Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense - Essay Example

number Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense The free will defense is like an effort to show that “there may be a different kind of good that God cannot bring without permitting evil” (Plantinga, p, 29). There are good states of affairs without evil, they do not entail the existence of any evil, but God cannot bring them without permitting evil. Platinga demonstrates how theistic belief, about God being omnipotent and wholly good, is logically consistent. Permitting evil means creating a world with moral good, as well as, moral evil. This is an argument that answers the questions raised by different philosophers, or defends itself against some philosophers, with contradictory ideas about the existence of evil and the role of God. In the logical problem of evil, it is indicated that there are different possibilities to the existence of evil. Some of these mentioned are that God: can eliminate evil but he is adamant, wants to eliminate evil but is incapable of eliminating it, does not wish to eliminate evil and cannot eliminate evil, and wants to eliminate evil and can eliminate evil (Zagzebski, p. 146). Platinga gives an argument that creatures are given free will to do moral good and evil, and God had a valid reason for it. This paper is an explanation of Platinga’s argument of ‘free will’. In Platinga’s Free Will Defense, he has made certain definitions and distinctions. Being free is defined with respect to an action. Being free with respect to a certain action means that the individual has the free will to refrain from performing it or to perform it. There are no causal laws or antecedent conditions that predetermine the person’s choice of action. Free will means the person has the power to decide to act or not to act. A second definition or distinction is about the action. An action is morally significant if it is right to perform the action and wrong to refrain from it or vice versa. Significantly free means a person is free with respect to a morally significant action. There is also a distinction between naturally evil and morally evil. Moral evil is that which results from free human activity while natural evil is any other kind of evil (Plantinga, p, 30). Based on these distinctions and definitions, Platinga notes that a world is more valuable when it contains creatures with significant freedom than when it has creatures with no freedom at all. In their freedom, the creatures should be able to perform more good than evil actions. Platinga argues that there is no freedom if people are created with the freedom, but their actions are predetermined by God. According to him, God has the capability of creating creatures that are significantly free, but has chosen to give them the freedom to act on their own always. God cannot cause or determine the creatures to do only what is right. Freedom according to Platinga means being given a choice. A choice has to exist between two or more variables. In this case, the variables are good and evil, or moral good and moral evil. If God creates creatures with free will, but determines what their actions will be, there is no freedom at all. Free will creatures are given the will to choose from moral evil and moral good, and to act according to what they think is right or wrong. His argument, therefore, is that God cannot create creatures capable of moral good without giving the same creatures the capability of moral evil if they are to have free will. In exercising their freedom, some of God’s creatures went wrong in exercising their freedom. This does not mean that God is not omnipotent and not good. It means that he has given the free will with no determinations of what actions the creatures should engage in (Plantinga, p, 30). Free will defenders believe that or find propositions that are consistent with; God is omnipotent, God is omniscient, and is wholly good. They also believe that alongside the existence of these characteristics of God, there is still evil. God has very good reasons for creating both moral good and moral evil (Plantinga, p, 30). Objections to the Free Will Defense and Platinga’s Arguments to the Objections Mackie is one of the atheologists with objections to Platinga’s arguments. According to Mackie, traditional beliefs are positively irrational. The essential theological doctrine has several parts that are inconsistent with one another. To show the contradiction, there are additional quasi logical rules connecting the terms ‘evil’, ‘good’, and ‘omnipotent’ that have to be used (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 353). These additional principles are that: there are no confines to what an omnipotent being can do, and that good is opposed to evil and so good will always eliminates evil as far as it can. Based on these principles, it is only logical to Mackie, to conclude that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely. It is, therefore, contradictory to claim that a good omnipotent thing exists, and evil also exists. According to him, the existence of evil undermines the omnipotent and good nature of God. This is against Platinga’s argument that God’s is omnipotent, is omniscient, and is wholly good irrespective of the existence of evil. There is a reason for the existence of evil and this should explain why evil exists alongside the omnipotent God. According to Platinga, the omnipotent God is indeed powerful and almighty. He is a God who has no