Abortion of Fetus with Down Syndrome - Essay Example

? Abortion of Fetus with Down syndrome Introduction Abortion has become an issue to heated debate in the public forum. The proponents of Abortion claim that it is vital in order to save the life of a mother or to justify the nature of the mother of not wanting the potential baby. On the other hand, opponents of Abortion claim that this act is equivalent to killing of a human being an assertion, which the proponents claim is not justifiable. One of the major justifications of the proponents of the act rests in the case of a fetus with a health condition. For instance, these proponents have argued that for a fetus with Down syndrome, it is permissible to carry out abortion. Down syndrome (DS) is a health condition in which superfluous genetic material leads to delays in the mental and physical development. Thesis Statement This paper holds that it is morally permissible to abort a fetus with Down syndrome due to various reasons. Apparently, aborting this fetus will save it future pain and suffering once born. In addition, the fetus lacks capacity for making its own decision and does not have the capacity to desire for the continuation of its existence. Moreover, the fetus lacks more developed person-like features and it lacks fully developed rights to life (Warren, 2004). Moral issues surrounding abortion The issue of terminal conditions and abortion accrues from the idea of active euthanasia. Marquis (1989) indicates that the overall issue of killing a person who is terminally ill to save him or her from pain is sometimes not justifiable. This accrues from the premise that death is more painful that all other forms of physical pain. On the other hand, he claims that it is not generally wrong to kill the person who would die anyway. Under this premise, it is then not morally wrong to abort or terminate a fetus suffering from a terminal condition such as Down syndrome. This raises the proposition that aborting might be illegal but considering the moral responsibility concerning terminal conditions, it becomes morally justifiable. Warren (2004) adds that some babies are born with chronic and severe conditions that cause them great pain in their infancy through to their adulthood. In addition, such children lead a life that is predictably short and depressed. He adds that the parents of these children undergoes through hard financial strains while trying to provide adequate treatment to them. It is under this notion that it becomes morally permissible to abort a fetus that will probably bring about these problems once born. This premise asserts that it is not morally wrong to terminate a life that would otherwise go through pain and bring strain. He adds that there is a difference between terminally ill adult individuals and a fetus with a severe condition. This is in the sense that the adult individual can make a decision for himself or herself while the fetus does tot have the capacity to make its own decision. This therefore supports the claim that it is vital to make the decision on behalf of the fetus, thus becoming morally acceptable to abort it. On the other hand, Marquis (1989) indicates that some opponents of this issue would claim that it is not right to kill a terminally ill person due to his or her future value. Under this premise, the opponents would argue that this should be the same in the case of a fetus with Down syndrome. However, this assertion fails in the sense that a fetus is not fully ripe to realize its value in the future. Though there might be some innate value in the baby, there is no justification that it would add value in the future. This premise rests entirely in the public opinion but not in the reality of the issue. Another strong view in proposing the issue of aborting a 16 week- fetus with Down syndrome rests in the incompleteness of the person-like feature of the fetus. It is very evident that even though opponents of abortion argue that the fetus is a human being, it lacks unquestionable features to make it person-like. For instance, Warren (2004) indicates, “the fetus is not entirely cognizant, in the manner that an infant of a few months is, and that it cannot reason, or communicate messages of indefinitely many sorts.” Moreover, she asserts that the fetus does not engage in self-inspired action, and has no self-consciousness. Due to this, the fetus is not entirely person-like, hence cannot enjoy the same rights as those of an adult human being. This asserts that it becomes morally permissible to abort a fetus with any condition simply because it does not have the rights as a human being. However, Feinberg (1973) argues that an extremely grown fetus is a great deal closer to being a comrnonsense human with all the developed attributes that qualify it for moral personhood than is the mere zygote. He continues to assert that the developed fetus is nearer to being a human than is the zygote, just as a dog is closer to human hood than a jellyfish. Under this assertion, he argues that since a developed fetus is close to being a person, then terminating its life is the same as terminating the life of a person. Moreover, this premise deems that it would be morally wrong to abort a 16-week fetus even though it has any terminal condition. However, this premise lacks a concrete justification that the developed fetus is more person-like since it does not have a conscious mind. Warren (2004) presents another proposition in support of the abortion of a fetus. She claim that just as the human develops biologically, the rights of a human also develops continually. This means that an embryo and a fetus do not have fully developed rights of living as an adult person has. However, Feinberg (1973) counteracts this premise by stating that at any stage in the development of a fetus, any justification the mother might have for aborting will comprise a claim. However, when the fetus matures, its claims develop further requiring ever-stronger claims to supersede them. In this regard, he asserts that when a fetus is three months and above, it has stronger claims to be alive. In that case, the fetus, even that has a Down syndrome has a valid claim to life; hence, it becomes morally wrong to terminate its life. This claim however, fails in the sense that the fetus is not able to raise its claim. It is clear that any individual holding a claim must support it. In this sense, since the fetus cannot support its claim, it therefore fails to justify the moral non-permissiveness of terminating its life. Another comparable premise to reject the anti-abortion claims rests on the assertion that an entity cannot have the right to life unless it has the ability to long for its continued existence. In this regard, because fetuses do not have the conceptual capability to desire to continue to live, they lack the right to life. Individuals have a right to what they yearn for but the lack of the capability to long for something weakens the foundation of one’s right to it (Marquis, 1989). However, Feinberg (1973) argues that even if the fetus lacks the right to life, it is morally wrong to terminate its life based on its potential personhood. He claims that the fetus has an innate potential to become a human being. It is in this premise that it would not be morally permissible to abort a fetus even if it has Down syndrome. This premise would also argue that even grown-up adults have terminal conditions and that it would not be right to terminate their lives. In this regard, killing a fetus could be wrong in certain conditions, although it infringed no rights of the fetus, albeit the fetus was not a moral person, or the act was in no sense a murder. To counteract this premise however, the even if the fetus has the potential of personhood, it can possibly not exploit this potential once it has a terminal condition. Conclusion Apparently, although abortion should not be generally encouraged, certain premises could hold strong claims as to justify it. In this sense, when for instance a fetus has a serious condition like Down syndrome, it becomes morally permissible to abort the fetus. This is because the fetus may have minimal chances of living once it is born. Most importantly, the fetus is not more person-like. Moreover, the fetus cannot claim its right to life since it lacks the capacity to desire its continued existence. It is therefore becomes morally permissible to abort a fetus with Down syndrome. References Feinberg, J. (1973). Potentiality, Development, and Rights. Retrieved from http://www.people.umass.edu/cox/feinberg.pdf Marquis, D. (1989). Why Abortion is Immoral. The Journal of Philosophy, 86, 4, 183-202. Warren, M.A. (2004). On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion. Retrieved from http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/warren_article.html Read More