Fear is Inauthentic Anxiety - Term Paper Example

# 3: Fear is Inauthentic Anxiety Introduction The ment that, “fear is inauthentic anxiety” highlights that anxiety isa primordial phenomenon that devolves into fear the moment it relates to an object; the experience of anxiety is highlighted as central to the inner truth of the human being. In the same way as fear, Heidegger’s perception on anxiety acknowledges presence of threat. Heidegger is keen to highlight that anxiety is deficient of an object (nothing), which reveals itself exclusively as a threat. The experience of anxiety avails a privileged into the deeper truth of the human being. Fear and anxiety can be regarded as pivotal in philosophy, art, and literature; however, fear and anxiety are frequently confused, partially because the two are intertwined. The two terms can be easily differentiated: fear makes reference to certain object or situation, while anxiety represents a state of mind (mood) with its object and/or origin is never concise and is a source of anguish for the individual experiencing the emotion. The paper explores the claim that, “fear, is anxiety, fallen into the ‘world’, inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself,” and formulates arguments in favor against the claim. Discussion It is essential to recognize that phenomenological analysis of the form of intentionality that accompanies moods does not simply register a passing adjustment of the psyche, but rather discloses crucial fundamental elements of the self. For instance, the element of threat yields to fear, which makes individuals perceived some places of the world as more threatening, or some individuals vulnerable. Anxiety and fear are mainly distinguished to diverse degrees in psychology and philosophy. Fear manifests based on some danger or threat around a person’s self, whether precise or imprecise, but definitely known. Anxiety, on the other hand, conveys an ontological situation that is atypical to the individual’s quintessence indicating uncertainty or nothingness (Heidegger190). Nevertheless, is essential to appreciate that, the fact that the object is irresolute does not necessarily imply that it I connected to a certain situation. A frightened individual usually acts as per the situation, irrespective of whether the source of the fear is unknown, even in instances in which the case of fright remains tentative. The fact that fear manifests devoid of any distinct source signify that fear avails itself as an occasion of achieving freedom, whereby the context is solely distinct to man. Fear presents man with the opportunity to choose to be free. The crucial motives that stimulate anxiety details that man falls short to decide to which course the case will yield, which is not relatively a simple choice since it presents the duty to experience freedom. The Dialectical character of Anxiety The dialectical character of anxiety can be cited as the core drive that renders the terminological distinction between fear and anxiety essential. As such, anxiety appear to be awarded a special status, when interpreted from the perspective of fear, whereby anxiety is understood to represent a certain form of fear typified only by the lack of immediate object. There is no doubt that a concise distinction between anxiety and fear is highly difficult given that, an individual in a situation evidently lacking any danger might anticipate future dangers and respond to them the same way as to immediate physical threats. Hence, a differentiation between anxiety and fear will have to put into consideration the legitimacy of the anticipatory anxiety-fantasies. In the event that anxiety is defined based on the perspective of the phenomenon, then it should be perceived as a disposition or attitude of flight. If fear represent fearful of something that is particular and determinate, anxiety can then be conceived to represent being anxious about nothing definite and is therefore indeterminate. Hence, anxiety is manifest in the face of something that is entirely indefinite, which Heidegger terms as “nothing and nowhere.” Anxiety manifests in response to circumstances of identified threat and can be regarded as a consequent sense of helplessness, isolation, and vulnerability. Fear, on the other hand, represents a response to a known object. The temporality of fear renders it counterintuitive since it is heralded by a threatening object that appears to be a future evil. Similarly, the fear represents something concisely about oneself as being within the world in which the threatening object has been divulged as manifest. By mere the fact that the fearing subject ought to await or undertake something to avert the threat only demonstrates the inauthenticity of the state of mind that is connected to the real events of the world (Capobianco and William 54). Fear temporalizes itself inauthentically since it is grounded on making-present of self that has abandoned its authentic state. Anxiety, on the other hand, can be regarded as authentic since the about which and before which individuals are anxious are analogous. Hence, the perception of anxiety is not necessarily a phenomenon of anticipating and the feeling of anxiety heralds the self to its uncanniness. The differentials between anxiety and self derive from the divergences between authentic and inauthentic selves. As such, fear can be contextualized as overwhelming the self, while anxiety frees the self form the possibilities. Anxiety and fear are critical features that shape an individual’s ontological meaning; hence, anxiety and fear should contextualized on the basis of ontological experiences that shapes the forms and features of being, which accompany an individual throughput life. The term anxiety implies a critical case that is inclusive of the mayhem of everyday life, as well as the anxiety of the existential security that individuals carries themselves within their self throughput their lives. Anxiety relates to the apprehensiveness since it is connected to daily troubles, as well as the emergence of notions of nihility and nothingness of existence. As such, anxiety is a pertinent concept in relation to fear, since like fear, it conveys a characteristic feature that signifies the being and essence of humans in the world. Heidegger has highlighted the significance of anxiety insofar as it is connected to freedom and has maintained a strict separation of anxiety and fear. Heidegger view on fear details that, fear caries with the division between what is feared and the fearing itself. Conversely, anxiety is triggered not by some entity in the world, but rather by Dasein’s own existence. Anxiety represents the state-of-mind that renders it possible the attainment of the insignificance of the world that Dasein finds itself. Heidegger positions fear in