Do Persisting Objects Endure or Perdure - Essay Example

of the of the Concerned 25 February Do Persisting Objects Endure or Perdure? So far as the debate regarding the persisting material objects is concerned, the philosophers tend to segregate into two predominant groups that are commonly known as ‘four-dimensionalists’ and ‘three-dimensionalists’. Though there is the dearth of a single idea that specifically and discernibly defines these two groups, yet there exists the possibility to cull out some raw and tentative characterizations. The four-dimensionalists tend to hold that there is an analogy between the structure of space-time as envisaged by the modern physics and the structure of seemingly ordinary material objects (Sider 2001, p. 1). In contrast, the three-dimensionalists tend to put to question this analogy. As per the three-dimensionalists, the persisting things tend to wholly be present at the specific time at which they exist. Again, the four-dimensionalists totally reject this. As per the four-dimensionalists, the persisting objects exist through time by perduring (Sider, 2001, p. 1). Leaving aside the ordinary spatial parts of persisting objects, they also tend to have temporal parts in all the times in which they existed (Gallois 1998, p. 175). So, to put it in simple words, four-dimensionalism happens to be a view regarding the ontological status of objects that are non-present (Hudson 2001). As per the opinion of the Presentists, it is only the present objects that exist. In its simplistic interpretation, as per the Presentists, there exist no Dodos, though such birds existed in the past, there are no urban structures on the moon, though such structures may be erected in the future. In contrast, as per the four-dimensionalists, there exist both the past and future objects, and whiling asserting so the four-dimensionalists tend to put the past objects, ontologically in tandem with the present objects. As per the four dimensionalists, the non-present objects are the objects that happen to be spatially distant, that simply do not exist here, where the present is (Jackson 1998, p. 136). The three-dimensionalists tend to have a very simplistic approach towards existence that is not in consonance with the current scientific and psychological realities (Zimmerman 2004, p. 8). It will be utterly interesting to try to explain this assertion by taking an analogy. Let us imagine a Girl Josephine, who was born in the year 1972, who got admitted to a school in the year 1977 and graduated from a college in the year 1990. Now the three-dimensionalist approach regarding the existence of Josephine would be that she progressively moved through each of these phases of her life, totally whole and fully complete. Though Josephine was certainly different in each of these successive phases of her life, like she put on weight, she gained height, she got more learned, yet, it was one and the same Josephine, which exited in her entirety at each of these successive phases in her life. Hence, as per the three-dimensionalists, Josephine stands to be an ordinary three dimensional object, and a temporally non-extended persisting object. In other words, as per the three-dimensionalists, Josephine tends to endure as she lasted over time by being wholly present at each of the above mentioned successive phases in her life. Such an approach towards reality smacks of a harshly logical interpretation of existence, which leaves no scope for creative imagination and a possible scientific inquiry into the nature of existence through time (Hudson 2006). In contrast, the four-dimensionalist approach towards reality is more solid, replete with creative ingenuity and in tandem with the recent developments in physics and psychology (Hudson 2006). The four-dimensionalists tend to believe that persisting objects tend to perdure, or in other words, the persisting objects happen to last over time, without being wholly present at every successive phase of time in which they happened to exist (Inwagen 1993, p. 173). So, in case of Josephine, the opinion of four-dimensionalists will be that the little girl that was born in 1972, the girl child that went to school in 1977 and the teenager who graduated from college in 1990 happen to be the varied distant temporal parts of Josephine, if one considers Josephine to be a four-dimensional, extended whole. The four-dimensional argument sounds to be totally relevant that objects tend to be four dimensional in the sense that they do tend to have temporal parts. This idea sounds more plausible if one tends to analyze the nature of ‘change’. What is change? Change happens to be the properties ascribed to an object that prima facie appear to be inconsistent. A block of wood may be round, but at some other time the same block of wood may have been a square. Now the problem while grasping the nature of existence is that how can one ascribe two different shapes that are round and square to the very same block of wood? As per the three-dimensionalists, the