limit to what an omnipotent being can do, but the limits are restricted to logical limits only. There is no omnipotent being that can pass non logical limits to make things happen. Being omnipotent does not mean that the being can make anything possible including the illogical ones. Mackie implies that, because God is omnipotent, evil should not exist. Platinga acknowledges that there are those theists, such as Martin Luther and Descartes, probably, who believe that God’s power is unlimited even when the laws of logic are considered. These people are undisturbed by the claim that theists contradict themselves when they believe that God is wholly good and is Omnipotent, yet there still exists evil. This is because they believe that God can do even what is logically impossible. For good reason, Platinga also considers this belief, God being omnipotent to the extent of being capable of doing even the non logical things, incoherent. God’s omnipotence does not mean there are no limits to his powers, but that there are no unreasonable limits to his powers. It could therefore be reasonable to assume that Mackie’s claim, that “there are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do”, is necessarily true (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 353). Another one of Mackie’s propositions is that every good thing eliminates evil state of affairs that it can eliminate. This is not necessarily true. There are good people who are ignorant of evil that they can eliminate. A meaning obtained from Mackie’s argument is that a good thing has a specific property which it comes along with. This property is that it can eliminate every evil that it can. The point that Platinga tries to put across is that; what if the good can eliminate evil, but is not around to do so? Additionally, what if the good is not aware of the presence of the evil at the time? If Mackie might claim that because of lack of awareness of the good of the presence of evil, and the inability to eliminate the evil at the right time, means that there is no good in God or that God is not omnipotent. If he is to claim so, then he should change his claim to “every good thing always eliminates evil that it knows about and can eliminate” (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 354). Additionally, being good and omnipotent does not mean eliminating evil at the right time and in the right place. The meaning of being good is explained further. ‘Any good should be able to eliminate any evil that it can’. It means that if there is evil, there is a reason for it. This is because, according to Platinga, there can be two or more evils that a good can eliminate, but their time of occurrence does not allow an individual to eliminate the evil. This does not mean that one is not good. Eliminating evil that one has knowledge about is also not necessarily true. Mackie used quasi logical rules to explain the contradiction that exists among believers of God’s existence, alongside evil irrespective of his omnipotence and good. As explained above, these logical rules as claimed are not logical. Elimination of evil by good does not guarantee lack of existence of evil. A perfect example given by Platinga is that, a friend hurts a knee during mountain climbing. Being a physician and having been informed of the situation, a good being finds two options, to let the other leg heal and to amputate the other. The physician has knowledge of the evil, is at the right place of eliminating it, and can eliminate it, but by amputating the leg, another evil arises. Mackie’s claim even with the addition of a good being having knowledge of the evil is not right (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 254). It is, therefore, not always that “every good thing eliminates every evil it knows about and can eliminate” (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 254). Mackie does not understand that there are logical limits to God’s powers. Expecting an omnipotent being to go past logical rules to show the limits of his powers is not logical in itself. His claims about good have also been shown to be false. Some philosophers say that causal determinism and freedom are compatible. Platinga argues that if they are compatible, then God would have created creatures with predetermined will to do what is right only. The creatures could have been given the free will to do wrong, but the existence of causal determination would prevent them from ever performing any wrong actions. This is not considered free will. It does not make sense to give someone the free will to do wrong, and prevent the same person from doing wrong (Plantinga, p. 31-32). Another objection is that it is God’s failure to create a world of creatures with freedom of choice, but unable to chose good only. The objection claims that it is possible to do what is right always even if the free creatures have a choice to do wrong. The main issue raised by Mackie is that the limitation on God’s power not to be able to create the best possible world is contradictory to his being wholly good and omnipotent. Platinga argues against this by saying that there are no possible worlds that God would have created. He is an omnipotent God, for that reason, he can create any possible world he chooses. He chose this world, and there is no reason as to why Mackie should claim that there are other possible worlds. There could be a world with faultlessly righteous persons, persons who are considerably free, but always do what is