Retrieved from https://studentshare.org/philosophy/1528748-philosophy-of-emotion
https://studentshare.org/philosophy/1528748-philosophy-of-emotion.
In view of the prolifertion of incresingly fruitful exchnges between reserches of different stripes, it is no longer useful to spek of the philosophy of emotion in isoltion from the pproches of other disciplines, prticulrly psychology, neurology nd evolutionry biology. While it is quite impossible to do justice to those pproches here, some sidelong glnces in their direction will im to suggest their philosophicl importnce.In this ppr I will criticlly nlys th concpt of motion s it is rfrrd by svrl rsrchs nd philosophrs.
I will py spcific ttntion to th dfinition of motion by Solomon nd Russll who invstigtd th phnomnon profoundly nd from diffrnt prospctiv s th mjority of uthors. Philosophrs hv bn concrnd nd oftn worrid bout th ntur of motion sinc Socrts nd th "prSocrtics" who prcdd him, nd lthough th disciplin hs grown up s th pursuit of rson, th motions hv lwys lurkd in th bckground, s thrt to rson, s dngr to philosophy nd philosophrs, s just plin unrsonbl. Prhps tht is why on of th most nduring mtphors of rson nd motion hs bn th mtphor of mstr nd slv, with th wisdom of rson firmly in control nd th dngrous impulss of motion sfly supprssd, chnnlld or, idlly, in hrmony with rson.
But nowhr hv th unruly nd thrtning powr of th motions bn mor t odds with wht hs oftn bn clld "rson" thn in th rlm of justic, whr both compssion nd its vicious "ngtiv" countrprt, vngfulnss, hv bn condmnd s disruptiv, irrlvnt nd, t worst, downright dngrous (Jms, 1889).Robert Solomon (1980) spurred both interest nd opposition with his provoctive thesis tht emotions re judgments, lbeit judgments of prticulr kind, chrcterized by their mode of hste nd their evlutive content. Under the influence of (Srtre 1948), he lso dopted the view tht emotions could be understood s strtegic choices, collectively driven by the gol of protecting nd enhncing self-esteem (Solomon 1984).
In his more recent work he hs lso written bout the emotionl dimension of justice, nd dvocted n enrichment of emotion theory through cross-culturl perspectives nd the integrtion of scientific perspectives (Solomon 1999).Th rgumnts tnd to focus on th llgd "cpriciousnss" nd "prjudic" of motions, lthough, ltrntivly, thy r ttckd for thir "intrctibility" nd thir stupidity. On th on hnd, consrvtivs lov nothing mor thn to lmbst th "do-goodrs" nd "blding hrts," nmly thos who xprss thir flings rthr thn stick by som bstrct nd oftn ruthlss, but in ny cs "hrd-hdd" thory.
On th othr hnd, thr is th g-old insistnc on "th rul of lw," shrd by both librls nd consrvtivs, which insists on "not rturning vil for vil," nd, ccordingly, th forswring nd condmntion of rvng. But compssion nd rvng r but two sids of th sm coin, nd ginst th wisdom tht gos bck to Plto. Rson is not th mstr hr, nor should it b. (Nor, of cours, should it b slv.) Wht must b shown is tht th motions do not nd should not ply n infrior rol in dlibrtions bout justic, nd tht it is fls tht motions r mor primitiv, lss intllignt, mor bstil, lss dpndbl, nd mor dngrous thn rson.
Rson nd motion r not two conflicting nd ntgonistic spcts of th soul. Rtionl motions constitut justic, which is nithr dispssiont nor mrly motionl. "I hd been dvised erly in life tht sound decisions cme from
...Download file to see next pages Read More