because some sentences can be observed while others cannot. Furthermore, sentences rarely exist in isolation as they depend on each other to derive truth; this implies that no direct mechanisms exists for distinguishing observation sentences (sentences that derives from observation and can be understood without prior knowledge) and non observation sentences. The philosopher explained that most language consists of a series of interconnections in which the margins had sentences that mirrored reality while the center contained non-observation sentences, which relied on others. Therefore, trying to falsify or verify a sentence on its own was futile since these sentences rarely existed independently; instead, one ought to attempt to alter one’s entire language theory. Quine explained that in order to maintain consistency in language, sometimes certain sentences needed to be altered or revised in order to fit into the deeply embedded truths. The thinker felt that revisions are inevitable in any language but the ones that should be embraced are the ones that cause the smallest amount of disorder in the system. Contradictory observation sentences would have to be ignored in order to maintain the acknowledged truth, but if too many clashing observations occur, then one may have to alter their laws. In this regard, Quine felt that it was possible to alter any sentence; however, the subject may have to contend with numerous revisions in their language. For this reason, Quine felt those logical positivists were misguided because they had missed the interconnectedness of sentences in language. Empirical confirmation or disconfirmation ought not to be a basis for determining the meaning of sentences since sense experience is just one of the ways of confirming these meanings (Chalmers and Jackson, 2001). The total theory of the speaker is what needs to be taken into consideration rather than analyses of singular units of the language. A logical positivist would say that an analytic sentence is one that stays true irrespective of evidence, but Quine would declare that no sentence stays true forever. If a speaker wants to preserve their personal theory, then they would need to let go of some sentences even when they were previously assumed immutable or treated as definitions. Criticism of Quine’s rejection Circular rejection One of the key premises that Quine uses in his argument against the two dogmas is their circular character; one needs to understand necessity and synonymy in order to make sense of an analytic sentence. It is because of this reason that Quine suggests the abandonment of the theory as he believes that distinctions are obscure or that they lack any foundation. However, circular characteristics are common in almost all components of philosophy and ought not to be the basis of nullifying a certain school of thought. There is nothing erroneous about circularity if it is understood that beliefs often get their justification from other beliefs. If one does not hold certain beliefs to be basic, then language speakers will always find themselves regressing into an infinite number of possibilities. Quine was mistaken to assume that necessity and a priori character were interlinked (and formed a vicious circle), since it is possible for a statement to have one and not the other. For instance, one can say that the atomic number for hydrogen is (1) one but it is not possible to justify this analytically since it is not necessary to logically do so. On the other hand, it is necessary as a first principle, so its reliance on an apriori nature is not really that significant (McCarty, 1998). Sometimes, first principles or theories actually rely on intuitions and assumptions, and the contents of those assumptions are what one would treat as apriori justification. In this regard, it is mistaken to assume that necessity predicates analyticity, so for this reason the circularity argument looses a lot of credibility. Most philosophers are actually not greatly disturbed by circularity because a number of them have always encountered them when handling topics like consciousness, existence or even causation. Revisability of beliefs The second objection to the logical positivist school was there was no epistemological basis for the rejection of analytic sentences since all sentences are interconnected. Quine held that it is possible to revise all beliefs, so the reliance that logical positivists had on empirical verification was self-defeating. A critic can say that this verification procedure may also apply to Quine and his theory since he is also subject to the same revisions that he firmly supports. The above philosopher endorsed the notion of holistic verification, but it is possible to turn around his suppositions on his own views. Suppose a theory exists that takes into account holistic verification and another does not; if these theories make the same observational forecasts then different inferences may be made about them. The claims in the theory with the holistic verification would be assumed to hold no significance to one’s understanding of reality. On the other hand, the theory without holistic verification would be used to make more sense of the world because every single truth is analyzed individually. In this regard, one may argue that Quine’s theory has minimal implications on one’s understanding of the world and hence philosophy in general. The thinker’s assertions rest on the need to maintain simplicity or least disturbance, so claims and predictions will often add nothing to their world (Chalmers and Jackson, 2001). It should be noted that Quine’s attacks were highly useful in shedding light on some of the dogmas that plagued the positivist school of thought. However, his proposals are not effective in shielding themselves from the very problems he was guarding against in logical positivism. Quine did not have a helpful criterion against which to make revisions in any system