Francis Fukuyama' s idea of human dignity - Essay Example

Thesis ment: Francis Fukuyama is able to stress out the ways in which man is benefiting from the surfacing of biotechnology as he d in his emergent theory with this idea it is possible to reconcile his idea with Surowiecki with regard to maintaining human dignity amidst man's continuous use of biotechnology. Francis Fukuyama pronounced that man has not yet reached the end of history for man has not yet reached the end of science. The discussion of the consequences of biotechnology does comprise the strongest part of Fukuyama's latest book. The author is popular for his statements on biotechnology and human dignity more than a decade ago that, because the other possibilities to liberal egalitarianism had pushed themselves, history as we knew it was at a conclusion. Fukuyama's objective is not simply to describe the consequences of biotechnology, but to insist that biotechnology suggests unwelcome consequences both the designation of man and the existing communal structure. Fukuyama promotes that government institutions should be recognized to assess and standardize biotechnological innovations. The revolution of biotechnology as an emergence of progress and development is very evident with the rise into power of the breakthroughs in the pharmaceutical industry wherein medicines are now aimed not only to cure diseases but also to improve the existing normal conditions. For example, Prozac is used by people who are not depressed to increase confidence and reduce shyness; Ritalin is used by adults who do not have attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder to increase their capacity to focus attention for sustained periods; and the antinarcoleptic Modafil is used by long-distance truck drivers who do not have narcolepsy to reduce their need for sleep. Nanotechnology is responsible for genetic modifications giving man the power to create their ideal man by selection of traits that affects the genetic makeup of future offspring. In vitro fertilization together with preimplantation genetic diagnosis now makes it possible to avoid the implantation of embryos with genes for serious disease or to select for sex. Human cloning has been a long-term debatable topic when it comes to biotechnology. There has been a widespread opposition to it. Many commentators have expressed a wide variety of concerns about these advances, such as their very worrisome potential to increase inequalities between those who can afford genetic enhancements for their children and those who cannot. It is unquestionable that our equal moral status, or worth, rests on certain properties we share, or as Fukuyama puts it, on our common human nature. Few argue that it is morally wrong to kill bacteria; presumably this is because the bacteria lack these properties. Fukuyama defines human nature as "the sum of the behavior and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental factors." (Fukuyama, 217) It's worth noting that by this definition, human nature is an empty concept, because no human behavior or characteristic arises only from genetic rather than environmental factors-all are the result of complex interplay of those factors. But setting this difficulty aside, what is the common nature that could ground our human dignity and rights Fukuyama argues that it is the way language, reason, moral choice and emotions combine in humans that gives us human dignity. Our dignity rests on what he calls Factor X, "some essential human quality underneath [contingent and accidental characteristics] that is worthy of a certain minimal level of respect." (Fukuyama, 136) This "human essence" is a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts: If what gives us dignity and a moral status higher than that of other living creatures is related to the fact that we are complex wholes rather than the sum of simple parts, then it is clear that there is no simple answer to the question, What is Factor X That is, Factor X cannot be reduced to the possession of moral choice, or reason, or language, or sociability, or sentience, or emotions, or consciousness, or any other quality that has been put forth as a ground for human dignity. It is all of these qualities coming together in a human whole that make up Factor X. Every member of the human species possesses a genetic endowment that allows him or her to become a whole human being, an endowment that distinguishes a human in essence from other types of creatures. Now, the claim of this last sentence is false-some humans have been left so impaired by their genetic endowment that they lack capacities for language or reason or emotion necessary to become a "whole human being" in this sense. Thinking along these lines raises serious problems about whether such people possess human dignity. Admittedly, though, determining the moral status of this group presents difficulties for any secular view, not just Fukuyama's. Fukuyama is concerned that any future advances in biotechnology that allow self-modification of "our complex evolved natures" could "disrupt either the unity or the continuity of human nature, and thereby the human rights that are based on it." (Fukuyama, 89) I believe that this concern is misplaced. Our species, like other species, is continually evolving, and it is unnecessary to freeze it in place to protect human dignity and human rights. Obviously, we shouldn't modify humans in ways that would destroy or seriously impair important human