The Notion of True Belief - Essay Example

? The focus of the following analysis is toward the aim and the goal of understanding that the belief in 'x' is necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the validity or justification/knowledge of x. Therefore, the claim that a justified true belief is both necessary and sufficient is false. Toward this end, the focus of this discussion will be directed toward understanding the notion of belief in connection with what the author of Epistemology by Robert Audi (2003) this book claims about the argument from ‘acquaintance’ argument, and in turn, the argument which maintains that perception is a form of knowledge, although indefensible as a form of valid knowledge. This paper will begin with a brief introduction to some of the crucial, but general aspects of the author’s position, and in turn, proceed to a more pointed discussion of the nature of the notion of belief, according to Audi. According to Audi, the notion of ‘belief’ can loosely be translated as opinion or belief, and it is a term which comes from the Ancient Greek. To claim, or to maintain that there is an ideal form of a belief, is to defend the belief in some sense. For Audi , he presents at the first level, the notion of a belief in terms of the connection with the notion of knowledge “through acquaintance” [Audi, 2003, p. 36], which is a notion which was developed by Russell. He argues that there is sufficient evidence, through the knowledge by acquaintance notion that a belief is justified as a form of knowledge if the object of the belief in question has some form of ‘propositional content’ or “inference from propositions about them” [Audi, 2003, p. 36]. That is, where there is a correspondence between the propositional content on the one hand, and on the other hand, the belief which there is supposed to be a relation with. For example, and in keeping with Russell’s notion of acquaintance, there is a difference between the propositional content of a sensible referent, and one which is connected with rationality or mathematics [Audi, 2003, p. 58]. That is, if I can say that I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, it follows that the propositional content of the belief in question refers to a sensible phenomena on the one hand, and the laws of probability or the nature of experience which would lead me to believe in such a proposition [Audi, 2003, p. 37]. However, those which are connected with acquaintance are a form of knowledge where the propositional content does not necessarily have a sensible referent involved. For example, the belief in the truth of a mathematical proposition. For example, it might be said that the proposition F(N){N +1 + 1 . . .}, is a proposition which has a potentially infinite chain of sequences of integers which will follow. This is an example of knowledge by acquaintance in the following regard: first, it is not a form of propositional content which has a truth which is guaranteed through experience, and second, it is obvious that nobody could experience this in the first place. However, there is the experience of acquaintance. That is, the familiarity with the mathematical reasoning involved with the proposition. That is, where the consequence which cannot necessarily be demonstrated through ‘sense’, can be demonstrated by the very rules of mathematics. As is noted by Audi, this has always been an important aspect for the consideration of theological or religious questions in the “medieval” context, which he describes in terms of the “analytic” dimensions of the concept of belief [Audi, 2003, p. 97]. As Audi points out in these pages, the notion of form which is connected to analytic truths are important in a number of senses which are germane to the notion of acquaintance. As a form of knowledge which is of rational truths, it is not the case that the truths are guaranteed by anything more than the rules which govern the given proposition, and it is important that they are known to be beyond sense experience, and hence, beyond the form of reductive thinking which empiricism has the mandate to pursue and defend against this form of thinking. For example, and as he notes later on in the analysis, these are notions or propositions which are justified on the ground of self evidence [Audi, 2003, p.99]. To this end, for example, he states that propositions such as some things change qualifies as such [Audi, 2003, p. 101]. While it is a proposition which is true, it is both so universal and also vague and vacuous to be anything more than an instance of a self evident truth. It is a proposition which is partially connected with experience and therefore acquaintance, but also a proposition with out a corresponding ‘referent’ in necessary terms as argues Audi. The above argument is important for the notion of the 'belief in x’ . It is important for a number of reasons which will now be explored. If one were to assert something which represented a proposition about an experience, which had no ‘external’ referent in necessary terms, it is possibly still a valid form of knowledge. Further, if we break down the barriers between the notion of ‘internal’ or subjective experience along side the opposite, namely, the notion of the ‘external’, or that which is connected with a sensible referent, then, it follows that by a form of acquaintance, it is possible to have some form of a belief which informs experience [Audi, 2003, p.238]. For example, and in keeping with the example above concerning the notion of the infinite, it is possible to have a concept that ‘god is the infinite’, but without necessarily having a referent. It can be justified on the grounds that it is a form of acquaintance as was outlined and defined above, and further, it can be defended in terms of the actual definition of the terms in question. It might be said that it is a form of experience which is in some senses rational, but one which is not known in empirical terms or terms which can be verified by experience. It is simply known through the acquaintance with the propositional content, and in this instance, the content concerns both the notion of ‘god’ on the one hand, and the predicate which is being raised in relation to ‘god’, which is the notion or the concept of the infinite. Which is a notion which can also be asserted in a perfectly acceptable mathematical proposition, and as such, it is sufficient that any given individual can say that they have a form of acquaintance with the content, according to [Audi, 2003, p. 37]. It might be argued in the above example that while one of the variables is known through acquaintance, that the other variable in the proposition in question is unknown through acquaintance. That is, the proposition which maintains that ‘god’ is coextensive with the principle of the ‘infinite’. While the notion of acquaintance can substantiate the predicate of ‘god’, it is the case that the subject in this proposition is not necessarily known. To this, it is argued that Locke’s notion of substance essentially suffices for the form of knowledge necessary [Audi, 2003, p. 20]. Locke argued that all predicates must be a predicate of something and not nothing. If it is impossible for there not to exist a subject for a predicate of a known existent, then, it follows that there is a substance underlying the known predicate but that this substance is not necessarily known and therefore, no significant formal belief in x', in terms of any substances was possible”. It is argued in this sense that it is sufficient that there is a substance, but the nature or definition of the actual substance is not known. It is known that there must be subject of the predicate in question, but the nature or definition of the substance of, for example, ‘god’, cannot actually be known. It is only known through an acquaintance with the predicates, but not known itself except to say that the subject exists in the propositional content because it is impossible for their not to be something underlying a known predicate. In closing, the author in question is critical. Having outlined the tenets of how belief can be conceded to be a form of knowledge through acquaintance, he also maintains that while it is conceivable to have experiences beyond rational explanation, it is also the case that such an experience, remains ambiguous or unclear [Audi, 2003, p.21]. That is, the author is reducing the belief to a form of subjective belief. That is, the belief in ‘x’, is sufficient for the existence in the belief in ‘x’ and is therefore a form of acquaintance, however, there are problems. While leaving the belief without any further definition except to say that the nature of the belief is that it is a form or rationality [Audi, 2003, p. 284], and therefore, a form of acquaintance, says nothing about the belief. Like Locke’s notion of substance, it is essentially undeniable. In this respect, it remains a part or portion of the belief system or acquaintance of another individual. It is not a form of the type of higher certainty of knowledge which is defined at the very outset of the essay by the author in question. And, it is in this regard that the argument concerning the belief in x can be maintained as essentially empty and problematic. In conclusion, this analysis has focused on Robert Audi's 2003 work titled Epistemology. This paper has maintained that the framework for discussion the 'belief in x' is valid as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the validity of x. To this end, arguments from Locke's notion of substance and the notion of 'knowledge by acquaintance' have been presented in so far as they are important for understanding the difference between 'necessity' and something which is sufficient. Therefore, while evaluating the proposition that a belief in x is both necessary and sufficient, it has been argued that it is not. Rather, it is a necessary but not a sufficient to know x. Audi, Robert, 2003, Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge, Second Edition, Routledge, London. Read More