of language, so he replicated the same flaws that were evident in the logical positivism school of thought. His work was quite successful in pointing out mistakes among other people’s work but was not sufficient to act as a replacement for what was still needed at the time. Analysis of the criticisms The first criticism focuses on negating the notion that circular outcomes are not substantive enough to eliminate the need for analytic truths. One is inclined to support this criticism because philosophic history has shown that sometimes-circular reasoning is not undesirable always. In some scenarios, it is inevitable to employ circular reasoning and when proof can be found for those assumptions then the argument is not fallacious. Standards are needed in scientific work because without them one would find it difficult to make sense of certain things (Kripke, 1980). The priori beliefs often act as a starting point upon which one may look for evidence to support those assumptions; for abstract concepts like existence, it is inevitable for one to select such standards. A truth can work as non-fallacious in a circular argument if the component does not simply rely on the assumptions that it is trying to make. Instead, it must strengthen itself by getting extra information from other parts to render credibility to the conclusion. Adherents who believe in the distinction between analytic and synthetic truth usually start with arguing against their assumption and looking for things to show it is true. This explains why they depend on empirical testing for singular sentences, yet Quine appeared not see the merit in this scientific or positivist method. Logical positivists first ask what is it that they need to have in place in order for all other things to make sense. It is true that circular reasoning appears to occur in the logical school but this is done consistently and contributes to the discovery of other knowledge (Soames, 2005). One ought not to reject a useful theory such as the one above because of a concept that is regular and common to philosophical thought but is often necessary to move things forward. Quine’s attack on radical reductionism appears to be well intended because strong grounds exist for the support of semantic holism as proposed by the philosopher. A sentence is best understood through its interrelations to others, and this has implications on a person’s theory of language. The objection makes sense thus far because it illuminates a grave oversight on the part of logical positivists; they ignored the fact that it takes more than experience for statements to make sense (Quine, 1991). Sentences are often mediated by other facts and theories that have been used over time and may not necessarily relate to statements that mirror reality. One should note that Quine did not eliminate the need the need for evidence in his explanations; he acknowledged their importance but put them in the context of an entire theory. This shows that he did stay true to the school of thought that he identified with; that is positivism, but still acknowledged that other forces may come into play. No doubt exists on this scholar’s contributions concerning the weakness of the radical reductionist premise; however, one cannot ignore the fact that his theory is itself not immune to revision. It makes sense for critics to raise this issue since it takes a lot for a person to revise their entire system, yet Quine makes it appear that it is a relatively simple process. One is also inclined to believe criticism against Quine’s attack on reduction because changing one’s mind about analytical sentences sometimes implies altering an entire language. The practicalyity of achieving this is not as effortless as the philosopher might think, so on this basis it may be imperative to look for other explanations. One is also inclined to believe the above criticism against Quine’s attack because of the nature of beliefs; not all beliefs are actually revisable. If one thinks about some notions like the laws of logic, one cannot simply wished them away and replace them with other more convenient beliefs. The so-called analytic truths are sometimes impossible to revise because without them even scientific disciplines would cease to exist. Conclusion Quine was indeed a powerful philosopher who pointed out inconsistencies in the empirical school of thought; his objections against circular reasoning as well as radical reductionism are well intended and insightful. However, criticisms against him imply that his theories were not adequate to replace what he was opposing in the first place. The acknowledgement that all statements or beliefs can be revised implies that the same relativist paradigm may be applied in his theory and be used to render him powerless. Additionally, one of his two dogmas is not necessarily a bad thing because it is needed to move things along even in other aspects of philosophy. References Chalmers, D.J. (2004). Epistemic two-dimensional semantics. Philosophical Studies, 118, 153-226. Chalmers, D.J. and Jackson, F. (2001). Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation. Philosophical Review, 110, 315-61. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003). Theory and reality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Harvard: HUP. McCarty, P. (1998). Intuitionism. London: Routledge. Pryor, J. (2007). Uncertainty and undermining. Retrieved from http://www.jimpryor.net/research/papers/Uncertainty.pdf Quine, V. (1991). Two dogmas in retrospect. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21, 265-274. Quine, V. and Carnap, R. (1990). Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap correspondence and related work. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Schwitzgebel, E. (2008). The unreliability of naïve introspection. Philosophical Review, 4, 66-72. Soames, S. (2005). Philosophical analysis in the twentieth century. Princeton: PUP Read More