Theory of Knowledge - Essay Example

?Theory of Knowledge INTRODUCTION Philosophy and its idealism is often argued to have a whale of a difference from any other doctrine, especially those which are based on scientific realms; but at the same time, it is valued for its contributions in human understanding of subjective aspects that cannot be explained by means of set formulas and rules. Undoubtedly, it rewards the freedom of thinking, arguing, assessing and underpinning one’s thoughts and beliefs of envisioning a particular experience in its perceived ideal form. These idealisms, although often happen to be unrealistic, act in the rudiments of shaping the views of humans towards the life experiences and hence are laudable in their own unique manner. The sole purpose of philosophical idealisms also poses a major influence in dignifying its worthiness in the human society, which clearly avows that educating is not the purpose of philosophy, but the purpose is to develop understanding (Hacker 2005, 7-12). Yet, this principle notion of philosophy does not advocate it’s obsolescing from the reality or reasonability. With reference to Socrates’ method to verify the reasonability of a philosophical idealism, one should emphasize the underlying meaning of the words and the association of truth with the idealized thought (Davis 2011, 19-20). Plato also argued that the real worthiness of philosophical idealism lies in delivering a true meaning of the opinions formed and the knowledge gained from reality (Howe 2006, 1). Astonishingly, assertions made by Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his most debated work, “On Certainty”, lacks in terms of adjusting with the praxis of reasonability, as described in the Socratic method and even befitting with the essence of ‘true knowledge’ avowed by Plato. In Wittgenstein’s notes, which was later published as a book by G. E. M. Anscombe, following his death, claims have been made to counter the significance of habitual as well as perpetual doubts practiced in contrast to every aspect of philosophic idealisms. One of his notes thus proclaimed, “From its seeming to me - or to everyone - to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it” (Wittgenstein 1969, 140). In his notes, Wittgenstein also argued that such practices must be rejected in most cases, if not in all; because doubts, as a form of philosophical skepticism, entrench into the beliefs in a radical form, contradicting the same ideology that articulated the grounds of those doubts. In his another note, Wittgenstein postulates, The statement “I know that here is a hand” may then be continued: “for it's my hand that I'm looking at.” Then a reasonable man will not doubt that I know. - Nor will the idealist; rather he will say that he was not dealing with the practical doubt which is being dismissed, but there is a further doubt behind that one. - That this is an illusion has to be shown in a different way (Wittgenstein 1969, 141). Many critics have thus far argued in contradiction as well as in agreement to these connotations. What remains common in most of these theses is the lack of understanding of Wittgenstein’s idealism, which is apparent in the way it is portrayed with some shallow illustrations. Perhaps, it is this gap that gave rise to the limitations of Wittgenstein’s arguments in contrast to the significance of philosophical skepticism. THESIS STATEMENT The lacuna of Wittgenstein’s arguments contrary to the practice of making doubts in philosophical ideologies becomes apparent when it is measured on the basis of Plato’s as well as Socrates’ methods of deriving a worthy result within the realm of philosophy. Based on this understanding, the thesis will argue that Wittgenstein’s idealism, as translated by G. E. Moore, lacks owing to its nature of fallacy being idealized on the basis of illustrations that either represent a universal truth or exemplify incontrovertible aspects to which, no contradictions apply as those are already proven, justified and accepted. In other words, Wittgenstein’s arguments made in his book “On Certainty”, explain one side of the coin and that too in a vague manner, rendering almost no reference to subjective areas which are paradoxical in nature. Thus, they could have been appropriate illustrations to advocate the notion. Another limitation of the ideology is its ignorance to justify those dimensions of philosophical idealism where doubts can be applied; as it argues that in most cases, practicing doubts is undeserving, and thus should be avoided. This thesis aims to provide a critical justification to these counter claims made in contrast to Wittgenstein’s connotations in “On Certainty”. With this aim, the thesis will initially provide a brief elaboration to the views of Wittgenstein as portrayed in the book, followed by the bases to refute the ideology. To offer an in-depth and evenhanded justification of the counter claims made in this thesis, rationalities that can support the arguments made by Wittgenstein will also be studied. These counter claims and rationalities will further be compared and contrasted to derive a comprehensive conclusion to verify the reasonability of Wittgenstein’s philosophical ideology. WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEWS “ON CERTAINTY” Idealisms presented through the book titled “On Certainty”, which is based on and intends to give an explanation on behalf of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notes, can be argued to be strongly influenced by its history of publication. This