Personhood, Rationality and Morality - Essay Example

Personhood, Rationality and Morality The of personhood, rationality and morality is most often directly related to Derek Parfit, who is believed to be one of the most original writers of the century, who has contributed vastly to the field. His first ever book, Reasons and Persons, which was published in 1984 is one of the most popular books in this regard which has touched each of the aspects in detail after considering various conditions and possibilities relevant to various aspects of morality. He was a proponent of the reductionist views of morality, and thus criticized various other theories of morality and rationality. Parfit made use of various experiments and theoretical worldviews to prove the point that continuity and self doesn’t matter much, in fact what matters the most is the individuality and the morals behind it which are essential to the existence of humans. To prove the point, he conducted various experiments out of which the teletransportation case is the most popular one, the claims of which will be central to the discussion of the paper. Through this experiment, which is a well conceived one indeed, he manages to prove that the survival or death of a person doesn’t matter in any case, the individual personhood and the morals behind matter. Also, Parfit is a proponent of the Buddhist view of self and thus argues that personhood in itself holds no value especially when the morals aren’t yet intact (Nagel pp 31). Thus, the paper aims at arguing over the point by using the tenets of philosophical argumentation by using logic and consistency between arguments, relying on contemporary philosophy, he himself being one of the most prevalent contributors to the field of contemporary philosophy. The paper revolves around this context explaining and arguing over the teletransportation case, and drawing analogues with human morality and personalization. Parfit presents an imaginary story with two cases being discussed to prove the point, rather start a discussion about which case might be a closer contraception to reality. For this reason, it is crucial to first discuss the experiment and all the fundamentals attached with the experiment itself. The experiment suggests that a teletransporter is a device often quoted in fiction movies, which is used to send the human into Mars, as it enables one to move at the speed of light. According to the experiment, if I press the green button, I will be sent to Mars in several weeks after having travelled at the speed of light. I am rather nervous that in the course of travel I might lose my conscious more importantly my identity or brain or maybe my body, however as this experiment has been performed before, that is not a possibility. Thus, once I press the button, I find myself at Mars, and then back to earth. I have been going back and forth for quite some time now, thus I`m quite sure about the process and its results, and I don`t fear the loss of body or identity anymore, however during the course my mind and body is effected to some effect as I travel back and forth. However, this one time, I enter the cubicle and again press the green button as required by the process, but this time nothing happens. Thus, I step out of the cubicle and inquire from the attendant to see what might be wrong with the machine. As a response, he hands over a card which says that the new technology will allow the brain and body of the individual to stay back while a replica is sent to Mars. He can now also use the intercom to even talk to himself back at Mars, as both of them are rather the same. However, soon enough he discovers a problem recently discovered with the scanner, i.e. the system ought to leave some cardiac problems on the individual. This implies that though the health of the individual will be perfectly normal back at Mars, but on earth, he has only a few days left to live. Though some of the philosophers have argued that this case is of little importance when it comes to understanding the concepts of philosophy, while others agree slightly with the significance of this imaginary case to understand the concepts of personality of humans (Williams pp 31). In other words, there words indeed would have a little importance if humans weren’t being affected by such cases, and they wouldn’t have developed any reactions, but as a matter of fact, that doesn’t stand to be true so far. Thus, an analogue can be drawn with humans and emotions, as it is through such cases that humans discover their true self. On the face of it, these facts remain hidden, however, as time passes, humans discover such facts about life, and even themselves to actually reveal to themselves what is it that makes human similar this year and the next one and years to come. Now, the dilemma in the case needs to be discussed as that is what will become the beginning of the discussion over which claim actually stands to be true. In the first case, when simple teletransportation takes place, an organic replica is sent to Mars with me being back on earth and being able to talk to the replica on Mars. Thus, one may assume that the replica is me, since it lives my life on Mars, also, even it comes to earth people will automatically assume it`s me, owing much to the physical and psychological similarities. However, the proponents of science fiction in this case would argue that as soon as the button is pressed I die, and only what is left is my replica and not me. This was one case, and here when I know that I`m about to die, it is quite depressing to know. However in the second case, I talk to my replica, and his feelings, thoughts, and everything else is just like me. When I