Human Limit and Contradictory Nature of Self-Identity - Essay Example

?Philosophy Chapter 4 of the book by Solomon, Higgins, and Martin begins with the quote from Alice in Wonderland where the Caterpillar questions the very importance of self (p. 285). In Carroll’s (1996) text, neither the caterpillar nor actually Alice care too much about their identities. They choose the selves they want to be, as if they were Sartrians, but in much more playful manner. Yet in one of the responses to the caterpillar Alice remarks: “Oh, I'm not particular as to size, only one doesn't like changing so often, you know” (Carroll, 1996). That means that there are still limits to human will. In this paper, I will be arguing for the contradictory nature of self-identity that establishes itself through choice, as Existentialists assert (Solomon, Higgins and Martin, 2011, p. 303), but necessarily encounters the opposition to its choice from the parts of the larger context (“Others”). I believe that the working momentary compromise between the assertions of human will (internal factors) and such external factors as natural circumstances, or the will of other(s), is a possible solution of the problem of self-identity. Such thinkers as Locke and Sartre strictly associated self with consciousness: Locke believed this because he relied on the separation of mind and substance (Solomon, Higgins and Martin, 2011, p. 291) while Sartre emphasized such act of consciousness as choice. This notion is very controversial for a number of reasons. Firstly, there are states of mind in which the present of self is either not registered or not controlled by ‘consciousness’, the ones that are conceptualized as different brain waves in contemporary neurology (Hall, 1998). Beta wave is associated with awake condition while alpha (relaxed) or theta (sleep) waves are slower in frequency, which prevents humans from performing the whole scope of actions they would be capable of in an awake state (Hall, 1998). However, a given brain remains the same in these conditions. Secondly, returning to the domain of philosophy, it is still unclear what is the entity that is responsible for the conscious decision (Solomon, Higgins and Martin, 2011, p. 293). This was one of Hume’s objections to Locke (Solomon, Higgins and Martin, 2011, p. 293) and could also be seen as an objection to Existentialist worldview in which “existence precedes essence” (Solomon, Higgins and Martin, 2011, p. 305), as in such states when something “essential” (if any) is not subjected to any existential choices. Still, the notion that self should be associated with choice appeals to me for the reason that ‘self’ is never alone. It might be asked why the question of self is needed at all. One of the possible answers lies in manifestations of identity. People usually establish their identities through either promoting positive (and selective) values and corresponding deeds or contradicting other conflicting ideas and deeds. It could be argued that there are the identities that are so widespread as to cover almost the whole human population. They might require openness to negotiation, like communitarianism (Jayaram, 2012); they can also broaden human self to other human and non-human creatures and other elements of material world, like this is done in deep ecology (Taylor, 2005, p. 457). However, communitarianism and deep ecology encounter opposition on the ground that they suppress diverse values (Taylor, 2005, p. 458). Coming back to the argument, if it is assumed that an identity is manifested through the difference with other identities, it becomes clear that identity is a matter of choice. The choice may be conscious (on which Sartre insisted) (Solomon, Higgins and Martin, 2011, p. 304) or unconscious, the notion introduced in psychoanalysis and partially covered by Hume in his debate with Locke (Solomon, Higgins and Martin, 2011, p. 293). Like Freud, Hume asserted that there is something in the work of human mind that makes it deceive itself (Solomon, Higgins and Martin, 2011, p. 294). This lack of control of human mind over itself is also grasped by Kant who claimed that the ability to become self-conscious is enough for selfhood (Solomon, Higgins and Martin, 2011, p. 298). Some of our choices, so widely used in advertisement and criticized in contemporary cultural studies, are entirely based on stereotypic patterns, and this is a human need, as the studies in psychology prove (Rosenberg, 2004). Moreover, many choices are informed by pressing circumstances, such as the need for birth control arising from climate change. Human and non-human others are usually involved in this process. “The Lexus Problem” is a perfect example of a choice (this time conscious) contradicted by the will of the Other. As Smith’s self is necessarily a part of the system in which the dealer (the Other) is also a part, his selfhood is consciously chosen within but compromised by an observer outside. Basically, he is the owner of Lexus because this is witnessed by the Other in front of whom the choice was made. The question whether Smith is accountable for his selfhood is not important, since this choice may have been unconscious. At the current moment, Smith establishes his identity through contradiction, not cooperation with the Lexus dealer; whatever the result of the situation will be, he has to do with the consequences of his previous choice. Thus, there is a sequence between his identities related to his choices and the choices of others. Thus, self is not limited to the entity that makes choice; rather, it is a compromised consequence of choices. Consciousness is just one of the factors in identity shaping process, sometimes very remote: for instance, one may not even be aware of the fear of bees from childhood when choosing to avoid the path to the bee garden, and yet, it is a choice that shapes one’s identity. Numerous studies from Freud’s to post-freudists’ prove that many human reactions are sub-consciously formed in childhood (Mitchell, 1996). In this paper, the functional approach to consciousness and identity is adopted: consciousness may be an agent of choice while identity is the manifestation of choice. Hence, self is a compromise resulting from choice. It becomes significant only when the need for an identity contradicting other identities arises. References Carroll, L., 1998. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. Project Gutenberg, [online] Available at: < http://www.literature.org/authors/carroll-lewis/alices-adventures-in-wonderland/> [Accessed 24 Jan 2013]. Hall, R., 1998. Stages of sleep, Psychology World, [online] Available at: < http://web.mst.edu/~psyworld/sleep_stages.htm> [Accessed 24 Jan 2013]. Jayaram, N., 2012. Identity, community, and conflict: a survey of issues and analyses. Economic & Political Weekly, 47(38), [online] (Last updated 22 Sept 2012) Available at: http://www.epw.in/survey/identity-community-and-conflict.html [Accessed 24 Jan 2013]. Mitchell, S. A., 1998. Freud and beyond: a history of modern psychoanalytic thought. New York: Basic Books. Rosenberg, E. L., 2004. Mindfulness and consumerism. In: Kasser, T. and Kanner, A. D., eds. Psychology and consumer culture: the struggle for a good life in a materialistic world. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association, pp. 107-125. Solomon, R. C., Higgins, K. M. and Clancy, M., 2011. Introducing philosophy: a text with integrated readings. New York: Oxford University Press. Taylor, B., 2005. Deep ecology. In: Encyclopedia of religion and nature, pp. 456-460. [online] Available at: http://www.religionandnature.com/ern/index.htm [Accessed 24 Jan 2013]. Read More