book presents a biblical explanation to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notes, which he had left behind in the residence of G. E. M. Anscombe in Oxford. After his death, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright published Wittgenstein’s notes in the book in a translated form. These notes unfortunately lacked any particular date that would prove the context based on which, these ideologies took shape. Nevertheless, it was apparent that Wittgenstein had been working on these unpolished notes until his death in 1951. One main reason to give an account of the history of the book is that it shall be helpful in postulating the underlying gap in what Wittgenstein might have intended to explain and the explanations given in the book. In simple words, as the notes were raw materials giving random understanding of the thoughts or ideals in pursuit of Wittgenstein’s philosophy on certainty and its liaison with philosophical skepticism in the form of doubts, substantial limitations can be witnessed in the postulations. This gap further gives rise to vagueness in the conceptual notions presented in the book (Wittgenstein 1969). The book contains a total of 192 points, which apparently postulates the gradual precision that Wittgenstein aimed to depict in his writing. Throughout these notes, Wittgenstein also avows his agreement and contradiction with that of the other philosophists, mainly those postulated by G.E. Moore. Thus, it can be assumed that the notes of Wittgenstein, which have been comprehended in the book, were in reply to G. E. Moore’s thoughts in favor of philosophical skepticism. To be noted in this regard, Moore argues that skepticism is a means to rationalize the reasonability of a particular idealism and in every instance it is likely to yield better understanding to a given notion. According to Moore’s arguments, skepticism derives moral and normative judgments to a philosophical notion and thus is necessary (Hurka, “Moore's Moral Philosophy”). In reply to Moore’s arguments, Wittgenstein states that “Doubting the existence of the external world” does not mean for example doubting the existence of a planet, which later observations proved to exist. - Or does Moore want to say that knowing that here is his hand is different in kind from knowing the existence of the planet Saturn? Otherwise it would be possible to point out the discovery of the planet Saturn to the doubters and say that its existence has been proved, and hence the existence of the external world as well (Wittgenstein 1969, 141). Emphasizing the postulations of Moore on his philosophy of eternal world in light of skepticism, Wittgenstein connected certainty in contrast to skepticism. It was thus argued by Wittgenstein that not all inferences drawn by philosophists are based on false premises. Therefore, doubting everything around and questioning every aspect of the philosophical notion shall result in nothing but wastage of energy, especially in cases where the rudimental arguments have been based on true premises. Gradually, Wittgenstein also draws inferences on the difference between knowing and understanding, which grounds the arguments in contrast to philosophical skepticism. Apparently, not all Wittgenstein’s arguments are unrealistic or can be noted as an unintentional attempt to fallacy. For instance, his argument that a strong difference lies between one knowing and one understanding the similar concept, is quite rationally aligned with the previously proven philosophical concepts of reality, knowledge and understanding made by historic philosophists like Plato and Socrates (Fogelin 2006, 57-58). On the other hand, his complete ignorance towards the benefits and the worthiness of philosophical skepticism raises certain questions with reference to Wittgenstein’s thoughts regarding those applications where doubting will be appropriate (Reed, “Certainty”). Hence, the major limitation to Wittgenstein’s thoughts can be identified to be vagueness in his explanations to which, the publication history of the book, “On Certainty” might also have had an influence. REASONS JUSTIFYING THE REFUTATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S IDEALISM “ON CERTAINTY” At the onset, the vagueness in the illustrations rendered, along with the words or terminologies used by Wittgenstein in his notes, can be identified as the most apparent reason to counter his idealisms regarding certainty. For instance, in his notes, Wittgenstein argues the practice of skepticism and the corresponding connotations as a mere depiction of “language-game”. As was noted in his third note, “If e. g. someone says "I don't know if there's a hand here" he might be told “Look closer”. - This possibility of satisfying oneself is part of the language-game. Is one of its essential features” (Wittgenstein 1969, 140). Further explanations have been delivered on the definition of the term, “language-game” in Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations” with liaison to his arguments in contrast to philosophical skepticism. Illustrating the behavior of students repeating the names and other words spoken by their teachers, or in a much wider sense, followers repeating or following the same words and principles as that implemented and practiced by their leaders, Wittgenstein argued his thoughts regarding “language-games”. In a more precise form, Wittgenstein argued that “language-games” replicate a lifestyle or an activity practiced by almost every individual in their life (Wittgenstein 1958, 