morally right only. This does not mean there are such worlds. There could be possible worlds with no moral evil, but with moral good only. As Mackie states, such worlds are not there, and this is due to God’s incapability. The free will defense argues that, if God is omnipresent, it means such worlds do not exist. He is capable of any logical thing. The only limitations to his power are logical limitations. It means that there are no possible worlds God could have created. It is not logical according to the impotent being, to create a world with moral good and no moral evil, and claim to have given creatures free will, yet controlling them by making them perform good only (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 360-361). Two beliefs by Mackie and Leibniz are also objections to the free will defense. Leibniz argues that this world must be the actual and the best of all possible worlds. This is because, before God created anything, he was faced with a variety of choices. He could have chosen to bring into actuality any of the countless possible worlds that were available to him. Because he is perfectly good, he must have chosen the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz believes that this must be the best possible world, while Mackie believes that this is not the best possible world, and it is because of God’s incapability. A free will defender will not agree with both Leibniz and Mackie. A free will defender would even ask why, Leibniz and Mackie assume that there is the best of all possible worlds (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 361). Platinga also argues that God could not have actualized any world he pleased. A possible world is any possible state of affairs that is complete. It should be obvious that only one possible world is actual (p, 362). A possible world is maximal. There cannot be two possible worlds. If there were, they would have the same state of affairs, making them the same. There cannot be more than one possible world that is actual. Platinga assumes that people or creatures may exist in other possible worlds, but their optimal nature exists in the actual world. An optimal being would exist in an actual world and so if Mackie exists in this world; it means it is the actual world. If there is a different world in which Mackie can exist and be optimal compared to his existence in the current world, then he would not exist in the current world. He would be in the optimal world which would be the actual one. Platinga argues that people and other things, only exist in actual worlds (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 363). God could not create the world he pleased because he created a world, but not the state of affairs. The state of affairs determines the state of the world. The state of affairs affect the kind of world that Mackie and Leibniz want it to be. The state of affairs, since the creatures in the world were given free will, should determine if the worlds should only contain moral rights with no moral evil. It is the creatures with the free will that make the world what it is. It is true God is omnipotent, but he could not have created the world he pleased. His powers are not limited, but he cannot go beyond logical grounds to create a world with no free will. God did not create the atheists’ beliefs or theists’ beliefs. He only performed certain actions, for example, creation of heaven and earth and all the things they contain (Zagzebski & Miller, p. 363). The free will gives people the choice of thinking about the existence of other worlds. Free will gives people their beliefs. Free will creates the worlds that the beings are in. One strong belief of the free will defender is that God is an omnipotent being, but even with his powers, “it was not within his powers to create a world containing moral good with no moral evil” (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 368). This is because there is something called trans-world depravity that limits God’s power to create such a world. According to Platinga, there is a possibility that everybody suffers from trans-world depravity. If this possibility is actual, God could not have been capable of creating a world with moral good only. By creating such a world, God would have created significantly free creatures, but with trans-world depravity. Trans-world depravity “makes a person go wrong with respect to at least one action in any world God could have actualized” (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 368). This happens even if they are created with the free will to do what is morally good only. Instead of creating a world in which people will suffer from trans-world depravity, God opted to create a world with creatures of free will. This proves the point of; there is nothing logical that God is not capable of. The price of creating a world with moral good only is too high compared to creating that with moral good and moral evil, but giving the creatures the free will (Zagzebski & Miller, p, 368). Works Cited Plantinga, Alvin. Mill and Marx: Individual Liberty and the Roads to Freedom. Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1974. Print. Readings in Philosophy of Religion: Ancient to Contemporary. Ed. Zagzebski, Linda and Miller, Timothy D. MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2009. Print. Zagzebski, Linda. The Philosophy of Religion: An Historical Introduction. MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2007. Print. Read More