such a manner that it can be distinguished from anxiety and appear to demonstrate certain connectedness that is lacking within the inter-connected perceptions if anxiety. The contrast between anxiety and fear (not a ground mood) that is provided by Heidegger Implies that, when an individual is afraid of something, he or she fears for oneself, which is only possible is an individual already matters within a certain way. Nevertheless, the forms of mattering that allow fear do not foster an adequate recognition of individuals as human beings. Anxiety eliminates the forms of concern that render fear possible since one cannot be anxious and afraid simultaneously given that the possibility of fear necessitates that the possibilities made evident by anxiety remain concealed. Anxiety plays a central role in shaking individuals out of pervasive self-misinterpretation by eliminating the forms of significance that, mundane mood usually takes for granted. As such, anxiety fosters the possibility of having an authentic self-understanding based on the appreciation that individuals are not merely entities in the world whose behavior is directed by the public norms that individuals are uncultured. Heidegger also implies that anxiety is philosophically illuminating since it renders prominent the customarily presupposed structure of being-in-the world. According to Heidegger, anxiety is at the heart of authentic Dasein and plays a critical function in Being and Time. In his analysis of anxiety, Heidegger awards a critical methodological function within the analytic of Dasein in which anxiety is regarded as a mode of attunement where the ontological structure of existence is heralded in concise and simplified way. This derives from the fact that it is through anxiety that the self is disclosed, given that the Self remains transcendental and irreducible to the object-world. It is through moments of anxiety that individuals come to confront themselves and appreciate that which define them, which means that anxiety aids individuals to emerge as unique or authentic. Anxiety can manifest in multiple forms and can be the outcome of mental complexities, frustrations, stress, depression, or insanity; however, the central mode of existence requires to be examined and considered is an individual is to appreciate the whole meaning of a text (Wrathall 107). Heidegger perceived anxiety to represent angst, which is linked to the feeling of “uncanniness,” which represents a state of mind situated in Dasein (human being). The philosopher argued that anxiety is concealed, but carry the potential of shaking Dasein to the core. Heidegger argued that, “anxiety” contrasts with “fear” in the sense that an individual is afraid within the face of something. The interpretation if anxiety from the perspective of fear gives it a special status, whereby anxiety is understood as a certain mode of fear typified only by the nonexistence of an immediate object (Wrathall 106). As such, a concise distinction between fear and anxiety is highly difficult given that an individual within a circumstance that is devoid of any danger might expect future dangers and respond to them in concisely the same way to match immediate physical threats. The distinction between fear and anxiety may require appraisal of the legitimacy of the anticipatory anxiety-fantasies. In the event that anxiety is interpreted from the basis of the phenomenon of fear, then it can be equated to fear, or perceived as an outlook or solicitation to behavior. Heidegger differentiates between fear and anxiety viewing them as “kindred phenomena.” Fear and anxiety can be considered as qualitatively analogous, since they possess analogous ontological root; however, the two are not the same in actuality. The conversion from anxiety to fear, presuppose that anxiety, in the same way fear, can be considered a reaction to threat. Heidegger viewed anxiety as an essential element of living an authentic life. Authenticity, in this case, represents the level to which one remains true to high or her own spirit, personality, or character. For Heidegger, authenticity is a distinctly temporal structure and a procedure of unfolding possibility or a state of being that is congruent, active, dynamic, contemplative, and teleological. Authenticity represents the process of becoming uniquely and idiosyncratic subjective. Heidegger’s account can be regarded as unclear and/or an understatement, and can be regarded as highly plausible. One of the pending issues not covered by the statement relates to whether and how Heidegger’s “anxiety” can be differentiated form various forms of experiences that individuals undergo when they have depression. The anxiety highlighted by Heidegger appears to be a brief episode, instead of being an enduring state. Fear usually manifests in the “face of something” or in response to an object and he who fears is usually afraid and caged to the mood. Anxiety, on the other hand, usually manifests in the “face of” (anxiety for), rather than in the “face of this or that thing.” This is akin to struggling with something within the dark, but the subject is unaware of what it is. The anxiety that individuals experience is rarely an object of consciousness that individuals can focus on, instead it manifests as a profound, inner state of their being that makes itself felt devoid of conceptual thought. Conclusion The feeling of anxiety can be regarded as a critical aspect of the human being. Anxiety, unlike fear, possesses no object since one can fear something, but not necessarily experience anxiety about something concrete. I concur with Heidegger on the issue of relation between anxiety and fear, especially on the assertion that anxiety is a primordial phenomenon. I concur that, anxieties, as opposed to fear, is not essentialized by any external object, and derives from the inner world of man. Anxiety, in the same way as fear, an individual may grasp self as threatened or vulnerable, but as opposed to fear, anxiety possesses no direct object. This derives from the fact that anxiety pulls the individual out of the circuit, which means that individuals are no longer “geared into” the world. The feeling of anxiety may also make individuals to perceive that they are alienate from the world since individuals are no longer practically involved; indeed, anxiety downplays the taken-for-granted sense of things sense of things to the extent of the things becoming absurd. Works Cited Capobianco, Richard, and William J. Richardson. Engaging Heidegger. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010. Print. Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper Perennial, 2008. Print. Wrathall, Mark. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time.’ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Print. Read More