120-127). Few occurrences of “language-games”, as illustrated by Wittgenstein include: Giving orders, and obeying them— Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements — Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)— Reporting an event— Speculating about an event— (Wittgenstein 1958, 127) Drawing his inferences from his theoretical context of “Philosophical Investigations”, Wittgenstein argued that a person, familiar with the ‘language-game’ shall agree with the statement that “I know”, while another person acquainted with the same ability shall disagree with the statement. In Wittgenstein’s words, ““I know” often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement. Therefore, if the other person is acquainted with the language-game, he would admit that I know. The other, if he is acquainted with the language-game, must be able to imagine how one may know something of the kind” (Wittgenstein 1969, 141). Apparently, this particular premise raises considerable vagueness in contemplating the significance of ‘language-game’ to rule out the applicability of doubts or philosophical skepticism, when individuals acquainted with the same abilities can either agree or disagree to the statement. From a realistic perspective, is not agreeing with a statement and disagreeing with the same the only options available to a being? Rather, is it not that by playing a language-game, individuals act in pursuit to argue in favor and also against a particular statement to infer the ‘true meaning’ of the postulation? In this regard, arguing and doubting can be explained as analogous, which indicates the practice of philosophical skepticism as rational and at the same time, counters the claims made by Wittgenstein on the grounds of vagueness. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein has been successful in drawing a linkage between his description of ‘language-game’ and the concept of knowledge as applied in the doctrine of philosophy. By means of following the explanations rendered by others in the form of “language-game”, one can obtain knowledge of a particular happening, which he may further use to doubt another occurrence. This particular practice of applying the knowledge obtained from “language-game” to argue another statement can be linked with Moore’s concept of common sense. In precise, Moore’s arguments based on common sense had been in strong liaison with the concept of knowledge, where he argued that one must begin questioning or doubting a particular statement (often) disregarding any proof to his limited knowledge in pursuit to obtain firm evidence. Responding to this idealism of Moore, Wittgenstein further argued that the concept of certainty heralds both the notions of knowledge and skepticism; hence, the ability of an individual to define and identify what certainty is, lies upon his common sense. Wittgenstein also argued regarding the importance of judgmental abilities and capability of employing the appropriate concepts by practitioners in determining certainty of a particular postulation (McQuaid 2013, 2). If this particular notion is expanded to an extent, it becomes evident that knowledge applies to the common sense of practitioners, replicated through their selection of concepts along with judging whether a particular situation is certain. However, when it comes to the identification of which concept can be applied (given that there are many options available to the practitioner), it can be argued to be depending on the dubitability of the practitioner to question the applicability of the concepts adjoining the statements made and thereafter, deciding upon the employable concepts. It must also be affirmed in this regard that assuming practitioners, to possess knowledge from the beginning of defining a statement, to be certain, shall be unrealistic. In accordance, it shall be deemed as much justifiable to state that a practitioner is most likely to confirm a statement as certain, only when he doubts the underlying concepts. This particular argument can also be explained on the basis of Unger’s arguments focused on ‘certainty’ as an obsolete term. As can be observed at often instances, sentences which involve obsolete terms, relate closely with the sentences involving the term ‘certainty’ (Unger 2009, 5-6). For example, when an individual states to be certain that the Sun rises from the East, more than his possession of a tobacco pipe which can only be used for smoking, the individual can be argued as certain of neither happenings. It thus depends on the comparison prospects of the terms or the dubitability of the individual to test and verify a particular happening to be certain. In other words, certainty is subjective to doubts, which again depends on the knowledge of the individual to testify the certainty of a particular statement. Here, the knowledge of the individual is again depending on his cognitive capabilities, influencing his common sense to testify every aspect, prior to confirming it as certain and believing in it. This in itself advocates the significance of philosophical skepticism in contrast to the notion postulated by Wittgenstein. RATIONALES BEHIND THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS MADE BY WITTGENSTEIN “ON CERTAINTY” Irrespective of the limitations argued against the philosophical illustrations and inferences drawn by Wittgenstein in his book “On Certainty”, it has undoubtedly contributed to the formation of contemporary anti-skepticism philosophical understanding. Elaborating on various unconventional