round block of wood that exited in the past has ceased to exist in the present. At present what exists is a square block of wood, which defines the total and whole existence of that block of wood. Three-dimensionalists fail to grasp the simple premise that an object may have different properties at different points in time and hence the persisting objects tend to endure. In contrast, the four dimensionalists happen to solve the problem of existence through time and do resolve the problem of seeming inconsistency, by relativizing the inconsistent properties to times. For instance if the block of wood which was round is called R and the time at which it was round is called T1 and the block of wood when it was square is called S and the time when it was square is called T2, the three dimensionalists would not say that ‘S is R at T1’ to mean S is R at T1. Rather the four-dimensionalists will tend to explain it as ‘S at T1 is R’. No doubt the property ascriptions happen to be timeless. Still, it is more viable and logical to ascribe properties to objects-at-times, which could readily be interpreted as temporal parts of the four-dimensional objects. Yes it is possible to understand if someone says that a block of wood has different shapes at different points in time because the spatial parts of that block of wood had different shapes. Still, it sounds more realistic, whole and scientifically propitious to say that a block of wood had different shapes at different points in time because the temporal parts of that block of wood had different shapes. The four-dimensional approach towards existence and reality is more intuitive. Besides, it readily tends to solve the mystery associated with the process of change (Mumford 2004). The four-dimensional approach towards existence also helps grasp the puzzle associated with the coinciding objects (Mumford 2004). Hence, a bar of silver and a necklace that is made out of that silver are different objects because the silver bar has temporal parts that the silver necklace does not have. In a hardcore pragmatic context, the eventual viability and relevance of a philosophy could be interpreted by the extent to which that philosophy is applicable in practical disciplines such as science and mathematics. So it will be amicably interesting to establish the sagacity and relevance of four-dimensionalism by ascribing it and applying it to a practical mathematical problem. In that context it would be very wise to establish the relevance of four-dimensionalism by applying it to the set theory. Simply speaking, a set is an assortment of things having some commonality and a set is defined by its numbers. However, if one proceeds with the set problems in a three-dimensional context, it gives way to many problems because as per the three-dimensionalists, the individual objects cease to have temporal parts (Tolk 2009, p. 247). So if one could not ascribe temporal aspects to persisting objects, this gives way to instability in set problems because the set membership tends to change over time. Take for instance a house that was once painted red, but now which happens to be blue. So, at one time the set Red Houses included that house, while at other time it did not. In contrast, the advantage with four-dimensionalism when it is applied to mathematical problems is that it considers the states of individual objects to be the instances of a set; it leaves the membership of a set stable and unchanging (Tolk 2009, p. 247). Hence, when noticed from any point in the time, the state of the house stands to be Red. Thus 4-dimensionalism makes it more straightforward to solve the set problems. Four-dimensionalism also unravels the same degree of relevance and facility in varied other scientific and mathematical disciplines. Three-dimensionalism gives way to a very segregated and opportunistic explanation as to what it means to be an object that is not totally in consonance with the existing scientific knowledge. In contrast, by asserting that the persisting objects tend to perdure, the approach of four-dimensionalism towards defining the existence of persisting objects is very lucid, holistic and interconnected. It allows for a far pragmatic treatment of mathematical and scientific problems. Reference List Gallois, Andre 1998, Occasions of Identity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hudson, Hud 2001, A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Hudson, Hud 2006, The Metaphysics of Hyperspace, Clarendon, Oxford. Inwagen, Peter Van 1993, Metaphysics, Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Jackson, Frank 1998, Mind, Method, and Conditionals, Routledge, London. Mumford, Stephen 2004, Laws in Nature, Routledge, New York. Sider, Theodore 2001, Four-Dimensionalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Tolk, Andreas 2009, Complex Systems in Knowledge Based Environments, Springer, New York. Zimmerman, Dean W 2004, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Clarendon, England. Read More