enlighten him with the fact that I`m about to die, he consoles me with same words which I had used earlier to console another friend, however, it is still enthralling to know that once I die, my replica will take my place and live my life with my kids and wife, which is still better than dying without a replica at all. Since, by the end of the story, my life and that of the replica turns out to be the same, this case is quoted by Parfit as the Branch-line case. This implies that the earth for me is a branch line, and once I leave my replica is all set to take my place. However, though there are similarities psychologically and physically, the replica is still not me. He may think like me and act like me, even respond like me, however he still is not me. He is another person, as he is not hurt when I`m hurt in either case. This is where Parfit`s claim comes in. In one case, where one assumes that dying is still as painful and depressing as the replica is another person, I believe that dying with a replica is not at all depressing rather relieving, and as good as a survival would be. To prove this proposition, he takes up different positions. The first position, being a very impactful one indeed is explained by virtue of numeric identity. This implies that every single entity in the world has a numeric identity and a qualitative identity. In the case of a replica, the replica and I are qualitatively identical while numerically very different as we are two different people. However, considering two billiard balls in this case, both are qualitatively similar but still are numerically different, however, if one of them is painted with another color, the qualitative similarity ceases to exist in such a case. To further prove the point, imagine a person had an accident, in this case, it won`t be fair to say that this person has changed, though his body might have changed but the character still remains to be the same, and it is this trait which makes him the person he is. Thus, it is clear that we are concerned with the numeric identity i.e. it would be wrong to say that I would change after marriage, though I might be a little different but it won`t be the case that I will die. The qualitative change however in some cases may destroy the numeric identity as well, and in such a case, it would be true to assume that person who went through an experience ceases to exist and is an entirely new person now. He further defends the position by asking certain questions about the nature of the person, i.e. what exactly is the nature of the person, and how does one differentiate between the nature of this person and another one, and the answers to both are indeed interrelated. Since, it is the nature which differentiates one person from another and not other material things, thus when one knows and is exposed to the nature of a being he can automatically differentiate as well. The nature, according to Parfin, is thus, self consciousness of an individual which one must be aware of, or become aware of with the course of time. This brings Parfin to the third question, i.e. the continuity of existence of a human over time, which makes him the same person even after many years have passed. This explains how having the same body and same heart doesn’t define the continuity, though can be a part of it, however, it is still the nature which makes the person same over the course of time (Jonathan pp 13). Thus, after much discussion and debate he comes to the conclusion that it is not the entire body which determines the course of continuity, rather the brain, and in fact only that part of brain which makes him the same person as he is. Thus, a person would be same only and if that part of brain, which makes him a person, remains same overtime, also in such a case, if this part remains the same it would wrong to say that such human has taken a branching from, therefore, in this context the challenge to explaining continuity is explained. Thus, in such a case, since replica possesses similar parts of brain which will remain same overtime, the death of one is survival of both and vice versa. Moreover, the case is further strengthened after using Locke`s description of memory to prove how me and my replica on Mars are the same. Locke gave the concept of short term memory, and experiential memory which has instances of continuity (Parfit and Samuel pp 21). This implies that, according to Locke, a person commits crime only when he has a memory of doing so, thus, if the memory is completely removed by taking punitive action, future course of actions can be reversed. Thus, Parfit uses this phenomena to explain the similarities between the replica and me. Since the replica has similar long term memories, it clearly implies that the reactions by both of them will be the same in any case, since the memories are the same as well, thus even if I may die the replica remains to live which is still the same as me living and thus it means survival of the original me. Thus, given the physiological and the psychological explanations for the simple teletransportation, the claims portrayed by Parfit seems to be true and thus coherent. In other words, if the replica in Mars continues to live while I die, it is the same as my survival as the physiological realities i.e. nature or the entity in the brain along with the long term memory remain to exist in any case, thus my death still means survival even if my replica remains to live. Works Cited: Parfit, Derek, and Samuel Scheffler. On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Jonathan Dancy, ed. Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Oxford: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. Read More