aspects of knowledge or epistemology, although in an uneven manner, Wittgenstein has been able to examine the “hinge” metaphor existing between knowledge, understanding and an individual’s intention to doubt a particular situation (Pritchard 2005, 6-7). In this regard, the proposition and premise claims made by Wittgenstein in support of anti-radical skepticism can be illustrated. In his words, When one says: "Perhaps this planet doesn't exist and the light-phenomenon arises in some other way", then after all one needs an example of an object which does exist. This doesn't exist, - as for example does... Or are we to say that certainty is merely a constructed point to which some things approximate more, some less closely? No. Doubt gradually loses its sense. This language-game just is like that. And everything descriptive of a language-game is part of logic (Wittgenstein 1969, 143-144). In his further postulations, Wittgenstein intends to make it clear that doubting itself is often based on epistemology that already exists and is conversed in a regular pattern so that an individual could apply his common sense in determining if a particular object is to be questioned or not. To be precise, an individual might barely intend to question anything which has been conveyed to him on repeated occurrences, such as truths regarding the existence of earth as a planet, sun and fire as a heat source and even that the person is a human being. Although these arguments render a wide scope of counter claims on the grounds that an individual even intends to verify these propositions. For instance, when asked if earth is a planet, one can attempt to verify if earth rotates around a star, i.e. sun; again, when confirming the certainty of sun and fire as a heath source, the individual may intend to testify the degree of warmth he feels when he is near to fire or in sunlight; similarly, when arguing on being a human, the individual may explain that he has organs of a human body including five senses. But all over again, the beliefs of the individual that planets always rotate around a star, his understanding of the feel of warmth and his certainty that a human body will have organs which are dissimilar to that of any other animal, are all based on his knowledge or epistemological proofs. This particular notion presented by Wittgenstein thus infers a “hinge” proposition of epistemology, which rotates around the various aspects of knowledge as perceived by an individual. Another rationalization of Wittgenstein’s arguments against the philosophy of radical skepticism can be identified with regard to Kant’s theory of common sense, in association with the theory of knowledge. Kant and Wittgenstein can be observed to perceive similar views when countering the propositions made by G. E. Moore, based on their theory of common sense. As per their postulations, common sense is something that generates from the cognitive ability of an individual. This cognitive ability is further influenced by the naturally in-built cognitive functionality of the individual. When it comes to dubitability of that individual and correspondingly when scientific assumptions fail to provide a just answer, common sense tends to be of great value in developing an understanding regarding a particular aspect (Coates 1996, 1-3). Indeed, Wittgenstein had been quite generous in depicting the values of common sense as a cognitive functionality of individuals, to frame his arguments against philosophical skepticism and thus inflate in response to G. E. Moore’s propositions in agreement with uncertainty. To be elaborated, Wittgenstein had stressed on the understanding of an individual to refute a particular proposition by doubting it or accepting the statement as true, screening no dubitability of the same. When this particular assumption is related with the theory of common sense presented by Kant and other modern philosophists, it can be expanded on the basis of the concept that these cognitive functionalities (argued by Wittgenstein) facilitate to form a radical understanding of an individual, which further develops his common sense. Wittgenstein, although vaguely, also intended to affirm that common sense of an individual might play a role in determining the statements to be countered or doubted and those which are to be excluded from their skepticism. It is in this regard that an individual shall be able to practice philosophical skepticism in worthy instances, rather than applying it radically in each and every statement conveyed to them; consequently, limiting the worthiness of doubting a subject matter or concern. Contextually, common sense, as a practice countering the notion of philosophical skepticism, can be argued as a procedure of rationalizing a particular statement on the basis of current beliefs possessed by an individual until adequate evidences are collected to abandon the presupposed thoughts (Coates 1996, 1-3). However, Wittgenstein lacks in explaining the relation between rationalization and dubitability of a particular statement, where both these terms can also be used in an analogous form. CRITIQUING THE RATIONALES The above discussed rationales to the propositions made by Wittgenstein in his book “On Certainty” are worthy to be regarded as a foundation to the unconventional decorum rendered towards anti-skepticism. Apparently, not all the propositions made by Wittgenstein are irrational or can be criticized of being insufficient to postulate a firm and precise premise in the philosophy of knowledge, understanding