capacities. Enhancements, like treatments, will have risks and uncertainties that need to be adequately minimized before they are employed, and the risk-benefit ratio will often be less favorable than for treatments of serious disease. But suppose that a trait such as memory could be genetically enhanced so that everyone could have a "photographic" memory, or that everyone could be brought up to what is now the high end of the normal range of intelligence. What reason would there be to think that such enhancements would interfere with human nature in a way that threatens human dignity If anything, wouldn't they increase human dignity I believe that modifying what Fukuyama calls the "unity and continuity" of human nature need not threaten human dignity and human rights if the safety and efficacy of the modification have been adequately established and if enhancement of a desirable trait is the result. Our Posthuman Future is a well-written and accessible discussion of advances in biotechnology and their social, ethical, legal and regulatory implications. "Social scientists who study juries often differentiate between two approaches juries take ... evidence-based and verdict-based."(Surowiecki, p.286) I see Surowieck's arguments supporting the case that boards and governing bodies should have a real social, gender, ethnic and skill mix. This isn't "political correctness" or just "tokenism" (although it can be, if done badly) - it is a vital contribution to making decision-making more effective. According to James Surowiecki's new book The Wisdom of Crowds, large groups of people are simply smarter than a few experts. To quote a basic example, two hundred students were asked to rank items by weight. The group's estimate was 94% accurate, better than all but five of the individual guesses. Many such experiments are cited by Surowiecki, where individual guesses were aggregated, then averaged. "The simplest way to get reliably good answers is just to ask the group each time," says Surowiecki. Not only is the judgement of crowds good in laboratory settings and classrooms, but this applies in the real world as well. Evidence is cited from gambling, the stock market, and even in the development of the algorithm used by the Internet search engine, Google. (Surowiecki, 214) Surowiecki cites evidence that when comparing the problem-solving skills of groups of people, a group made up of some smart people and some not-so-smart always did better than a group comprised of smart people only. He explains that smart groups that are too much alike find it harder to keep learning, because each member is bringing less and less new information to the panel. Of course, homogeneous groups are great at doing what they do well - playing the piano, in this case. But they become progressively less able to investigate alternatives. In The Wisdom of Crowds, Surowiecki quotes the organisational theorist James G. March: "Bringing new members into the organization, even if they're less experienced and less capable, actually makes the group smarter simply because what little the new members do know is not redundant with what everyone else knows." (Surowiecki, 214) This gain does not come from the superior knowledge of the average new recruit. Recruits are, on average, less knowledgeable than the people they replace. The beneficial effect comes from their diversity. Although Surowiecki considers committees, juries and teams - and even beauty contests - he neglects to consider the minefield that surrounds the judging of musical events. That's a pity. Surowiecki's book should be required reading for all music competition organisers. For example: two-thirds of all foremen are men, yet during deliberations they talk more than women do. Conclusion: Fukuyama sees these advances in biotechnology as carrying an immense threat. If he is indeed correct that the biological revolution endangers the equal moral worth of human beings-what he calls their human dignity and human rights-then the menace truly is profound. Recognizing the limitations of our understanding of genetic complexity, we should approach any possible genetic modifications the same way we approach new medical interventions or pharmaceuticals-with appropriate caution and prior research. Surowiecki argues that juries are either verdict-based (starting with the verdict and working back) or evidence-based. He also points to the influence on group decisions of the status and talkativeness of individual group members. In making small groups work better Surowiecki stresses the importance of diversity of group members. This militates against "groupthink" and improves the chances of a "devil's advocate" emerging who can challenge and test the evidence and recommendations being put forward. With this idea of Surowiecki regarding juries and committees and Fukuyama's concern about human dignity, it can be concluded that biotechnology can be considered safe for the usage of man as long as the regulation and control of its research and implementation does not lie only with a few intelligent individuals, such as scientists, in order to decrease the probability of biotechnology working ony for a group of people instead for the majority. REFERENCES: Fukuyama, Francis. Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. 1st. Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2002. Surowiecki, James. Committees, Juries, And Teams: The Columbia Disaster And How Small Groups Can Be Made To Work. 1st. New York: Doubleday, 2004. Read More