and common sense. Nevertheless, critiquing the propositions made by him, compared to the propositions made by other philosophists of the modern day era, it became perceptible that a “hinge” relation exists between these notions, where the determinant of one can cause rudimental effects on the other. Yet, vagueness in the postulation and limitation of the notes to provide elaborated understanding on the terms used, remains to be a major countering point when arguing against the anti-skepticism philosophy presented by Wittgenstein. Throughout his notes, Wittgenstein had made various remarks in reply to G. E. Moore’s philosophical proposition on common sense and skepticism. In doing so, the major inadequacy of the proposition has been its vagueness in justifying the terms appropriately and with clarity. As had been discussed above, Wittgenstein explains the concept of common sense with reference to his notion of ‘language-game’. Although this could have formed a valid inference to discuss the applicability of philosophical skepticism, the notes seemed to be inadequate to frame a discrete understanding of the two situations. In other words, situations where an individual accustomed with the ‘language-game’, restrains from doubting a particular phenomenon or happening or a statement, from those situations when he decides otherwise, has been elucidated in an indistinguishable manner. This certainly limits the rationality of the anti-skeptic propositions. Again, the forms through which, common sense or cognitive understanding of a person tends to satisfy his quench of proof and thereby restrict him to doubt a declaration, has also been observed as questionable on the grounds of rationality and clarity of the terms used. To be noted, even if Wittgenstein indicates the notion of common sense when elaborating on his theory of ‘language-game’, the interrelation seems to be weakly explained which lacks a firm establishment to counter G. E. Moore’s arguments in favor of philosophical skepticism. Even though Wittgenstein successfully exemplifies the ‘hinge’ relation working underneath the notions of understanding, common sense and dubitability, the notes lack to present a clear reason as to how this apparent ‘hinge’ relation counters philosophical skepticism in a radical manner. Nevertheless, his proposition that philosophical skepticism cannot always be used as a procedure of understanding or unveiling the truth has been quite apparent throughout the notes gathered in the book. In the philosophy of knowledge, considerable significance can be identified towards skepticism, in alliance with the notion of morality. As a conventional thought, skepticism assists an individual in querying the true meaning of terms used in a philosophical proposition and likewise, acquiring knowledge regarding the facts that are true. It is in this context that skepticism contributes towards morality when understanding a particular philosophical proposition (Erion and Smith 2002, 3-4). However, unfortunately, the notes of Wittgenstein biblically presented in the book, lack in terms of addressing the aspect of morality in relation to the significance of philosophical skepticism. CONCLUSION At the very beginning of the discussion in this thesis, inferences were drawn emphasizing the sole intention of philosophy in respect of the theory of knowledge. Accordingly, it was identified that it is the tendency of humans to question and doubt particular situations that has eventually assisted them in obtaining knowledge, although the intention of philosophical propositions in most cases is to develop understanding. This understanding is further developed on the basis of the clarity of terms used in a proposition of philosophical premises to frame the claim. However, as debated throughout the thesis, Wittgenstein’s elaboration fundamentally lacked clarity to submit a rational proposition against philosophical skepticism. It might be owing to the fact that the notes were unpolished when being complied in the book after the demise of Wittgenstein in 1951. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned in this context that neither are the postulations inferred by G. E. Moore acceptable on every ground, nor does that happen in the case of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s propositions. As revealed from the above discussion and critical analysis, Wittgenstein’s major weakness and setback lay in the vagueness of his propositions, and the consequent effects witnessed on its generalisability. For instance, where Wittgenstein argued that skepticism or in simple words, doubting every aspect shall not be worthy, he lacks in connoting the conditions or subjects regarding which the decision to agree or to doubt subsist. As often argued and agreed upon, certainty is a subjective aspect that might differ from person to person and on a situational basis. Wittgenstein’s arguments also fall short of a valid and elaborative explanation to this affirmation and thereby, fail in delivering an obvious account of the philosophy of anti-skepticism. Works Cited Davis, Jessica. “Being Participation: The Ontology of the Socratic Method.” Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis 33.1 (2011): 19-29. Print. Erion, Gerald J. and Smith, Barry. “In Defense of Truth: Skepticism, Morality, and The Matrix.” Philosophy and the Matrix, La Salle and Chicago: Open Court (2002): 16–27. Print. Fogelin, Robert J. Wittgenstein's critique of philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Web. 26 Aug. 2013. Read More